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ABSTRACT
Microfinance celebrates 40 years of existence with an ever wider popularity in the com-
munity of development practitioners. It is one of the cornerstones of the newly de-
signed Sustainable Development Goals. But popularity does not mean success. To this
day, the actual empirical evidence on the welfare impacts of microfinance programs
are mixed. Using panel data from Bangladesh, this thesis seeks to address three major
gaps in the literature.
Impact evaluation studies typically focus on mean population outcomes. Chapter 2
makes use of quantile regression techniques in order to investigate potential distribu-
tional impacts of microfinance programs. There is compelling evidence that if micro-
finance benefits borrowers, the impacts are not the same for everyone. Such impact
heterogeneity can have important welfare consequences.
Chapter 3 investigates whether spillover effects from microfinance programs exist,
which could benefit the community as a whole on top of direct beneficiaries. After
providing a new set of direct impact estimates that corroborate previous findings, esti-
mations suggest there are potentially consumption gains to non-borrowers who live in
villages where microfinance is accessible. A linear social interactions model succeeds
in characterising spillover effects on consumption and on boys schooling as stemming
from peer endogenous effects.
Chapter 4 looks into the benefits of microfinance in helping the poor deal with vulner-
ability, another dimension of welfare that relates to the ability to insure against risks.
A measure of vulnerability as expected poverty is constructed from cross-sections of
data directly. After seven years went by between the surveys borrowers, who were by
far worse off than non-borrowers in their ability to face idiosyncratic shocks, do at least
as well as non-borrowers. Empirical evidence suggests that households who borrowed
are less likely to be considered as vulnerable.
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Introduction
Microfinance practices have received a growing interest in the program evaluation liter-
ature over the past twenty years. Indeed, this is legitimate as the provision of financial
services to the poorest has become broadly adopted by development practitioners and
is partaking at the very heart of the worldwide fight against poverty. The numbers
provided by the State of Microcredit Summit Campaign Report witness the ‘success’
of microfinance: in 2010 more than 3,600 MFIs reported to have reached around 205
millions of people, amongst whom 137.5 million were living on less than $1.25 per day
(the definition of extreme poverty). These numbers have dropped significantly in 2011
to 195 millions of clients served by MFIs, of whom 125 million extremely poor people,
but the decrease is mostly driven by a worsening of outreach in India following the
late 2010 financial regulation in the state of Andhra Pradesh; for instance, outreach
improved in Sub-Saharan Africa between 2010 and 2011. Assuming that five persons
live in one household on average, microfinance has potentially had an impact on 687.5
(621) million of extremely poor people in 2010 (2011), i.e. about half the estimated
world population living in extreme conditions. The fact that such claimed outreach
paralleled the achievement in 2010 of the first objective of the previous MDGs to
halve poverty in the world in twenty years must make one wonder whether a causal
link exists.
Notwithstanding the economic effects that are expected from microfinance interven-
tions, their social impacts are also of prime interest when leading a thorough impact
assessment; however hard or impossible to measure precisely, proxies and qualitative
indicators can be used to assess the magnitude and significance of the latter. The over-
arching aim of the thesis is to show that there are numerous things to learn by investi-
gating the impacts of microfinance programs above and beyond simple average effects
on borrowers.
The same dataset is used throughout the thesis, and therefore Chapter 1 is dedicated to
its description. We build our estimation dataset from raw household survey data that
were collected in rural villages of Bangladesh in 1991-92 and in 1998-99. We detail
the sampling procedure and discuss study design issues that can create potential sta-
tistical problems. More precisely, non-random program placement and self-selection
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provide ground for endogeneity issues between variables measuring the intensity of
microcredit uptake and household characteristics or environmental features. Fortu-
nately, the two waves of data embed a large panel of households who were successfully
interviewed at two points in time, and the empirical analysis in every chapter draws
heavily on this advantage.
Although descriptive in nature, Chapter 1 helps motivate the empirical strategy fol-
lowed in Chapter 2 by examining the distribution of our most important outcome
variables of interest: measures of household per capita expenditure (total, food and
non-food). We compare the distribution of consumption data for various sub-samples:
between borrowers and non-borrowers, and across time periods. In all cases, consump-
tion data exhibit leptokurtic distributions with very long right tails. We observe sub-
stantial discrepancies in both location and shape of the distribution of expenditure
between sub-groups of households and over time, suggesting that average impacts are
probably missing something.
Thus motivated, Chapter 2 seeks to investigate whether microfinance programs have
heterogeneous impacts for different categories of borrowers. Instead of doing so by
comparing average impacts for sub-samples of households, as has been sometimes pro-
posed in the literature, we decide to use quantile regression techniques to recover the
marginal impact imputable to microfinance loans at different points of the conditional
distribution of household expenditure.
Implementing such econometric techniques in the context of panel data with only two
time periods and many panels is a real challenge, and our final specification consists of
quantile regressions on pooled data with household correlated random effects, in order
to mitigate as much as possible any possible correlation between the errors and the
regressor of interest, i.e. microcredit. We find that although all categories experience
consumption gains, the latter are much larger for relatively high-consumers (i.e. at top
quantiles of the conditional distribution). We determine that this heterogeneity stems
from impacts on non-food expenditure, and we discuss the possible implications in
terms of social welfare.
Our interpretation of the main findings of Chapter 2 rely on the premise that everyone
is affected by what others do. In that spirit, Chapter 3 explores the question of the
potential spillover effects from microfinance programs, building on the idea that the
context in which microfinance institutions operate should see such programs generate
broader effects than just those expected on the borrowing population. After establish-
ing the existence of important indirect consumption effects form microfinance, we fol-
low the literature on linear social interactions model to examine whether whether such
effects on the non-borrowing population could come from social interactions with the
population targeted by the program. We also consider children education as a relevant
outcome for the study of spillover effects, but evidence of direct and indirect impacts
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on boys and girls schooling is very scarce.
The last chapter of the thesis concerns itself with the potential for microfinance to
work as a risk mitigation device. Indeed, anecdotal evidence from the surveys reveal
that households in the sample under scrutiny are vulnerable to frequent adverse shocks
with potentially drastic welfare consequences. We build a measure of household vul-
nerability as the expected probability of falling into poverty at a given time horizon,
and use it as a dependent variable in a panel data analysis to infer on the impact of
microfinance on this alternative measure of welfare. Our findings are unequivocal and
show that household are less vulnerable when they have access to microfinance loans.

Chapter 1
Data Architecture
1 Introduction
In the introduction, we have reviewed the importance of microfinance in poverty alle-
viation. Indeed, the microfinance initiatives in developing countries started with the
aim to provide the most destitute people with access to credit, following in the steps of
pioneer Dr. Muhammad Yunus. Over the past three decades since the inception of the
Grameen Bank, the microfinance industry has evolved and now more broadly refers to
the provision of financial services to the poor, including credit, savings and insurance
products by intermediaries such as NGOs, associations, government-sponsored finan-
cial institutions and private banks. As these practices flourished all over the develop-
ing world, becoming an important tool for economic and social development policies,
precise and decisive evaluations of their impact have become more crucial.
With an aim to facilitate estimation of our empirical models in the ensuing chapters, it
is necessary to understand the characteristics of the data. An important step in this en-
deavour is to explain the study design and how villages and households were selected
before the surveys. Investigators in charge of the project sought to evaluate the impacts
of microcredit thanks to planning data collection in a quasi-experimental framework.
However, census data and household information from the surveys suggest that the in-
tended quasi-experiment might not be powerful enough to enable clear identification
of relevant program impacts, hence inviting the need for an alternative approach.
Along with presenting summary statistics of all variables used in regressions in the
next chapters, the focal point of this chapter is to explore the distributional features
of our main outcome variables of interest (i.e. household per capita expenditure as
a proxy for household welfare). Consequently, the fact that the distribution of con-
sumption in our sample is far from normal – with a long right tail – and displays dis-
crepancies in location and shape between sub-groups of households (borrowers and
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non-borrowers) and over time, lays the foundations of our advocacy for the use of
quantile regressions as useful tools to estimate potentially heterogeneous impacts of
microfinance programs1.
We plan this chapter as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the study design and focus
on some characteristics of the data collection process. Section 3 and its various sub-
sections focus on uncovering different distributional patterns amongst borrowing and
non-borrowing households in terms of per capita expenditure, the main dependent
variable of interest in Chapter 2 of the thesis. Finally, Section 4 briefly describes other
variables used in regressions in the next chapters, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Study design
2.1 Data collection
The dataset consists of a survey of 1,798 households sampled from 87 villages in rural
Bangladesh (about 20 households in each village) that were selected across 29 sub-
districts (or thanas). Three villages were randomly chosen in each thana, while sub-
districts had been sampled according to the presence of one of three leading microfi-
nance programs at the time of survey, namely the Grameen Bank, the Bangladesh Rural
Development Bank (BRDB) Rural Development-12 program (RD-12) and BRAC, result-
ing in three groups of eight thanas each exposed to a different microfinance initiative;
five thanas were also selected where no microfinance programs existed, providing 15
control villages.
The first wave of data was collected during the years 1991 and 1992 through three
rounds of survey corresponding to the three main rice seasons of the year ; 1,769 house-
holds of the original sample were successfully interviewed the three times.
A second wave of data was collected in 1998-99. This time, only one survey was ad-
ministered in an effort to interview the same households as in 1991-92 as well as new
households sampled from the same villages, new villages from the original thanas as
well as three newly selected thanas, for a total of 2,599 households. There were 1,638
households from the first wave successfully re-interviewed in 1998-99, and 237 of these
had split into 546 households for a total of 1,947 observations in 1998-99 for originally
sampled households.
Finally, a third wave of data collection took place in 2010-11, in an effort to re-survey
the same households as in 1998-99, but attrition and household split-offs resulted in
3,082 households being interviewed between March and September 2010-11. As of
1 This is the topic of Chapter 2.
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today, and to the best of our knowledge, this dataset remains one of the largest ever
collected for the specific purpose of studying microfinance phenomena, and certainly
spans the longest time period if we consider the three waves of data collection (20
years). The collected data contains a rich set of variables, including socio-economic
aspects, credit history of the households and qualitative information. Raw data for
the two first waves of survey (1991-92 and 1998-99) are available freely on the World
Bank’s website. However, the third wave of data still remains inaccessible to the public
so far.
Our empirical strategy, which we describe in details in following chapters, seeks to
exploit the “time” feature of the data and therefore makes use of a balanced panel
structure, i.e. we keep in the sample only those 1,638 households that were successfully
interviewed across all waves of data collection. We merge the 1998-99 data for those
households that had split since 1991-92, and combine data across the three first rounds
of interviews in order to have 2 observations per household: one in 1991-92, and one
in 1998-99. Therefore, discussions on sampling and descriptive statistics consider this
balanced sample only, unless indicated otherwise.
2.2 Sampling, program eligibility and microcredit uptake
2.2.1 Sampling
As explained above, households were randomly sampled within villages according to
their eligibility status to the microfinance initiatives under scrutiny in 1991-92, i.e.
Grameen Bank, BRAC and BRDB RD-12. Around 20 households were sampled from
each village, and eligible households were oversampled compared to ineligible house-
holds (around 85% of households sampled in each village are program-eligible), as is
customary in impact evaluation studies that seek to maximize the statistical power of
program effects estimates for a lower cost. Weights to be used in the analysis are de-
rived from this sampling procedure. They are not readily available on the World Bank’s
website with the rest of the raw data, but can fortunately be found on David Roodman’s
webpage at the Center for Global Development as a consequence of his numerous ex-
changes with Mark Pitt, when the author and his collaborator Jonathan Morduch were
trying to replicate and criticise the seminal paper by Pitt and Khandker (1998)2. Inter-
estingly, along with the household sampling weights are data about the initial census in
the selected villages: the total number of ineligible and eligible households within each
village – the latter subsample split in two groups of participants and non-participants
2 This famous and most insightful replication and critic of Pitt and Khandker (1998) was published
in Roodman and Morduch (2014). A preliminary version (Roodman & Morduch, 2009) also included a
replication and critical review of the results in Khandker (2005), a study that uses a panel dataset similar
to ours.
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to microfinance in any of the programs considered at the time of survey – and the
number of households finally sampled within each sub-group.
The final sample used in this thesis counts close to 19 households per village on aver-
age, with a minimum (maximum) of 13 (23) observations, for a total of 1,638 house-
holds. According to the initial sampling information, as of 1991-92 our dataset counts
824 eligible households who borrowed through microfinance programs (treated target
households), 567 eligible households who did not participate to microcredit initiatives
(non-treated target households), and 247 households not eligible to microcredit borrow-
ing (non-target households). However, according to individual-level loan data, only
55.8% of those eligible households did borrow from either Grameen Bank, BRDB or
BRAC, i.e. the subsample of participating target households is actually made of 761
households instead of 824 as stated by census data. Another 19 eligible households
took up microcredit loans from other NGOs, as was also the case for one ineligible
household.
Such census data are not available in 1998-993, and we must rely on individual-level
information. By the late 1990s, every village in the sample had access to microfinance
(including those initially sampled as control villages), be it through the MFIs initially
considered or other initiatives. Therefore, 1998-99 data considers eligibility to any
microcredit program instead of focusing on Grameen Bank, BRAC and BRDB only.
The sample then consists of 839 eligible households participating to any microfinance
initiative, 612 eligible non-participating households and 187 ineligible households, one
of whom borrowed from a MFI.
Because of the aforementioned change in the definition of program eligibility between
the two waves of interviews, we follow the 1998-99 definition and thus include micro-
credit from any source (Grameen Bank, BRAC, BRDB or any other MFI) in the credit
variables used in the analysis.
2.2.2 Eligibility and participation
This sub-section explains how households were classified as program-eligible, which is
relevant to the choice of an empirical strategy, as will be explained further. According
to Pitt and Khandker (1998), at the time the study was designed the three MFIs under
scrutiny followed a similar rule which deemed a household eligible to borrowing if
their landholdings were no greater than half an acre (50 decimals). The study was
planned so that this cut-off point be used as a source of identification in dealing with
endogeneity issues. To make it viable for use in an instrumental variable approach, this
landholdings-based eligibility rule should be consistent across household-level data
3 As a consequence, the same sampling weights are used for both waves of data.
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and the available census data on which sampling was designed. However, a closer look
at the data shows that this rule was not strictly followed.
Table 1.1 Sample composition in 1991-92, for various definitions of eligibility
Census data Loan data Land before Land after Arable land
Eligible borrowers 824 761 586 566 597
Eligible non-borrowers 567 630 589 587 625
Ineligible non-borrowers 247 247 288 290 252
Ineligible borrowers 0 0 175 195 164
Table 1.1 presents the sample composition in 1991-92 based on various definitions of
eligibility to microfinance programs. According to census data, no microfinance loans
were issued to households classified as ineligible, while 824 households out of 1,391 el-
igible ones did borrow. In the questionnaire module on credit history, households were
asked to provide information on past loans and also to report their eligibility status.
Based on said loan data, the eligible and ineligible populations are the same as with
census data (none of the 247 ineligible households were issued microcredit), although
there are discrepancies between self-reported credit history and participation as de-
scribed in census data4. Indeed, the latter claim the sample includes 824 borrowing
eligible households while loan data report only 761. The available information does
not allow us to explain this difference, shedding doubts on the criteria that were used
for the classification of households and hence for sampling.
Furthermore, we want to check the consistency in eligibility and participation sta-
tus between census data and household survey data. It is not made clear in Pitt and
Khandker (1998) whether total landholdings are considered to determine eligibility, or
whether only arable land with productive potential (and higher value than, e.g., non-
arable land) should be scrutinized. We consider three measures of landholdings. In
1991-92, households were asked to report landholdings before and after having had ac-
cess to microcredit. Also, another module of the questionnaire was used to collect data
on arable land5.
The numbers in Table 1.1 show that landholdings data point to a substantial amount of
“mistargeting” in the allocation of microcredit. For instance, landholdings reported as
before the inception of microcredit programs lead to classifying 1,175 households as el-
igible (against 1,391 according to census data), amongst whom 586 borrowed, and 463
as ineligible with 175 borrowers, i.e. about 23% of borrowing households are not eli-
gible. The fraction of mistargeted households is 25.6% when considering landholdings
4 We consider borrowing from Grameen Bank, BRAC and BRDB only for the sake of comparability
with census data that focused on these three MFIs only.
5 We construct this variable for the first of the three rounds of interviews in 1991-92 only, as data for
later rounds appeared to be incomplete and inconsistent.
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after microfinance programs were made available, and 21.5% when looking at arable
land. At any rate, whichever measure of landholdings is used, more than one in five
borrowing households was mistargeted. This empirical statement further sheds a veil
of shadows on the “actual” eligibility rule followed by loan officers when issuing credit,
and on the source of information used to compile the census data that later influenced
sampling.
Table 1.2 Sample composition in 1998-99, for various definitions of eligibility
Loan data Land before Land after
Eligible borrowers 643 583 455
Eligible non-borrowers 808 895 612
Ineligible non-borrowers 187 100 383
Ineligible borrowers 0 60 188
Table 1.2 presents similar numbers for 1998-99, although the definitions change. Cen-
sus data are not available and the eligibility status of the household is recovered from
survey data on credit history. Also, questionnaire modules about landholdings were
different in the late 1990s: “land before” corresponds to acquisitions of land before
1992 (not before access to microcredit as in 1991-92 questionnaires), and “land after”
embeds total landholdings. Ownership of arable land cannot be computed for 1998-99
data in a reliable fashion as for 1991-92. Finally, program eligibility and participation
relate to any MFI, as opposed to only three target initiatives in 1991-92.
Again, a substantial amount of mistargeting is unraveled when using landholdings
data to assess whether a household is eligible to microcredit. Individual-level loan data
show that 1,451 households were eligible to borrowing in 1998-99, amongst whom 643
did borrow, leaving 187 ineligible and non-borrowing households. Information on ac-
quisitions of land before 1992 imply that 1,478 households are eligible, with 583 bor-
rowers, while we find 60 mistargeted borrowing households amongst ineligible ones
(160 in total). Based on total landholdings, only 1,067 households would be classified
as eligible, and close to 30% of borrowing households would be considered ineligible.
Altogether, findings from Tables 1.1 and 1.2 show that information available from the
survey does not allow researchers to replicate the eligibility rule – allegedly based on
landholdings – used by MFIs as reported in census data. Maybe landholdings are only
one of the factors that enter the decision to classify a household as eligible to receiving
microcredit, in which case part of the decision process remains opaque, hence jeopar-
dizing an identification strategy that relies on landholdings as an instrumental variable
for eligibility – as in Pitt and Khandker (1998).
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3 Descriptive statistics of outcome and treatment variables
A large part of our empirical investigations – in Chapter 2 and part of Chapter 3 – puts
focus on household annual per capita expenditure as the outcome variable of interest,
given its broadly recognized quality as a good proxy for household welfare in develop-
ing countries. We also break it down into food and non-food expenditures to explore
whether the nature of the expense matters when households adjust their behaviour
after receiving microcredit.
Our so-called “treatment” variable is the intensity of exposure to microcredit measured
as the sum of all microfinance loans taken up over the previous six years. More accu-
rately, cumulative borrowings for 1991-92 do include a few instances of loans more
than six years old6, and 1998-99 variables include all new loans taken up since the pre-
vious round of data collection in late 1992. The “treatment” variable in our regressions
is either the total cumulative borrowings of a household or cumulative borrowings
differentiated by gender (both appearing in the regression) to assess the existence of
different impacts of microcredit following that loans are given out to men or women.
3.1 Means and dispersions of consumption and credit variables
Table 1.3 presents weighted summary statistics for our outcome variables of interest,
namely household per capita total, food and non-food expenditures (the former being
the sum of the two latter), along with weighted means and standard deviations for our
measures of the intensity of exposure to microcredit programs corresponding to cumu-
lative borrowings over the previous six years. Summary statistics are presented for the
balanced panel dataset which is our final estimation sample, with 1,638 observations
(households) for each time period. We count that 781 households borrowed at least
once from microfinance programs in the first time period up to December 1992, and
840 households borrowed between then and the last round of data collection in late
1998/early 1999. Our sample includes 611 households eligible to group lending and
246 ineligible ones who did not borrow in 1991-92; these numbers are 612 and 186 for
1998-99, respectively.
Average female borrowings more than doubled between the early and late 1990s (from
around Tk 6,700 to above Tk 15,000), and they are substantially greater than average
male borrowings in both time periods (the latter decreased over time). This is hardly
surprising given that microfinance programs have historically targeted women in pri-
ority, and that successful first loans typically open the right to borrow again, with sub-
sequent loans that usually are of larger amounts. Table 1.3 shows that household per
6 Out of 3,095 loans reported in 1991-92 across the three rounds of data collection, 122 were taken up
before December 1986, i.e. more than six years before the last round of data collection.
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capita total expenditure is on average greater for those households that are not eligible
to group lending and do not borrow (Tk 5,664 per year in 1991-92 and Tk 6,989 per
year in 1998-99) than for other categories of households for both time periods.
A similar pattern is observed for food and non-food expenditures. These summary
statistics seem to confirm the idea that non-eligible households are on average bet-
ter off than eligible households, in line with the idea that microfinance programs are
supposed to serve the poorest of the poor. It also appears that households benefitting
from microcredit loans achieve slightly higher levels of total per capita expenditure
than eligible households who do not borrow (Tk 4,028 per year versus Tk 3,864 per
year in 1991-92) although the spread decreases over time (Tk 5,040 per year versus Tk
4,971 per year in 1998-99). Similar observations arise when turning to food and non-
food expenditures, with the exception of food expenditure in 1998-99 that sees eligible
non-borrowing households achieve a slightly higher level on average than borrowing
households (Tk 3,256 per year versus Tk 3,224 per year).
Table 1.3 Summary statistics of household credit and expenditure variables
1991-92 1998-99
Borrowers
Non-borrowers
Full sample Borrowers
Non-borrowers
Full sample
Eligible Non-eligible Eligible Non-eligible
HH total microcredit
cumulative borrowings
10,295.2 2,515.3 17,985.7 7,408.6
(9,741.1) (6,538.2) (19,508.5) (15,332.5)
Female microcredit
cumulative borrowings
6,717.5 1,641.2 15,196.2 6,259.6
(8,726.8) (5,189.4) (19,242.0) (14,436.1)
Male microcredit
cumulative borrowings
3,577.7 874.1 2,789.4 1,149.0
(7,490.6) (4,008.0) (8,937.5) (5,896.7)
HH per capita total
expenditure, annual
4,028.0 3,864.0 5,664.2 4,513.7 5,039.9 4,971.0 6,989.2 5,373.0
(1,645.7) (1,683.6) (3,553.9) (2,605.2) (3,324.2) (3,599.6) (5,387.5) (3,963.2)
HH per capita food
expenditure, annual
3,082.4 3,039.5 3,646.5 3,255.6 3,224.1 3,256.8 3,960.2 3,373.5
(799.6) (946.8) (1,053.1) (991.2) (1,140.2) (1,550.6) (1,868.6) (1,491.6)
HH per capita non-food
expenditure, annual
945.6 824.4 2,017.7 1,258.1 1,815.8 1,714.2 3,029.1 1,999.4
(1,194.1) (984.5) (2,980.4) (2,011.9) (2,727.8) (2,541.6) (4,693.2) (3,156.7)
Observations 781 611 246 1,638 840 612 186 1,638
Note: Sample means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for household-level credit and expenditure variables.
Statistics account for sampling weights. All amounts are deflated and given in 1992 Taka. The word household is ab-
breviated by ‘HH’. The eligibility status of a household used to identify sub-samples is taken from census data for the
first wave (1991/92) and from the questionnaire module on loans for the second wave (1998/99).
It must be mentioned, however, that comparisons in household per capita expendi-
ture levels between borrowing households and eligible non-borrowing ones are to be
considered with great care because of the substantial amount of mis-targeting observ-
able in the data. Indeed, as discussed in the preceding section, some households are
classified as eligible in 1991-92 census data while they hold more than half an acre of
land, even though this cut-off point is presented by the researchers leading the study as
an eligibility criterion shared by all microfinance programs under scrutiny. Assuming
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this criterion was set to identify the poorest of the poor, it implies that each sub-sample
of borrowers and eligible non-borrowers includes a share of households relatively bet-
ter off than the most indigent ones (according to landholdings as a proxy measure of
wealth). Mis-targeting in microfinance programs regarding the “landholdings eligibil-
ity rule” makes it hard to assess the success of such programs in reaching the alleged
targeted fringes of the population, at least in our sample, precisely because eligibility
seems to be determined at the discretion of lending institutions.
3.2 A closer look at the distribution of consumption
The focal point of our study in Chapter 2 is to understand how the impacts of micro-
credit on household welfare are distributed amongst households who rank at various
points of the outcome variable distribution. We complement our brief description of
the means and variances of consumption variables with an exploration of their distri-
butions across time periods and across household groups, namely borrowers and non-
borrowers. We wish to readily emphasize that the purpose of the following discussion
is by no means an attempt at unravelling causal effects, but merely at describing em-
pirical facts about marginal distributions as stepping stones towards our econometric
study, and also to strengthen our argument in favour of using econometric techniques
with an object of interest other than conditional means.
3.2.1 Household per capita total expenditure
Panel A of Figure 1.1 presents kernel density estimates for household per capita expen-
diture in each time period for the full sample and the two sub-samples of borrowers
and non-borrowers7. We can easily see that in every instance the distribution displays a
sharp peak around its mode and is positively skewed with a long and thin right tail. For
the full sample as for each sub-sample we also note that in the second time period the
distribution of household total consumption, albeit still leptokurtic and right-skewed,
is a bit more evenly spread around its central tendency than in 1991-92, with an in-
crease of the proportion of households in the tails, most notably in the upper part of
the distribution.
Bottom left graph of Panel A of Figure 1.1 shows that for borrowing households the dis-
tribution of total expenditure reaches slightly further left in 1998-99 than in 1991-92,
indicating the occurrence of ever lower levels of consumption at the lowest quantiles.
Borrowers at top quantiles tend to achieve higher consumption in the late 1990s than
7 Expenditure variables are valued in 1992 Taka and hence are comparable across time periods.
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in 1991-92, and the very highest achievers seem to realize comparable levels of ex-
penditure in both time periods, although there appears to be slightly more of them in
1998-998.
In the group of non-borrowing households (bottom right graph of Panel A of Fig-
ure 1.1), the lowest levels of consumption are similar in both time periods although we
find larger proportions of low-achievers in 1998-99. Similarly, there are more house-
holds achieving high levels of total expenditure in the top part of the distribution in
1998-99, while the very top achievers also realize higher levels of consumption in the
late 1990s than in 1991-92.
These observations can be refined with the help of the quantile-quantile plots shown
in Panel A of Figure 1.2. The bottom left graph of Panel A shows that the proportions
of borrowing households with low levels of consumption are quite similar in both time
periods, and departures of the plotted points from the identity line is clear evidence
of the increased spread of the distribution of consumption from lower quantiles to
around its median in the late 1990s. In the upper tail, points in the plot form a line
with near-zero slope, representing the fact that extreme values in the high tail of the
consumption distribution are closer together in the second time period than they are in
the first. A kindred pattern can be observed for non-borrowers, although sharp discrep-
ancies between distributions in both time periods appear at slightly higher quantiles
still. Points at the top of the plot falling roughly on an upward sloping straight line
paralleling the identity line suggest that the allocation of observations across higher
levels of consumption in each time period is almost identical, even though the absolute
levels of per capita expenditure in that part of the distribution are higher in 1998-99
than in the early 1990s, with a more frequent occurrence of extreme high values.
Panel A of Table 1.4 reports the values of the quartiles and of the lower and upper
deciles for each sub-sample considered in the graphs and plots described above. The
lower decile and lower quartile of per capita expenditure are very similar in both time
periods for the full sample, with the former at Tk 2,537 and Tk 2,534 and the latter at
Tk 3,099 and Tk 3,138 in 1991-92 and 1998-99, respectively. The positive difference in
favour of the second time period sharpens at the median and higher quantiles, figur-
ing the fact that the distribution is more spread to the right in 1998-99, as previously
observed in Panel A of Figure 1.1. We also see that borrowers achieve higher total ex-
penditure in 1998-99 than in 1991-92 at every reported quantile, with this difference
sharpening from the bottom decile up, which suggests both a location shift (higher lev-
els of consumption at each quantile) and a change in shape (quantiles are relatively
further apart than they were) over time. Interestingly, non-borrowers at the bottom
decile and first quartile achieve lower consumption in 1998-99 than in 1991-92 while
the converse is true for non-borrowing households at the median and upper quantiles,
8The plotted densities seem to converge as we move to the far right end but the dashed line (1998-99)
remains above the plain line (1991-92).
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a stylized fact outlining that over time the distribution of consumption amongst non-
borrowers spread out more than that of borrowers.
Table 1.4 Sample quantiles and distribution tests for household per capita total ex-
penditure
(a) Panel A: Comparison across time, by borrowing status
Quantile
Full sample Borrowers Non-borrowers
1991-92 1998-99 1991-92 1998-99 1991-92 1998-99
10% 2,537.1 2,534.0 2,544.8 2,645.6 2,533.4 2,454.9
25% 3,098.9 3,138.1 2,992.5 3,208.4 3,148.5 3,071.4
Median 3,899.0 4,220.7 3,726.9 4,208.6 3,930.9 4,242.1
75% 5,065.5 6,094.5 4,675.1 5,725.2 5,220.2 6,457.5
90% 7,003.5 9,348.0 5,737.2 7,799.9 7,505.0 10,593.4
Wilcoxon signed
rank test (p-value)
0.000 0.000 0.001
Sign test, 2-sided
(p-value)
0.000 0.000 0.021
(b) Panel B: Comparison across borrowing status, by time period
Quantile
1991-92 1998-99
Borrowers Non-borrowers Borrowers Non-borrowers
10% 2,544.8 2,533.4 2,645.6 2,454.9
25% 2,992.5 3,148.5 3,208.4 3,071.4
Median 3,726.9 3,930.9 4,208.6 4,242.1
75% 4,675.1 5,220.2 5,725.2 6,457.5
90% 5,737.2 7,505.0 7,799.9 10,593.4
Wilcoxon rank-sum
test (p-value)
0.002 0.116
Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test (p-value)
0.002 0.009
Median test
(p-value)
0.043 0.199
The bottom rows of Panel A of Table 1.4 provide p-values associated with distributions
equality tests for matched paired data, a sensible choice given that comparisons over
time consider repeated measurements for the same panel of households. The first is the
Wilcoxon matched-pairs rank-signed test, which tests the null hypothesis that two dis-
tributions are equivalent by considering whether the median difference between pairs
of observations is zero9. The second, coined the sign test, has a similar null hypoth-
esis that is decided against in the event that there are unequal numbers of positive
and negative pairwise differences10. Both are non-parametric tests in that they do not
assume normality of the data, but their assumptions are still likely to be violated by
9 The test assumes that pairs are randomly sampled and that pairwise differences are i.i.d. and follow
a symmetric distribution.
10 Unlike the Wilcoxon signed-rank test it does not account for the magnitude of the differences.
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our ill-behaved consumption variables. We do not however see this as a major concern
because the tests are carried out as part of our descriptive exercise and not for formal
inference. The latter is also the reason why we consider the two-sided sign test only
and not its one-sided alternatives. For the full sample as well as for sub-samples of bor-
rowers and non-borrowers, the null that the distribution of household total per capita
expenditure is similar in 1991-92 and 1998-99 is overwhelmingly rejected (the largest
p-value we find is 0.021), hence comforting the idea that some distributional transfor-
mation happened over time in terms of household consumption, as was suggested by
observations made so far from Panel A of Figure 1.1 and Panel A of Figure 1.2.
We now turn to comparisons between borrowers and non-borrowers in each time pe-
riod, for which kernel density estimates can be found in Panel B of Figure 1.1. In 1991-
92 the proportions of households with low levels of consumption are very close for both
groups while both distributions still display leptokurtic shapes with positive skew.
The right tail is however a bit thicker for non-borrowers than for borrowers, show-
ing that more households from the former group manage to achieve higher levels of
consumption. Interestingly in 1998-99 there are larger proportions of non-borrowing
households than borrowing ones with low levels of per capita expenditure. Both dis-
tributions spread more to the right of their respective central tendencies but the upper
tail remains thicker for non-borrowers. The leftmost quantile-quantile plot in Panel
B of Figure 1.2 confirms the similarity of the consumption profiles of borrowers and
non-borrowers at low quantiles in 1991-92, with discrepancies between both groups
appearing little below Tk 5,000 of per capita expenditure. There are greater shares
of high-consumers amongst non-borrowers even though high achievers are closer to-
gether than in the group of borrowers, as witnessed by the rightmost points of the plot
that follow a steep upward sloping line.
In the second time period the largest discrepancies between the two groups appear in
the top part of the distributions before slowly vanishing for high levels of consump-
tion where the allocation of observations is similar for borrowing and non-borrowing
households. Evidence from the quantile-quantile plots is confirmed by the numbers re-
ported in Panel B of Table 1.4. The lower deciles and lower quartiles of total per capita
consumption in 1991-92 are quite close for borrowing and non-borrowing households,
although with a slight edge for the latter (except at the bottom decile), while the con-
verse is true in 1998-99. The difference between both samples at the median and higher
quantiles is systematically in favour of non-borrowers even though median consump-
tion in both groups is almost identical in 1998-99 (Tk 4,207 for borrowers and Tk 4,242
for non-borrowers).
In the same vein as earlier (and with the same reserve) we carry out two non-parametric
tests for the equality of distributions between both groups, as well as a Pearson’s Chi-
squared test for the equality of medians (the bottom rows of Panel B in Table 1.4 report
Chapter 1 Data Architecture 17
p-values). The Wilcoxon rank-sum test and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test both con-
sider the null hypothesis that two independent samples were drawn from the same
population, the former being more sensitive to discrepancies in location while the lat-
ter is also sensitive to differences in shape. Both tests invite us to reject the null that
the distribution of per capita expenditure for borrowers is the same as that of non-
borrowers in the early 1990s, while the third test is against the equality of medians for
the two sub-samples.
Although we fail to reject the null that median consumption is similar for both groups
in 1998-99, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test suggests that both distributions are different
and contradicts the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for which we just fail to reject the null at
the conventional level of 10% confidence. Without putting too much emphasis in these
tests, their conflicting conclusions are not necessarily inconsistent. We can imagine that
the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, being more sensitive to location, considers that achieved
levels of consumption in the group of non-borrowers are similar enough to those in
the group of borrowers at many points of the distribution (see the reported values of
quantiles in Panel B of Table 1.4 and the corresponding quantile-quantile plot in Panel
B of Figure 1.2). On the other hand, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test detects different
enough locations and, especially, shapes to reject the null that both distributions are
very close (as in the corresponding kernel density estimates in Panel B of Figure 1.1)11.
3.2.2 Household per capita food and non-food expenditures
One main refinement of our subsequent empirical analysis is to consider the break-
down of total per capita expenditure into food and non-food expenditures as alterna-
tive outcome variables of interest. In the interest of saving space and avoiding redun-
dancy we comment more briefly on the distributions of these two variables, and place
the associated Kernel density estimates and quantile-quantile plots in Appendix A.
From graphs in Panel A of Figure A.1 we note that the distribution of food per capita
expenditure is less skewed to the right than that of total consumption in either time
period, although the mode remains in the upper part of the bottom half of the distri-
bution. Observations are more evenly spread for borrowers than for non-borrowers,
and for both sub-samples the graphs show the distribution “flattening” over time with
a thickening of the tails around a central tendency that seems to change little. This is
confirmed in the corresponding quantile-quantile plots (Panel A of Figure A.3) with
points falling slightly below the identity line for the bottom half of the distribution
and then settling above and not far from the identity line at higher quantiles. Non-
parametric tests suggest that the distribution of food consumption in 1998-99 is indeed
11 Put in yet another way, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test detects large enough discrepancies to decide
against the null.
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different from that in 1991-92 for borrowing households whereas they fail to reject the
null for non-borrowers (Panel A of Table 1.5).
Table 1.5 Sample quantiles and distribution tests for household per capita food ex-
penditure
(a) Panel A: Comparison across time, by borrowing status
Quantile
Full sample Borrowers Non-borrowers
1991-92 1998-99 1991-92 1998-99 1991-92 1998-99
10% 2,192.2 1,952.2 2,213.2 1,966.6 2,183.6 1,938.6
25% 2,564.4 2,365.0 2,508.1 2,424.7 2,578.2 2,340.4
Median 3,093.8 3,067.8 2,946.1 3,022.1 3,137.3 3,124.3
75% 3,771.7 3,942.8 3,545.7 3,812.7 3,867.3 4,063.1
90% 4,524.0 5,010.0 4,188.6 4,664.9 4,658.1 5,501.4
Wilcoxon signed
rank test (p-value)
0.081 0.000 0.321
Sign test, 2-sided
(p-value)
0.639 0.025 0.111
(b) Panel B: Comparison across borrowing status, by time period
Quantile
1991-92 1998-99
Borrowers Non-borrowers Borrowers Non-borrowers
10% 2,213.2 2,183.6 1,966.6 1,938.6
25% 2,508.1 2,578.2 2,424.7 2,340.4
Median 2,946.1 3,137.3 3,022.1 3,124.3
75% 3,545.7 3,867.3 3,812.7 4,063.1
90% 4,188.6 4,658.1 4,664.9 5,501.4
Wilcoxon rank-sum
test (p-value)
0.005 0.382
Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test (p-value)
0.008 0.028
Median test
(p-value)
0.001 0.843
Kernel estimates in Panel B of Figure A.1 display evidence that the allocation of house-
holds at low levels of food consumption is similar for borrowers and non-borrowers in
1991-92. However the mode for the latter appears to the right of its counterpart for the
former group of households (we reject the null of equality of medians, Panel B of Ta-
ble 1.5), and there are larger proportions of non-borrowing households than borrowing
ones that achieve high levels of food consumption (left-hand graph in Panel B of Figure
A.1). These discrepancies are backed by both distribution equality tests for which the
null is rejected. For 1998-99 data the central tendencies for both groups of households
seem much closer together (we fail to reject the null in the median test and Wilcoxon
rank-sum test) and so does the overall shape (even though we reject the null hypothesis
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of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test), with the distribution of food consumption for bor-
rowers gathered a bit more tightly around its mode than that for non-borrowers which
has thicker tails (right-hand graph in Panel B of Figure A.3).
Table 1.6 Sample quantiles and distribution tests for household per capita non-food
expenditure
(a) Panel A: Comparison across time, by borrowing status
Quantile
Full sample Borrowers Non-borrowers
1991-92 1998-99 1991-92 1998-99 1991-92 1998-99
10% 272.7 407.2 269.8 450.9 272.7 384.6
25% 417.7 589.8 398.5 624.9 422.6 572.3
Median 677.3 964.3 608.6 973.1 712.4 954.2
75% 1,262.9 1,962.3 1,009.1 1,787.0 1,378.4 2,057.9
90% 2,580.6 4,358.3 1,844.6 3,740.3 2,947.8 5,157.5
Wilcoxon signed
rank test (p-value)
0.000 0.000 0.000
Sign test, 2-sided
(p-value)
0.000 0.000 0.000
(b) Panel B: Comparison across borrowing status, by time period
Quantile
1991-92 1998-99
Borrowers Non-borrowers Borrowers Non-borrowers
10% 269.8 272.7 450.9 384.6
25% 398.5 422.6 624.9 572.3
Median 608.6 712.4 973.1 954.2
75% 1,009.1 1,378.4 1,787.0 2,057.9
90% 1,844.6 2,947.8 3,740.3 5,157.5
Wilcoxon rank-sum
test (p-value)
0.001 0.013
Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test (p-value)
0.001 0.001
Median test
(p-value)
0.012 0.018
Patterns in the distribution of non-food per capita expenditure closely match the ob-
servations made for total expenditure, only with much sharper discrepancies. Kernel
estimates in Panel A of Figure A.2 show an extremely sharp peak in the distribution
of non-food consumption around its mode in 1991-92 complemented by a far-reaching
thin right tail. It seems the distribution shifts to the right in the second time period
(which is evident from Panel A of Table 1.6), especially for borrowers, with the right tail
getting slightly thicker, more so for non-borrowers. Quantile-quantile plots in Panel A
of Figure A.4 look similar to those for total expenditure, only the discrepancies appear
at the very low quantiles of the distributions and are sharper.
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Panel A of Table 1.6 shows we can reject the null that the distribution of non-food
expenditure does not change over time for the full sample as well as for the two sub-
samples of borrowers and non-borrowers. In Panel B of Figure A.2 we see that both
groups have quite similar non-food consumption profiles 1991-92 even though the
peak around the mode is sharper for borrowers and higher levels of non-food expendi-
ture are more often achieved by non-borrowers, as also shown by the near-flat pattern
of points in the middle of the corresponding quantile-quantile plot (left-hand graph of
Panel B of Figure A.4).
In the late 1990s data the central tendency of the distribution of non-food consumption
for borrowers appears to settle to the right of that for non-borrowers, and larger pro-
portions of households from the latter group achieve very low levels and high levels of
non-food expenditure with a few exceptions at the topmost quantiles (points lying on
the identity line in the top right corner of the right-hand plot in Panel B of Figure A.2).
Our distribution equality tests and median tests suggest a rejection of the null in ev-
ery instance, but we put little faith in their meaningfulness giving the highly irregular
behaviour of the variable under scrutiny.
3.2.3 Summary of findings
In the context of our study, exploration of dependent variables beyond their average
values and dispersions provides invaluable information. Our dependent variables ex-
hibit leptokurtic and positively skewed distributions with departures from normal-
ity particularly salient for total and non-food consumption. Such shapes imply that
empirical means are probably unfit to adequately summarise these variables, in turn
questioning the relevance of measuring causal effects of microfinance programs with
our data through the estimation of conditional expectation functions. Of course, in
studies such as Pitt and Khandker (1998) and Khandker (2005) the authors transform
all continuous variables into logarithmic forms in order to work with better behaved
data, therefore improving chances to fulfil normality assumptions on the error terms
and making average tendencies more representative of the distribution. One drawback
is the need to input an arbitrary value to observations corresponding to non-borrowing
households, and the choice of that value is not negligible because it can influence the
interpretation of the estimated coefficients that represent elasticities. This concern is
discussed in Roodman and Morduch (2014).
We feel that the non-standard distribution of consumption in our sample plays in
favour of the argument of using quantile regression techniques that consider objects
other than conditional expectation functions and do not rely on normality assump-
tions. Additionally, the robustness of said techniques to outlying observations makes
it unnecessary to transform ill-behaved variables into logarithms and avoids having to
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choose an arbitrary value for the logarithm of zero in treatment variables (cumulative
microcredit borrowings).
The set of kernel density estimates, quantile-quantile plots and corresponding tables
also suggests that the distribution of consumption tends to spread out over time, with
typically an upward shift in location and slightly thicker tails. This is true for the full
sample and for each of the two sub-samples of borrowers and non-borrowers. Non-
parametric tests confirm the intuition gotten from graphs and plots that consump-
tion is distributed substantially differently across the sub-populations of borrowers
and non-borrowers in each time period.
To that extent, quantile regressions are relevant tools because they can capture the
influence of covariates not only on the location of the conditional distribution of the
outcome variable at a given quantile, but also on its shape through allowing estimated
coefficients to vary across quantiles. They will be invaluable in assessing whether ap-
parent discrepancies in the location of distributions can be imputed (at least in part)
to the effect of microcredit and, if so, whether this caused location-shift is homogenous
across the distribution. We want to stress again that the aforementioned observations
on the distribution of consumption conditional on the borrowing status of households
and on the related diagnostic plots and non-parametric tests of distribution equality
do not provide formal evidence about the causal relationship between microcredit and
household welfare.
Finally, we note that kernel density estimates show that the distribution of food con-
sumption does not exhibit as sharp a peak around its central tendency as that of non-
food consumption, and that it is more evenly spread than the latter. Moreover, quantile-
quantile plots confirm that differences in shape and location for the distribution of food
per capita expenditure over time and across borrowing status are much less salient than
is the case for total or non-food expenditure. Nevertheless, we still observe a “flatten-
ing” of the distribution around its centre in the second time period and thicker tails,
even though a rightward shift of central tendency is not always obvious.
Interestingly, in both sub-groups of borrowers and non-borrowers there are markedly
larger proportions of households achieving low levels of food consumption in 1998-
99 as compared with 1991-92. It follows mechanically that clear discrepancies in the
distribution of household non-food per capita expenditure over time and across house-
hold groups closely resemble those observed for total expenditure, only with sharper
patterns. They are a manifestation of the fact that non-food expenditure includes sev-
eral types of lumpy expenses, such as durable household goods or large amounts of
money spent for religious and social ceremonies, the nature of which implies they
are not systematically incurred by many households or maybe not often enough to
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be picked up by punctual surveys12.
As a consequence, non-food expenditure data is made of many unique (or close to
unique) observations that can represent some heterogeneity in extreme events facing
households (such as marriage or death), but can also capture the notion that some of
these expenses are important social markers (e.g. clothes and shoes) and hence might
rank differently in the priorities of different households. In comparison, household
behaviour with respect to the purchase of food items is more broadly consistent over
time and sub-samples. The overall contrast between food and non-food expenditure
in terms of distributional characteristics makes a good case for considering them as
alternatives to total expenditure for our outcome of interest in the context of quantile
regressions that will be sensitive to the distinct underlying shapes of the distributions.
4 Descriptive statistics for other household variables and vil-
lage characteristics used in regressions
Table 1.7 shows weighted sample means and standard deviations for the fifteen vari-
ables included in each of our regressions as household-level covariates. Summary
statistics are displayed for the sub-samples of borrowers and non-borrowers from mi-
crocredit programs as well as for the full sample, for each wave of data separately.
Therefore, they can be read as summarizing our variables for the population under
scrutiny, i.e. for all the households living in the villages selected for the study. We
show summary statistics only for the balanced panel dataset used in regressions. The
choice of variables follows previous studies using the same dataset (Chemin, 2008;
Dalla Pellegrina, 2011; Khandker, 2005; Pitt & Khandker, 1998) and studies using sim-
ilar quasi-experimental data collected in rural Bangladesh (Imai & Azam, 2012; Islam,
2011).
Around 95% of households in selected villages are male-headed in 1991-92 data against
about 90% in the late 1990s. The share of male-headed households is very similar
across the borrowers and non-borrowers sub-samples in the early 1990s, but is slightly
higher for borrowing households (92%) than for non-borrowing ones in 1998-99. The
heads of borrowing households are on average a bit younger and also less educated
than their counterparts in non-borrowing households. Table 1.7 shows that the most
educated man in a household achieved a higher class on average than the most edu-
cated woman in a household. The highest achievers in non-borrowing households are
more educated (by about one additional year of schooling) than their counterparts in
12 The inherent lumpiness of such expenses also means they are likely to take many almost unique
values, i.e. two households might face similar events but do not necessarily incur the same financial
consequences.
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borrowing households, and this is the case for both waves of data and for men and
women alike.
We see that households who borrow in the first wave of data hold less than 0.5 acre
of land on average (46.6 decimals) while those who do not borrow hold 1.6 acres of
land on average. The numbers for 1998-99 data appear inconsistent with that of the
early 1990s (borrowing households hold more land than non-borrowing households on
average), but this might stem from differences in the interview questionnaires between
the two waves of data collection. In 1991-92, respondents were asked to report land-
holdings before the inception of microfinance programs in their village, while in 1998-99
they reported landholdings before 1992, which can explain under-reporting or at least
less precise reports given the time that had elapsed. An alternative measure gathers
information from reports of landholdings after the inception of microfinance programs in
the village for 1991-92 data, and landholdings after 1992 for 1998-99 data. However,
we include a measure of household landholdings in our regressions to try and control
for total wealth as an ex ante confounding factor in the determinants of microcredit
borrowing and subsequent consumption decisions, so we stick to our measure of land
before microfinance / before 199213.
Eligibility to group loans is the only variable for which the table shows unweighted
summary statistics. About 85% of households in our estimation sample are eligible to
group lending in 1991-92, according to village census data on which random sampling
was then carried out. Such data is not available for the 1998-99 wave, we use respon-
dents’ answers to the question “Does any member of the household qualify to join any
poverty alleviation credit programs?” for our classification of eligible households; 89%
of households have at least one member who is eligible to such programs. One might
think this number alone is a sign that the microcredit programs under scrutiny did not
help many people to exit poverty, given that there are even more eligible households af-
ter the programs ran for at least 9 years in 72 of the 87 villages in our sample. However,
most microfinance initiatives allow successful borrowers to take up new loans, so that
some households can still be eligible to group lending even though they are better off
than when they joined the program, for instance owning more land than was required
to be eligible in the first place.
Our regressions (in the next three chapters) also include the household economic de-
pendency ratio, which is defined as the number of non-active (non-working) members
in the household divided by the number of active (working) members in the household.
It is a measure of household structure taking into account the number of “earners” in
the household as well as the size of the household. The data show it is quite similar for
borrowing and non-borrowing households, albeit slightly higher for the latter group.
Overall, the average economic dependency ratio is much higher in 1998-99 than in the
13 It is also the measure of land used in Pitt and Khandker (1998) and Khandker (2005).
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early 1990s. This could be due to a number of reasons, for instance more dynamic
demographics resulting in larger households with more numerous very young, hence
not working, children; or it could be due to the presence in households of ageing older
people who stopped working. Another possibility is that access to microcredit worked
in favour of children’s schooling, and hence higher economic dependency ratios could
reflect a substantial decrease in child labour. This last remark is pure speculation, al-
though it does make for a good story. Indeed, Pitt and Khandker (1998) find that group
lending is beneficial to children’s schooling when loans are given out to women. How-
ever, Islam and Choe (2013) show that microcredit can actually have adverse effects on
education.
Pioneering studies by Rosenzweig (1988a, 1988b) in rural India established the impor-
tance of extended family networks and inter-household transfers (especially through
marital ties) as sources of ex post risk mitigation solutions. As a conclusion to his work
on ICRISAT villages Townsend (1994) recognised that the extended family network
should likely be the preferred unit of observation for the study of informal insurance
mechanisms, an intuition later strengthened by Fafchamps and Lund (2003) who find
that risk-sharing at the village level is not efficient and works in fact through family and
friends networks. In their seminal work Pitt and Khandker (1998) acknowledge that
family networks can be sources of transfers and informal insurance that can in turn in-
fluence a household’s decision to borrow and their consumption profile. They include
separate variables for whether the parents, brothers and sisters of the household head
own land and add three similar variables for relatives of the household head’s spouse.
In order to limit the number of covariates in our specification we include only one vari-
able for the total number of relatives of the household head who own land, along with
a similar variable for his/her spouse14.
Summary statistics show that heads of non-borrowing households and their spouses
have on average more relatives who own land (around 5) than those of borrowing
households (between 3 and 4), although the difference gets smaller for household heads
and almost vanishes for head spouses in 1998-99 data. Our regressions also include
the number of relatives of the household head and his/her spouse who live outside
the thana (sub-district). Such variables account for the fact that geographic distance
can potentially offer better – or at least more flexibility for – insurance within the ex-
tended family network as it exposes various components of the network to different
and maybe little correlated states of the world. For instance, if the agricultural envi-
ronment is different across sub-districts, members of the network facing a bad crop
season have more chance to get help from members in a different area that might not
be subject to the same adverse conditions. Additionally, Dalla Pellegrina (2011) shows
that participation in the informal credit market depends positively on the distance to
in-law relatives, dowries and marriage gifts, suggesting that the uptake of loans from
14 Our variables account for all relatives: parents, siblings, offspring, uncles and aunts.
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Table 1.7 Summary statistics of household-level variables used in regressions
1991-92 1998-99
Borrowers
Non-
borrowers
Full
sample
Borrowers
Non-
borrowers
Full
sample
Age of HH head
40.20 41.66 41.30 47.70 48.90 48.40
(11.75) (13.25) (12.91) (12.60) (13.51) (13.15)
Education of HH head
2.157 3.007 2.800 2.286 3.117 2.774
(3.126) (3.856) (3.708) (3.229) (4.065) (3.765)
Gender of HH head
0.944 0.955 0.952 0.922 0.884 0.900
(0.230) (0.208) (0.214) (0.269) (0.320) (0.300)
Landholdings
46.45 153.5 127.4 41.30 36.83 38.67
(84.49) (351.3) (311.6) (135.1) (148.8) (143.3)
Eligibility of HH (1=yes)
0.993 0.552 0.660 0.995 0.685 0.813
(0.0829) (0.498) (0.474) (0.0696) (0.465) (0.390)
HH economic
dependency ratio
1.698 1.792 1.769 2.490 2.624 2.569
(1.369) (1.520) (1.485) (1.761) (2.000) (1.906)
Highest education of
men in HH
2.857 4.093 3.791 3.844 5.013 4.532
(3.551) (4.382) (4.227) (4.020) (4.820) (4.543)
Highest education of
women in HH
1.316 2.200 1.984 2.383 3.378 2.968
(2.543) (3.446) (3.270) (3.308) (4.127) (3.841)
# of HH head relatives
owning land
3.284 4.662 4.325 2.644 3.183 2.961
(4.102) (4.790) (4.668) (3.466) (3.738) (3.637)
# of HH head’s spouse
relatives owning land
3.875 5.292 4.946 3.779 3.901 3.851
(4.887) (5.844) (5.656) (4.550) (4.269) (4.386)
# of HH head relatives
living outside thana
1.010 1.244 1.187 3.364 3.141 3.233
(2.397) (2.101) (2.179) (3.360) (3.320) (3.337)
# of HH head’s spouse
relatives living outside
thana
1.868 2.428 2.291 4.330 4.470 4.412
(3.975) (4.214) (4.162) (4.892) (4.811) (4.843)
Loans from traditional
banks (1=yes)
0.0241 0.121 0.0970 0.0627 0.0926 0.0803
(0.153) (0.326) (0.296) (0.243) (0.290) (0.272)
Loans from informal
sources (1=yes)
0.0569 0.148 0.126 0.0580 0.0904 0.0771
(0.232) (0.356) (0.332) (0.234) (0.287) (0.267)
Loans from relatives
(1=yes)
0.0439 0.140 0.117 0.170 0.227 0.204
(0.205) (0.347) (0.321) (0.376) (0.419) (0.403)
Observations 781 857 1,638 840 798 1,638
Note: Sample means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for household-level variables. Statistics
account for sampling weights. The additional label ‘(1=yes)’ indicates dummy variables. The word
household is abbreviated by ‘HH’. Landholdings are measured in decimals, where 1 decimal = 0.01 acre.
The eligibility status of a household is taken from census data for the first wave (1991/92) and from the
questionnaire module on loans for the second wave (1998/99).
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moneylenders also has some sort of link with primary mutual insurance networks.
Similarly, “wealthy” (or, rather, “landed”) relatives can provide guarantees and help
securing traditional bank loans that require collateral (Dalla Pellegrina, 2011).
Therefore our set of variables accounting for the number of relatives who own land
and those who live outside the thana are relevant in controlling for the strength and
depth of a household extended family network as a potential source of transfers and
insurance, and they are also relevant in controlling for opportunities to access sources
of credit other than microcredit, all of which are likely to influence borrowing and con-
sumption decisions. Finally we control directly for alternative sources of credit with
dummy variables taking a value of 1 if a household reports loans from banks (commer-
cial, government-run and cooperative banks), informal sources (input supplier, shop-
keeper, landlord, employer) and relatives and friends (including neighbours). Table
1.3 shows that in 1991-92 6% of households in our sample borrow from traditional
sources, and around 10% from informal sources and relatives and friends; only 3%
of households participating in microcredit programs borrow from banks (9% of non-
participating households do), while about 5% of them get loans from other sources
(15% and 12% of non-participating households borrow from informal sources and
from relatives, respectively). In the second wave of data over 7% of households bor-
row from banks and informal sources while 19% borrow from relatives and friends.
Around 6% of households involved in microcredit borrowing also borrow from banks
and informal sources (the share is around 9% for non-participating households), and
15% of them get loans from relatives and friends (23% of non-participating households
do).
Table 1.8 provides summary statistics for village-level variables included in some of
our regressions that do not specify village fixed effects or village quantile effects. The
set of village-level controls includes the levels of average wages for men and women;
separate dummy variables for the presence of any primary school in the village, the
presence of any food program (run by NGOs or the government), and the availability
of electricity in the village; variables that measure the distance in kilometres to the
nearest bank, the closest market and the nearest “pucca” road15; and prices for six
popular food items that are rice, wheat flour, mustard oil, hen’s eggs, milk and potatoes.
5 Conclusions
The aim of this chapter is to present the data used for empirical analyses in subsequent
parts of the thesis. The data we gather from the World Bank website were collected for
15 The term “pucca” comes from Hindi and means “solid, permanent”. A “pucca” road is a road of
good quality, i.e. a black-topped road. Similarly, “pucca” houses would refer to dwellings made of sturdy
material such as brick or cement.
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Table 1.8 Summary statistics of village-level variables used in regressions
1991-92 1998-99
Average female wage
37.53 65.77
(9.457) (16.96)
Average male wage
16.50 37.85
(9.594) (12.84)
Primary school (1=yes)
0.678 0.897
(0.470) (0.306)
Food program (1=yes)
0.552 0.471
(0.500) (0.502)
Distance to nearest bank
(km)
3.580 2.910
(2.927) (2.349)
Distance to nearest pucca
road (km)
2.612 1.171
(3.411) (1.609)
Distance to nearest
shop/market (km)
1.561 0.995
(2.090) (0.974)
Electricity in village (1=yes)
0.506 0.414
(0.503) (0.495)
Price of rice
11.14 12.65
(0.856) (1.705)
Price of wheat flour
9.575 12.77
(1.004) (1.047)
Price of mustard oil
52.50 58.25
(5.810) (5.973)
Price of hen’s eggs
2.483 2.787
(1.949) (0.489)
Price of milk
12.52 15.68
(3.031) (4.576)
Price of potatoes
3.730 7.764
(1.517) (2.669)
Note: Sample means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for village-level variables. There are 87
villages in the sample. The additional label ‘(1=yes)’ indicates dummy variables.
the purpose of evaluating the efficiency of microfinance programs on the livelihoods
of the poorest of the poor. The study was designed so that the available information
could be used to mimic the conditions of a controlled experiment from a statistical
standpoint and therefore allow estimation of meaningful impacts, which is known as a
quasi-experiment. Investigators in charge of planning data collection built on the fact
that all MFIs providing credit in sampled areas deem a household eligible to group
lending when they are landless (owning less than half an acre of land). That way, data
on landholdings can be used to replicate this exogenous eligibility rule in a strategy
to instrument for microcredit borrowings which are potentially endogenous to other
household decisions such as consumption behaviour. The exact way identification can
be achieved thusly is detailed in the methodological discussion of Chapter 2.
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However, we show that defining eligibility based on landholdings data unravels a sub-
stantial amount of mistargeting in the sample, i.e. a non-negligible fraction of func-
tionally landed households do actually receive loans from MFIs. This questions instru-
mental variable approaches used in Pitt and Khandker (1998) and Khandker (2005)
and calls for an alternative empirical strategy to identify program impacts by building
on the availability of panel data. Two waves of household survey are available, from
which we construct a balanced panel dataset consisting of 1,638 households each ob-
served twice over time, in 1991-92 and in 1998-99. We use said estimation sample in
all empirical chapters of the thesis, unless indicated otherwise.
This chapter also aims at paving the way to defending the relevance of using quantile
regression techniques – as implemented in Chapter 2 – by exploring the distributional
features of our main outcome variables of interest, i.e. household per capita total, food
and non-food expenditure. Indeed, they exhibit leptokurtic and right-skewed distri-
butions. Dependent variables with such characteristics can be problematic in typical
linear-in-means models, making it especially hard to fulfill necessary conditions re-
garding the distribution of residuals. Quantile regressions are robust to outliers and do
not assume normally-distributed errors, thereby eliminating the need for logarithmic
transformation and putting focus on objects better suited than expectations (which are
sensitive to extreme observations) to represent such ill-behaved outcomes. Moreover,
consumption variables are not distributed similarly for borrowers and non-borrowers,
the latter typically achieving higher levels of consumption on average but not neces-
sarily at every point of the distribution. Additionally, the distribution of consumption
appears to evolve over time not only in terms of location but also with respect to shape,
strengthening the idea that one could expect the welfare impacts of microcredit to be
potentially different for various categories of beneficiaries. Quantile regressions can be
used to estimate the influence of a covariate at multiple points of the distribution while
allowing it to vary at different quantiles, hence measuring location- and shape-shifting
impacts.
Finally, we provide descriptive statistics for household-level and village-level variables
used in regressions to control for socio-economic characteristics and features of the
environment facing the population under study in an effort to try and account for as
many confounding factors as possible when estimating program impacts.
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Figure 1.1 Kernel density estimates for household per capita total expenditure
(a) Panel A: By borrowing status
Full sample
Borrowing HH Non-borrowing HH
(b) Panel B: By time period
1991-92 1998-99
Note: Kernel density estimates using an Epanechnikov kernel function and sampling weights.Because of
the long right tails, the top 1% observations of the grand distribution of the sub-sample considered in each
graph are trimmed to improve visualisation.It does not hamper the overall shape of the density estimates.
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Figure 1.2 Quantile-quantile plots for household per capita total expenditure
(a) Panel A: Comparison across time, by borrowing status
Full sample
Borrowing HH Non-borrowing HH
(b) Panel B: Comparison across borrowing status, by time period
1991-92 1998-99
Note: Quantile-quantile plots. The straight line is the ‘identity’ line, i.e. the benchmark case in which
both distributions are identical. Because of a few very extreme observations, the top 1% observations of
the grand distribution of the sub-sample considered in each graph are trimmed to improve visualisation.
It does not hamper the overall shape of the plots.
Chapter 2
Distributional Consequences of
Micro-Credit Borrowing on
Household Consumption Behaviors:
Evidence from a quasi-experimental
setting
1 Introduction
Motivated by the findings in Chapter 1, we now turn to quantifying the true and hid-
den effects of microfinance initiative. The conceptual underpinning and the empirical
construct, in this chapter, will draw on the broad implications of data characteristics
presented in Chapter 1.
For myriad of economic theoretic and statistical reasons, evaluating the true impact of
a program, such as a microfinance initiative, is not straightforward. This is because
it is often mired by methodological and conceptual complexities. To the very least,
the methodological weaknesses or conceptual issues or both can lead to misinformed
estimates of microfinance program on household consumption behavior. At a finer
level, conclusions arrived at within such an environment may lead to over or under-
emphasis of policy concerning the true impact of microfinance program on household
consumption.
Indeed, a quick survey of the extant literature reveals that program evaluation has long
consisted in estimating average impacts, or program effects on the conditional means of
outcome variables of interest. However, very often policymakers might be interested
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in the impact an intervention has on the distribution of said outcomes. The investi-
gation of the distributional impacts of public policies or development programs has
therefore become more and more popular since the late 1990’s. We believe that an ex-
amination of the distributional impacts of microfinance initiatives is also relevant for
today’s policymaking. Although it is valuable to understand what impact microcredit
has on e.g. the average consumption of borrowers compared to non-borrowers, one
might be interested to know whether this impact is greater for those individuals who
achieved a relatively low (or high) consumption in the first place. The quantile regres-
sion (QR afterwards) estimator introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978) set the path
for researchers to evaluate treatment effects at different points of the distribution of
the outcome variable of interest. The authors provided a representation of quantiles
as solutions to a linear programming problem, allowing one to estimate quantiles of a
variable conditional on a set of covariates.
To the best of our knowledge, examples of studies using QR in the microfinance litera-
ture are sparse. In a recent research, Angelucci, Karlan, and Zinman (2015) use survey
data on over 16,000 households from a randomised controlled trial (RCT) in Mexico
to investigate the impact of expanding access to credit, and they complement their
analysis of average intent-to-treat effects with QR to look at potential heterogeneous
impacts, finding mild evidence of absence of negative impacts in the lower tails of the
outcomes’ distributions under scrutiny. Tarozzi, Desai, and Johnson (2015) also exploit
a RCT design in rural Ethiopia to investigate the effects of expanded access to credit
on economic activities such as investment and entrepreneurship, and the positive av-
erage intent-to-treat effects they find on cop-related costs, the value of livestock sales
and total revenues from self-employment actually seem to be mostly driven by positive
effects above the median, while the increase in crop sales is positive above the fourth
decile. Augsburg, De Haas, Harmgart, and Meghir (2015) make the same observation
from a RCT in Bosnia and Herzegovina to assess the impact of expanded microcredit
using data on marginal applicants for loans, and find that positive impacts on firm
profitability are only present at the top of the distribution.
These findings corroborate those by Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, and Kinnan (2015)
that carry out a randomised experiment in the slums of Hyderabad, India, and by
Cre´pon, Devoto, Duflo, and Pariente´ (2015) that follow the method by Chamberlain
(1994) to estimate quantile treatment effects on various outcomes of an expansion of
microcredit access in rural Morocco. In a study of the Thai Million Baht Fund, Boon-
perm, Haughton, and Khandker (2013) use panel data to estimate a fixed effects model
and find out this nationwide promotion of microcredit led to significant increases in
income and expenditures for its beneficiaries, and they rely on a panel data fixed effects
QR model to assert these effects are pro-poor in the sense they benefitted dispropor-
tionately those individuals at the bottom of the income and expenditure distributions.
Another example of QR in the context of microfinance is Polk and Johnson (2012) in
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an attempt to capture the effect of microcredit borrowing on poverty reduction in the
Philippines.
Our study aims at estimating the distributional impacts of microcredit borrowing on
household consumption outcomes using household-level panel data from villages in
rural Bangladesh publicly available on the World Bank’s website. We contribute to
the existing literature by focussing on objects other than conditional means in our
assessment of treatment effects, and we see our approach as a complement to more
conventional impact studies that seek to measure average effects only. Even though
conditional QR are often decried because of not allowing researchers to infer about the
impact of covariates on the marginal distribution of the outcome of interest, we show
that they remain relevant tools and provide insightful findings when correctly imple-
mented and interpreted. Indeed, our empirical results lead us to conclude that mi-
crocredit helps all borrowing households generate similar food consumption gains but
that overall welfare gains are heterogeneous and depend on a household’s relative so-
cial status given its socio-economic characteristics. Moreover, we take on the economet-
ric challenges inherent to the study of microfinance programs with non-experimental
data by exploiting as best we can the panel structure of our dataset in order to tackle
the issues of non-random program placement and self-selection in the context of QR.
We use QR on pooled data with village dummy variables and household-level corre-
lated random effects, the latter following the work of Abrevaya and Dahl (2008). Ours
is, to the best of our knowledge, the first study to make use of panel data QR with
correlated random effects to investigate the impacts of microcredit in rural areas of a
developing country1. Last but not least, in a field that tends to hold controlled exper-
iments as a golden standard, we hope our work can demonstrate that observational
data, albeit flawed in design, nevertheless harbor much valuable information.
The next section briefly reviews the empirical literature on microfinance and provides
some context. Section 3 presents the study design, and Section 4 introduces QR and
existing estimators that propose to deal with endogeneity or applicable to panel data.
In light of previous studies that exploited the same data we do, we detail our empirical
strategy in Section 5 before describing the variables used in regressions. Section 6
describes results from preliminary cross-sectional estimations. Finally, in Section 7
we present our main results from panel data QR while Section 8 exposes our final
conclusions regarding their interpretation, before acknowledging the main limitations
of our study. Section 9 concludes.
1 One instance of a related research is Boonperm et al. (2013) who study the implications of the Thai
Million Baht Village Fund Program. However they use a different estimator, and they exploit a natu-
ral experiment to investigate a phenomenon that is not exactly similar to the traditional group-lending
microfinance programs we scrutinize.
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2 Literature review
2.1 The importance of microfinance on household consumption behaviour
The positive impacts of microcredit on household-level economic development have
been asserted in numerous studies in various contexts. Microfinance initiatives seem
to achieve their prime goal of unlocking investment opportunities by favoring business
creation and self-employment (Attanasio, Augsburg, De Haas, Fitzsimons, & Harmgart,
2015; Augsburg et al., 2015; Banerjee et al., 2015; Coleman, 2006) and gains from mi-
crocredit borrowing are realized in terms of income (Imai & Azam, 2012; Islam, 2011;
Kaboski & Townsend, 2012) and profits (Attanasio et al., 2015; Tedeschi, 2008). Micro-
credit borrowing can also provide risk mitigation benefits through diminished income
uncertainty (Morduch, 1998) and help the poor insure more or less directly against
health shocks in the short run, to the extent that it mitigates the need for borrowers to
sell livestock in response to such shocks (Islam & Maitra, 2012). Ultimately, borrowing
through microfinance programs seems to trigger increases in household consumption
expenditures (Annim & Alnaa, 2013; Chemin, 2008; Pitt & Khandker, 1998).
Access to and use of microcredit borrowing has also been shown to exhibit benefits
for non-monetary outcomes such as school enrolment of children (Chemin, 2008; Pitt
& Khandker, 1998), women’s nutrition (Imai & Azam, 2012) and political empower-
ment (Basher, 2007). The observed consumption and asset accumulation benefits from
microfinance persist over time (Khandker, 2005; Khandker & Samad, 2014), although
they seem to be stronger and longer-lasting for those individuals who participate con-
tinuously to a program (Attanasio et al., 2015; Islam, 2011) as the impacts of previous
loans are bound to decrease over time (Islam, 2011; Kaboski & Townsend, 2011). Mi-
crofinance initiatives significantly help reducing poverty and extreme poverty at the
local level (Khandker, 2005; Khandker & Samad, 2014) while the expansion of access
to credit for households living in rural and poor urban areas can play a role in reducing
aggregate poverty (Burgess & Pande, 2005).
Nevertheless, the microfinance literature show us that the measured effects of micro-
credit on the livelihoods of the poor are heavily dependent on context (e.g. different
countries; rural versus urban areas, etc) and are not consistent across the board. Poten-
tial benefits in terms of entrepreneurship are not always realized, as in studies by Cole-
man (1999) in Thailand or Copestake, Dawson, Fanning, McKay, and Wright-Revolledo
(2005) in Peru. Nor does financial development in rural areas guarantee improvements
regarding consumption, as the latter’s response to microcredit can be mute (Cre´pon et
al., 2015), or remain unclear as in Gloede and Rungruxsirivorn (2013) whose results
state that microfinance fails to work as a consumption-smoothing device. Adverse im-
pacts of microcredit are also not be ruled out, a striking example being the observed
increase in child labor at the expense of schooling in the paper by Islam and Choe
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(2013) where the authors find this phenomenon to be particularly significant for girls2.
Moreover, the widespread belief that microcredit beneficiaries are systematically able
to repay high interest rates thanks to high returns on investment activities is challenged
by Schicks (2013) in a study that warns about the risks of over-indebtedness.
The quality of the data and the empirical strategy used to analyse them are also crucial
to the results one might get. Duvendack and Palmer-Jones (2012) criticized the lack of
replicability of Pitt and Khandker (1998) headline results that microfinance has signifi-
cant positive impacts on household consumption expenditure. Roodman and Morduch
(2014) provide an insightful criticism of the same seminal study by Pitt and Khandker
(1998), questioning the reliability of the results because of a dubious instrumentation
strategy.
Randomised controlled trials (RCTs) allow researchers to examine Intent-To-Treat ef-
fects, i.e. the impact of mere exposure to microfinance programs without considering
actual uptake of loans. RCTs are often seen as a golden standard able to provide results
that are more reliable and easier to generalise than those obtained from observational
studies, although no methodology is perfect (Banerjee & Duflo, 2009). This is the case,
for instance, of 6 studies recently published in 2015 in the American Economic Journal
Applied Economics. Banerjee et al. (2015) find insignificant effects on total consump-
tion, profits, women empowerment measures and Human Development Indices in the
slums of Hyderabad, India. Most of these results are echoed in the Cre´pon et al. (2015)
study in rural Morocco. Augsburg et al. (2015) unravel insignificant impacts of microfi-
nance on profits and negative effects on total consumption in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
If anything, these carefully led investigations shed even more doubts on the effective-
ness of microfinance programs which, overall, remains inconclusive.
2.2 Mission drift and the financial challenges of microfinance institutions
(MFIs)
Another widely recognized stylized fact about microfinance programs is that they can
fail to reach the poorest fringe of the population (Coleman, 2006; Menkhoff & Run-
gruxsirivorn, 2011) and can also suffer from mistargeting, i.e. some households who
are not eligible to microfinance based on landholdings requirements still get credit, as
Morduch (1998) and Roodman and Morduch (2014) showed was the case in the dataset
used by Pitt and Khandker (1998)3. Poor households who are the most vulnerable with
respect to their capacity to smooth consumption appear to be excluded from microfi-
nance programs or at least less likely to borrow (Amin, Rai, & Topa, 2003; Pearlman,
2 This result is consistent with the idea that microcredit increases demand for labour in the household
after a household business was setup thanks to the loan.
3 See also sub-section 2.2.2 of Chapter 1 of this thesis.
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2012). One could speculate that those beneficiaries who are already relatively better-
offmight also exhibit better ability to transform credit into profitable investments that
could yield higher income and hence improve consumption; such ability being the rea-
son they were better-off in the first place. If this is the case, average treatment effects
could overestimate the true impact of microfinance.
These last remarks relate to the broader debate on the financial sustainability of MFIs,
a concern raised early on by Morduch (1999a) that points out the reliance of MFIs on
subsidies as their primary source of funds and questions their actual financial viability.
For instance Morduch (1999b) shows that with proper provisioning and correct assess-
ment of repayment rates the financial health of Grameen Bank would be jeopardized
by small bumps in default rates on overdue loans or a small expansion of its activi-
ties. A more recent article by D’Espallier, Hudon, and Szafarz (2013) states that 23%
of MFIs are now subsidy independent, but the reliance of the industry on cheap funds
remains a timely issue as (Cull, 2015) confirms that few MFIs are actually profitable
when accounting properly for the cost of capital, suggesting the sector is still heavily
subsidised.
The funding structure of most MFIs that rely on donations and very low interest rates
might be essential to their ability to reach remote markets, which is much more costly
than traditional banking, and they raise the issue of subsidy-free financial sustainabil-
ity at the expense of the social mission carried by MFIs. In their attempt to investigate
potential trade-offs between financial sustainability and outreach, Cull, Demirguc¸-
Kunt, and Morduch (2007) show that village banks, mostly present on the poorest
segments of the market, experience the highest average costs and receive the most sub-
sidies, even though lenders that make smaller loans (a characteristic of outreach to the
poorer) do not seem to be less profitable. On the other hand, larger loans (likely less
poor-oriented institutions) are associated with lower average costs (and cutting costs
is crucial for MFIs to achieve financial sustainability) and individual lenders charge
higher interest rates and are more profitable than village banks or solidarity group
lenders.
Surprisingly, mission drift is salient for larger individual lenders and group lenders
alike, preventing the authors to draw clear-cut conclusions regarding the consequences
of healthier finances on MFIs practices. Nonetheless, the existence of such trade-offs is
ascertained by Hermes, Lensink, and Meesters (2011) who show that deeper outreach is
indeed strongly and significantly negatively related to cost efficiency: the more female
borrowers and the poorer the borrowers, the less efficient the institution. To a similar
extent, Hudon and Traca (2011) find that almost all subsidized institutions (in a sample
of 100 representative MFIs from two microfinance rating agencies) are more productive
than non-subsidized MFIs in terms of number of borrowers per staff. This intuition is
confirmed by D’Espallier et al. (2013) who analyse data from over 1,000 MFIs around
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the world to find suggestive evidence that subsidies indeed seem to improve social
performances.
On the other hand, unsubsidised lenders seem to have different strategies to achieve fi-
nancial efficiency depending on context, but they usually come at the expense of their
social mission: they tend to charge higher interest rates in Africa and Asia and to have
shallower outreach in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, i.e. they target less poor bor-
rowers, while Latin American MFIs reduce lending to women. The link between more
subsidies and smaller loan sizes (an indicator of deeper outreach) is also corroborated
by the findings in Armenda´riz, D’Espallier, Hudon, and Szafarz (2011) who argue that
mere uncertainty regarding the reception of future subsidies is harmful for outreach
and pushes interest rates up.
Competition and fight for survival can sometimes be useful motors that trigger waves
of innovation and push service providers to explore uncharted territories, which is rel-
evant in the case of microfinance as well. However, as suggested by evidence, access
to cheap funds seems crucial for MFIs to carry out their social mission. Nevertheless,
Muhammad Yunus, among others, was one to voice his fears4 in reaction not only to the
events occurring in India at the time but to the underlying trend of transformations the
sector experienced, referring to the emergence of IPOs launched by formerly non-for-
profit MFIs, for instance Compartamos in Mexico and SKS in India. As more and more
microfinance service providers undergo an institutional transformation towards more
shareholder-oriented structures (D’Espallier, Goedecke, Hudon, & Mersland, 2017), in-
creasing commercialisation and fierce competition have made financial sustainability
a crucial determinant of the future of microfinance.
Although studying the mission drift of MFIs is outside the scope of that paper, a bet-
ter understanding of how the gains from microfinance are distributed across destitute
and relatively better-off beneficiaries could help the debate. If microfinance programs
appeared to exhibit heterogeneous impacts that systematically benefit little or not at
all the poorest of the poor, one could even start to wonder whether such initiatives can
carry out the social mission they were set out to fulfill in the first place.
2.3 In search of the heterogeneous impacts of microfinance
The main contribution of this paper is to implement QR techniques to investigate the
potentially heterogeneous impacts of microfinance programs. Generally speaking, ex-
isting studies on the impacts of microfinance focus on effects at the conditional mean
of the outcome variable. However, one might wonder whether such average impacts are
truly representative for the population under study. In their structural evaluation of
the “Thai Million Baht Village Fund” program, Kaboski and Townsend (2011) develop
4 Opinion piece in The New York Times, “Sacrificing microcredit for megaprofits”, 2011, January 14.
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a theoretical framework that allows for heterogeneous responses of consumption and
investment to a surprise relaxation of credit constraints (expansion of access to credit)
depending on a household’s level of liquidity.
A few empirical studies also undertake to unravel whether microfinance loans recip-
ients respond differently to newly gained access to credit. For instance, Islam (2015)
finds that microcredit borrowing benefit more in terms of consumption to those house-
holds who hold less arable land. Copestake et al. (2005) find positive impacts on house-
hold income that are greater for the sub-sample of beneficiaries in the upper half of the
income distribution (above the median). But suggestive evidence based on mere sub-
sampling is not very satisfactory. A more suitable statistical technique to investigate
this question could be quantile regressions, which allow one to examine the impact of
changes in covariates at various points of the conditional distribution of the outcome
variable.
Exploiting the “Thai Million Baht Village Fund” natural experiment to study data from
nationally representative surveys, Boonperm et al. (2013) use panel data to estimate
a fixed effects model and find out this nationwide promotion of microcredit led to
significant increases in income and expenditures for its beneficiaries. They rely on a
panel data fixed effects QR model (following Gamper-Rabindran, Khan, and Timmins
(2010) in an application of the methodology by Chen and Khan (2008)) to assert these
effects are pro-poor in the sense they benefitted disproportionately those individuals
at the bottom of the income and expenditure distributions.
Angelucci et al. (2015) use survey data on over 16,000 households from a randomised
controlled trial (RCT) in Mexico to investigate the impact of expanding access to credit,
and they complement their analysis of average intent-to-treat effects with QR to look at
potential heterogeneous impacts, finding mild evidence of absence of negative impacts
in the lower tails of the outcomes’ distributions under scrutiny. Tarozzi et al. (2015)
also exploit a RCT design in rural Ethiopia to investigate the effects of expanded ac-
cess to credit on economic activities such as investment and entrepreneurship, and
the positive average intent-to-treat effects they find on crop-related costs, the value of
livestock sales and total revenues from self-employment actually seem to be mostly
driven by positive effects above the median, while the increase in crop sales is posi-
tive above the fourth decile. Augsburg et al. (2015) make the same observation from
a RCT in Bosnia-Herzegovina to assess the impact of expanded microcredit using data
on marginal applicants for loans, and find that positive impacts on firm profitability
are only present at the top of the distribution. These findings corroborate those ob-
tained in Banerjee et al. (2015) that carry out a randomised experiment in the slums of
Hyderabad, India, and by Cre´pon et al. (2015) that follow the method by Chamberlain
(1994) to estimate quantile treatment effects on various outcomes of an expansion of
microcredit access in rural Morocco.
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3 Data characteristics and previous studies
3.1 The dataset
As explicated in details in Chapter 1, our dataset consists of a survey of 1,798 house-
holds sampled from 87 villages in rural Bangladesh (about 20 households in each vil-
lage) that were selected across 29 sub-districts (or thanas). We use three waves of data
for our empirical investigation. The first wave of data was collected during the years
1991 and 1992 through three rounds of survey corresponding to the three main rice
seasons of the year; 1,769 households of the original sample were successfully inter-
viewed the three times. A second wave of data was collected in 1998-99. There were
1,638 households from the first wave successfully re-interviewed in 1998-99, and 237
of these had split into 546 households for a total of 1,947 observations in 1998-99 for
originally sampled households. In sum, the sample we use includes 1,638 households
that were successfully interviewed three times in 1991-92 and again in 1998-99. De-
tails about the study design and data collection can be found in Chapter 1 of the thesis.
3.2 Quasi-experimental design and estimation issues: insight from previ-
ous studies
The sampling strategy presented in Chapter 1 makes it clear that potential statistical
biases can easily arise in the analysis. First, program placement is not random. Only
the selection of villages where programs are effective is random, while the thanas from
which they are sampled are chosen precisely for the availability of microfinance in
these areas. It is likely that MFIs do not randomly choose where to setup their offices.
They might want to serve poorer areas where the need for credit is high and their social
mission is crucial, or alternatively they could start in less destitute areas to ensure the
financial viability of their operations before expanding to more remote and riskier seg-
ments of the market. Second, credit uptake is left to self-selection, posing the question
of how households form their decision to borrow (or not to). Although we are able to
control for a number of household characteristics and socio-economic variables, there
almost surely remain some factors crucial to the borrowing decision and not observable
to the researcher. One example that comes to mind is one’s entrepreneurship ability,
which must be determinant for the decision to borrow when most loans are given out
for productive purposes. Moreover, existence of similar unobservable variables at the
thana- and/or village-level is not to be ruled out.
Studies exploiting observational data often face the difficulty that valid excluded vari-
ables are not readily available to enable the use of an instrumental variable approach
or a sample selection correction model to deal with endogeneity issues. With that in
mind, data collection in this study was designed as a “quasi-experiment” in order to
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provide a candidate variable to be used as an instrument. Pitt and Khandker (1998)
explain that this is the reason why households were sampled based on their eligibility
status, which the authors consider to follow an exogenous rule based on land owner-
ship. They carry out their analysis on the 1991-92 data. They define a household choice
variable based on the eligibility status of a household and the availability of a micro-
finance program in the village. Indeed, an individual can only borrow if microcredit
is available to her and if she is eligible. The choice variable is then interacted with the
whole set of exogenous covariates to provide the instruments5.
A detailed exposition of their approach is provided in Roodman and Morduch (2014),
along with critics about its validity. The main concern is that identification hinges on
the validity of the exclusion restriction for program-eligibility as defined by the sup-
posedly exogenous rule about landholdings. We showed in Chapter 1 that according
to this rule a substantial amount of mistargeting exists in the data (around 1 in 5 bor-
rowing households is not eligible in 1991-92), which means that the choice variable
introduced above could not instrument the amount of credit correctly as it would be
zero for mistargeted households (ineligible borrowers)6. As it so happens, before esti-
mation Pitt and Khandker (1998) actually classify households as eligible if they own no
more than half an acre of land or if they effectively borrow, therefore not exploiting the
exogenous discontinuity they defended in the first place (Roodman & Morduch, 2014).
Thanks to the second wave of data from 1998-99, panel data analysis techniques can be
used to mitigate the endogeneity issues at hand. Let’s assume an empirical model of the
same form as Khandker (2005) where the outcome of interest C (say, consumption) for
household i in village j for period t is determined by current and past characteristics
including levels of borrowing S:
Cijt = Xijtα +Xij(t−1)β + Sijtδ+ Sij(t−1)γ + ηcij +µ
c
j + 
c
ijt (2.1)
where X is a vector of household- and village-level characteristics, η and µ represent
unobserved time-invariant characteristics at the household and village levels, respec-
tively,  is the error term, and credit demand is given by:
Sijt = Xijtλ+ η
s
ij +µ
s
j + 
s
ijt (2.2)
5 The actual empirical strategy in Pitt and Khandker (1998) is more complex, as variables enter in
logarithms (hence inputting a censoring value for when credit is zero), village fixed effects are introduced,
and the authors differentiate between the impacts of microcredit issued to women versus men from the
three possible lenders considered in the 1991-92 study, thereby estimating 6 coefficients of interest. They
coin their estimator weighted exogenous sampling maximum likelihood-limited information maximum
likelihood-fixed effects (WESML-LIML-FE).
6 Roodman and Morduch (2014) use LOWESS regression plots to show that there is no apparent dis-
continuity in microcredit borrowings along the distribution of landholdings, although Pitt and Khandker
(1998) deemed their approach to identification akin to that of a regression discontinuity design.
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The superscripts c and s signify the fixed effects and error term belong to the ‘con-
sumption’ or the ‘credit demand’ equations, respectively.
The above empirical model allows for the impact of microcredit on household-level
outcomes to vary over time, with the inclusion of the lagged value of microcredit stock
S7. Therefore, coefficient δ measure the impacts of the current stock of (female and
male) microcredit on contemporaneous consumption while coefficient γ estimates cap-
ture the long-term impacts on current consumption of the past stock of household bor-
rowings (for men and women borrowers). Furthermore, Khandker (2005) breaks down
credit variables by gender, in line with baseline results from Pitt and Khandker (1998)
that advertised different benefits from microcredit depending on the gender of bor-
rowers, i.e. one regression yields two values for each coefficient δ and γ . In Khandker
(2005), a first-difference version of Equation 2.1 is estimated directly via OLS to yield
unbiased and consistent coefficient estimates, assuming that household- and village-
level endogeneity stem from unobserved attributes that are time-invariant and hence
controlled for by household-level fixed effects.
The author measures microcredit impacts on three outcome variables, namely house-
hold per capita total, food and non-food expenditure measured annually and expressed
in 1992 Taka. He reports that an extra Tk 100 in microfinance loans given out to women
in the previous time period yield an average marginal gain of about Tk 15 in household
total annual expenditure, and gains of Tk 7 and Tk 8 in food and non-food expenditure,
respectively8.
As exposed in Khandker (2005), both equations must be estimated jointly, which would
raise endogeneity issues in a cross-section framework such as that in Pitt and Khandker
(1998). In a panel data setting, the introduction of household-level fixed effects pick up
any unobserved household-level characteristics that is time-invariant, including such
unobservable that might influence credit demand and consumption decisions. By the
same token, time-invariant unobserved village-level attributes are also controlled for
by household-level fixed effects assuming uncorrelated error terms between the con-
sumption and credit demand equations (Khandker, 2005).
However, Khandker (2005) rightly points out that several such hidden characteristics
may vary over time, hereby jeopardising the consistency of parameter estimates, as the
author puts it: “The unmeasured determinants of credit at both households and village
levels may vary over time, and if credit is measured with error (which is likely), the
error gets amplified when differencing over time, especially with only two time periods.
7 Note that credit stock is assumed to depend only on contemporaneous household characteristics, al-
though Khandker (2005) argues that allowing for credit demand to depend on past characteristics would
not change an estimation strategy based on fixed effects panel data analysis.
8 Regressions are carried in logarithmic form, hence estimating elasticities, with dependent variables
expressed in terms of per capita consumption, while marginal gains are computed for total consumption
of an average-sized household.
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This measurement error will impart attenuation bias to the credit impact coefficients,
biasing the impact estimates towards zero.” (Khandker, 2005). As a consequence of this
statement the author advocates for the use of an instrumental variable approach, and
proposes to use the same instruments as in Pitt and Khandker (1998), i.e. to interact the
choice variable with each and every exogenous covariate to create the set of instruments
in the first stage.
Khandker (2005) does note that the purpose of instrumentation is different: in the pre-
vious study it was aimed at getting rid of endogeneity; here it is used to deal with mea-
surement error and potential time-varying heterogeneity. The author does not provide
much more details about the instrumentation strategy and reports only the household-
level fixed effects OLS estimation results, a model that is not out-performed by the IV
approach according to the Hausman-Wu test, although results from the latter and from
the 2SLS regression are not reported.
More details are to be found in the original version of Roodman and Morduch (2009)
that is a well-known constructive critique of the Pitt and Khandker (1998) methodol-
ogy, and in which they also replicate and criticise the study in Khandker (2005). For
instance, although they replicate the pattern of results presented in Khandker (2005)
quite nicely, they cannot reject the hypothesis that OLS and 2SLS differ, which makes
them question the reliability of the conclusions of the paper about the very strong im-
pact of microcredit on poverty reduction, the latter being computed from a numerical
extrapolation based on the OLS results.
4 Overview of quantile regression methods
4.1 The linear quantile regression estimator
Let Y be a random variable with distribution function FY and τ ∈ [0,1]. Define the τ-th
quantile of FY , denoted by qY (τ), as:
qY (τ) = F
−1
Y (τ) = inf{y : FY (y) ≥ τ } (2.3)
The τ-th sample quantile of Y is then any solution to the following minimization prob-
lem (Koenker & Bassett, 1978):
min
ξ
∑
i
ρτ (Yi − ξ) (2.4)
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where ρτ (.) is the tilted absolute function (Koenker & Hallock, 2001), more commonly
referred to as the “check” function:
ρτ (u) = (τ −1[u < 0])u (2.5)
and 1[.] is the indicator function.
Now, consider that Y has a conditional distribution function FY |X with its τ-th (condi-
tional) quantile defined similarly as above by QY |X(τ) = F−1Y |X(τ) . Assuming the τ-th
conditional quantile of Y is linear in a set of covariates X, we can write:
QY |X(τ) = X ′βτ (2.6)
and an estimator for βτ is given by:
βˆτ = argmin
βτ
∑
i
ρτ (Yi −Xiβτ) (2.7)
which is the representation of linear conditional QR made popular by Koenker and
Bassett (1978) for which a solution can be found through linear programming tech-
niques as discussed for instance in Koenker and d’Orey (1987, 1994).
The main interest of QR lies in that it allows researchers to characterise the impact of a
set of covariates at points of the conditional distribution of the response variables other
than the mean as is typically done in “traditional” econometrics. As Koenker puts it:
“from a policy standpoint it is important to have a clear indication of how the mean
response to changes in [a covariate of interest] is ‘allocated’ to the various segments
of the conditional distribution of [the outcome of interest], and this is what quantile
regression analysis provides.” (Koenker, 2005, Section 2.4.1, p.50)9.
Another advantage of QR is that it is robust to outliers compared to OLS in the same
fashion that the median is robust to outliers compared to the mean as a measure of
central tendency. Moreover, QR are able to capture sources of heterogeneity stemming
from the covariates when errors are not necessarily i.i.d. (Koenker, 2005). An intuitive
way to visualise this property is to consider the following model that allows for a simple
form of heteroscedasticity:
yi = β0 + β1xi + (γxi)ui (2.8)
9 The phrases in square brackets are amendments made to the original quotation to make it more
general.
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Equation 2.8 is what Koenker (2005) coins the linear location-scale model, where the ui ’s
are i.i.d. with distribution function Fu . The τ-th conditional quantile of Y is given by:
QY |X(τ) = β0 + β1X + (γX)qu(τ) (2.9)
where qu(τ) = F−1u (τ) is the τ-quantile of the error term u = {ui} as defined before. We
can then easily see that:
QY |X(τ) = β0 + (β1 +γqu(τ))X = β0 + βτX (2.10)
Equation 2.10 shows that QR of Y on X yield estimates of βτ that vary with each esti-
mated quantile level, reflecting the type of heteroscedasticity specified in (2.8). This
example illustrates the ability of QR to capture some heterogeneity inherent to the
data at little cost10. One might notice that in the case of homoscedastic i.i.d. errors (set
γxi = 1 in (2.8)) the influence of qu(τ) at various quantiles is absorbed in the constant,
i.e. βτ is the same for all τ ∈ (0,1) and the estimated conditional quantiles are parallel
lines11.
Note that it was assumed so far that the “true” conditional quantile function is lin-
ear, which of course is debatable. Angrist, Chernozhukov, and Ferna´ndez-Val (2006)
show that QR can actually be seen as providing a minimum mean squared errors lin-
ear prediction of the conditional function, the implication being that QR is the best
linear approximation to the conditional quantile function, much like OLS gives the
best linear approximation to the conditional expectation function.
The robustness and relative simplicity of QR have made this technique a popular tool in
empirical work since the mid-1990s. See for instance the book edited by Fitzenberger,
Koenker, and Machado (2002), “Economic Applications of Quantile Regression”, for a
review of the uses and interest of this technique in modern econometrics.
4.2 Endogeneity in quantile regressions
Let us introduce a regression model that resembles that of our empirical study. We
denote Y the observed outcome variable, say consumption, observed for a sample of N
households, that can be written as:
Yi = Xiβ +Ciδ+ i for i = 1, ...,N (2.11)
10 Obviously, more complex forms of heteroscedasticity would not necessarily be adequately controlled
for by specifying a simple linear conditional quantile function as in 2.9.
11 This discussion and equations 2.8 to 2.10 draw heavily on Sections 1.4 and 1.5 of Koenker (2005),
Chapter 7 of Angrist and Pischke (2008) as well as a brief exposition in Gamper-Rabindran et al. (2010).
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where X is a set of covariates and  represents a household-specific error term. The
extra regressor C represents household microcredit borrowings in our case, and the
coefficient of interest δ can be consistently estimated via OLS provided idiosyncratic
errors are i.i.d., follow a Normal distribution with zero mean and constant variance,
and are orthogonal to X and C. A household decision to borrow likely depends on
measurable socio-economic factors X, but also on some unobserved households char-
acteristics. Let credit C assume the following reduced-form representation:
Ci = Zi +ui (2.12)
where Z is a set of measured household characteristics, for instance the variables in
X, and ui ’s are household-specific disturbances. Endogeneity concerns arise when the
latter are correlated with the errors in (2.11), which violates the orthogonality condi-
tion on  (i.e. that E(iCi) , 0) and introduces bias in the OLS estimate of δ. When
Z also includes at least one other exogenous variate that does not enter equation 2.11,
then δ can be consistently estimated via an instrumental variable or control function
approach.
To get a representation of endogeneity issues in QR, let us re-write Equation 2.11 as
follows:
Yi = Xiβ(τ) +Ciδ(τ) + i(τ) (2.13)
For a given quantile level τ , QR run on Equation 2.13 consistently estimates the τ-th
conditional quantile of Y provided a zero conditional quantile restriction on the error
term, i.e. that Qτ (|X,C) = 0. The latter can be written in the form of a conditional
expectation as in Kim and Muller (2013):
E(φτ (i)|Xi ,Ci) = 0 (2.14)
where φτ (u) = τ − 1[u ≤ 0], for any quantile τ . This equality tells us that, at a given
quantile, the rank of an observation in the conditional distribution of the response vari-
able i.e. whether it is above or below the estimated conditional quantile function (the
associated error term being positive or negative, respectively) must not be influenced
by the values of the regressors, on average. Therefore, endogeneity at quantile τ is ad-
equately described by E(φτ (i)|Xi ,Ci) , 0 (Kim & Muller, 2013)12. The consequence is
that, in our context, microcredit and household consumption might be endogenous at
given quantiles of the conditional distribution of the latter, but not necessarily every-
where.
12 Kim and Muller (2012) define endogeneity in a similar way based on the following orthogonality
condition: E[Xiφτ (i )] = 0 (assuming only covariates X enter the regression equation).
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An early suggestion to deal with endogeneity in QR was made by Amemiya (1982) in
the context of median regression where the problematic regressor(s) is replaced by its
fitted values from a linear-in-means first stage13. Kim and Muller (2004) generalise
this approach to all quantiles and recommend using linear QR in the first stage, with
both stages of estimation carried out at the same quantile level. The authors also show
that any remaining bias from using OLS in the first stage is concealed to the constant,
the approach still yielding consistent estimates for the slope coefficients which usually
are of primary interest (Kim & Muller, 2012). This methodology follows the intuition
of two-stage least squares and could be regarded as its quantile counterpart.
Abadie, Angrist, and Imbens (2002) discuss the use of instrumental variables in QR
and provide identification results for a QR equivalent of the Local Average Treatment
Effect when both treatment and the instrument are binary variables. Chernozhukov
and Hansen (2006) propose an estimation procedure to recover quantile treatment ef-
fects when treatment is endogenous and a strong instrument is available under a rank
similarity assumption. Other approaches suggest to address sample selection bias in
the spirit of Heckman using control functions, such as in Buchinsky (1998, 2001) or
Lee (2007), while Arellano and Bonhomme (2017a) proposes to use copulas to cor-
rect directly for selection bias in QR coefficients14. Other approaches include Chesher
(2007) and Imbens and Newey (2009) who focus on identification under endogene-
ity in triangular models with non-separable disturbances, and also a recent paper by
D. Powell (2016b) presenting an estimation procedure to recover quantile treatment
effects on the unconditional distribution of the outcome variable, even when treatment
is endogenous.
As of today, to the best of our knowledge, no method has emerged as superior to others,
nor do standardised tests exist for the detection of endogeneity or for checking instru-
ment validity in QR. A discussion of quantile models with endogeneity can be found
in Chernozhukov and Hansen (2013).
4.3 Quantile regressions with panel data
Let us write a simple panel data regression model where outcome Y observed for house-
hold i at time t depends on a set of covariates X and a set of household-specific effects:
Yit = Xitβ +αi + it (2.15)
Equation 2.15 is the typical representation of a “fixed effects” model15. Individual
13 The asymptotics of this estimator were worked out in J. L. Powell (1983).
14 Arellano and Bonhomme (2017b) provide a survey of such methods in the context of QR.
15 We take this opportunity to clarify an often confusing semantic choice. In our discussion of panel
data models, “random” and ‘fixed’ effects always refer to the way unobserved individual components are
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effects, or unobserved individual heterogeneity, enter additively and are assumed time-
invariant while their distribution is left unspecified, allowing the researcher to control
non-parametrically for potential correlation between unobserved components αi and
one or several variables in X. In practice, in a balanced panel dataset with two time
periods such as ours, model 2.15 can be estimated directly by running OLS on the
first-difference version of 2.15, yielding a consistent estimate of parameter β (see e.g.
Wooldridge, 2010b).
Unfortunately, no analogous transformation on quantiles exists that yields similar re-
sults for QR because linear functions do not pass through the quantile operator, i.e.
the quantile of the difference does not equal the difference of the quantiles. First-
differencing before implementing QR is not necessarily wrong, but the object of in-
terest then becomes the conditional distribution of a differenced variable, making the
interpretation of the results less intuitive and maybe even irrelevant (see e.g. Abre-
vaya & Dahl, 2008; Kato, F. Galvao, & Montes-Rojas, 2012; Koenker, 2004; Koenker &
Hallock, 2000, among others).
The consequence is that potential correlation across individual-level repeated measure-
ments and/or correlation between individual effects and regressors have to be handled
directly. One could specify a QR version of (2.15) such as:
Yit = Xitβ(τ) +αi(τ) + it(τ) (2.16)
and consider the τ-specific individual effects as parameters to be estimated. How-
ever, this strategy is unreliable for many real-world applications because QR will suf-
fer from the incidental parameters problem when the number of panels greatly exceeds
the number of time periods (Graham, Hahn, & Powell, 2009; Kato et al., 2012; D. Pow-
ell, 2016a). For instance, studying a model of the form of (2.16) with our data amounts
to estimating 1,638 individual effects on top of the common parameters pertaining to
covariates, using only 3,276 data points (we have two time periods).
Understandably, there is a rich literature on QR with panel data. Koenker (2004) pro-
poses to focus on the following conditional quantile functions for response variable
Y:
QYit (τ |Xit) = αi +X ′itβτ for i = 1, ...,N and t = 1, ...,T (2.17)
where the unobserved individual components αi are restricted to have a location-shift
defined. Random effects representations assume the individual unobserved components are independent
of the error term, uncorrelated to the regressors, and follow some pre-specified distribution function. In
fixed effects models, the distribution of individual-specific unobservables is left unrestricted, allowing for
arbitrary correlation with the error term and regressors, and individual effects can be seen as parameters
to be estimated. We make this clarification because researchers with different backgrounds can under-
stand the concepts of random and fixed effects in different ways.
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effect only, i.e. they are the same across all quantiles16 (note that the impact of covari-
ates is allowed to vary across quantiles). The author makes a case to circumvent the
high-dimensional nature of this specification (when the number of individuals is very
large) by estimating the model for k quantiles simultaneously and imposing a penalty
on the fixed effects which results in solving a problem of the form:
min
(α,β)
∑
k
∑
t
∑
i
wkρτk (Yij −αi −X ′ijβτk ) +λ
∑
i
|αi | (2.18)
where wk is a weight defining the contribution of the k-th quantile to the estimation
of the individual effects, and λ is a regularisation parameter to be chosen by the re-
searcher. The penalty term based on absolute values is called an l1-penalty and is built
to shrink the individual effects towards a common value to an extent determined by λ.
For small values of λ tending to 0 the αi ’s tend to their values in the unpenalised ver-
sion of the estimator, whereas they tend to be zero for all i when λ tends to infinity. In
practice the choice of λ remains at the discretion of the researcher (Koenker, 2004) and
its impact on estimated coefficients can be quite substantial especially in datasets with
numerous panels and few time periods (see for instance simulation studies in Geraci
and Bottai (2007) and Bache, Dahl, and Kristensen (2013)). Although it does not di-
rectly address the incidental parameter problem, when a fair amount of shrinkage is
allowed the penalty term will make the smaller village effects (in terms of magnitude)
tend to zero which in turn can make for a sparser design matrix and improve the pre-
cision of the estimated slope coefficients (Koenker, 2004).
Canay (2011) also specifies pure location-shift individual effects and proposes to run
a least squares regression to get estimates of the fixed effects, which are then sub-
tracted from the response variable, the resulting transformed outcome being used as
the dependent variable in linear QR. Ponomareva (2010) derives identification results
of quantile coefficients in panel data with small T when fixed effects have a distribu-
tional shift impact under the condition that all covariates have continuous support;
if (some) regressors are discrete identification is possible only when individual effects
are independent from the error term (location-shift effect only). In a competing ap-
proach, Geraci and Bottai (2007) proposes a simulation-based estimation procedure
for QR with random effects, assuming the quantile error term follows an asymmetric
Laplace distribution and individual effects are independent from the error term and
orthogonal to regressors.
The instrumental variable QR estimation procedure developed in Chernozhukov and
Hansen (2006) is adapted by Harding and Lamarche (2009) to deal with endogeneity
16 When the αi ’s are τ-dependent as in Equation 2.16, they are implicitly allowed to have a distribu-
tional shift effect, i.e. to impact both location and scale of the conditional distribution.
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in panel data models that include quantile individual effects17 and interactive effects
(Harding & Lamarche, 2014). Chetverikov, Larsen, and Palmer (2016) also develop an
estimator to recover quantile treatment effects under endogeneity in panel data models
when treatment is allocated at the level of a group.
In sum, the heart of the issue is to consider unobserved individual effects as parameters
to be estimated while no transformation of the data can adequately ‘get rid of them’ in
the context of QR18. Even though some methods are straightforward to implement
such as that of Canay (2011) or the model considered in Kato et al. (2012), most of
the aforementioned approaches rely on large T -large N asymptotics for consistency,
while conditions for identification in a very small T setting are quite restrictive (as in
e.g. Ponomareva, 2010). These considerations were crucial for our choice of a suitable
empirical strategy given the nature of our data that have a large number of panels and
only two time periods, as we detail in the next section.
5 Empirical methodology
In this section we discuss the details of our empirical strategy to exploit the panel
dataset presented in Chapter 1 of this thesis.
We first carry out a cross-sectional analysis, performing regressions on both waves of
data separately with an exploratory purpose, trying to unravel potential patterns of
heterogeneity in how microfinance credit can influence household consumption be-
haviour. The first sub-section presents our baseline regression model and explains
how we try to address the endogeneity issues pointed out in Section 3 of this chapter.
The second sub-section details how we intend to implement adequate panel data tech-
niques in the context of QR, as the availability of longitudinal panel data – i.e. each
household in the sample is observed twice over time – offers alternative ways of dealing
with endogeneity, especially that stemming from self-selection. Given the limitations
in addressing endogeneity using only cross-sections of our data, we consider the panel
data approach our preferred specification in that it exploits more information and is
more robust.
In each sub-section – whether discussing cross-sectional or panel data analysis – we
take stock of what has been done in previous studies that used the same data before
exposing our methodology.
17 The authors point out that characterising individual effects as fixed when they are allowed to vary by
quantile is “not fully appropriate” and therefore prefer to refer to them as quantile individual effects.
18We discuss models that assume additivity in the individual effects and the error term. For instance,
Powell (2016b) develops a novel approach to estimating quantile panel data models with non-additive
individual effects based on a rank similarity assumption, although the proposed moment-based estimator
does not allow for the inclusion of covariates.
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5.1 Cross-sectional data analysis
5.1.1 Insight from previous studies
This sub-section builds mainly on Pitt and Khandker (1998) (PK afterwards) and Rood-
man and Morduch (2009, 2014), and therefore equations and notations are very close
to those found in their papers.
PK carry out their study on cross-sectional data and model response variable Y for
household i in village j as a linear function of household microcredit C and household-
level covariates X as follows:
Yij = Cijδ+Xijγ +αj + ij (2.19)
where αj represents village j unobserved characteristics that influence Yij and ij is a
household-specific disturbance. Direct estimation of Equation 2.19 via OLS yields a
consistent estimate of the parameter of interest δ under a zero conditional expectation
restriction on the error term, i.e. that E(|X,C,α) = 0 . We note that regressor C, the
credit variable, stems from a household decision to borrow and that it can be modelled
in a way analogous to Y in Equation 2.19 as proposed in PK:
Cij = Xijγ
c +Zijλ+α
c
j + 
c
ij (2.20)
where Z embeds household and village characteristics that affect the decision to borrow
only (and not household behaviour Yij ). Other terms are defined as in Equation 2.19
and subscript c signifies they pertain to the ‘credit equation’.
We know from the the discussion in sub-section 3.2 that program placement in the sam-
ple is not random, which leads to possible correlation between αcj and αj , hence violat-
ing the zero conditional expectation restriction on the error term in Equation 2.19 and
yield biased OLS estimates. Similarly, credit program participation (and the amount
borrowed) is left to self-selection, so we expect there exist variables entering the deci-
sion to borrow that are not observable and might influence other household decisions
such as outcome Y . Again, the restriction on the error term in 2.19 is violated because
of correlation between cij and ij and OLS yield a biased estimate of δ.
PK propose to implement an instrumental variable (IV) approach19 to address endo-
geneity issues20. As explained in sub-section 3.2, the three microfinance initiatives
19 Discussion of the estimation strategy in PK is very technical and can be hard to follow. Roodman and
Morduch (2009, 2014) present it in a clear and more intuitive fashion and we build on their work for this
paragraph, as well as on responses to their critique from Pitt (1999, 2014).
20 In studies using the same dataset, Chemin (2008) uses propensity score matching (PSM) techniques
that assume selection be stemming from observed characteristics only, while Dalla Pellegrina (2011) uses
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considered in the study officially abode by the following rule: households must hold
no more than half an acre of land to be eligible to microcredit borrowing. The interac-
tion of the eligibility indicator e with a dummy variable p taking value 1 if a program
is available in a village generates a household choice variable c = p × e. It follows that
a household decision to borrow depends first and foremost on c: microcredit borrow-
ing is observed only when c = 1, i.e. when a household is eligible and lives in a village
where a program is available. Because they choose a continuous measure of microcredit
(household cumulative borrowings over the past 6 years), PK increase the variability
and explanatory power of their binary candidate IV by interacting choice variable c
with household and village characteristics to create their final set of instruments Z21.
Identification hinges on two assumptions: the ‘landholdings rule’ of eligibility was
set exogenously, and household landholdings are also exogenous. Morduch (1998) ex-
plores landholdings data to challenge the latter, while Roodman and Morduch (2009,
2014) show there is actually no clear discontinuity in microcredit participation along
the distribution of landholdings, pointing to the substantial mistargeting in the data
(a large proportion of ineligible households who do in fact borrow) and questioning
the validity of the aforementioned eligibility rule as an exogenous cut-off point from
which identification of the parameters of interest should stem22. The critiques by Mor-
duch (1998) and Roodman and Morduch (2009, 2014) spawned a rich debate about the
strategy used in PK with the latter being fiercely defended in responses by Pitt (1999,
2014).23. Notwithstanding the interest of the aforementioned discussions regarding
econometric techniques and the virtues of transparent research to make replication
easier, we do not comment further on these issues as our study involves a much dif-
ferent empirical setting, namely quantile regressions, and does not aim at replicating
previous work but rather at taking stock of it in order to provide a sensible comple-
mentary analysis.
an IV setup to try to identify the impact of various sources of credit, including microcredit, on productive
investment.
21 This approach to IV estimation in a quasi-experimental setting, i.e. the choice variable as candidate
IV, has become popular and was used for instance in Islam and Maitra (2012), Islam and Choe (2013) and
Islam (2015) in studies of the impact of microfinance in Bangladesh (using a dataset different from ours),
and in Boonperm et al. (2013) to analyse the impact of the nationwide Thai Million Baht Village Fund
program.
22 Roodman and Morduch (2014) explain that PK actually classified ineligible borrowers as eligible
when estimating their model.
23 Similarly, Duvendack and Palmer-Jones (2012) could not fully replicate the results of Chemin (2008)
using PSM and built on their own estimates to challenge the findings of PK and Chemin (2008), an exercise
that earned them two heated responses from the authors in question (Chemin, 2012; Pitt, 2012).
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5.1.2 Baseline cross-section specification
We start by estimating a quantile version of Equation 2.19 as specified in PK, hence
modelling the conditional quantile function of outcome variable Y as follows:
Qτ (Yij |Cij ,Xij = C′ijδτ +X ′ijβτ +αj(τ) (2.21)
The relationship in (2.21) is assumed to hold for all i and all j at every quantile τ
provided the usual restriction on the error term mentioned in sub-section 4.2 of this
chapter. Coefficient estimates are obtained via the textbook QR estimator of Koenker
and Bassett (1978). Note that we allow for village-level unobserved components and
leave their impact free to vary at each quantile, as is the case for other right-hand side
variables. Regressor C stands for our measure of household microcredit borrowing
and therefore δτ is the coefficient of interest. Other variates in X control for household
characteristics and capture features of a village economic environment.
We estimate Equation 2.21 at every decile to recover the marginal impact of microcre-
dit on the conditional distribution of consumption. Whether households rank above
or below the conditional quantile function estimated at the τ-th quantile depends on
their characteristics. That is, the rank of households in the conditional distribution is
given relative to other households with similar characteristics. Therefore, δτ represents
the shift in consumption imputable to microfinance loans on the consumption level
of households who consume relatively little or much (depending on quantile level τ)
given their socio-economic features. That way, Equation 2.21 allows us to investigate
whether borrowers benefit from microfinance differently based on their pre-existing
level of welfare.
We know from sub-sections 4.1 and 4.2 that in spite of its robustness properties, and
even though it can handle some level of individual heterogeneity, the linear QR estima-
tor can be subject to an endogeneity bias. Unfortunately, our options are limited by the
structure of the data and the debatable quality of the candidate instrumental variable.
Nevertheless, we carry out an attempt at correcting for the endogeneity of household
microcredit and consumption through an IV approach.
5.1.3 IV approach for cross-sectional data
The candidate instrument is a household choice variable (c) defined as the interaction
of two dummy variables: the eligibility status of the household (e) and the availability
of microfinance programs in a village (p). All exogenous covariates are then interacted
with c to create the set of instruments. While Roodman and Morduch (2014) consider
PK’s framework in the “traditional” IV setting to discuss the credibility of the necessary
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exclusion restriction regarding the candidate IV, Pitt (2014) points out that identifica-
tion in PK does not rely on the instrument being excluded, but rather on the fact that
the outcome variable is observed “for individuals that exogenously have no choice to
obtain (credit) treatment” (Pitt, 2014). Essentially, their strategy is akin to instrument-
ing for microcredit with all exogenous covariates on a restricted sample for which c = 1,
acknowledging the fact that credit is deterministically zero for observations that have
c = 0 (Pitt, 2014).
In order to mimic PK’s instrumentation strategy we elect to implement the two-stage
QR (2SQR) approach discussed in Kim and Muller (2012). We construct the household
choice variable c defined above, and the first step consists of a least squares regres-
sion of household microcredit borrowings on the full set of exogenous variables for the
subset of households for which c = 1. We then replace microcredit by its first-stage
predicted values in QR at each decile, making sure to set predictions to zero where
c = 0. In the case of gender-specific impacts, we define one choice variable for each
gender built on the availability in a village of micro-lending to single-sex groups of the
corresponding gender. In 1991-92, our first wave of data, 22 villages have female-only
groups, 10 have programs providing credit to male-only groups and 40 have single-sex
groups of both genders. Hence, there are two first-stage regressions in that case, one
for each gender.
Recall that there is a substantial amount of mistargeting in the data, i.e. some bor-
rowing households are not functionally landless although this is meant to be the main
eligibility criterion. In order to make sure all observations with non-zero credit are
included, eligibility is defined de facto as in PK (Morduch, 1998). In other words, in
program villages households are deemed eligible if they own less than 0.5 acre of land
or if they actually borrow, while only the former criterion applies in control villages24.
Note that event though Kim and Muller (2004) recommend the use of QR in the first
stage, we do not follow this approach because credit variables have a mass point at
zero which rendered QR in the first step unfeasible because of the sample restrictions
imposed by our instrumentation strategy. However, as pointed out in sub-section 4.2,
Kim and Muller (2012) show that 2SQR with OLS predictions provides consistent slope
estimates as any remaining bias in second stage estimation is limited to the constant.
Therefore, we feel that our approach using linear-in-means estimators in the first stage
is still sensible.
We must close this section with a few remarks regarding cross-sectional analysis of
1998-99 data. By the late 1990’s, every village in the sample has access to microfi-
nance, including former control villages. Therefore, the choice variable described ear-
lier cannot be defined and sample restrictions in the first stage are merely based on
24 Morduch (1998) raises the issue that groups of eligible households in program and control villages
might not be comparable as the former also includes a substantial proportion of landed households.
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eligibility status defined de facto. Moreover, the three microfinance initiatives first
under scrutiny in 1991-92 are not the only ones present in sampled villages in the sec-
ond wave of data, and their activities are not limited within selected thanas anymore
(see section 3 and our discussion of the study design). Although PK differentiate im-
pacts of credit on households outcomes for different lenders (BRAC, Grameen Bank
and BRDB), this distinction is not relevant in the 1998-99 data. For the sake of consis-
tency, we do not allow for differential credit impacts between micro-lenders in 1991-92
either25. Finally, the 1991-92 variables identifying villages in which microfinance pro-
grams offer credit to single-sex groups of a given gender were not available in raw data
from the World Bank’s website and were obtained from a webpage at the Center for
Global Development website that hosts data and resources relating to a revised version
of Roodman and Morduch (2009) published as Roodman and Morduch (2014)26. They
are not available at all for the 1998-99 data.
5.1.4 Empirical specification and estimation procedure
We estimate model (2.21) at each decile for both waves of data separately and include
alternatively village covariates or a set of village dummy variables to control for non-
random program placement27. The latter is more conservative but it implies the esti-
mation of 86 village effects (there are 87 villages, one is left out as a reference point)
which might increase the variability of other estimated coefficients, a consequence of
the incidental parameters problem mentioned in sub-section 4.3. Therefore, we also
implement the penalised QR method to restrict village fixed effects to have the same
impact at each quantile of the conditional distribution (Koenker, 2004).
In fixed effects specifications, it is crucial for 2SQR estimates that first-stage regres-
sions on restricted samples also include village dummy variables so as to control for
possible unobserved community-level that could influence demand for credit in pro-
gram villages. Indeed, we see that the outcome and credit demand equations - (2.19)
and (2.20), respectively - each include their own set of village effects28.
Along with impact estimates for household microcredit, we follow PK and accommo-
date the possibility of gender-based returns to microfinance loans by splitting micro-
credit borrowings into two variables, i.e. loans issued to female/male members of a
25 Another reason for considering microcredit borrowings as a whole in 1991-92, instead of just these
three MFIs, is that some borrowers already got micro-credit from various sources at that time.
26 David Roodman himself obtained the information from a dataset sent to him by Mark Pitt in one of
their communications.
27Controlling for observable village characteristics alone does not account for unobserved village char-
acteristics that can correlate with the error term and it leaves the issue of non-random program placement
partly unaddressed.
28 This point was made in Morduch (1998) to argue that PK fail to account for it, and Pitt (1999)
responded that the very design of their estimator, with restricted first-stage estimation samples, effectively
allows for two different sets of village effects as reflected by equations (2.19) and (2.20).
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household. Interestingly, PK was extremely influential in strengthening the belief that
female borrowers do more for global household welfare than male borrowers. Anyhow,
the microfinance initiatives under scrutiny when the study was set up only offered
loans to single-sex groups, so it is sensible to differentiate the impacts of microcredit
by gender in our dataset29.
For inference, we use a block bootstrap procedure to generate 999 samples from our
data by drawing villages randomly with replacement. The reason we draw at the village
level rather than drawing individuals is to account for the within-cluster dependency
structure of the data block bootstrap is often used to compute cluster-robust stan-
dard errors (see MacKinnon (2002) and Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008), among
others). We generate bootstrap samples separately for each wave of data. Then, we
perform estimations on each bootstrap sample30. The quantile slope coefficients for
microcredit variables shown in the results section are estimates from baseline regres-
sions carried out on the original sample. The empirical distribution of our estimates is
used directly to build 95% confidence intervals in the fashion of Efron and Tibshirani
(1993), sometimes referred to as percentile bootstrap confidence interval31. Parente
and Santos Silva (2016) developed a method to produce cluster-robust standard errors
in QR, however they do not allow for sampling weights that are crucial to our analy-
sis32.
Another advantage of bootstrapping is that we can obtain an estimate of the variance-
covariance matrix across quantiles, which opens the door for Wald-type tests of cross-
quantile restrictions33. For each treatment variable under consideration we test the
null hypothesis that the estimated coefficients are equal across all quantiles, and also
whether they are jointly equal to zero. Rejection of the null for the first test indicates
significant heterogeneity in the quantile process, while for the second test it means that
the quantile process as a whole is not zero. In regressions with distinct credit variables
for each gender, we test at each quantile whether the impact of female microcredit
is statistically distinguishable from that of male microcredit. Finally, we carry out
joint hypotheses tests to formally determine whether the quantile process as a whole
29 Recent advances in theoretical microeconomics have put forward the issues of gender and bargain-
ing power in the process of intra-household decision-making in developing countries (Fuwa, Ito, Kubo,
Kurosaki, & Sawada, 2006; Xu, 2007). The influence of newly gained credit access on the balance of bar-
gaining power within the household is studied in a theoretical model by Ngo and Wahhaj (2012), and
Alam (2012) finds evidence that self-employment returns to microcredit significantly promote gender
empowerment in rural Bangladesh.
30 Note that for 2SQR we perform both stages of the estimation on each bootstrap sample.
31 This approach provides better coverage than alternative bootstrap confidence intervals because the
distributions of our bootstrap estimates are often asymmetric. Especially, such confidence intervals do not
include “unrealistic” coefficient values (or rather, values that are not empirically observed in our bootstrap
estimates).
32 The same authors developed the qreg2 command in Stata that performs QR with cluster-robust stan-
dard errors. Failing to account for sampling weights in our data produces substantially different coeffi-
cient estimates.
33 See Abrevaya and Dahl (2008) for details on the testing procedure.
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is similar for both credit variables, and also whether all quantile coefficients estimated
on the two treatment variables are jointly equal to zero.
5.2 Panel data
In the previous section we discussed econometric issues pertaining to our dataset and
more generally to the evaluation of microfinance programs based on observational
data, namely non-random program placement and self-selection. We now present how
we try to address these exploiting the fact that most households sampled in the study
were interviewed at two points in time.
5.2.1 Baseline panel data model specification
The empirical framework in Khandker (2005) closely follows that of PK while drawing
on the advantages of panel data. The author re-writes Equation 2.19 to include a time
component as well as dynamics:
Yijt = Cijtδ+Cij(t−1)θ +Xijtγ +Xij(t−1)β +αij + ηj + ijt (2.22)
where Yijt is the outcome variable of interest for household i in village j at time t, and
depends on contemporaneous and lagged values of covariates X and household mi-
crocredit borrowings C. Household and village unobserved components that influence
outcome Y αij and ηj , respectively enter model (2.22) additively and are assumed to
be time-invariant. In line with PK, Khandker (2005) defines a credit demand equation:
Cijt = Xijtλ+α
c
ij + η
c
j + 
c
ijt (2.23)
where superscript c signifies household and village time-invariant characteristics and
the error term belong to the credit equation. As exposed in Khandker (2005), both
equations must be estimated jointly, which would raise endogeneity issues in a cross-
section framework such as that in PK. In a panel data setting, the introduction of
household-level fixed effects can remove household and village-level endogeneity if
the source of the latter are unobserved attributes that are time-invariant (Khandker,
2005). More details about the empirical strategy of Khandker (2005) can be found in
the original version of Roodman and Morduch (2009).
For the purpose of our study, we modify Equation 2.22 and perform QR on panel data
assuming that the conditional quantile of the outcome variable of interest respects the
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following linear specification:
Qτ (Yijt |Cijt ,Xijt = C′ijtδτ +X ′ijtβτ +αij(τ) + ηj(τ) (2.24)
The parameter of interest is δτ , the impact of microcredit on outcome Y. Note that this
specification is very similar to Equation 2.21 specified in the cross-sectional case, only
with the addition of household-specific unobserved characteristics αij . Their inclusion
allows us to control for any time-invariant household feature that influences both the
decision to borrow and the outcome of interest. Recall that in the context of QR there is
no prior transformation of the data that can get rid of the quantile-specific individual
and village effects and still yield estimates of the desired quantities. One might first-
difference the data and run a linear QR on the transformed variables, but the object
of interest is then different and nothing guarantees that quantile individual effects are
appropriately dealt with. Indeed, Kato et al. (2012) remind us of what Koenker and
Hallock (2000) noted: “Quantiles of convolutions of random variables are rather in-
tractable objects, and preliminary differencing strategies familiar from Gaussian mod-
els sometimes have unanticipated effects.” (see also our discussion of QR methods for
panel data in sub-section 4.3). Therefore, individual effects have to be handled directly,
in a fashion explained in the next sub-section.
One big difference with the OLS specification used in Khandker (2005) is that variables
enter Equation 2.24 in levels. As a consequence we choose not to include dynamics in
our model because of the potentially high collinearity between contemporaneous and
lagged credit variables. Also, our measure of microcredit borrowings includes previous
loans going as far back as six years, which means that our impact estimates necessarily
embed some long-term effects of microcredit on household behaviour34. The inclusion
of the lagged value of cumulative microcredit borrowing would imply to estimate the
impact on contemporaneous household consumption of loans taken up 7 to 12 years
ago.
5.2.2 Specification of household correlated random effects
The purpose of household-specific effects is to capture the potential correlation be-
tween microcredit and the error term stemming from unobserved attributes that also
impact household outcomes. Assuming the self-selection process into microfinance
programs is the same in both time periods and emerges from time-invariant hidden
characteristics, this is akin to controlling for endogeneity in our credit variables. The
large panel dimension of our data with only two time periods means that none of the
methods mentioned in sub-section 4.3 is applicable to our problem as they rely on
large N -large T asymptotics. The only candidate would then be the method developed
34 By construction, long-term and contemporaneous effects are implicitly constrained to be equal.
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in Ponomareva (2010) but our specifications include a mix of continuous and discrete
variables as covariates, which violates the identifying assumptions of the estimator.
In their study of the impact of birth inputs on birthweight, Abrevaya and Dahl (2008)
(AD henceforth) develop a quantile version of Chamberlain (1982) correlated random ef-
fects (CRE) model. They propose to model individual effects as a function of covariates
as follows (we drop the subscript for village j):
αi = f (Xi1,Xi2) (2.25)
So the individual effects in each time period depend on the values of the individual’s
observed characteristics of both time periods. Later in the discussion we sometimes
refer to Xi1 and Xi2 as fixed covariates, because for instance Xi1 takes the value of co-
variates Xi in period 1 for both time periods alike; similar reasoning applies to Xi235. A
closely related approach to controlling for numerous individual effects with two time
periods in the context of median regression is considered in Chen and Khan (2008).
There, function f (.) in (2.25) is left unspecified and their two-stage estimation strat-
egy involves a non-parametric first step. Their methodology was extended to other
quantiles in an application by Gamper-Rabindran et al. (2010).
In its simplest form, function f (.) in (2.25) is linear in its arguments, hence:
αi = c+Xi1λ1 +Xi2λ2 + vi (2.26)
where c is a scalar and vi is a disturbance uncorrelated to Xi1 and Xi2. Following the
specification and notations in AD, we can then write the conditional quantile function
of interest for each time period as follows (we absorb credit variable C into covariates
X and drop the dependence on village j for ease of exposition):
Qτ (Yi1|Xi) = φ1τ +X ′i1θ1τ +X ′i2λ2τ (2.27)
Qτ (Yi2|Xi) = φ2τ +X ′i1λ1τ +X ′i2θ2τ (2.28)
These reduced-form equations represent approximations of the ‘true’ conditional quan-
tiles by general functions of Xi1 and Xi2 (linear functions in that case). The quantile
effects of interest are defined in AD in a way analogous to those identified in the linear-
in-means case, that is:
∂Qτ (Yi1|Xi)
∂Xi1
− ∂Qτ (Yi2|Xi)
∂Xi1
(2.29)
35 It is made clear in Bache et al. (2013) that correlated effects might be characterised as a function of
only a subset of covariates which are assumed to be sufficient covariates.
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and
∂Qτ (Yi2|Xi)
∂Xi2
− ∂Qτ (Yi1|Xi)
∂Xi2
(2.30)
The differences in (2.29) and (2.30) capture the effects of Xi1 (first time period observ-
ables) and Xi2 (second time period observables) on Qτ (Yi1|Xi) and Qτ (Yi2|Xi), respec-
tively, above and beyond the contribution of each period’s fixed covariates to the corre-
lated effects (AD). In order for the estimation of (2.27) and (2.28) to yield the quantities
of interest we follow AD and impose the additional condition that the quantile-specific
effects of covariates – denoted βτ – are the same for both time periods. We can therefore
re-write the conditional quantile functions as:
Qτ (Yi1|Xi) = φ1τ +X ′i1βτ +X ′i1λ1τ +X ′i2λ2τ (2.31)
Qτ (Yi2|Xi) = φ2τ +X ′i2βτ +X ′i1λ1τ +X ′i2λ2τ (2.32)
AD propose a simple estimation procedure to recover estimates of the parameter of
interest βτ which consists in running the τ-th linear QR on the pooled sample while
including the ‘fixed’ covariates as extra regressors to control for individual effects. An
indicator variable taking value 1 for observations in the second wave of data (the 1998-
99 sample) and zero otherwise (for the 1991-92) must enter each regression along with
the constant to capture the overall distributional shift that can happen between time
periods, i.e. to adequately account for φ2τ −φ1τ . In traditional panel data econometrics
parlance, this is a time effect36.
The CRE approach is our preferred specification, as it is the only one allowing us to
exploit all the information from our two waves of data while adequately controlling
for household-level time-invariant unobserved confounding factors37. One drawback
of this method is that the number of parameters to be estimated grows fast with the
number of time periods. For instance, our regressions include 16 household covariates
(including credit variables; 17 when differentiating by gender) and two time periods,
which implies the addition of 32 (34) variables to model individual effects. Degrees of
freedom are a crucial concern given the size of our dataset (especially when our spec-
ification includes the full set of village dummy variables), so we choose the so-called
36 Note that in this setting the contribution of household covariates to the correlated effects is also
identified, i.e. the method yields estimates of λ1τ and λ
2
τ .
37 In a working paper that recently came to our attention, Harding and Lamarche (2017) propose a
quantile panel data estimator that combines semi-parametric correlated effects and location-shift indi-
vidual effects. They propose a one-step estimator that basically follows that of Koenker (2004) where
quantile-independent individual effects are shrunk towards a common value thanks to an l1-penalty to
mitigate the variability of the slope coefficients estimates and the quantile-varying part of the individual
effects is captured through the inclusion of fixed covariates as in AD. We do not follow this approach that
would imply the inclusion of 1,638 dummy variables for the individual fixed effects, which would greatly
disturb slope coefficient estimates in spite of the penalty term (recall that Koenkers penalised estimator
only mitigates the incidental parameter problem).
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Mundlak’s representation of correlated effects, i.e. they are modelled through the time-
averaged values of individual covariates. This characterisation of CRE is mentioned in
AD as a possible alternative to their model and is studied more extensively in Bache et
al. (2013).
5.2.3 Estimation procedure
We get a first set of baseline results by estimating model (2.24) via pooled QR, ignoring
individual unobserved effects. We merely stack observations together and run a linear
QR at each decile, with the full set of household and village covariates, or alternatively
village dummy variables instead of the latter to better account for non-random pro-
gram placement. Given that we double the number of observations, direct estimation of
time-invariant quantile village effects is less problematic than it is with cross-sectional
data and our pooled QR can account for village-level unobserved heterogeneity. Simi-
lar to the cross-sectional case, village fixed effects are either left unrestricted to allow
for quantile-varying village effects, or penalised following the approach of Koenker
(2004) to coerce them to have the same impacts across quantiles and reduce the vari-
ability of quantile-varying slope coefficient estimates.
We then re-estimate model (2.24) via pooled QR with the inclusion of household CRE
specified as a linear function of time-averaged values of household covariates. Our CRE
pooled QR on panel data also include in turn village covariates, village quantile effects
or penalised village effects. All our regressions consider the quantile-varying impacts
of total household microcredit on consumption, alternatively allowing different im-
pacts by gender of borrowers through the inclusion of both gender-based microcredit
variables simultaneously.
Inference is carried out using block bootstrapping in a similar spirit to that of the cross-
sectional case, with the difference that re-sampling is done at the household-level to
account for the potential dependence of observations made on the same household at
different points in time. We perform 999 replications, reported slope coefficient esti-
mates are obtained from baseline regressions on the original sample while the graphs
also present 95% percentile bootstrap confidence intervals.
6 Empirical results: Cross-sectional analysis
To minimise repetition, we do not report all the descriptive statistics of the variables
and their distributional characteristics. Rather, we focus in this chapter exclusively on
the analyses of QR results. The first part of this section comments on results obtained
from “naive” regressions performed on both waves of data separately, while the second
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considers output of estimations carried out in an instrumental variable approach. Our
interest lies in the distributional impacts of microcredit on household per capita expen-
diture, therefore only those coefficients attached to microcredit variables are plotted in
graphs along with 95% confidence intervals for each of the specifications explained
in details in the methodology section. The latter pertain to the way we account for
village-level heterogeneity through the inclusion of village covariates, village dummy
variables (to allow for quantile-varying village effects, also coined village quantile ef-
fects) or penalised village fixed effects la Koenker (2004). Plots are complemented
by tables reporting the values of coefficients and their estimated bootstrap standard
errors, as well as Wald statistics and p-values for a variety of tests. Regression tables
reporting the full set of coefficients for some of our econometric specifications can be
found in Appendices B, C and D (for a subset of quantiles).
6.1 Baseline estimates with village covariates
Tables 2.1 to 2.3 report the estimated values and bootstrap standard errors of the coeffi-
cients plotted in Figures 2.1 to 2.3, respectively, along with Wald statistics and p-values
associated with tests of various restrictions.
The top left graph of Figure 2.1 shows that household cumulative borrowings have
a small positive impact on household total per capita expenditure in 1991/92 which
increases from 0.006 at the first decile to 0.008 at the 60th quantile, taking smaller
values for deciles 7 and 8 (0.006 and 0.004, respectively), with the larger impact ob-
served at the top of the conditional distribution (0.025). Coefficients are imprecisely
estimated and the bottom rows of the first column of 2.1 show we cannot reject the
null hypothesis that they are jointly equal to zero. Results for the second wave of data
(right graph of Panel A) show that microcredit impacts household total consumption
positively throughout the distribution, with quantile treatment effects (QTEs) between
0.010 and 0.014 for the bottom four deciles increasing steadily across the rest of the
distribution to reach 0.053 at the top decile. Coefficient estimates from the second
decile up are significant with 95% confidence. The large standard errors do not allow
us to statistically distinguish the estimated coefficients from each other (Wald test with
a p-value of 0.292), however they are not jointly equal to zero.
Graphs in Panel B of Figure 2.1 show that the impacts of female microcredit borrowings
on household per capita total expenditure in the early 1990s decrease from 0.008 at the
first decile to 0.002 at the 80th quantile and peak at the top decile (0.015), none of the
estimates being statistically significant and all of them being jointly equal to zero across
quantiles. The pattern for estimated QTEs in the late 1990s is similar to that observed
for household total microcredit, with coefficient estimates ranging from 0.011 at the
bottom decile to 0.054 at the 9th decile, all of which are statistically distinguishable
from zero (at the 10% level for the first decile, and 5% level for others) and can be
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considered as not jointly equal to zero, although we cannot reject the null that they
are of similar value across the distribution because of the imprecision of the estimates
(Table 2.1, bottom cells of column 6).
The left graph of Panel C indicates a very slightly negative impact of microcredit issued
to men on household total consumption in 1991/92 at the bottom of the distribution (-
0.001) before it turns positive at the 30th quantile and increases steadily to reach 0.026
at the top of the distribution. The estimates are extremely imprecise and cannot be dis-
tinguished from zero, be it individually or jointly across all quantiles. The conclusions
regarding significance are the same for the second wave of data with estimates ranging
between -0.001 and 0.012.
We note that Wald tests reported in columns 4 and 8 of Table 2.1 do not allow us to
reject the null hypothesis that microcredit has the same impact, at a given quantile,
whether it is issued to women or men. Even though the estimates of the impact of fe-
male credit are always positive, and much larger than those of male credit in 1998-99,
the conclusions of the tests are not surprising given the huge size of the estimated stan-
dard errors, which is well represented by the impressive width of the 95% confidence
intervals. We are very close to rejecting the null with 90% confidence at the top decile
in 1998-99 (p-value is 0.101) where the impact of female credit is positive (0.054) and
significant. Similarly, the bottom row of column 8 in Table 2.1 shows that we can al-
most reject the null hypothesis that coefficients attached to female and male credit are
jointly equal to zero across all quantiles at the 10% level for 1998-99 (p-value of 0.107).
Turning to Figure 2.2 and the relationship between microcredit and household food
consumption, we observe that overall household borrowings have little positive to no
impact in the early 1990s, with overwhelmingly imprecise estimates. In the second
time period, household credit increases food consumption by 0.006 at the first decile
and by 0.008 and 0.007 at the 3rd and 4th deciles, respectively. Statistical significance
vanishes from the median up as estimates increase from 0.005 to 0.011 at the top decile,
although we can reject the null that all estimates are jointly equal to zero (p-value of
0.096, bottom cell of column 5 in Table 2.2).
The pattern is quite similar for female microcredit (graphs in Panel B of Figure 2.2).
In the early 1990s, it increases food consumption by 0.003 at the bottom of the distri-
bution and by 0.009 at the median before the estimates settle back between 0.002 and
0.003 in the top three deciles, although statistical significance is nowhere present along
the distribution. The impacts measured in 1998-99 are significant at the 10% level for
bottom deciles up to the median (and even at the 5% level for deciles 2 through 4), with
values ranging from 0.007 at the 10th quantile to 0.005 at the median, and increasing
steadily from 0.008 to 0.013 (8th decile) in the top half of the distribution. Coefficient
estimates at the top two deciles are also significant with 90% confidence. We can reject
the null of coefficients being jointly equal to zero at the 10% level (p-value of 0.077,
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bottom cell of column 6 in Table 2.2).
When microfinance loans are issued to men, however, it seems that they have a negative
effect on food consumption in 1991-92 (only two occurrences of positive values at the
2nd and 6th deciles), albeit very small in magnitude and not significant. The pattern
is less decisive for the late 1990s, the right graph of Panel C in Figure 2.2 depicting an
“N-shaped” curve. Estimates increase from just below zero at the 1st decile to 0.008 at
the 3rd decile before plummeting to -0.006 at the 8th decile and finally take a small
positive value at the top decile (0.001). None of these estimates is significant and they
cannot be collectively distinguished from each other or from zero.
The 1991-92 estimates are very imprecise and we cannot reject the null that female and
male credit have the same impact on food consumption at any quantile. The same is
true at almost all quantiles for the second wave of data except at the 6th, 7th and 8th
deciles where we reject the null at least at the 10% level (5% level foe the two latter),
with QTEs of female credit between 0.008 and 0.013 and those of male credit below
-0.002.
The estimated QTEs of microcredit on household per capita non-food expenditure are
plotted in Figure 2.3. It appears that household credit has a positive impact on non-
food consumption across the distribution in 1991-92, with a value between 0.002 and
0.003 in the bottom half of the distribution (significant at the 10% level for the bottom 3
deciles) and larger impacts thereafter ranging from 0.006 (6th decile) to 0.021 at the top
decile. As for the late 1990s, household credit affects non-food expenditure positively
and significantly across the board with estimated QTEs increasing steadily between the
bottom (0.003) and top deciles (0.031). They are not statistically distinguishable from
each other but we can reject the null that they are jointly equal to zero at the 10% level
(p-value of 0.062, bottom row of column 5 in Table 2.3).
The impacts of female credit on non-food expenditure exhibit the same pattern as those
of household total credit although they are never significant in the early 1990s. For the
second wave of data, the estimated QTEs range from 0.003 at the 10th quantile to 0.034
and 0.032 at the 8th and 9th deciles, respectively, and are significantly different from
zero across the distribution (although at the 10% level only for the bottom two deciles).
We also reject the null that they are all jointly equal to zero at the 10% level (p-value of
0.054, bottom row of column 6 in Table 2.3).
Again, the aforementioned pattern of results for the early 1990s is observed in the
case of male credit, with smaller impacts in the bottom half of the distribution and
larger increasing impacts in the top half, albeit statistical significance is nowhere to
be found. In 1998-99, the conclusions about significance are the same and estimates
increase slowly from 0.001 at the bottom decile to 0.012 at the 8th decile before taking
a negative value of -0.003 at the top decile.
64 Chapter 2 Distributional Impacts of Micro-Credit on Consumption
Unfortunately, the estimates are too imprecise to allow us to statistically distinguish the
impacts of female and male credit on non-food expenditure at any quantile, although
estimates can sometimes differ in sign and even by one order of magnitude, for instance
at the top decile for the second wave of data where the estimated impact of female
microcredit is 0.032 against -0.003 for that of male microcredit.
Let us conclude this first sub-section by a few general remarks on the pattern of results
obtained from cross-sectional regressions with village covariates. Overall, statistical
significance for our coefficients of interest is almost never achieved for regressions car-
ried out on 1991-92 data, only does it arise for the estimated impacts of household total
and female borrowings in most of our regressions on the second wave of data. It ap-
pears that microcredit issued to men has virtually no significant impact on household
per capita expenditure in either time period, although such conclusions are made with
great care given the overall imprecision of our estimates as witnessed by the very large
width of confidence intervals plotted on Figures 2.1 to 2.3. However, it is not incom-
patible with the broad picture one gets from glancing at the pattern of results depicted
by plots of the estimated QTEs of household total and female microcredit.
Indeed, the resulting curves typically have similar shapes, and Tables 2.1 to 2.3 show
that coefficient values are also very close in most instances. Therefore, this preliminary
analysis hints that most of the observed impact of household microcredit on their con-
sumption is actually driven by loans made out to women while those given out to men
would have much smaller impacts, if any at all. This can also be an artefact of the data
because our sample includes many more female borrowers than male (a consequence
of the alleged targeting policy of microfinance programs), and also because average fe-
male borrowings are much larger than their male counterpart, possibly overwhelming
the latter. At any rate, focussing on significant results, we observe that household to-
tal and female borrowings have positive impacts on household expenditure throughout
the distribution, with typically larger impacts at higher quantiles of the conditional dis-
tribution. This pattern is especially clear in the case of household per capita total and
non-food expenditures. It means that microcredit benefits more to those households
who are better off in terms of consumption relative to households with comparable
socio-economic characteristics. In other words, households who already achieve rela-
tively high consumption given their socio-economic group are better able to increase
their consumption thanks to microcredit. For instance in 1998-99, an extra Tk 1,000
in microcredit given out to women helps relatively low achievers (bottom decile of the
conditional distribution of consumption) increase their per capita total expenditure by
Tk 11 per year, while it helps relatively high achievers (top decile) increase theirs by
Tk 54 per year. The overall picture is less clear in the case of food expenditure because
estimates are very imprecise, although it seems that household total and female bor-
rowings have positive impacts throughout the distribution with larger effects around
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the median in the early 1990s and a generally upward sloping quantile process in 1998-
99; the estimated impact of male microcredit on food consumption takes on very small
values that oscillate around zero in both time periods.
As our estimates stem from conditional QR, they do not allow us to infer about the
absolute consumption-poverty status of these beneficiaries. Indeed, some households
ranking relatively low in the conditional distribution of consumption can very well
rank in the upper parts of its marginal distribution. Nevertheless, we can still say
that microcredit does not seem to efficiently promote upward mobility within a given
socio-economic group, given that it benefits most to those households who fare rela-
tively well compared to similar households. Households who achieve low consumption
relative to similar households experience smaller positive welfare benefits from micro-
credit than relatively high achievers, hence potentially resulting in sharper inequalities
within a given group. This interpretation nonetheless opens the door to the possibility
of upgrading to a “higher” social group for a household that receives microcredit while
already achieving high consumption relative to its socio-economic reference group, al-
though the odds of multiple subsequent such upgrades for the same household are very
low as per the limited potential for within-class upward mobility.
This first set of results and its interpretation will be used as a baseline for our com-
ments on subsequent sets of estimates. Given the great number of results we have to
present, we choose to comment the next graphs and tables in a less detailed fashion
by emphasising on overall patterns. The sub-section above is also seen as a “guide” to
how we present and read our results. Replicating the exact same exercise for all of our
results would be tedious and moot.
6.2 Cross-sectional analysis with unobserved village-level effects
6.2.1 Village Quantile Effects
The next set of results, presented in Figures 2.4 to 2.6 and Tables 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6, re-
ports coefficient estimates obtained from regressions that include village dummy vari-
ables instead of covariates to try to control for village-level overall heterogeneity in a
flexible way such that the issue of non-random program placement is addressed. Such
village effects are left unrestricted and are free to vary at each quantile. The drawback
of this specification is the number of parameters to estimate that becomes very large,
and with the limited number of observations at our disposal we expect our regressions
to suffer from the incidental parameter problem mentioned in Section 5. A direct con-
sequence is an increased imprecision in parameter estimates, as is adequately reflected
in the wide 95% confidence intervals of the graphs in Figures 2.4 to 2.6. We feel this
justifies a shorter discussion for this set of results.
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In the first time period, household total microcredit affects total consumption posi-
tively and almost constantly across the distribution (left graph of Panel A of Figure 2.4),
and has small positive impacts on non-food consumption in the bottom half of the dis-
tribution and larger and increasing impacts in the top half (left graph of Panel A of 2.6),
a picture broadly consistent with the results observed previously. The upward sloping
quantile process identified earlier characterising the impact of household total and fe-
male microcredit on household total per capita expenditure in the second time period
can be observed again (right graphs of Panels A and B of Figure 2.4), even though the
effects are about twice as small in magnitude at the top decile (Table 2.4). This pattern
is also persistent when the dependent variable is non-food expenditure (right graphs
of Panels A and B of Figure 2.6).
The graphs in Panel C of Figure 2.4 show that male borrowings have positive distri-
butional effects on total expenditure in the early 1990s (larger for the top than for the
bottom deciles), and negative effects in the late 1990s with the most adverse impacts
experienced at the bottom two deciles and between the 6th and 8th deciles. We can
reject the null of equality of the impacts of female and male microcredit in 1998-99
at the 5% level for the bottom two deciles and the 70th quantile, and at the 10% level
for the 3rd and 6th deciles (column 8 of Table 2.4). At the bottom of Figure 2.6, we
can see that in 1991-92 male microcredit has close to no impact on non-food consump-
tion through deciles 1 to 6, but larger and increasing estimated QTEs at the top three
deciles. Conversely in 1998-99, male borrowings have close to zero effect on non-food
consumption in the bottom three deciles before the quantile process falls below zero
with the most adverse impacts at the top decile. Tests results show that the estimated
impacts of male credit on non-food expenditure in the second time period can be con-
sidered statistically different from those of female credit at almost all deciles from the
median up, except at the 7th decile (rightmost column of Table 2.6).
The overall patterns are harder to discern when food consumption is the dependent
variable (Figure 2.5 and Table 2.5). An additional Tk 1,000 in microcredit for a house-
hold increases household per capita food expenditure in the early 1990s by Tk 3 per
year at the bottom decile and by up to Tk 8 per year at the 3rd decile, with smaller
effects at the top three deciles. In 1998-99, the impact of household total credit is small
and positive for deciles two to four and at the top two deciles, with estimates slightly
below zero at the bottom decile and at the median and 6th and 7th deciles. The effect
is 0.005 at the top of the distribution (right graph of Panel A of Figure 2.5 and column
5 of Table 2.5). The quantile processes representing the distributional impacts of fe-
male microcredit (Panel B of Figure 2.5) are overall similar in shape to those described
above, albeit with smaller effects in magnitude from the median up in the early 1990s,
and fewer and less adverse negative effects in 1998-99.
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It appears that male microcredit (Panel C of Figure 2.5) in the early 1990s helps house-
hold increase their food consumption throughout the distribution with a quantile pro-
cess similar to that of total microcredit, with small impacts at extreme quantiles and
rather large impacts around the median, ranging from 0.012 at the 3rd decile to 0.009
at the 4th and 6th deciles (column 3 of Table 2.5). Interestingly, in this specification
with village quantile effects they are the only set of coefficients for which we are close
to rejecting the null that they are simultaneously zero across the distribution (bottom
row of column 4 of Table 2.5). In the second time period, however, loans issued to men
have exclusively negative effects on food consumption, with small adverse impacts at
extreme deciles (between -0.004 and -0.003) and larger adverse effects for the rest of
the distribution (e.g. -0.013 at the 7th decile). We can never reject the null of equality
between the estimated QTEs of male and female credit on food consumption, except at
the median at the 10% level for the second time period.
The introduction of village quantile effects in our regressions greatly disturbs the ac-
curacy of the estimated coefficients of interest and naturally often leads to the inability
to reject the null for almost all of our statistical tests. Taking stock of this new set of
results with great caution, we can only say that the appearing upward sloping quantile
process associated with the impacts of household total and female microcredit on total
and non-food consumption seems to be robust, especially for the 1998-99 data. The
pattern of heterogeneity in the effects of total and female credit on food consumption
remains hard to grasp. As for the influence of male credit on our various measures
of household expenditure the overall picture is still unclear: with the previous spec-
ification distributional impacts often seemed to cluster around zero, and with village
quantile effects they experience a seemingly systematic sign reversal, i.e. positive in
1991-92 and negative in 1998-99.
6.2.2 Penalised Village Fixed Effects
Our third and last specification also controls for non-random program placement by
the introduction of village dummy variables, only this time the coefficients attached
to the latter are constrained to be the same at all quantiles through an l1-penalty (this
estimator is developed in Koenker (2004)). This makes for less flexible village effects
but on the other hand it efficiently mitigates the aforementioned incidental parameter
problem. The results are reported in Figures 2.7 to 2.9 and Tables 2.7 to 2.9.
At a glance, overall patterns identified in our baseline regressions seem to be corrobo-
rated. Household total and female microcredit have positive distributional impacts on
household per capita total and food consumption in 1998-99 (right graphs of Panels
A and B of Figures 2.7 and 2.8), and for non-food consumption in both time periods
(Panels A and B of Figure 2.9), with typically larger effects at higher deciles and the
magnitude of maximum impacts at the top deciles in line with those obtained in our
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first specification (columns 1, 2, 5 and 6 of Tables 2.7 to 2.9). In the early 1990s, house-
hold total and female credit increase total consumption throughout the distribution in
a heterogeneous fashion with maximum impacts at the 1st, 6th and 7th deciles (left
graphs of Panel A and B of Figure 2.7). We find a fairly homogenous positive quantile
process for the effect of microcredit on food consumption in 1991-92 with only one
negative value at the top decile (all coefficients are insignificant, left graph of Panel
A of Figure 2.8). In the same time period female credit shows a maximum impact on
food consumption at the bottom decile and a small negative one at the top quantile.
The overall picture for the impacts of male credit in 1998-99 show that they are mostly
homogenously centred around zero across the distribution (right graphs of Panel C in
Figures 2.7 to 2.9), which is also the case for impacts on food consumption in 1991-92.
Credit issued to men has positive impacts on total and non-food consumption that are
large at the top deciles in 1991-92 (left graphs of Panel C of Figures 2.7 and 2.9).
Statistical significance is strong for the estimated QTEs of total and female credit, espe-
cially in 1998-99 (columns 5 and 5 of Table 2.7) and in both time periods for non-food
consumption (columns 1, 2, 5 and 6 of Table 2.9). We reject the null of the equality of
coefficients on female and male credit from the second decile up for estimated impacts
on total consumption in 1998-99, from the 5th decile up for impacts on food consump-
tion, and from the 4th decile up for impacts on non-food consumption. We reject the
null that quantile-coefficients are the same for estimated impacts of total credit and
female credit on total and non-food expenditures in the late 1990s.
To sum up our findings from this cross-sectional exploratory analysis, we can say that
the most robust pattern of results appears to be an exclusively positive and upward
sloping quantile process characterising the distributional impacts of microcredit on
household consumption, especially in the late 1990s. If microcredit indeed benefits
more to those households who already achieve high consumption levels relative to
their socio-economic characteristics, then there is a limit on the extent to which micro-
finance programs can help upward mobility within social groups, and such initiatives
could even sharpen welfare inequalities amongst households with similar characteris-
tics. Along with the mitigated picture about the impacts of male credit that oscillate
around zero and are rarely significant (even when significance is strong for total and
female credit), we interpret the fact that the distributional impacts of household total
and female credit are very similar in shape as a potential sign that the positive influ-
ence of microcredit on household consumption (if it exists) is mostly driven by loans
issued to women. This is confirmed in several instances by the rejection of the null in
tests of the equality of the effects of female and male credit at a given quantile.
Obviously any clear-cut conclusion would be too premature at this point. We saw that
our estimates are overall very imprecise, especially when we include village quantile
effects, leading to seldom rejections of the null that the estimated coefficients of a given
quantile process are all equal. However, the fact that we manage to reject the null of this
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test in a few instances even with such imprecise estimates (for instance for the impact
of total and female credit on non-food consumption in 1998-99) is encouraging as it
shows that there exist heterogeneous impacts of microcredit on consumption that are
statistically distinguishable. This confirms the idea that QR techniques are relevant for
the analysis of microfinance programs. They are also interesting in that they capture
part of household-level unobserved heterogeneity, even though they are not an exact
remedy to endogeneity issues stemming from self-selection, which we try to address
through an instrumental variable approach in the next section.
6.3 Instrumental variable approach
We now briefly present results from QR on cross-sectional data performed in two steps
in an attempt to correct for self-selection into group lending programs, following the
methodology detailed in sub-section subsection:ivqrstrat. As such we carry on with the
IV approach for the sake of completeness of our study, without hoping for it to be our
preferred specification given the potential weakness of the instrumentation strategy.
Therefore, we present only a subset of results, for the case where household per capita
total consumption is the outcome variable of interest, in Figures 2.10 to 2.12 and Tables
2.10 to 2.12. Graphs and the associated results tables pertaining to other dependent
variables can be found in Appendices E and F.
A first general remark is that estimates remain very imprecise and that accuracy does
not respond as adversely to the introduction of village unobserved effects as is the case
in specifications without instrumentation. In our specification with village covariates,
we see in Panel A of Figure 2.10 that household total borrowings in the early 1990s
generate consumption gains only at the top decile (0.015) while yielding losses in the
rest of the distribution that are sometimes very large (coefficients range between -0.027
at the 3rd decile and -0.009 at the 8th decile), although none of these estimates is
significant. Results from 1998-99 data show negative effects of household microcredit
on consumption at the second and 7th deciles, with positive estimates for the rest of
the distribution and the largest impacts to be found at the top decile (0.059 against
0.016 at the bottom decile, column 5 in Table 2.10).
Panel B of Figure 2.10 displays the distributional impacts of female credit on total con-
sumption. In 1991-92, the quantile process is qualitatively similar to that associated to
total credit with expenditure losses everywhere but at the top decile. In the second time
period the quantile process is downward sloping, starting from consumption losses of
0.031 at the bottom tail of the distribution down to an adverse impact of -0.461 at the
top decile. Panel C of Figure 2.10 displays negative impacts of male credit on total con-
sumption in 1991-92 for the bottom four deciles, with a 0.004 gain a the median and
up to 0.037 at the 9th decile. Male credit in the late 1990s impacts total expenditure
positively expect at the 6th and 7th deciles, with a maximum impact of 0.559 at the top
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decile. We can never statistically distinguish between the impacts of female and male
microcredit, although none of the individual coefficients are significant.
The introduction of village quantile effects does not offer a clearer picture, only con-
firming mostly negative estimated impacts from microcredit on total consumption in
the top half of the distribution, except in the case of male credit in 1991-92. At any
rate, again significance eludes our results (Figure 2.11 and Table 2.11).
Last, Figure 2.12 shows the results of implementing 2SQR with penalised village fixed
effects. The left graph of Panel A displays the upward sloping quantile process iden-
tified earlier. Household microcredit in 1991-92 positively impacts total per capita
consumption to a larger extent in the top half - where coefficients range between 0.022
and 0.041 for deciles 6 to 9 - than in the bottom half of the distribution up to the me-
dian with estimated coefficients between 0.009 at the bottom decile and 0.019 at the
median (column 1 of Table 2.12). Estimated coefficients are significant with 90% confi-
dence at the top three deciles. The upward sloping quantile process is also present for
impacts estimated on 1998-99 data (right graph of Panel A of Figure 2.12. Recipients of
microcredit in the second time period of our study experience statistically significant
consumption gains that are larger the higher they rank in the conditional distribution
of household total per capita expenditure, estimates increasing steadily from 0.020 at
the bottom to 0.136 at the top decile (column 5 of Table 2.12). We are also able to re-
ject the null that these coefficients are all equal across quantiles with 99% confidence
(second to bottom row of column 5 of Table 2.12).
Female microcredit in the early 1990s also generates consumption consumption gains
throughout the distribution, with significant estimates of 0.029 and 0.027 at the 2nd
and 3rd deciles, respectively, and a maximum effect of 0.042 at the 7th decile (insignif-
icant). The picture its impacts in 1998-99 resembles that observed for household total
microcredit (Panel B of Figure 2.12). Households at the bottom of the conditional dis-
tribution experience gains of 0.021, the latter increasing throughout the distribution
to reach 0.129 at the 9th decile. Here also all estimates are significant with 95% confi-
dence (column 5 of Table 2.12), and the observed heterogeneity is statistically signifi-
cant (second to bottom row of column 6 of Table 2.12).
Finally, the effects of male microcredit on total consumption in the specification with
penalised village effects are also characterised by a positive upward sloping quantile
process, although less precisely estimated than for household total and female micro-
credit (only one negative estimate at the bottom decile in 1991-92, Panel C of 2.12).
Nonetheless, we find the largest impact at the top deciles in 1991-92 (0.031 and 0.056
for the 8th and 9th deciles, respectively) are statistically significant with 90% confi-
dence (column 3 of Table 2.12). Only the estimated impact at the 8th decile in 1998-99
(0.072) is significant, but the quantile process is once again positive and upward slop-
ing. Interestingly, although we can never distinguish between the impacts of female
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and male microcredit in a quantile by quantile fashion, we are able to overwhelmingly
reject the null that both quantile processes are similar across quantiles (second to bot-
tom row of column 8 of Table 2.12).
It is risky to identify any meaningful trend in the results commented above, mostly
because many estimates experience sign reversals depending on how non-random pro-
gram placement is addressed. They are usually negative when using village covariates
or village quantile effects, and positive when implementing penalised QR. However,
they only exhibit significance in the latter case, especially so for regressions using
1998-99 data. And, even when estimates are not significant, with penalised QR we
systematically observe an upward sloping quantile process with larger consumption
gains at top quantiles than at bottom ones. Actually, 2SQR results pertaining to food
and non-food consumption (available in Appendices E and F) display similar trends as
those presented here, with similar sign reversals across specifications, similar signifi-
cance patterns and similar upward sloping quantile processes when penalised QR are
implemented, more notably in 1998-99.
Altogether, given the flags of caution raised in section 5 about this instrumentation
strategy, and the obvious instability of results across specifications, we do not feel this
strategy is robust enough to allow us to strengthen our previous claims, no matter how
tempted we are by some appealing results. However, it does not unequivocally hurt
them.
7 Results from panel data regressions
We now turn to results from specifications that exploit the panel structure of the data.
One natural advantage is that the number of degrees of freedom is now larger for
each regression, which should help generate more precise estimates especially when
our specification includes numerous village dummy variables. The first sub-section
presents results from QR run on the full sample in the fashion of cross-section QR,
with the addition of a time dummy variable on top of the full set of covariates. We
coin these “pooled” QR in which we include either village covariates or village dummy
variables, the latter controlling for any time-invariant village-level characteristics that
we assume also determine non-random program placement, which is then adequately
controlled for.
Also, in the panel data context we can employ the empirical strategy proposed in Abre-
vaya and Dahl (2008) and discussed further in Bache et al. (2013) that allows us to
account for time-invariant unobserved household heterogeneity without having to in-
clude over 1,600 dummy variables, but with a richer specification than pure random
effects allowing some arbitrary correlation between individual effects and covariates.
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In other words, in that model unobserved household heterogeneity is correlated with
household-level variables. Results from correlated random effects (CRE) regressions
are discussed in the second sub-section. We present plots of our estimates in a slightly
different order, sorted by dependent variable, and proceed to comment on results from
each specification for each chosen measure of household expenditure.
7.1 Pooled quantile regressions
7.1.1 Total expenditure
Panel A of Figure 2.13 shows the distributional impacts of household total borrowings
on household total per capita expenditure. When only observable village heterogeneity
is controlled for (left graph of Panel A), estimated QTEs are all positive and increase
steadily across the conditional, from 0.008 at the bottom decile to 0.039 at the top
decile. Coefficients are statistically significant with 95% certainty, and we can reject
the null hypothesis that they are jointly equal to zero, although the other Wald-type
test does not allow us to distinguish between them (column 1 of Table 2.13).
The introduction of village quantile effects (middle graph of Panel A) narrows the am-
plitude of the quantile process that remains upward sloping throughout the distribu-
tion, with estimates ranging from around 0.006 at the bottom two deciles (where they
are not significant) to 0.023 at the top of the distribution (column 5 of Table 2.13). The
estimates are smaller in magnitude but remain imprecise, and therefore we cannot the
null that they are equal at all quantiles and not distinguishable from zero.
Our last specification (right graph of Panel A of Figure 2.13) restrains the village effects
to be the same across quantiles which has the benefit of reducing the variability of our
estimates. The quantile process is exclusively positive and displays the same upward
sloping pattern, and estimates are significant at the 95% confidence level, with magni-
tudes similar to the first specification with village covariates. Those households at the
bottom of the conditional distribution experience a consumption gain of 0.008 while
the top decile shifts up by 0.034 (column 9 of Table 2.13). We reject the null of equality
of coefficients at all quantiles at the 5% level (penultimate bottom cell of column 9 of
Table 2.13).
The distributional impacts on consumption of microcredit loans issued to women are
qualitatively similar in sign and significance to those of total household microcredit,
and a little larger in magnitude (Panel B of Figure 2.13). Regressions controlling for
village covariates produce estimates ranging from 0.009 at the first decile to 0.049 at
the 90th quantile, and if we cannot reject the null that they are equal at all quantiles we
are however able to say they are not jointly equal to zero (column 2 of Table 2.13). The
introduction of village quantile effects removes significance at the bottom two deciles
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(as was the case for total microcredit), but otherwise preserves the upward sloping
quantile process (middle graph of Panel B of Figure 2.13) taking values of 0.007 at the
bottom of the distribution and 0.025 at the top decile (column 6 of Table 2.13).
In the specification with penalised village effects the quantile process is very similar
(right graph of Panel B of Figure 2.13), displaying an upward trend from a coefficient
of 0.009 at the bottom decile to an estimate of 0.050 at the top one, and the gain in
precision allows us to reject the null for both joint hypotheses tests, meaning that the
observed heterogeneity is statistically meaningful (bottom two rows of column 10 of
Table 2.13). We fail to reject the null for either test when village-level heterogeneity is
left unrestricted and can vary by quantile ((bottom two rows of column 6 of Table 2.13)
The QTEs of male microcredit on total expenditure (Panel C of Figure 2.13) are the
most imprecise. The first set of results shows a small negative impact of microcredit
loans issued to men on consumption at the top of the distribution (-0.001) while the
effects are otherwise positive, ranging between 0.001 and 0.009 between the 10th quan-
tile and the median, and 0.010 or above for deciles 6 through 8. Only that coefficient
estimated at the 3rd decile is significant with 90% confidence, while all coefficients are
not statistically different from each other, nor are they jointly different from zero.
Similarly to what we pointed out earlier, village dummy variables shrink the magnitude
of the estimated QTEs (middle graph of Panel C of Figure 2.13) and they now range
between slightly below zero and 0.008, only one negative impact to be found at the top
decile (column 7 of Table 2.13). Estimates with our third specification are similar to
those obtained with the first one, where only the coefficient at the top decile is (very
slightly) negative. Other estimates range between 0.004 and 0.008, with the largest
(and significant) gains of 0.017 realised at the 8th decile (column 11 of Table 2.13).
In the regressions including village covariates only, we can reject the null that the im-
pacts of female and male microcredit are equal at the upper end of the distribution
(column 4 of Table 2.13). We fail to reject the null at any quantile when village effects
are left unrestricted across quantiles, however we are at least 90% confident that male
and female microcredit have different impacts on total expenditure from the 4th decile
up when village effects are penalised, with the exception of the 8th decile (column 12
of Table 2.13). Only with the first and third specification can we reject the null that
both quantile processes are jointly equal to zero (bottom rows columns 4 and 12 of Ta-
ble 2.13), but never can we assert that they are significantly different from each other
as a whole.
The pattern of results that arose from our preliminary cross-sectional analysis seems
to be confirmed when running regressions on the pooled sample of panel data. Espe-
cially, household total and female microcredit have positive effects on household total
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expenditure at every point of the distribution with larger welfare gains for those house-
holds ranking higher in the conditional distribution. The impacts of male microcredit,
however, appear to be small if they exist at all, albeit being positive at most quantiles
under consideration.
7.1.2 Food expenditure
The impacts of microcredit on food expenditure are plotted in Figure 2.14 and reported
in Table 2.14. Household total borrowings seem to have a small positive effect on food
consumption which is fairly homogenous across quantiles (left graph of Panel A of
Figure 2.14) and estimated to range between 0.005 and 0.008 (column 1 of Table 2.14).
Indeed we cannot reject the null that coefficients are equal across quantiles, although
they are not jointly zero (bottom rows of column 1 of Table 2.14).
The estimated QTEs with quantile-varying unobserved village effects remain positive
and of small magnitude; the largest gains (at 0.005 and 0.006) are observed for the 2nd,
3rd and 4th deciles and are significant at the 5% level. The top deciles experience the
smallest gains but estimates across the quantile process are not statistically distinguish-
able from each other. In the third specification the quantile process is again positive
and relatively flat (right graph of Panel A of Figure 2.14) and while all coefficients are
quite precisely estimated (significant with 95% confidence), they range from 0.005 to
0.008 and we cannot conclude that they differ significantly from each other (column 5
of Table 2.14). Households at the bottom two deciles experience the smallest gains and
those at the third decile benefit most from microcredit.
When QTEs are differentiated by gender in our specification with village covariates,
female microcredit yields positive food consumption gains that are a little greater in
the top half of the distribution (left graph of Panel B of Figure 2.14) and contained
between 0.006 and 0.010 at all quantiles (column 2 of Table 2.14). Introducing village
quantile effects modifies the pattern and evens out the quantile process (middle graph
of Panel B of Figure 2.14), yielding estimates ranging between 0.003 and 0.006 across
the board with a smaller impact at the 8th decile only (0.001, column 6 of Table 2.14).
As expected, restraining village effects across quantiles strengthens statistical signifi-
cance as witnessed by narrower confidence bands in the middle graph of Panel B of
Figure 2.14. If coefficients are similar in magnitude to those from the first specifica-
tion, there emerges an upward sloping quantile process with a larger impact at the top
decile (0.010) than at the bottom (0.005).
From the left graph of Panel C of Figure 2.14 we see that male microcredit generates
food consumption losses at the bottom decile and top two deciles, with the most ad-
verse effect found at the 90th quantile while the 2nd and 3rd deciles shift up by about
0.007. Interestingly, this is the only case when food consumption is the dependent
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variable that we can reject the null (with 90% confidence) that the estimated effects
of male credit are equal across quantiles (column 3 of Table 2.14). Accounting for
quantile-varying village heterogeneity shifts up the quantile process although con-
sumption losses remain at the top three deciles. With penalised village effects the
picture is rather similar to that of the first specification, with gains above 0.005 around
the third decile and a small negative loss at the top quantile (column 11 of Table 2.14).
We reject the null that female and male credit yield similar food consumption gains at
the bottom and top two quantiles when only village covariates are included (column
4 of Table 2.14). Estimates are too imprecise with village quantile effects to allow us
to conclude against the null. With the third specification we conclude that female and
male microcredit have different impacts on food consumption at the median, the 6th
and 7th deciles (column 12 of Table 2.14). Overall the tests results suggest that female
and male credit might yield different benefits in the top half of the distribution. We also
note that with village covariates or penalised village effects we can reject the null that
estimated coefficients at all quantiles are jointly equal to zero for each quantile process
under scrutiny. This points to the idea that microcredit might have a homogenous
impact across the distribution (as we cannot reject the null for the other test) but that
this impact is significant (and small and positive according to the sign and magnitude
of the estimates).
7.1.3 Non-food expenditure
Results from regressions focussing on the impact of microcredit on household per
capita non-food expenditure are plotted in Figure 2.15 and coefficient values are re-
ported in Table 2.15. We comment on these more concisely because the apparent pat-
tern of results is rather unequivocal.
Indeed, household total borrowings affect non-food consumption positively at all quan-
tiles for the three specifications, with all our estimates significant with 95% confidence
(Panel A of Figure 2.15). The gains are typically small at the bottom decile (between
0.002 and 0.003 depending on the empirical model), ranging roughly between 0.002
and 0.006 in the bottom half of the distribution and up to the 6th decile, while larger
benefits are experienced by those households ranking in the top three deciles (columns
1, 5 and 9 of Table 2.15). Those at the top of the distribution get the most from mi-
crocredit with QTEs estimated between 0.025 and 0.035. We reject the null that coeffi-
cients of the quantile process are jointly equal to zero across all specifications, but we
can conclude in favour of significant impact heterogeneity in the model with penalised
village effects (second to bottom row of column 9 of Table 2.15).
The pattern of results depicted in graphs of Panel B of Figure 2.15 for the impacts of
female microcredit are very similar to the above, represented by an upward sloping
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quantile process with coefficient estimates that are typically slightly larger in magni-
tude than for total microcredit, especially so at the top decile where estimated QTEs
are between 0.027 and 0.041. Households ranking at bottom quantiles up to the me-
dian experience gains between 0.002 and 0.007, while gains are typically greater than
0.010 at the 7th decile and above. Conclusions on the statistical tests are also qual-
itatively identical to those carried out on estimated impacts of total microcredit, and
the observed heterogeneity is statistically significant in the specification with penalised
village effects.
Overall, graphs in Panel C of Figure 2.15 show that households receiving microcredit
issued to men also exhibit small positive gains at the bottom quantiles and larger ben-
efits at the very top of the distribution (with estimates between 0.011 and 0.021 at the
9th decile, see Table 2.15). However, the estimates are inaccurate and we cannot reject
the null that the observed quantile processes are significantly different from zero. In
the third specification with penalised village effects, we can conclude that female and
male microcredit have statistically different impacts on the distribution of non-food
consumption at all deciles between the 40th and 80th quantiles. The test statistics also
allows us to reject the null that all estimated coefficients on the female and male credit
variables are equal.
The first set of results obtained from the exploitation of the full sample in pooled QR
is encouraging and tends to confirm our observations from the cross-sectional analy-
sis. Household total and female borrowings benefit all households in terms of total
and non-food per capita expenditures, with significantly heterogeneous impacts that
increase along the distribution. When food consumption is the outcome variable of
interest, results seem to point to the existence of small positive impacts of microcredit
that are probably homogenous across the distribution. The impacts of male microcre-
dit are in general positive but smaller in magnitude than those of female credit. There
is partial evidence that microcredit yields substantially different gains at given quan-
tiles depending on the gender of the recipient, and that both quantile processes differ
as a whole, although imprecise estimation of male microcredit impacts makes it hard
to conclude formally.
7.2 Panel quantile regression with correlated random effects
We now turn to the final set of results in our study that are obtained through running
QR on the pooled sample of data with household unobserved heterogeneity modelled
as a linear function of time-averaged household covariates, allowing time-invariant
household (random) effects to be correlated with observed household characteristics.
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7.2.1 Total expenditure
Figure 2.16 gathers plots of the coefficients reported in Table 2.16. When village het-
erogeneity is controlled for through observed characteristics only, household total mi-
crocredit borrowings have a positive effect on household total expenditure across the
distribution (Panel A of Figure 2.16). Those households at the bottom decile of the
distribution experience an upward shift of 0.011 in total consumption, and this impact
increases steadily throughout to reach a maximum of 0.061 at the 9th decile. All quan-
tile slope coefficients are significant at the 5% level and we reject the null that they are
all equal with 90% confidence (column of Table 2.16).
The upward sloping quantile process is robust to controlling for total village hetero-
geneity (middle and right graphs of Panel A of Figure 2.16), with estimated QTEs of
similar magnitude although their values are typically lower at the top two deciles when
village effects are left unrestricted (0.042 at the top decile with village quantile effects
against 0.058 with penalised village effects, columns 5 and 9 of Table 2.16). In this
latter case we cannot reject the null that estimated coefficients are equal across quan-
tiles, whereas we can ascertain that heterogeneity in estimated impacts is statistically
significant with at least 90% confidence in the other two specifications.
The impacts of female microcredit display a qualitatively similar pattern, as can be
seen from the graphs in Panel B of Figure 2.16. The quantile process is upward sloping
across the three specifications, positive gains at the bottom of the distribution range
between 0.013 and 0.016 and the largest consumption gains at the top decile have val-
ues of 0.048 to 0.068, with estimated QTEs generally settling slightly higher than those
obtained for household total borrowings. Although all individual estimates are statis-
tically significant at the 5% level, we reject the null that they are equal across quantiles
only in that specification with penalised village effects (bottom rows of column 10 of
Table 2.16). However we can confidently conclude that the quantile process as a whole
is statistically different from zero in every model considered.
Turning to the estimated QTEs of male microcredit shown in Panel C of Figure 2.16,
our model with village covariates suggests small positive impacts at the bottom deciles
that increase to a maximum of 0.049 at the 7th decile before plummeting back to 0.032
at the top quantile. Estimates around the median are statistically significant but we
do not find evidence that the quantile process is indeed heterogeneous (column 3 of
Table 2.16). The introduction of village dummy variables produces larger estimates at
the bottom deciles (0.011) while column 7 of Table 2.16 shows homogenous impacts
around the median (between 0.028 and 0.031) with the greatest benefits (above 0.040)
found for those households at the 7th and 8th deciles. Statistical significance of the
estimates extends around the median from the 3rd to the 8th decile, but not to the
quantile process as a whole.
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When village effects are restricted across quantiles the impacts of male microcredit in
the bottom half of the distribution settle between 0.012 and 0.018, and those house-
holds in the top half of the distribution experience gains of 0.020 or greater, with ben-
efits from microcredit being maximal at the 7th and 8th deciles still (0.033 and 0.037,
respectively). Estimated QTEs are significant with 95% confidence except at the two
extreme deciles, and we reject the null that they are jointly equal to zero, although we
fail to conclude that there is significant heterogeneity in the quantile process.
Our previous observations are generally confirmed by this first set of results. However
formal statistical evidence that female and male microcredit yield different benefits at
any given quantile is non-existent. We also cannot reject the null that both quantile
processes are statistically different, although they are not jointly equal to zero.
7.2.2 Food expenditure
The left graph of Panel A of Figure 2.17 shows that households ranking in the bottom
half of the food consumption conditional distribution benefit from microcredit to a
lesser extent than those at the 6th, 7th and 8th deciles. The smallest impact is found
at the bottom decile, and estimates range between 0.006 and 0.015. They are all sta-
tistically significant and the tests at the bottom of column 1 of Table 2.17 bring us to
the conclusion that they are not statistically different from each other but cannot be
considered to be jointly zero.
When we specify village quantile effects the range of the estimates over the distribu-
tion is narrower (middle graph of Panel A of Figure 2.17), with statistically significant
QTEs between 0.008 and 0.013. Conclusions from the joint hypothesis tests remain
the same (column 5 of Table 2.17). In the case where village effects are identical across
quantiles the quantile slope coefficients of interest are consistent with those previously
observed. Households at the bottom decile benefit the least and those in the top half
of the distribution experience the largest food consumption gains (right graph of Panel
A of Figure 2.17). Estimated QTEs are statistically indistinguishable from each other
but the quantile process is overall different from zero (bottom rows of column 9 of
Table 2.17).
The graphs of Panel B of Figure 2.17 provide a very similar pattern of results for the im-
pacts of female credit. The top of the distribution typically enjoy the largest food con-
sumption benefits from female borrowings and estimates range from 0.009 to 0.015
across the three specifications under consideration. Heterogeneity of the QTEs can
never be asserted formally and the quantile process as a whole is systematically differ-
ent from zero (bottom rows of columns 2, 6 and 10 of Table 2.17). In no instance can we
ever reject the null that male and female credit have similar impacts at a given quantile,
even though the quantile process pertaining to the effects of male microcredit can be
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said to be statistically different from zero in one instance only (our third specification
with penalised village effects).
Much like for previous results from pooled QR, while the graphs hint at slightly larger
QTEs for households ranking in the top half of the distribution, the joint hypothe-
ses tests invite us to conclude that microcredit does not generate heterogeneous food
consumption gains across the distribution. Similarly, impacts from female microcredit
seem visually more stable than those from male microcredit but we cannot reject the
null that their respective quantile processes are identical.
7.2.3 Non-food expenditure
Our final set of results on the impacts of microcredit on household non-food expen-
diture is reported in Table 2.18 and plotted in graphs of Figure 2.18. Those graphs in
Panel A of Figure 2.18 display an all-positive upward sloping quantile process repre-
senting the impacts of household total borrowings on non-food per capita expenditure.
Households ranking in the bottom half the distribution up to the third decile experi-
ence an upward shift in non-food consumption ranging from 0.004 to 0.009; those in
the top decile gain the most from microcredit borrowing, between 0.040 and 0.044
(columns 1, 5 and 9 of Table 2.18). All individual coefficients are statistically differ-
ent from zero with 95% confidence. We systematically reject the null that estimates
of the quantile process are jointly equal to zero, and when the regression includes pe-
nalised village effects we can reject the null that quantile slope coefficients are equiva-
lent across all deciles (second to bottom row of column 9 of Table 2.18).
We draw similar conclusions in the case of female microcredit. The quantile processes
depicted Panel B of Figure 2.18 are made of positive estimated QTEs, significant across
the board. The smaller gains at the 1st decile are between 0.004 and 0.007, and the
greatest benefits accruing to the top decile take values between 0.044 and 0.050. The
statistical tests at the bottom of columns 2 and 10 of Table 2.18 ascertain the existing
heterogeneity in the estimated QTEs in two of our specifications, while we reject the
null that the quantile process as a whole is equal to zero for all three empirical models.
Finally, graphs in Panel C of Figure 2.18 show that male microcredit also yields greater
benefits in the top half of the distribution. Estimates are strongly significant around
the median and insignificant for the top two deciles (columns 3, 7 and 11 of Table 2.18).
When village quantile effects are left unrestricted we can reject the null that the im-
pacts of male microcredit on non-food consumption are equal across all quantiles, and
also conclude against the hypothesis that they are jointly equal to zero.
In the next section we recap our main findings from our panel data analysis and draw
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our final conclusions on the heterogeneous impacts of microcredit on household ex-
penditure.
8 Interpretation of the results
We set out to unravel the potential existence of heterogeneous impacts of microcredit
programs on household welfare through the use of QR. The main challenges were to
adequately account for non-random program placement at the village level and for self-
selection into group borrowing at the household level. First differencing our variables
is not an option because, unlike expectations, quantiles are not linear operators. Our
final specifications best exploited the panel structure of the data by introducing house-
hold correlated random effects in order to model household-level unobserved hetero-
geneity without running into the incidental parameter problem. By allowing house-
hold effects to be correlated with household covariates, we control for time-invariant
factors that potentially influence the outcome of interest as well as household charac-
teristics, including microcredit variables. Non-random program placement is handled
by village dummy variables which we allowed to have different effects at various quan-
tiles or not. Here are the conclusions we are able to draw from our empirical study,
focussing on results obtained in our correlated random effects framework.
8.1 Heterogeneous impacts
A clear pattern emerged in our cross-sectional study that remained robust and was
even strengthened by our panel data analysis: the upward shift in household per capita
expenditure caused by microcredit is larger at higher quantiles of the conditional dis-
tribution. Plots of the quantile process and the estimated coefficients reported in tables
are unequivocal. For each quantile process associated with a treatment variable (house-
hold total microcredit, female microcredit or male microcredit) we carry out a test on
the joint equality of coefficients across the nine deciles under consideration in order to
formally assess the apparent heterogeneity in the estimated impacts.
We systematically reject the null of no heterogeneity for the impacts of total microcre-
dit and female microcredit on total and non-food per capita expenditure when village
effects are restricted to have the same impact at each quantile, even when correlated
random effects are introduced, which hampers accuracy by drastically increasing the
number of parameters to be estimated. As explained in the methodology section, this
implementation of Koenker (2004) estimator aims at reducing the variability of the
slope estimates due to the inclusion of many dummy variables. Leaving the latter un-
restricted offers more flexibility in controlling for village heterogeneity but is costly in
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terms of precision of estimation, and hence we fail to reject the null in regressions with
such specifications.
Similarly, the QTEs associated with male microcredit are in general very imprecisely
estimated across all specifications, and there is too little evidence to support heteroge-
neous consumption gains from loans issued to men. Another interesting result is that
we can never reject the null of no heterogeneity of the estimated impacts of microcredit
on food expenditure. That is, the beneficial (or adverse) effects of microfinance loans
in terms of food consumption are constant across the distribution. Nevertheless, the
multiple occurrences of rejections of the joint hypothesis of equality of quantile slope
coefficients on total and female credit variables in our second best specification (with
correlated random effects and penalised village effects) constitute valuable evidence
in favour of the claim that all recipients of microfinance loans do not necessarily ben-
efit from such programs to the same extent, hence making a case for the interest of
studying distributional impacts as a complement to average treatment effects that are
usually the focus of program evaluation studies.
8.2 Sign and magnitude of estimated impacts
As an addition to testing the equality of slope parameters associated to a given credit
variable across all quantiles, we also test whether these estimates are jointly equal to
zero. The null is overwhelmingly rejected for the quantile processes attached to house-
hold total microcredit (and female microcredit) across all regressions from our panel
data analysis. Moreover, all the corresponding parameters are estimated to be positive.
Therefore, we can safely conclude that indeed microfinance loans help recipients im-
prove their welfare as measured by household per capita expenditure, a finding in line
with Khandker (2005) and Islam (2011) among others.
For instance, without differentiating by gender, an extra Tk 1,000 in microcredit to
households who consume relatively little given their socio-economic characteristics
(1st decile) helps them increase total per capita consumption by Tk 11 to Tk 14 per
year. The annual per capita consumption gains from an extra Tk 1,000 in microcredit
for median households settles between Tk 24 and Tk 31. Additionally, the benefits to
relatively high-consuming households (9th decile) from receiving an extra Tk 1,000 in
credit are between 42 and 61 Taka per year in per capita total expenditure.
Overall, the estimated gains from microcredit are quite small compared to the median
levels of annual per capita consumption in the sample, which are Tk 3,899 in 1991/92
and Tk 4,220 in 1998/99. We provide a measure of central tendency for comparison
with the estimated benefits from microfinance because the objects our methodology al-
lows us to study are conditional quantile functions, which do not tell us about quantiles
of the marginal distribution of consumption. Treatment effects on the latter might be
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of different magnitude. The main observation is that, according to our estimates, con-
sumption gains realised thanks to microcredit at the top of the conditional distribution
are about four times as large as those realised at the bottom.
8.3 Types of expenditure
We refine our analysis by considering two other dependent variables, namely house-
hold annual per capita food and non-food expenditure, which are the breakdown of to-
tal consumption. Non-food expenditure embeds items such as clothes, shoes, durable
goods for the house and house repairs, as well as lumpy expenses incurred for religious
ceremonies, weddings or funerals for example.
The distributional impacts of total household borrowings on per capita food expendi-
ture typically settle between around 0.006 and 0.015 with the smallest estimates found
at the bottom two deciles. However we already pointed out that the null of no het-
erogeneity for food consumption benefits can never be rejected, therefore we can only
understand these values as providing bounds for QTEs that are most likely constant
across the distribution. In other words, microcredit generates small food consumption
gains that are similar for all beneficiaries and range between Tk 6 and Tk 15 per capita
per year for an extra Tk 1,000 in microcredit.
It follows that the previously established heterogeneity of QTEs on total expenditure
must stem from the impacts of microcredit on non-food per capita consumption. When
the latter is the outcome of interest we are indeed able to reject the null of heterogeneity
for the quantile processes associated to total and female microcredit in our specification
with correlated random effects and penalised village effects. Our estimates suggest that
relatively low-consuming households (bottom decile) gain about Tk 4 to Tk 7 per capita
per year in terms of non-food expenditure for an extra Tk 1,000 of credit received,
while their high-consuming counterparts realise gains between Tk 40 and Tk 46.
The signs and magnitudes of the measured impacts of microcredit on food and non-
food expenditure are in line with the magnitudes and signs of those impacts measured
on total consumption, the heterogeneity of the latter stemming from quantile-varying
effects on non-food expenditure while QTEs are constant for food expenditure.
8.4 Gender of borrowers
We further investigate the impacts of microcredit borrowing by distinguishing treat-
ment effects for female and male borrowers. It appears that in both cases microcredit
generates smaller positive gains in the lower half of the distribution than in the upper
one, with a very clear upward sloping quantile process representing QTEs of female
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microcredit while the picture is less clear-cut for the impacts of male borrowing. Ad-
ditionally, the plots offer a visual representation of quantile processes for which it is
easy to see that the pattern of distributional impacts pertaining to female microcredit
is very close to that of household microcredit in general.
We can reject the null that quantile-varying coefficients are jointly equal to zero for the
estimated impacts of female microcredit on the three outcome variables under scrutiny
across all specifications with correlated random effects, although the null of no hetero-
geneity is only rejected for the estimated QTEs of female microcredit on total expendi-
ture when we use penalised village effects and on non-food expenditure when we use
village covariates or penalised effects.
Similar tests carried out on the estimated impacts of male microcredit seldom succeed
in rejecting the null hypothesis, although in one instance we are able to reject the null in
both tests (when the outcome variable is non-food consumption and village effects are
left unrestricted). According to the shapes of quantile processes and the conclusions
of the tests when they are considered separately it would be very tempting to conclude
that the observed heterogeneous benefits from microfinance loans are actually driven
by welfare gains generated in households with female borrowers, while those with male
borrowers benefit little from it, if at all (given that for male microcredit QTEs we can
rarely reject the null of no heterogeneity or the null that the quantile process as a whole
is zero). Unfortunately these remain tentative conclusions because we can never reject
the null hypothesis that, at a given quantile, the estimated coefficient on the female
credit variable is similar to its male counterpart38. Similarly, we generally fail to reject
the null that the quantile process as a whole is statistically different for each treatment
variable.
Overall, the results seem confusing. On one hand, we have evidence to support the ex-
istence of positive and significantly heterogeneous impacts of female microcredit, and
evidence that microcredit issued to men affects consumption behaviours little (individ-
ual quantile coefficients are often significant around the median). On the other hand,
joint hypothesis testing does not allow us to conclude against the similarity of QTEs
from female and male microcredit at any given quantile, nor can we rule against the
statistical equivalence of the two associated quantile processes. It is more than likely
that the large standard errors associated to our point estimates are guilty of making
rejection of the null almost impossible, but if we are to believe the statistical tests pre-
sented here we cannot formally prove that consumption gains from microcredit depend
on the gender of its recipients.
38 In our regressions with correlated random effects, across all three specifications and with three dif-
ferent dependent variables, the null can be rejected only once in 81 tests.
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8.5 Implications
From a policy-making point of view, our most significant finding is that indeed mi-
crofinance loans help their beneficiaries improve their welfare but not all to the same
extent, and that this heterogeneity in consumption gains is especially important for
non-food expenditure while the impacts of microcredit on food expenditure appear to
be constant across the distribution. The rank of an observation in the distribution is
a measure of unobserved heterogeneity and can be considered as its ability or “prone-
ness” to achieve certain values of the outcome. This view goes back to Doksum (1974)
and is used to discuss QR estimators in Chernozhukov and Hansen (2006) and D. Pow-
ell (2016a, 2016b). Therefore, households who typically achieve low levels of con-
sumption given their socio-economic characteristics have a lower ability to generate
consumption gains than those households who already achieve relatively high levels of
consumption.
In line with our interpretation of the findings from cross-sectional regressions pre-
sented earlier, and argue that microcredit is inadequate to promote upward mobility
within a group of household with similar characteristics. Significantly different im-
pacts at various points of the conditional distribution of consumption suggests that
microcredit could actually play a role in heightening inequalities amongst households
that are alike with respect to their socio-economic features. Those who are relatively
worse off will enjoy an increase in consumption thanks to help of microfinance loans
but will struggle to catch up with those who are relatively better off as the latter cate-
gory show better ability to reclaim benefits from microcredit.
It is of course reassuring to observe positive impacts of microcredit on food consump-
tion, if only for the obvious reason that sustenance is the cornerstone of mere sur-
vival. In development economics, measures of consumption, and food expenditure
especially, are often considered a good candidate to proxy household welfare in devel-
oping countries (Deaton, 1997), and to that extent our findings could lead to charac-
terise microcredit as a fairly “democratic” tool in its capacity to improve welfare in a
similar fashion for all categories of recipient households. Recall that tentative evidence
from quantile-quantile plots and non-parametric tests suggested that the distribution
of food consumption in the sub-sample of borrowers changes significantly over time,
whereas it does not for non-borrowers.
Similarly, non-parametric tests shown in Panel B of Table 1.5 of Chapter 1 point to the
fact that non-borrowing households exhibit food expenditure behaviours distributed
significantly differently from those of their borrowing counterparts in 1991-92 (tests
results go against the null of similarity of location or shape), but their results for the
1998-99 data are not so clear cut and hint at the possibility that both distributions are
quite close in terms of location and shape.
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In sum, it seems borrowers “catch up” on non-borrowers over time both in terms of
levels of food consumption to reach a more homogenous distribution. This observation
is in line with our estimates of the impact of microcredit on the location and shape
of the conditional quantile function of food consumption. Our regressions provide
evidence that all borrowers realise similar food consumption gains however they might
rank in the distribution. Therefore, borrowing households catch up on comparable
non-borrowing households at all levels of food consumption, and microcredit plays a
significant role in this phenomenon.
Notwithstanding, our observation that heterogeneity in the distributional impacts of
microfinance arises from its effects non-food expenditure can also have crucial welfare
implications. We relate our interpretation of these findings to the existing literature
on social spending in developing countries. For instance, Banerjee and Duflo (2007)
explore survey data from 13 developing countries and find that households who rank
amongst the poorest in the world consistently spend a substantial part of their financial
resources on goods that do not strike as prime concerns for survival, mostly festivals
and ceremonies (for instance weddings or funerals). The authors suggest this could
stem from the well-known “keeping up with the Joneses” phenomenon. Indeed Bloch,
Rao, and Desai (2004) claim that in rural India the holding of very lavish wedding
ceremonies is used to signal the standing of the groom’s family, in a way quite similar
to what can be found in South Africa where funerals bear such social significance that
some households feel compelled to borrow money in order for the service to match up
to their apparent social status (Case, Garrib, Menendez, & Olgiati, 2013).
Status-seeking through increased spending on visible goods such as weddings, fu-
nerals and gifts has also been documented as being a consistent behaviour amongst
poor households in rural China (Brown, Bulte, & Zhang, 2011). Our own measure of
non-food expenditure includes a variety of items embedding clothes, shoes and house
durables but also expenses for social events or religious ceremonies, all of which can to
some degree be seen as potential positional goods. If food consumption is of primary
importance for well-being, the ability to spend on conspicuous goods is relevant to so-
cial status and hence has a non-negligible role in household welfare in rural areas of
developing countries.
Our empirical study shows that relatively high achievers who take up microfinance
loans can increase non-food expenditure by up to 6 to 10 times what low-achieving
comparable households are able to realise. In a conceptual framework where non-
food consumption is an indicator of social spending and households with comparable
socio-economic characteristics constitute a relevant reference group, we see that micro-
credit can actually sharpen existing inequalities in social welfare amongst comparable
households. Non-food expenditure gains realised from microcredit can strengthen the
observed social status of those who already fare relatively well in signalling their stand-
ing within their reference group, while households who rank relatively low in terms of
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social status will not be able to catch up.
One could argue that this pattern of heterogeneous gains in non-food expenditure ac-
tually reflects unobserved differences in the consumption preferences of households,
i.e. those who intrinsically put more value on social spending naturally decide to in-
crease spending on conspicuous consumption when they have access to extra financial
resources. Such preferences could also stem from the particular social environment
households live in and therefore differ significantly across villages, for instance. How-
ever, we feel such an interpretation can be at least partially ruled out given that we
control for observed ability through the inclusion of household covariates and also for
the part of unobserved proneness that is time-invariant in our model with correlated
random effects, as well as total village-level heterogeneity thanks to the inclusion of
dummy variables.
Additionally, the aforementioned empirical studies show that the diversion of financial
resources from private goods towards visible consumption is a consistent behaviour
amongst poor and extremely poor households in developing countries (particularly so
in rural India, Banerjee and Duflo (2007)). This observation is rather in favour of the
idea that consumption preferences are likely similar for microcredit borrowers and
non-borrowers, so that our interpretation holds even if we consider that microfinance
programs succeed in targeting the poorest of the poor.
We also note that rank-based status models have been used to theoretise the welfare im-
plications of changes in the location and scale of the income distribution when agents
derive utility from relative income (Hopkins & Kornienko, 2004) and also from con-
sumption of visible goods (Hopkins & Kornienko, 2009). Our work has no pretence to
empirically apply or assess the validity of such models, but it is interesting to draw a
parallel with QR that solve a minimisation problem whose objective function is based
the ranks of observations39.
The final conclusion is therefore that microcredit offers some opportunities of an up-
grade in social status for those households who already have a relatively high standing
given their socio-economic features, but microcredit borrowing has little virtue regard-
ing within-group upward mobility. Although the estimated distributional impacts are
overall positive and hence suggest that borrowers somehow catch up on non-borrowers
in a general sense, the significant heterogeneity in coefficients at various quantiles high-
lights the fact that social welfare gains do not accrue to all borrowers to the same extent
and are in favour of those who already have higher proneness in signalling social status.
39 In theoretical models on relative income and conspicuous consumption the rank is typically the
exogenous rank, the position of the observation in the marginal distribution. In quantile regressions, the
minimisation problem is posed in terms of ranks of the observations below or above a given quantile of
the conditional distribution.
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Note that even though the inequality-sharpening feature of microcredit in terms of
household welfare arises for borrowing households who increase non-food expendi-
ture and fail to keep up with ever higher-achieving comparable borrowing households,
adverse welfare consequences can also appear for the non-borrowing population. In-
deed, the estimated QTEs of microcredit on non-food consumption are positive across
the board, which means that, overall, borrowers catch up on non-borrowers, or leave
them further behind depending on the initial situation. At any rate, provided that con-
cerns of social status are shared amongst all households (which is likely in our setting),
we cannot rule out the possibility that non-borrowing households (even high-achieving
ones) may incur welfare losses as a consequence of microfinance loans helping borrow-
ing households fill (or widen) the gap in terms of status-signalling expenditure.
8.6 Limitations of our study
There are two principal limitations in our study of the heterogeneous impacts of mi-
crocredit. The first one pertains to the nature of our data. Indeed, as was made clear
in our description of the dataset, the non-experimental design of the study posits two
main econometric challenges. Villages were initially sampled based on the presence
of microfinance programs (or not) for at least three years, and it follows that such
non-random program placement can bias estimates of treatment effects if microfinance
practitioners decided to set up offices based on systematic differences in village char-
acteristics. We address this issue by including village dummy variables.
Our most significant results typically arise in regressions where we compel coefficients
on said binary indicators to have the same value across quantiles, which is akin to as-
suming that village heterogeneity has a pure location-shift effect on the distribution
of consumption. We relax the assumption that the shape of the distribution is similar
across villages by allowing coefficients to vary at each decile under consideration. How-
ever, doing so greatly increases the standard errors of our estimates and we tend to fail
to reject the null hypothesis of no heterogeneity of microcredit impacts even though
the range of values for our point estimates is consistent across specifications. The in-
cidental parameter problem persists when using panel data because in the framework
of QR we cannot first-difference variables to “get rid” of fixed effects (see sub-section
4.2). Moreover, we have relatively few observations and only two time periods, and
these limitations close the door to many alternative estimators for panel data QR.
The other econometric issue is that of endogeneity of household borrowing and con-
sumption behaviours, given that participation in microfinance programs is ultimately
left to self-selection. Conceptually, endogeneity is hard to perceive in the context of
QR because it is more pervasive than in the case of linear-in-means approaches: it
can be strong at one quantile and less so at another. This in turn implies that in-
struments must have a rich relationship with the problematic regressors to adequately
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tackle the issue at every considered level of the conditional quantile function. In the
cross-sectional case we attempt a two-stage QR approach to mitigate the issue but the
results do not seem reliable in light of the reserves we voiced regarding the strength of
the only instrument available. In regressions carried out on panel data we control for
time-invariant household unobserved heterogeneity in the form of correlated random
effects, which given our data is our best take on dealing with the potential endogeneity
of household borrowing and household consumption. Non-random program place-
ment and self-selection are popular issues in the study of microfinance programs with
non-experimental data, and dealing with them is somehow made harder when using
QR estimators.
The second limitation of our study is that our empirical strategy only provides informa-
tion on the impact of covariates on the conditional distribution of outcome variables.
As a consequence, our conclusions do not necessarily carry over to what happens on
the marginal distribution of consumption. For instance, we cannot strictly match the
measured heterogeneous impacts to parts of the population defined by a measure of
absolute poverty. In order to infer anything about the effects of microcredit at vari-
ous points of the marginal distribution of household expenditure one would need to
use alternative estimators such as, for instance, that based on the re-centred influence
function proposed by Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009), or the generalised QR estima-
tor of D. Powell (2016b), or his QR for panel data estimator (D. Powell, 2016a). In our
experience the assumptions on which they rely would make their implementation on
our data problematic.
Nevertheless, from conditional estimates we are able to draw interesting conclusions
about the welfare implications of microcredit, considering that matters of social sta-
tus are relative in nature and are very important in the type of communities under
consideration. In our interpretation of the estimated impacts of microcredit on food
consumption we are also able to link the pattern of results to descriptive evidence
on the discrepancies in the distribution of the outcome variable over time or between
groups of households. We hope our work can show that results from conditional QR
are informative when they are carefully interpreted.
9 Conclusions
We exploit a Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies/World Bank dataset to an-
swer the question whether microcredit has heterogeneous welfare impacts, i.e. whether
all borrowers experience the same gains (or losses) from microfinance loans. Our in-
vestigation is motivated first and foremost by the fact that most studies assessing the
efficiency of microfinance initiatives in tackling poverty focus on their average impacts.
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Our outcomes of interest are three measures of household per capita expenditure,
namely total, food and non-food expenditure, which are broadly recognised as good
proxies for households welfare. Descriptive evidence in Chapter 1 of this thesis showed
that the distributions of household consumption among borrowers and non-borrowers
differ substantially, and that their shapes evolve over time, further motivating the use
of quantile regression techniques to get a more comprehensive view of microfinance
program impacts.
Results from panel data QR with household correlated random effects lead to a num-
ber of interesting findings. First and foremost, all categories of households benefit
from microfinance loans. Our impact estimates are positive across the board, and a
household ranking at the median of the conditional distribution of total expenditure
can expect a consumption gain of Tk 24 to Tk 31 per capita per year for an extra Tk
1,000 in microcredit.
However, we cannot confirm formally that gains from microcredit stem only from loans
issued to women, as has been famously advertised in studies using the same dataset as
ours, such as Pitt and Khandker (1998) and Khandker (2005). Visual evidence from
plots of the estimated quantile processes pertaining to male and female credit invite
us to believe that might be the case, given that the latter are very close in location and
shape to estimated quantile treatment effects from household total microcredit. Ad-
ditionally, in our preferred empirical specifications female microcredit always exhibits
significant and positive impacts on consumption, while those associated male micro-
credit are typically small and not significant.
Nevertheless, formal testing does not allow us to claim that consumption gains from
female and male microcredit are not the same at a given quantile. We estimate that an
extra Tk 1,000 in female microcredit to a median household (in terms of conditional
consumption) would boost their total expenditure by Tk 23 to Tk 33 per capita per
year. Note that Khandker (2005) (using the same data as ours) advertises average re-
turns to total annual household expenditure between Tk 15 and Tk 21 for an extra Tk
100 in female microcredit. To get a rough idea of how our results compare, we can
divide the previously mentioned numbers by 10 and multiply them by 5.6, which is
the average size of a household in our sample. It follows that average-sized households
ranking at the middle of the conditional distribution experience gains of Tk 12.9 to Tk
18.5 in terms of total annual expenditure when receiving an extra Tk 100 in female
microcredit. The magnitude of our estimates is therefore in line with previous studies
A related and crucial finding from our study is that these gains are actually unevenly
distributed. Indeed, an extra Tk 1,000 in microcredit would yield total consumption
gains of Tk 11 to Tk 14 per capita per year for relatively low-consuming households,
while these benefits go up to between Tk 42 and Tk 61 for relatively high-consuming
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households, i.e. about four times as much40. This discovery does not contradict previous
studies, as we saw that our estimated gains at the center of the distribution are in line
with them, but rather complements them.
Moreover, we find that this heterogeneity stems from returns to non-food consumption.
Indeed, all categories of households appear to benefit from microcredit to the same
extent in terms of food consumption, with gains between Tk 6 and Tk 15 per capita per
year for an extra Tk 1,000 in microcredit. However, the increase in non-food per capita
expenditure generated from microcredit is 6 to 10 times greater at the top decile of the
conditional distribution than it is at the bottom decile.
We link this last finding to the literature on the consumption habits of poor households
in developing countries and on status-seeking. Our measure of per capita non-food ex-
penditure includes a number of items that can be considered as conspicuous consump-
tion goods, at least to some extent. Therefore, those households who have a relatively
high ability in signalling their social status - compared to households with similar char-
acteristics - reclaim larger non-food consumption gains from microfinance loans than
comparable households with low levels of such ability. In communities where conspic-
uous consumption constitutes a way to ascertain one’s social status, microcredit tends
to sharpen social welfare inequalities in groups of households with similar characteris-
tics, and most likely in the community as a whole. From a policy-making perspective,
this is an important finding because it shows that positive welfare gains from microfi-
nance programs in terms of consumption can hide more complex phenomena, such as
potential social welfare losses due to the heterogeneity inherent to returns from micro-
credit.
40 Corresponding returns to female microcredit are Tk 13 to Tk 16 for households at the first decile and
Tk 48 to Tk 68 for top-decile ones.
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Figure 2.1 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household total consumption:
cross-section quantile regressions with village covariates
(a) Panel A: Household microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
(b) Panel B: Female microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
(c) Panel C: Male microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
Note: Solid lines show the credit coefficients estimates at each decile. The grey areas show 95% bootstrap
percentile confidence intervals. We carry out 999 replications, re-sampling villages with replacement
to account for within-cluster dependence of household-level observations through time. The estimation
sample includes 1,638 households in each time period. Microcredit is measured as cumulative borrowings
from microfinance programs over the previous six years, in 1992 Taka. Specifications include either:
village covariates; village quantile effects (i.e. village dummy variables); or penalised village effects (i.e.
restricted to have a pure location-shift effect a` la Koenker (2004)).
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Figure 2.2 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household food consumption:
cross-section quantile regressions with village covariates
(a) Panel A: Household microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
(b) Panel B: Female microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
(c) Panel C: Male microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
Note: Solid lines show the credit coefficients estimates at each decile. The grey areas show 95% bootstrap
percentile confidence intervals. We carry out 999 replications, re-sampling villages with replacement
to account for within-cluster dependence of household-level observations through time. The estimation
sample includes 1,638 households in each time period. Microcredit is measured as cumulative borrowings
from microfinance programs over the previous six years, in 1992 Taka. Specifications include either:
village covariates; village quantile effects (i.e. village dummy variables); or penalised village effects (i.e.
restricted to have a pure location-shift effect a` la Koenker (2004)).
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Figure 2.3 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household non-food consump-
tion: cross-section quantile regressions with village covariates
(a) Panel A: Household microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
(b) Panel B: Female microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
(c) Panel C: Male microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
Note: Solid lines show the credit coefficients estimates at each decile. The grey areas show 95% bootstrap
percentile confidence intervals. We carry out 999 replications, re-sampling villages with replacement
to account for within-cluster dependence of household-level observations through time. The estimation
sample includes 1,638 households in each time period. Microcredit is measured as cumulative borrowings
from microfinance programs over the previous six years, in 1992 Taka. Specifications include either:
village covariates; village quantile effects (i.e. village dummy variables); or penalised village effects (i.e.
restricted to have a pure location-shift effect a` la Koenker (2004)).
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Figure 2.4 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household total consumption:
cross-section quantile regressions with village quantile effects
(a) Panel A: Household microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
(b) Panel B: Female microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
(c) Panel C: Male microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
Note: Solid lines show the credit coefficients estimates at each decile. The grey areas show 95% bootstrap
percentile confidence intervals. We carry out 999 replications, re-sampling villages with replacement
to account for within-cluster dependence of household-level observations through time. The estimation
sample includes 1,638 households in each time period. Microcredit is measured as cumulative borrowings
from microfinance programs over the previous six years, in 1992 Taka. Specifications include either:
village covariates; village quantile effects (i.e. village dummy variables); or penalised village effects (i.e.
restricted to have a pure location-shift effect a` la Koenker (2004)).
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Figure 2.5 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household food consumption:
cross-section quantile regressions with village quantile effects
(a) Panel A: Household microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
(b) Panel B: Female microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
(c) Panel C: Male microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
Note: Solid lines show the credit coefficients estimates at each decile. The grey areas show 95% bootstrap
percentile confidence intervals. We carry out 999 replications, re-sampling villages with replacement
to account for within-cluster dependence of household-level observations through time. The estimation
sample includes 1,638 households in each time period. Microcredit is measured as cumulative borrowings
from microfinance programs over the previous six years, in 1992 Taka. Specifications include either:
village covariates; village quantile effects (i.e. village dummy variables); or penalised village effects (i.e.
restricted to have a pure location-shift effect a` la Koenker (2004)).
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Figure 2.6 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household non-food consump-
tion: cross-section quantile regressions with village quantile effects
(a) Panel A: Household microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
(b) Panel B: Female microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
(c) Panel C: Male microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
Note: Solid lines show the credit coefficients estimates at each decile. The grey areas show 95% bootstrap
percentile confidence intervals. We carry out 999 replications, re-sampling villages with replacement
to account for within-cluster dependence of household-level observations through time. The estimation
sample includes 1,638 households in each time period. Microcredit is measured as cumulative borrowings
from microfinance programs over the previous six years, in 1992 Taka. Specifications include either:
village covariates; village quantile effects (i.e. village dummy variables); or penalised village effects (i.e.
restricted to have a pure location-shift effect a` la Koenker (2004)).
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Figure 2.7 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household total consumption:
cross-section quantile regressions with penalised village effects
(a) Panel A: Household microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
(b) Panel B: Female microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
(c) Panel C: Male microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
Note: Solid lines show the credit coefficients estimates at each decile. The grey areas show 95% bootstrap
percentile confidence intervals. We carry out 999 replications, re-sampling villages with replacement
to account for within-cluster dependence of household-level observations through time. The estimation
sample includes 1,638 households in each time period. Microcredit is measured as cumulative borrowings
from microfinance programs over the previous six years, in 1992 Taka. Specifications include either:
village covariates; village quantile effects (i.e. village dummy variables); or penalised village effects (i.e.
restricted to have a pure location-shift effect a` la Koenker (2004)).
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Figure 2.8 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household food consumption:
cross-section quantile regressions with penalised village effects
(a) Panel A: Household microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
(b) Panel B: Female microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
(c) Panel C: Male microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
Note: Solid lines show the credit coefficients estimates at each decile. The grey areas show 95% bootstrap
percentile confidence intervals. We carry out 999 replications, re-sampling villages with replacement
to account for within-cluster dependence of household-level observations through time. The estimation
sample includes 1,638 households in each time period. Microcredit is measured as cumulative borrowings
from microfinance programs over the previous six years, in 1992 Taka. Specifications include either:
village covariates; village quantile effects (i.e. village dummy variables); or penalised village effects (i.e.
restricted to have a pure location-shift effect a` la Koenker (2004)).
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Figure 2.9 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household non-food consump-
tion: cross-section quantile regressions with penalised village effects
(a) Panel A: Household microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
(b) Panel B: Female microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
(c) Panel C: Male microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
Note: Solid lines show the credit coefficients estimates at each decile. The grey areas show 95% bootstrap
percentile confidence intervals. We carry out 999 replications, re-sampling villages with replacement
to account for within-cluster dependence of household-level observations through time. The estimation
sample includes 1,638 households in each time period. Microcredit is measured as cumulative borrowings
from microfinance programs over the previous six years, in 1992 Taka. Specifications include either:
village covariates; village quantile effects (i.e. village dummy variables); or penalised village effects (i.e.
restricted to have a pure location-shift effect a` la Koenker (2004)).
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Table 2.1 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household total expenditure, cross-section quantile regressions with village covariates
1991-92 1998-99
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Quantile
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
10 0.006 0.008 -0.001 0.300 0.010 0.011* -0.001 0.211
(0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009)
20 0.006 0.006 -0.001 0.365 0.010** 0.011** 0.006 0.602
(0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009)
30 0.005 0.008 0.001 0.521 0.014** 0.015** 0.012 0.777
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005) (0.009)
40 0.008 0.010 0.003 0.572 0.012** 0.013** 0.008 0.595
(0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010)
50 0.007 0.008 0.003 0.774 0.017** 0.018** 0.007 0.311
(0.006) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012)
60 0.008 0.007 0.014 0.694 0.021** 0.023** 0.012 0.346
(0.007) (0.007) (0.016) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013)
70 0.006 0.004 0.015 0.575 0.028** 0.030** 0.007 0.143
(0.008) (0.008) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016)
80 0.004 0.002 0.019 0.433 0.031** 0.035** 0.012 0.288
(0.011) (0.013) (0.018) (0.014) (0.015) (0.019)
90 0.025 0.015 0.026 0.712 0.053** 0.054** 0.007 0.101
(0.016) (0.022) (0.022) (0.016) (0.017) (0.026)
Coefficients equal
across quantiles (p-value)
0.899 0.975 0.935 0.993 0.272 0.404 0.913 0.721
Coefficients jointly
zero (p-value)
0.770 0.750 0.965 0.946 0.011 0.013 0.913 0.107
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance is assessed based on bootstrap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level. The bottom
rows show Wald-type tests of the equality of coefficients for each credit variable across all quantiles, and whether they are jointly zero. Columns (4) and (8) show results from tests of the equality
of slope coefficients on female and male microcredit at each quantile. Bottom rows of columns (4) and (8) show joint hypotheses tests of the equality of slope coefficients on female and male
microcredit across all quantiles, and a similar tests for whether all these coefficients are simultaneously zero across all quantiles.
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Table 2.2 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household food expenditure, cross-section quantile regressions with village covariates
1991-92 1998-99
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Quantile
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
10 0.002 0.003 -0.005 0.243 0.006* 0.007* -0.000 0.255
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
20 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.563 0.007** 0.007** 0.007 0.912
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
30 0.002 0.004 -0.001 0.401 0.008** 0.007** 0.008 0.929
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
40 0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.415 0.007** 0.007** 0.004 0.616
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
50 0.002 0.009 -0.003 0.115 0.005 0.005* 0.001 0.410
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
60 0.003 0.006 0.002 0.631 0.006 0.008 -0.002 0.096
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
70 0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.801 0.008 0.011 -0.005 0.013
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
80 0.000 0.003 -0.004 0.481 0.010 0.013* -0.006 0.025
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
90 -0.002 0.002 -0.006 0.572 0.011 0.012* 0.001 0.406
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.013)
Coefficients equal
across quantiles (p-value)
0.979 0.714 0.798 0.835 0.884 0.837 0.678 0.765
Coefficients jointly
zero (p-value)
0.975 0.660 0.844 0.855 0.096 0.077 0.761 0.263
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance is assessed based on bootstrap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level. The bottom
rows show Wald-type tests of the equality of coefficients for each credit variable across all quantiles, and whether they are jointly zero. Columns (4) and (8) show results from tests of the equality
of slope coefficients on female and male microcredit at each quantile. Bottom rows of columns (4) and (8) show joint hypotheses tests of the equality of slope coefficients on female and male
microcredit across all quantiles, and a similar tests for whether all these coefficients are simultaneously zero across all quantiles.
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Table 2.3 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household non-food expenditure, cross-section quantile regressions with village co-
variates
1991-92 1998-99
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Quantile
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
10 0.003* 0.003 0.003 0.920 0.003* 0.003* 0.001 0.494
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
20 0.002* 0.002 0.004 0.583 0.003** 0.003* 0.004 0.815
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
30 0.003* 0.002 0.004 0.482 0.004** 0.005** 0.003 0.562
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
40 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.552 0.007** 0.007** 0.003 0.349
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
50 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.710 0.007** 0.007** 0.003 0.376
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
60 0.006 0.008 0.001 0.264 0.007** 0.009** 0.003 0.400
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
70 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.814 0.013** 0.013** 0.006 0.459
(0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
80 0.010 0.008 0.012 0.793 0.028** 0.034** 0.012 0.161
(0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012)
90 0.021 0.016 0.026 0.636 0.031** 0.032** -0.003 0.125
(0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.018)
Coefficients equal
across quantiles (p-value)
0.584 0.369 0.824 0.678 0.185 0.277 0.904 0.744
Coefficients jointly
zero (p-value)
0.239 0.171 0.644 0.316 0.062 0.054 0.886 0.350
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance is assessed based on bootstrap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level. The bottom
rows show Wald-type tests of the equality of coefficients for each credit variable across all quantiles, and whether they are jointly zero. Columns (4) and (8) show results from tests of the equality
of slope coefficients on female and male microcredit at each quantile. Bottom rows of columns (4) and (8) show joint hypotheses tests of the equality of slope coefficients on female and male
microcredit across all quantiles, and a similar tests for whether all these coefficients are simultaneously zero across all quantiles.
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Table 2.4 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household total expenditure, cross-section quantile regressions with village quantile
effects
1991-92 1998-99
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Quantile
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
10 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.924 -0.000 0.003 -0.017 0.028
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008)
20 0.006 0.005 0.011 0.520 0.003 0.005 -0.015 0.022
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
30 0.008 0.011 0.007 0.693 0.006 0.007 -0.010 0.090
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009)
40 0.007 0.007 0.002 0.575 0.007 0.008** -0.003 0.281
(0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.004) (0.005) (0.010)
50 0.007 0.003 0.010 0.652 0.004 0.007 -0.005 0.331
(0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.006) (0.007) (0.011)
60 0.006 0.005 0.015 0.540 0.003 0.008 -0.022 0.060
(0.007) (0.007) (0.015) (0.007) (0.008) (0.016)
70 0.006 0.003 0.018 0.442 0.006 0.011 -0.030 0.048
(0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.008) (0.008) (0.021)
80 0.007 -0.003 0.022 0.166 0.017 0.024 -0.017 0.120
(0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.010) (0.025)
90 0.008 0.004 0.016 0.566 0.026 0.031* -0.003 0.360
(0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.035)
Coefficients equal
across quantiles (p-value)
1.000 0.862 0.840 0.963 0.510 0.712 0.453 0.356
Coefficients jointly
zero (p-value)
0.947 0.775 0.769 0.889 0.326 0.221 0.336 0.285
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance is assessed based on bootstrap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level. The bottom
rows show Wald-type tests of the equality of coefficients for each credit variable across all quantiles, and whether they are jointly zero. Columns (4) and (8) show results from tests of the equality
of slope coefficients on female and male microcredit at each quantile. Bottom rows of columns (4) and (8) show joint hypotheses tests of the equality of slope coefficients on female and male
microcredit across all quantiles, and a similar tests for whether all these coefficients are simultaneously zero across all quantiles.
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Table 2.5 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household food expenditure, cross-section quantile regressions with village quantile
effects
1991-92 1998-99
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Quantile
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
10 0.003 0.004 0.000 0.585 -0.001 -0.000 -0.004 0.422
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
20 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.511 0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.434
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
30 0.008* 0.005 0.012** 0.187 0.001 0.002 -0.004 0.279
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
40 0.006* 0.005 0.009** 0.402 0.001 0.002 -0.004 0.256
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
50 0.004 0.001 0.007** 0.327 -0.001 0.001 -0.008 0.085
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
60 0.004 0.000 0.009** 0.156 -0.002 -0.000 -0.011 0.144
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007)
70 0.002 -0.002 0.005 0.260 -0.002 -0.001 -0.013 0.185
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008)
80 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.811 0.001 0.001 -0.008 0.392
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.009)
90 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.807 0.005 0.006 -0.003 0.443
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.011)
Coefficients equal
across quantiles (p-value)
0.675 0.849 0.379 0.658 0.770 0.906 0.913 0.979
Coefficients jointly
zero (p-value)
0.560 0.864 0.101 0.339 0.843 0.943 0.888 0.987
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance is assessed based on bootstrap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level. The bottom
rows show Wald-type tests of the equality of coefficients for each credit variable across all quantiles, and whether they are jointly zero. Columns (4) and (8) show results from tests of the equality
of slope coefficients on female and male microcredit at each quantile. Bottom rows of columns (4) and (8) show joint hypotheses tests of the equality of slope coefficients on female and male
microcredit across all quantiles, and a similar tests for whether all these coefficients are simultaneously zero across all quantiles.
C
hap
ter
2
D
istribu
tionalIm
p
acts
of
M
icro-C
red
it
on
C
onsu
m
p
tion
105
Table 2.6 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household non-food expenditure, cross-section quantile regressions with village quan-
tile effects
1991-92 1998-99
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Quantile
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
10 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.825 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.922
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
20 0.001 -0.000 0.002 0.468 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.804
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
30 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.714 0.003 0.003* 0.001 0.647
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
40 0.002 0.003* 0.001 0.599 0.003 0.004** -0.001 0.261
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
50 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.848 0.004 0.005** -0.007 0.007
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
60 0.003 0.004* 0.003 0.926 0.002 0.005 -0.010* 0.085
(0.003) (0.002) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008)
70 0.006 0.005 0.010 0.650 0.004 0.008 -0.008 0.117
(0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005) (0.011)
80 0.010* 0.007 0.013 0.686 0.004 0.012 -0.015 0.069
(0.007) (0.006) (0.014) (0.009) (0.008) (0.015)
90 0.018** 0.005 0.021* 0.374 0.022* 0.030** -0.024 0.033
(0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.023)
Coefficients equal
across quantiles (p-value)
0.646 0.556 0.787 0.822 0.363 0.434 0.500 0.409
Coefficients jointly
zero (p-value)
0.684 0.433 0.843 0.689 0.188 0.161 0.600 0.258
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance is assessed based on bootstrap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level. The bottom
rows show Wald-type tests of the equality of coefficients for each credit variable across all quantiles, and whether they are jointly zero. Columns (4) and (8) show results from tests of the equality
of slope coefficients on female and male microcredit at each quantile. Bottom rows of columns (4) and (8) show joint hypotheses tests of the equality of slope coefficients on female and male
microcredit across all quantiles, and a similar tests for whether all these coefficients are simultaneously zero across all quantiles.
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Table 2.7 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household total expenditure, cross-section quantile regressions with penalised village
effects
1991-92 1998-99
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Quantile
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
10 0.009 0.016** 0.004 0.199 0.009** 0.010** 0.003 0.289
(0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
20 0.009* 0.010** 0.007 0.718 0.008** 0.012** 0.002 0.096
(0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
30 0.008* 0.009** 0.003 0.428 0.011** 0.014** -0.002 0.007
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
40 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.983 0.015** 0.019** 0.002 0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
50 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.982 0.017** 0.020** 0.001 0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
60 0.015* 0.015 0.015 0.958 0.022** 0.025** -0.001 0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
70 0.013** 0.011* 0.023 0.451 0.022** 0.027** -0.001 0.016
(0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011)
80 0.013* 0.008 0.018 0.479 0.032** 0.038** 0.007 0.027
(0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012)
90 0.006 0.006 0.020 0.405 0.052** 0.056** -0.003 0.012
(0.009) (0.010) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020)
Coefficients equal
across quantiles (p-value)
0.541 0.226 0.770 0.521 0.067 0.015 0.880 0.019
Coefficients jointly
zero (p-value)
0.219 0.019 0.742 0.068 0.001 0.000 0.920 0.000
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance is assessed based on bootstrap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level. The bottom
rows show Wald-type tests of the equality of coefficients for each credit variable across all quantiles, and whether they are jointly zero. Columns (4) and (8) show results from tests of the equality
of slope coefficients on female and male microcredit at each quantile. Bottom rows of columns (4) and (8) show joint hypotheses tests of the equality of slope coefficients on female and male
microcredit across all quantiles, and a similar tests for whether all these coefficients are simultaneously zero across all quantiles.
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Table 2.8 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household food expenditure, cross-section quantile regressions with penalised village
effects
1991-92 1998-99
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Quantile
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
10 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.450 0.005** 0.007** 0.000 0.167
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
20 0.003 0.004 0.000 0.463 0.007** 0.009** 0.003 0.329
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
30 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.648 0.008** 0.008** 0.007 0.730
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
40 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.792 0.009** 0.009** 0.006 0.421
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
50 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.935 0.007** 0.010** 0.003 0.053
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
60 0.001 0.002 -0.000 0.766 0.008** 0.009** 0.001 0.041
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
70 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.862 0.011** 0.013** -0.003 0.001
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
80 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.923 0.013** 0.014** -0.001 0.019
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
90 -0.004 -0.001 -0.006 0.669 0.013** 0.015** -0.001 0.135
(0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010)
Coefficients equal
across quantiles (p-value)
0.712 0.924 0.848 0.966 0.414 0.718 0.262 0.311
Coefficients jointly
zero (p-value)
0.738 0.885 0.891 0.955 0.002 0.000 0.256 0.001
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance is assessed based on bootstrap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level. The bottom
rows show Wald-type tests of the equality of coefficients for each credit variable across all quantiles, and whether they are jointly zero. Columns (4) and (8) show results from tests of the equality
of slope coefficients on female and male microcredit at each quantile. Bottom rows of columns (4) and (8) show joint hypotheses tests of the equality of slope coefficients on female and male
microcredit across all quantiles, and a similar tests for whether all these coefficients are simultaneously zero across all quantiles.
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Table 2.9 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household non-food expenditure, cross-section quantile regressions with penalised
village effects
1991-92 1998-99
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Quantile
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
10 0.003** 0.003** 0.004** 0.988 0.003** 0.003** 0.001 0.400
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
20 0.004** 0.004** 0.004 0.851 0.003** 0.004** 0.002 0.281
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
30 0.003** 0.003** 0.003 0.745 0.004** 0.004** 0.002 0.183
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
40 0.002** 0.003** 0.002 0.774 0.004** 0.006** 0.001 0.017
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
50 0.002** 0.003** 0.002 0.849 0.006** 0.007** 0.000 0.012
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
60 0.003* 0.004** 0.001 0.547 0.007** 0.009** -0.002 0.014
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
70 0.007** 0.008** 0.005 0.723 0.014** 0.016** -0.001 0.032
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
80 0.008** 0.007** 0.020 0.268 0.023** 0.026** 0.001 0.017
(0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
90 0.018** 0.013 0.021* 0.524 0.041** 0.047** -0.004 0.012
(0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016)
Coefficients equal
across quantiles (p-value)
0.251 0.530 0.372 0.601 0.089 0.059 0.981 0.175
Coefficients jointly
zero (p-value)
0.060 0.042 0.386 0.158 0.002 0.001 0.969 0.021
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance is assessed based on bootstrap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level. The bottom
rows show Wald-type tests of the equality of coefficients for each credit variable across all quantiles, and whether they are jointly zero. Columns (4) and (8) show results from tests of the equality
of slope coefficients on female and male microcredit at each quantile. Bottom rows of columns (4) and (8) show joint hypotheses tests of the equality of slope coefficients on female and male
microcredit across all quantiles, and a similar tests for whether all these coefficients are simultaneously zero across all quantiles.
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Figure 2.10 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household total consumption:
cross-section two-stage quantile regressions with village covariates
(a) Panel A: Household microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
(b) Panel B: Female microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
(c) Panel C: Male microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
Note: Solid lines show the credit coefficients estimates at each decile. The grey areas show 95% bootstrap
percentile confidence intervals. We carry out 999 replications, re-sampling villages with replacement
to account for within-cluster dependence of household-level observations through time. The estimation
sample includes 1,638 households in each time period. Microcredit is measured as cumulative borrowings
from microfinance programs over the previous six years, in 1992 Taka. Microcredit is instrumented for
following the approach in Pitt and Khandker (1998), using OLS in the first stage. Specifications include
either: village covariates; village quantile effects (i.e. village dummy variables); or penalised village effects
(i.e. restricted to have a pure location-shift effect a` la Koenker (2004)).
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Figure 2.11 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household total consumption:
cross-section two-stage quantile regressions with village quantile effects
(a) Panel A: Household microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
(b) Panel B: Female microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
(c) Panel C: Male microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
Note: Solid lines show the credit coefficients estimates at each decile. The grey areas show 95% bootstrap
percentile confidence intervals. We carry out 999 replications, re-sampling villages with replacement
to account for within-cluster dependence of household-level observations through time. The estimation
sample includes 1,638 households in each time period. Microcredit is measured as cumulative borrowings
from microfinance programs over the previous six years, in 1992 Taka. Microcredit is instrumented for
following the approach in Pitt and Khandker (1998), using OLS in the first stage. Specifications include
either: village covariates; village quantile effects (i.e. village dummy variables); or penalised village effects
(i.e. restricted to have a pure location-shift effect a` la Koenker (2004)).
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Figure 2.12 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household total consumption:
cross-section two-stage quantile regressions with penalised village effects
(a) Panel A: Household microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
(b) Panel B: Female microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
(c) Panel C: Male microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
Note: Solid lines show the credit coefficients estimates at each decile. The grey areas show 95% bootstrap
percentile confidence intervals. We carry out 999 replications, re-sampling villages with replacement
to account for within-cluster dependence of household-level observations through time. The estimation
sample includes 1,638 households in each time period. Microcredit is measured as cumulative borrowings
from microfinance programs over the previous six years, in 1992 Taka. Microcredit is instrumented for
following the approach in Pitt and Khandker (1998), using OLS in the first stage. Specifications include
either: village covariates; village quantile effects (i.e. village dummy variables); or penalised village effects
(i.e. restricted to have a pure location-shift effect a` la Koenker (2004)).
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Table 2.10 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household total expenditure, cross-section two-stage quantile regressions with village
covariates
1991-92 1998-99
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Quantile
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
10 -0.019 -0.027 -0.015 0.721 0.016 -0.031 0.129 0.237
(0.017) (0.022) (0.024) (0.030) (0.043) (0.107)
20 -0.019 -0.006 -0.020 0.662 -0.004 -0.022 0.050 0.568
(0.015) (0.020) (0.021) (0.025) (0.040) (0.098)
30 -0.027 -0.018 -0.016 0.955 0.012 -0.009 0.037 0.690
(0.016) (0.022) (0.026) (0.025) (0.040) (0.090)
40 -0.022 -0.015 -0.010 0.916 0.021 -0.053 0.098 0.224
(0.019) (0.025) (0.029) (0.032) (0.046) (0.097)
50 -0.020 -0.016 0.004 0.643 0.021 -0.060 0.066 0.365
(0.023) (0.029) (0.034) (0.044) (0.052) (0.113)
60 -0.020 -0.013 0.005 0.721 0.018 -0.066 -0.040 0.867
(0.026) (0.031) (0.037) (0.059) (0.060) (0.137)
70 -0.011 -0.022 0.030 0.368 -0.025 -0.055 -0.054 0.996
(0.032) (0.037) (0.044) (0.082) (0.076) (0.211)
80 -0.009 -0.017 0.018 0.601 0.006 -0.076 0.086 0.692
(0.039) (0.045) (0.050) (0.141) (0.169) (0.358)
90 0.015 0.033 0.037 0.970 0.059 -0.461 0.559 0.150
(0.057) (0.068) (0.076) (0.304) (0.351) (0.563)
Coefficients equal
across quantiles (p-value)
0.996 0.934 0.963 0.995 0.957 0.753 0.664 0.864
Coefficients jointly
zero (p-value)
0.940 0.928 0.950 0.990 0.975 0.788 0.685 0.895
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance is assessed based on bootstrap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level. The bottom
rows show Wald-type tests of the equality of coefficients for each credit variable across all quantiles, and whether they are jointly zero. Columns (4) and (8) show results from tests of the equality
of slope coefficients on female and male microcredit at each quantile. Bottom rows of columns (4) and (8) show joint hypotheses tests of the equality of slope coefficients on female and male
microcredit across all quantiles, and a similar tests for whether all these coefficients are simultaneously zero across all quantiles.
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Table 2.11 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household total expenditure, cross-section two-stage quantile regressions with village
quantile effects
1991-92 1998-99
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Quantile
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
10 0.012 0.010 0.006 0.897 -0.019 -0.008 -0.026 0.747
(0.016) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.030) (0.043)
20 0.018 0.019 0.016 0.900 -0.014 -0.004 -0.021 0.742
(0.015) (0.019) (0.022) (0.023) (0.031) (0.039)
30 0.013 0.015 0.013 0.947 0.001 -0.015 0.010 0.614
(0.016) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.029) (0.038)
40 -0.005 -0.002 0.004 0.868 0.010 -0.002 0.028 0.616
(0.018) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.032) (0.046)
50 -0.001 -0.009 0.025 0.405 0.012 -0.005 0.043 0.570
(0.023) (0.028) (0.030) (0.036) (0.042) (0.066)
60 -0.005 -0.002 0.030 0.498 -0.028 -0.027 -0.031 0.973
(0.025) (0.029) (0.038) (0.042) (0.048) (0.106)
70 -0.026 -0.032 0.015 0.332 -0.033 -0.029 -0.036 0.961
(0.028) (0.032) (0.040) (0.044) (0.052) (0.123)
80 -0.008 -0.014 0.033 0.387 -0.007 -0.037 -0.029 0.977
(0.029) (0.032) (0.045) (0.076) (0.107) (0.232)
90 0.013 -0.012 0.078 0.210 0.069 0.067 -0.144 0.604
(0.036) (0.043) (0.056) (0.140) (0.204) (0.329)
Coefficients equal
across quantiles (p-value)
0.617 0.723 0.786 0.903 0.781 0.977 0.963 0.997
Coefficients jointly
zero (p-value)
0.638 0.763 0.841 0.890 0.823 0.984 0.981 0.998
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance is assessed based on bootstrap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level. The bottom
rows show Wald-type tests of the equality of coefficients for each credit variable across all quantiles, and whether they are jointly zero. Columns (4) and (8) show results from tests of the equality
of slope coefficients on female and male microcredit at each quantile. Bottom rows of columns (4) and (8) show joint hypotheses tests of the equality of slope coefficients on female and male
microcredit across all quantiles, and a similar tests for whether all these coefficients are simultaneously zero across all quantiles.
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Table 2.12 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household total expenditure, cross-section two-stage quantile regressions with pe-
nalised village effects
1991-92 1998-99
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Quantile
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
10 0.009 0.017 -0.010 0.232 0.020** 0.021** 0.012 0.782
(0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.011) (0.012) (0.029)
20 0.017 0.029* 0.004 0.287 0.025** 0.026** 0.030 0.876
(0.012) (0.012) (0.018) (0.012) (0.014) (0.025)
30 0.015 0.027* 0.000 0.270 0.038** 0.037** 0.041 0.917
(0.013) (0.011) (0.020) (0.015) (0.018) (0.028)
40 0.016 0.019 0.007 0.650 0.049** 0.049** 0.052 0.933
(0.013) (0.013) (0.022) (0.016) (0.020) (0.028)
50 0.019 0.017 0.016 0.976 0.061** 0.062** 0.052 0.760
(0.013) (0.017) (0.025) (0.015) (0.018) (0.028)
60 0.022 0.028 0.017 0.737 0.069** 0.071** 0.048 0.541
(0.018) (0.021) (0.026) (0.015) (0.019) (0.031)
70 0.041* 0.042 0.045 0.938 0.070** 0.076** 0.062 0.752
(0.019) (0.021) (0.028) (0.021) (0.026) (0.036)
80 0.041* 0.026 0.031* 0.870 0.107** 0.106** 0.072* 0.599
(0.017) (0.022) (0.028) (0.031) (0.033) (0.056)
90 0.035* 0.022 0.056* 0.453 0.136** 0.129** 0.140 0.942
(0.018) (0.025) (0.039) (0.041) (0.040) (0.142)
Coefficients equal
across quantiles (p-value)
0.624 0.382 0.576 0.587 0.000 0.000 0.614 0.001
Coefficients jointly
zero (p-value)
0.439 0.093 0.671 0.263 0.000 0.000 0.578 0.002
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance is assessed based on bootstrap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level. The bottom
rows show Wald-type tests of the equality of coefficients for each credit variable across all quantiles, and whether they are jointly zero. Columns (4) and (8) show results from tests of the equality
of slope coefficients on female and male microcredit at each quantile. Bottom rows of columns (4) and (8) show joint hypotheses tests of the equality of slope coefficients on female and male
microcredit across all quantiles, and a similar tests for whether all these coefficients are simultaneously zero across all quantiles.
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Figure 2.13 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household total consumption:
pooled quantile regressions
(a) Panel A: Household microcredit
Village covariates
Quantile
Village quantile effects
Quantile
Penalised village effects
Quantile
(b) Panel B: Female microcredit
Village covariates
Quantile
Village quantile effects
Quantile
Penalised village effects
Quantile
(c) Panel C: Male microcredit
Village covariates
Quantile
Village quantile effects
Quantile
Penalised village effects
Quantile
Note: Solid lines show the credit coefficients estimates at each decile. The grey areas show 95% bootstrap
percentile confidence intervals. We carry out 999 replications, re-sampling households with replacement
to account for dependence of household-level observations through time. The estimation sample includes
1,638 households in each time period. Microcredit is measured as cumulative borrowings from microfi-
nance programs over the previous six years, in 1992 Taka. Specifications include either: village covariates;
village quantile effects (i.e. village dummy variables); or penalised village effects (i.e. restricted to have a
pure location-shift effect a` la Koenker (2004)).
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Figure 2.14 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household food consumption:
pooled quantile regressions
(a) Panel A: Household microcredit
Village covariates
Quantile
Village quantile effects
Quantile
Penalised village effects
Quantile
(b) Panel B: Female microcredit
Village covariates
Quantile
Village quantile effects
Quantile
Penalised village effects
Quantile
(c) Panel C: Male microcredit
Village covariates
Quantile
Village quantile effects
Quantile
Penalised village effects
Quantile
Note: Solid lines show the credit coefficients estimates at each decile. The grey areas show 95% bootstrap
percentile confidence intervals. We carry out 999 replications, re-sampling households with replacement
to account for dependence of household-level observations through time. The estimation sample includes
1,638 households in each time period. Microcredit is measured as cumulative borrowings from microfi-
nance programs over the previous six years, in 1992 Taka. Specifications include either: village covariates;
village quantile effects (i.e. village dummy variables); or penalised village effects (i.e. restricted to have a
pure location-shift effect a` la Koenker (2004)).
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Figure 2.15 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household non-food consump-
tion: pooled quantile regressions
(a) Panel A: Household microcredit
Village covariates
Quantile
Village quantile effects
Quantile
Penalised village effects
Quantile
(b) Panel B: Female microcredit
Village covariates
Quantile
Village quantile effects
Quantile
Penalised village effects
Quantile
(c) Panel C: Male microcredit
Village covariates
Quantile
Village quantile effects
Quantile
Penalised village effects
Quantile
Note: Solid lines show the credit coefficients estimates at each decile. The grey areas show 95% bootstrap
percentile confidence intervals. We carry out 999 replications, re-sampling households with replacement
to account for dependence of household-level observations through time. The estimation sample includes
1,638 households in each time period. Microcredit is measured as cumulative borrowings from microfi-
nance programs over the previous six years, in 1992 Taka. Specifications include either: village covariates;
village quantile effects (i.e. village dummy variables); or penalised village effects (i.e. restricted to have a
pure location-shift effect a` la Koenker (2004)).
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Table 2.13 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household total expenditure, pooled quantile regressions
Village covariates Village quantile effects Penalised village effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Quantile
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
10 0.008** 0.009** 0.001 0.134 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.621 0.008** 0.009** 0.005 0.334
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
20 0.010** 0.011** 0.008 0.599 0.006 0.007 0.003 0.480 0.010** 0.012** 0.008 0.399
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
30 0.009** 0.009** 0.008* 0.801 0.008* 0.009* 0.003 0.477 0.010** 0.013** 0.005* 0.126
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
40 0.014** 0.016** 0.007 0.198 0.009** 0.012** 0.000 0.160 0.014** 0.017** 0.004 0.014
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
50 0.015** 0.016** 0.009 0.461 0.011** 0.013** 0.005 0.397 0.017** 0.019** 0.004 0.022
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
60 0.020** 0.021** 0.010 0.351 0.011** 0.012** 0.006 0.566 0.019** 0.024** 0.004 0.010
(0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
70 0.022** 0.025** 0.019 0.585 0.013** 0.014** 0.008 0.610 0.022** 0.023** 0.008 0.085
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008)
80 0.025** 0.027** 0.016 0.450 0.017** 0.019** 0.002 0.229 0.027** 0.028** 0.017* 0.290
(0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010)
90 0.039** 0.049** -0.001 0.044 0.023** 0.025** -0.000 0.203 0.034** 0.050** -0.000 0.012
(0.014) (0.016) (0.020) (0.010) (0.013) (0.016) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014)
Coefficients equal
across quantiles (p-value)
0.354 0.129 0.670 0.351 0.878 0.892 0.981 0.987 0.047 0.035 0.706 0.136
Coefficients jointly
zero (p-value)
0.011 0.002 0.482 0.012 0.350 0.333 0.978 0.835 0.000 0.000 0.508 0.001
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance is assessed based on bootstrap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level. The bottom
rows show Wald-type tests of the equality of coefficients for each credit variable across all quantiles, and whether they are jointly zero. Columns (4), (8) and (12) show results from tests of the
equality of slope coefficients on female and male microcredit at each quantile. Bottom rows of columns (4), (8) and (12) show joint hypotheses tests of the equality of slope coefficients on female
and male microcredit across all quantiles, and a similar tests for whether all these coefficients are simultaneously zero across all quantiles.
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Table 2.14 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household food expenditure, pooled quantile regressions
Village covariates Village quantile effects Penalised village effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Quantile
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
10 0.005* 0.006** -0.002 0.068 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.827 0.005** 0.005** -0.000 0.130
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
20 0.007** 0.007** 0.007 0.938 0.006** 0.005* 0.008 0.522 0.005** 0.005** 0.005* 0.929
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
30 0.008** 0.008** 0.007** 0.700 0.006** 0.005** 0.008* 0.496 0.008** 0.008** 0.007** 0.624
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
40 0.006** 0.008** 0.004 0.227 0.005** 0.006** 0.004 0.701 0.006** 0.007** 0.005** 0.572
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
50 0.006** 0.007** 0.002 0.209 0.004* 0.004* 0.004 0.951 0.006** 0.007** 0.003** 0.091
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
60 0.007** 0.010** 0.002 0.133 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.503 0.007** 0.009** 0.001 0.024
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
70 0.006** 0.008** 0.001 0.166 0.003 0.003 -0.001 0.411 0.007** 0.009** 0.001 0.066
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
80 0.007* 0.010** -0.002 0.017 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.786 0.007** 0.009** 0.001 0.106
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
90 0.007 0.007* -0.013 0.007 0.001 0.003 -0.006 0.182 0.007** 0.010** -0.001 0.151
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007)
Coefficients equal
across quantiles (p-value)
0.901 0.820 0.042 0.160 0.625 0.628 0.589 0.760 0.492 0.572 0.338 0.439
Coefficients jointly
zero (p-value)
0.011 0.009 0.023 0.002 0.298 0.308 0.373 0.344 0.000 0.001 0.082 0.001
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance is assessed based on bootstrap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level. The bottom
rows show Wald-type tests of the equality of coefficients for each credit variable across all quantiles, and whether they are jointly zero. Columns (4), (8) and (12) show results from tests of the
equality of slope coefficients on female and male microcredit at each quantile. Bottom rows of columns (4), (8) and (12) show joint hypotheses tests of the equality of slope coefficients on female
and male microcredit across all quantiles, and a similar tests for whether all these coefficients are simultaneously zero across all quantiles.
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Table 2.15 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household non-food expenditure, pooled quantile regressions
Village covariates Village quantile effects Penalised village effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Quantile
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
10 0.002** 0.002** 0.001* 0.757 0.002** 0.002** 0.002 0.956 0.003** 0.003** 0.002* 0.202
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
20 0.003** 0.003** 0.004** 0.856 0.002** 0.003** 0.001 0.282 0.003** 0.004** 0.002* 0.330
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
30 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.964 0.003** 0.004** -0.001 0.050 0.004** 0.004** 0.003 0.272
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
40 0.005** 0.005** 0.004** 0.542 0.004** 0.004** 0.000 0.253 0.004** 0.006** 0.001 0.010
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
50 0.006** 0.006** 0.004 0.662 0.005** 0.006** 0.001 0.318 0.005** 0.007** 0.001 0.010
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
60 0.007** 0.008** 0.003 0.370 0.006** 0.007** 0.003 0.558 0.007** 0.010** -0.000 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
70 0.010** 0.011** 0.009 0.811 0.007** 0.009** -0.002 0.147 0.013** 0.015** 0.003 0.021
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
80 0.022** 0.025** 0.005 0.127 0.011** 0.016** -0.001 0.127 0.018** 0.021** 0.005 0.093
(0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
90 0.035** 0.041** 0.012 0.176 0.025** 0.027** 0.011 0.403 0.029** 0.042** 0.021 0.250
(0.011) (0.014) (0.016) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.009) (0.012) (0.014)
Coefficients equal
across quantiles (p-value)
0.103 0.221 0.433 0.366 0.658 0.655 0.764 0.797 0.043 0.013 0.538 0.031
Coefficients jointly
zero (p-value)
0.011 0.030 0.279 0.073 0.077 0.117 0.765 0.342 0.000 0.000 0.386 0.000
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance is assessed based on bootstrap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level. The bottom
rows show Wald-type tests of the equality of coefficients for each credit variable across all quantiles, and whether they are jointly zero. Columns (4), (8) and (12) show results from tests of the
equality of slope coefficients on female and male microcredit at each quantile. Bottom rows of columns (4), (8) and (12) show joint hypotheses tests of the equality of slope coefficients on female
and male microcredit across all quantiles, and a similar tests for whether all these coefficients are simultaneously zero across all quantiles.
Chapter 2 Distributional Impacts of Micro-Credit on Consumption 121
Figure 2.16 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household total consumption:
pooled quantile regressions with correlated random effects
(a) Panel A: Household microcredit
Village covariates
Quantile
Village quantile effects
Quantile
Penalised village effects
Quantile
(b) Panel B: Female microcredit
Village covariates
Quantile
Village quantile effects
Quantile
Penalised village effects
Quantile
(c) Panel C: Male microcredit
Village covariates
Quantile
Village quantile effects
Quantile
Penalised village effects
Quantile
Note: Solid lines show the credit coefficients estimates at each decile. The grey areas show 95% bootstrap
percentile confidence intervals. We carry out 999 replications, re-sampling households with replacement
to account for dependence of household-level observations through time. The estimation sample includes
1,638 households in each time period. Microcredit is measured as cumulative borrowings from micro-
finance programs over the previous six years, in 1992 Taka. All regressions include the time-averaged
values of all household covariates (including credit variables) to specify household correlated random ef-
fects, following the method of Abrevaya and Dahl (2008). Specifications include either: village covariates;
village quantile effects (i.e. village dummy variables); or penalised village effects (i.e. restricted to have a
pure location-shift effect a` la Koenker (2004)).
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Figure 2.17 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household food consumption:
pooled quantile regressions with correlated random effects
(a) Panel A: Household microcredit
Village covariates
Quantile
Village quantile effects
Quantile
Penalised village effects
Quantile
(b) Panel B: Female microcredit
Village covariates
Quantile
Village quantile effects
Quantile
Penalised village effects
Quantile
(c) Panel C: Male microcredit
Village covariates
Quantile
Village quantile effects
Quantile
Penalised village effects
Quantile
Note: Solid lines show the credit coefficients estimates at each decile. The grey areas show 95% bootstrap
percentile confidence intervals. We carry out 999 replications, re-sampling households with replacement
to account for dependence of household-level observations through time. The estimation sample includes
1,638 households in each time period. Microcredit is measured as cumulative borrowings from micro-
finance programs over the previous six years, in 1992 Taka. All regressions include the time-averaged
values of all household covariates (including credit variables) to specify household correlated random ef-
fects, following the method of Abrevaya and Dahl (2008). Specifications include either: village covariates;
village quantile effects (i.e. village dummy variables); or penalised village effects (i.e. restricted to have a
pure location-shift effect a` la Koenker (2004)).
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Figure 2.18 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household non-food consump-
tion: pooled quantile regressions with correlated random effects
(a) Panel A: Household microcredit
Village covariates
Quantile
Village quantile effects
Quantile
Penalised village effects
Quantile
(b) Panel B: Female microcredit
Village covariates
Quantile
Village quantile effects
Quantile
Penalised village effects
Quantile
(c) Panel C: Male microcredit
Village covariates
Quantile
Village quantile effects
Quantile
Penalised village effects
Quantile
Note: Solid lines show the credit coefficients estimates at each decile. The grey areas show 95% bootstrap
percentile confidence intervals. We carry out 999 replications, re-sampling households with replacement
to account for dependence of household-level observations through time. The estimation sample includes
1,638 households in each time period. Microcredit is measured as cumulative borrowings from micro-
finance programs over the previous six years, in 1992 Taka. All regressions include the time-averaged
values of all household covariates (including credit variables) to specify household correlated random ef-
fects, following the method of Abrevaya and Dahl (2008). Specifications include either: village covariates;
village quantile effects (i.e. village dummy variables); or penalised village effects (i.e. restricted to have a
pure location-shift effect a` la Koenker (2004)).
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Table 2.16 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household total expenditure, panel quantile regressions with household correlated
random effects
Village covariates Village quantile effects Penalised village effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Quantile
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
10 0.011** 0.013** 0.003 0.356 0.013** 0.015** 0.011 0.707 0.014** 0.016** 0.014 0.878
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.009)
20 0.016** 0.017** 0.006 0.297 0.016** 0.017** 0.011 0.540 0.017** 0.017** 0.018** 0.920
(0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
30 0.016** 0.016** 0.014 0.844 0.022** 0.022** 0.022* 0.972 0.020** 0.021** 0.018** 0.668
(0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
40 0.021** 0.020** 0.017* 0.831 0.030** 0.031** 0.031** 0.983 0.022** 0.025** 0.012** 0.147
(0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008)
50 0.024** 0.023** 0.023** 0.992 0.031** 0.033** 0.029** 0.754 0.026** 0.028** 0.016** 0.224
(0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009)
60 0.032** 0.032** 0.036** 0.726 0.032** 0.032** 0.028** 0.827 0.031** 0.036** 0.022** 0.183
(0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.008) (0.014) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010)
70 0.036** 0.040** 0.049** 0.530 0.038** 0.037** 0.041** 0.819 0.034** 0.034** 0.033** 0.987
(0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.009) (0.010) (0.017) (0.006) (0.007) (0.013)
80 0.042** 0.040** 0.036* 0.860 0.039** 0.036** 0.040* 0.864 0.044** 0.047** 0.037** 0.511
(0.013) (0.014) (0.020) (0.012) (0.013) (0.022) (0.008) (0.010) (0.015)
90 0.061** 0.068** 0.032 0.382 0.042** 0.048** 0.037 0.722 0.058** 0.065** 0.020 0.177
(0.017) (0.020) (0.038) (0.014) (0.016) (0.027) (0.014) (0.016) (0.028)
Coefficients equal
across quantiles (p-value)
0.097 0.143 0.301 0.337 0.304 0.364 0.680 0.669 0.068 0.032 0.720 0.213
Coefficients jointly
zero (p-value)
0.000 0.000 0.121 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.155 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.071 0.000
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance is assessed based on bootstrap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level. The bottom
rows show Wald-type tests of the equality of coefficients for each credit variable across all quantiles, and whether they are jointly zero. Columns (4), (8) and (12) show results from tests of the
equality of slope coefficients on female and male microcredit at each quantile. Bottom rows of columns (4), (8) and (12) show joint hypotheses tests of the equality of slope coefficients on female
and male microcredit across all quantiles, and a similar tests for whether all these coefficients are simultaneously zero across all quantiles.
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Table 2.17 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household food expenditure, panel quantile regressions with household correlated
random effects
Village covariates Village quantile effects Penalised village effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Quantile
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
10 0.006** 0.007** -0.004 0.168 0.008** 0.008** 0.009 0.995 0.008** 0.009** 0.001 0.273
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007)
20 0.009** 0.010** 0.005 0.424 0.011** 0.011** 0.004 0.250 0.010** 0.010** 0.012** 0.656
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
30 0.010** 0.011** 0.010** 0.956 0.012** 0.013** 0.008 0.385 0.011** 0.012** 0.007** 0.275
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
40 0.010** 0.009** 0.009* 0.972 0.011** 0.013** 0.004 0.172 0.012** 0.011** 0.011** 0.856
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
50 0.010** 0.010** 0.011* 0.812 0.012** 0.013** 0.004 0.206 0.012** 0.013** 0.008** 0.305
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
60 0.014** 0.014** 0.011** 0.597 0.013** 0.015** 0.010 0.445 0.013** 0.014** 0.007* 0.190
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
70 0.013** 0.013** 0.011** 0.857 0.013** 0.013** 0.010 0.780 0.014** 0.013** 0.006 0.340
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
80 0.015** 0.015** 0.013 0.800 0.010** 0.009** 0.012 0.802 0.011** 0.013** 0.014 0.908
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008)
90 0.011* 0.010* 0.012 0.883 0.010** 0.009** 0.007 0.877 0.014** 0.015** 0.016 0.936
(0.005) (0.006) (0.015) (0.004) (0.004) (0.015) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011)
Coefficients equal
across quantiles (p-value)
0.625 0.707 0.855 0.913 0.945 0.785 0.871 0.919 0.939 0.928 0.461 0.823
Coefficients jointly
zero (p-value)
0.004 0.006 0.379 0.025 0.017 0.015 0.584 0.065 0.000 0.000 0.065 0.000
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance is assessed based on bootstrap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level. The bottom
rows show Wald-type tests of the equality of coefficients for each credit variable across all quantiles, and whether they are jointly zero. Columns (4), (8) and (12) show results from tests of the
equality of slope coefficients on female and male microcredit at each quantile. Bottom rows of columns (4), (8) and (12) show joint hypotheses tests of the equality of slope coefficients on female
and male microcredit across all quantiles, and a similar tests for whether all these coefficients are simultaneously zero across all quantiles.
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Table 2.18 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household non-food expenditure, panel quantile regressions with household corre-
lated random effects
Village covariates Village quantile effects Penalised village effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Quantile
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
10 0.004** 0.004** 0.010 0.151 0.007** 0.006** 0.012** 0.146 0.006** 0.007** 0.006* 0.772
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
20 0.005** 0.005** 0.008* 0.475 0.009** 0.009** 0.008** 0.971 0.006** 0.006** 0.005** 0.728
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
30 0.007** 0.006** 0.011** 0.381 0.009** 0.010** 0.009** 0.804 0.006** 0.007** 0.005** 0.610
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
40 0.009** 0.009** 0.016** 0.370 0.010** 0.010** 0.012** 0.791 0.008** 0.008** 0.006** 0.620
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
50 0.012** 0.012** 0.013** 0.876 0.014** 0.013** 0.026** 0.106 0.009** 0.010** 0.009** 0.884
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
60 0.014** 0.014** 0.020** 0.495 0.016** 0.016** 0.020** 0.657 0.014** 0.015** 0.011** 0.429
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
70 0.017** 0.018** 0.019** 0.920 0.019** 0.020** 0.021* 0.905 0.018** 0.020** 0.013** 0.364
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
80 0.030** 0.035** 0.018 0.287 0.028** 0.028** 0.033* 0.760 0.026** 0.028** 0.015 0.364
(0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.006) (0.008) (0.013)
90 0.040** 0.047** 0.027 0.506 0.040** 0.044** 0.014 0.233 0.046** 0.050** 0.018 0.186
(0.015) (0.019) (0.025) (0.013) (0.014) (0.021) (0.011) (0.014) (0.021)
Coefficients equal
across quantiles (p-value)
0.131 0.057 0.590 0.153 0.230 0.218 0.054 0.081 0.012 0.029 0.948 0.310
Coefficients jointly
zero (p-value)
0.002 0.002 0.155 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.445 0.001
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance is assessed based on bootstrap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level. The bottom
rows show Wald-type tests of the equality of coefficients for each credit variable across all quantiles, and whether they are jointly zero. Columns (4), (8) and (12) show results from tests of the
equality of slope coefficients on female and male microcredit at each quantile. Bottom rows of columns (4), (8) and (12) show joint hypotheses tests of the equality of slope coefficients on female
and male microcredit across all quantiles, and a similar tests for whether all these coefficients are simultaneously zero across all quantiles.
Chapter 3
Analysis of spillover effects from
microfinance as social interactions
1 Introduction
To this day, existing empirical evidence on the efficiency of microfinance programs pro-
vide a rather mixed picture (Banerjee, 2013). Most studies have focussed on investigat-
ing the direct impacts of microcredit borrowings on its beneficiaries only. The reason
for this is not only the relevance of measuring such impacts from a policy-making per-
spective, but also the necessity to impose strong statistical assumptions on empirical
models to be able to actually recover average treatment effects (Imbens & Wooldridge,
2009). However, the importance of assessing potential indirect effects of such programs
to the community as a whole has also been recognised as crucial in providing a compre-
hensive overview of the real impacts of development and poverty alleviation programs
in developing countries (Angelucci & Di Maro, 2016; Philipson, 2000).
Some empirical studies have successfully shown that indirect program impacts are cru-
cial to a better characterisation of treatment effects in the evaluation of policy inter-
ventions, as advocated by Angelucci and Di Maro (2016). Miguel and Kremer (2004)
study a program providing de-worming drugs in Kenya and show children from non-
targeted areas to benefit greatly from it. Another example is the study of PROGRESA,
a program in rural Mexico consisting of cash tranfers to poor households conditional
on good health and education practices. Bobonis and Finan (2009) and Lalive and Cat-
taneo (2009) unravelled positive indirect impacts from the program on the education
of children from non-target households, while Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009) show
that the initiative also triggered increases in the consumption of ineligible households.
Few studies have attempted to investigate the potential spillover effects stemming from
microfinance initiatives, and the ones that do mostly focus on equilibrium effects on
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local markets (see e.g. Demont, 2016) or even on general equilibrium effects (Buera,
Kaboski, & Shin, 2012). The present chapter endeavours to establish whether spillover
effects from microfinance can work through other channels, and especially through
social interactions.
The reason to believe that might be the case is that rural communities of developing
countries (allegedly prime targets for microfinance initiatives) are typically very in-
terconnected and display a high degree of solidarity. Networks of extended families,
friends and neighbours can play a crucial role in the diffusion of information (Wydick,
Karp Hayes, & Hilliker Kempf, 2011) and in the adoption of new technology (Con-
ley & Udry, 2010). But the most important feature of this cooperation is that it also
aims to fill the gap left by the lack of access to traditional financial services and risk-
coping mechanisms, resulting in highly efficient informal insurance networks Rosen-
zweig (1988a); Townsend (1994); Udry (1994).
In such a context, it is legitimate to speculate that such a shock as the introduction of
a microfinance program would impact the community as a whole. Availability of extra
resources in the form of credit can influence and recast pre-existing informal networks
and impact not only direct beneficiaries of loans, but also the people who interact with
them.
The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, we want to establish whether microfinance
programs generate welfare gains (or losses) for the local population as a whole, and
more precisely at the village-level. Second, we try to determine whether the source (or
one of the sources) of such indirect impacts is the existence of social interactions be-
tween beneficiaries and the non-target population. We focus on household per capita
expenditure as a proxy for household welfare, and also on children education. The
choice of the latter relates to the fact that previous studies using similar have adver-
tised positive outcomes from microcredit in terms of schooling (Chemin, 2008; Pitt &
Khandker, 1998), and because indirect impacts on education from development poli-
cies have been shown to arise in some cases, for instance for PROGRESA in Mexico.
Th next section reviews the existing literature in order to clarify the potential sources
of spillover effects in policy interventions, and how they are relevant to the context of
microfinance programs. Section 3 briefly describes the data and provides a detailed
account of our empirical methodology used to recover direct program impacts and
community-level indirect effects. We estimate well-defined positive welfare impacts
from microcredit for borrowers and the community as a whole in terms of consump-
tion, while results for children education are seldom significant. Finally, Section 4
presents our empirical strategy to investigate social interactions as a potential source
of indirect impacts in microfinance programs, and Section 5 concludes.
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2 Literature review
2.1 A first glance at spillover effects in microfinance programs: equilib-
rium effects
The incompleteness of markets for credit and other financial services makes the core
reason why microfinance initiatives, with lending methods that differ from existing
formal and informal institutions, fulfil part of the unmet demand for finance in ru-
ral and poor urban areas of developing countries (Morduch, 1999a). By delegating
screening and monitoring costs onto borrowers (Madajewicz, 2011), classic microcre-
dit contracts of group loans with joint-liability effectively mitigate adverse selection
and moral hazard issues that are too salient for traditional banks to lend to the indi-
gent, and ultimately improve borrowers’ welfare (Ghatak & Guinnane, 1999; Stiglitz,
1990).
When microfinance or traditional banking services are not accessible, households rely
heavily on informal sources for the provision of financial services1. Generally, local
moneylenders are called upon in order to obtain investment funds that typically carry
very high interest rates because of their somewhat monopolistic situation (see Hoff &
Stiglitz, 1998, for a theoretical treatment), while social networks embedding the ex-
tended family, friends and neighbours supply insurance in the face of adverse circum-
stances (Fafchamps & Lund, 2003; Rosenzweig, 1988a; Udry, 1994).
A legitimate enquiry is therefore to assess how the presence of new actors - namely mi-
crofinance institutions (MFIs) - amongst existing formal and informal financial institu-
tions might change market conditions. Indeed, one goal of MFIs is to directly compete
with and ultimately crowd out moneylenders who, in their close to monopolistic po-
sition, are often seen to exhibit exploitative behaviours towards the credit-constrained
indigent (Armenda´riz & Morduch, 2010). Notwithstanding some level of crowding out,
as Disney, Fichera, and Owens (2013) show to be the case in rural Malawi where mem-
bers of microfinance programs borrow substantially smaller amounts from informal
lenders, empirical evidence reveals that the various types of lenders actually continue
to co-exist even after the inception of microcredit programs.
For instance, Islam (2015) use data collected in rural Bangladesh to show that if ac-
cess to microcredit does indeed make borrowing from informal sources less frequent,
the size of informal loans taken up by MFI borrowers remains unchanged. This phe-
nomenon is due to the existing complementarity of various credit sources which is fur-
ther documented in Jia, Luan, Huang, and Li (2015) about credit in rural China where
1 Conning and Udry (2007) provide a comprehensive overview the main characteristics of rural finan-
cial markets.
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microfinance loans are used for livestock and non-agricultural investment, while for-
mal credit is typically used to fund crop production, and informal networks are relied
on for consumption purposes2. Gine´ (2011) proposes that the co-existence of formal
and informal credit sources is due to comparable low transaction costs for accessing in-
formal credit and loans from formal sources alike. The limited ability of formal credit
institutions to enforce contracts is the main reason why the latter sometimes ration
credit for risky projects, which in turn allows the more flexible informal credit sources
to survive an expansion of access to formal credit (Gine´, 2011).
In sum, different providers of funds meet different needs. Nevertheless, the aforemen-
tioned evidence suggest that the entrance of MFIs on incomplete financial markets does
disturb competition amongst lenders. The consequential changes on both the supply
and demand sides are bound to have an impact on prices. Indeed, exploiting data from
two surveys in Bangladesh, Berg, Emran, and Shilpi (2013) find that MFI members bor-
row less often from moneylenders and that informal interest rates increase in reaction
to the inception of microfinance programs. The latter observation is corroborated by
Mallick (2012) in an empirical study showing that moneylender interest rates are gen-
erally higher in villages with greater coverage by microfinance programs and where
loans are mainly used for productive purposes. On the other hand, Venittelli (2017)
claims that microfinance borrowers in Andra Pradesh, India, actually enjoy lower in-
terest rates from moneylenders as a positive externality to their engagement in produc-
tive activities financed through group-lending or Self-Help Groups, which make them
appear less risky in the eyes of informal lenders.
So, access to microfinance substantially modifies market conditions especially through
its impact on the price of informal credit, and such general equilibrium effects can
be one channel for the transmission of spillover effects from policy interventions (An-
gelucci & Di Maro, 2016). This approach is followed by Demont (2016) in a theoretical
model showing that when moneylenders serve some of the safe borrowers in the ab-
sence of MFI, the entrance of the latter can push up informal interest rates and dete-
riorate outreach to creditworthy borrowers. Theoretical results are comforted by em-
pirical evidence from India showing that individuals who were borrowing from mon-
eylenders are less likely to do so after the entry of MFIs, and that moneylenders tend
to charge higher interest rates where MFIs are present. Demont (2016) concludes that
formal financial institutions are harmful to existing traditional ones and that, as a con-
sequence, the vulnerability of worst-off individuals to adverse shocks increases.
In an attempt to assess general equilibrium effects generated by microfinance pro-
grams, some models analyse such initiatives from a more aggregate point of view,
2 Dalla Pellegrina (2011) shows that microcredit in rural Bangladesh tends to be channelled towards
investment in non-agricultural activities, whereas loans from traditional banks and informal sources typ-
ically support agricultural investment.
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which usually allows to draw conclusions on the distributional implications of mi-
crofinance. For instance, Batbekh and Blackburn (2008) work with a Dynamic General
Equilibrium model where two-period-lived agents with intergenerational ties have a
choice between subsistence production, a small- and a large-scale investment projects.
They show that traditional banks lend only for the large-scale investment project and
are unable to correctly enforce loan contracts, therefore they ration credit and serve
only those individuals with a minimum initial wealth, implying that some individu-
als cannot achieve their optimal occupation choice: only those who have at least the
minimum amount of wealth can borrow, and their lineage definitely exits subsistence
production while the others remain, i.e. initial inequalities persist. MFIs are modelled
as offering unsecured loans to fund the small-scale project, and their presence results
in this project becoming accessible and attractive such that more individuals access
their optimal occupation choice and success in exiting subsistence production. The
consequences of introducing microfinance in that setting in terms of income distribu-
tion are that poverty and inequalities are lower for the population as a whole, even
though some poverty persists.
In Buera et al. (2012) the effects of microfinance as an economy-wide program are also
investigated in a General Equilibrium (GE) framework. Here microfinance is consid-
ered as being regardless of initial wealth or collateral and is included in the model as
an innovation in access to capital for a pool of talented entrepreneurs or future en-
trepreneurs, the others engaging in waged labour. Partial Equilibrium (PE) estimates
tend to show that entrepreneurs benefit a lot from the innovation of microfinance and
“basic” workers almost benefit nothing; understand PE as being the analogy to the
usual empirical studies we encounter on microfinance. However, their main finding
is that wages increase in GE, implying strong redistributive effects from entrepreneurs
towards “less talented” people. This study gives valuable insight in line with the argu-
ment that in some parts of the world microfinance has developed so much that it might
have reached the “critical” size where GE effects appear. Indeed, exploiting the ‘nat-
ural experiment’ setting offered by the ordinance issued in October 2010 in the state
of Andra Pradesh, India – that saw the sudden ceasing of all microfinance activities in
that state and created an economy-wide liquidity shock for lenders – Breza and Kinnan
(2018) confirm the existence of positive externalities from microfinance on the welfare
of non-borrowers through increased wages in GE.
The above discussion sheds light on the search for the equilibrium effects of microfi-
nance programs. Access to microcredit tends to push up informal interest rates without
however completely crowding out informal sources of credit. This change in the price
of informal credit can have repercussions on any user of such sources of funds, and
hence on microfinance participants and non-participants alike. Similarly, an economy-
wide boost in productive investment triggered by the availability of microcredit can
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generate substantial increases in wages and subsequently create gains for the non-
borrowing population thanks to larger earnings.
Unfortunately, the actual welfare implications of such general equilibrium effects are
hardly assessed in the literature presented so far, but are rather assumed as logical
consequences of empirical facts. We recognise the great difficulty of formally linking
indirect impact of microfinance on informal interest rates or wages to other outcomes
of interest such as household consumption or children schooling. We believe that the
potential spillover effects of microfinance on such outcomes that are commonly used
proxies for household welfare might be more easily quantified when said indirect ef-
fects play through the channel of social interactions, which is what we discuss next.
2.2 Spillover effects through social interactions
An empirical study by Flory (2011) exploits a natural experiment to assess the impact
of an exogenous information campaign on the adoption of formal savings accounts in
rural Malawi. The investigation shows that the intervention has a positive and sig-
nificant effect on the proportion of former non-users of formal savings accounts (at
the time of the baseline survey) who adopt such practices, the effect being stronger in
more remote areas. The author then proceeds to show that as a consequence of the
intervention the most vulnerable part of the population is more likely to receive inter-
household transfers in treated locations. Thanks to the information campaign and its
effects on the adoption of formal savings, the most vulnerable individuals also seem to
experience better welfare outcomes such as a higher probability of exiting severe food
insecurity and of reporting fewer instances of injury or sickness. The rationale for the
interpretation of the results is that indirect treatment effects stem from the existence
of informal insurance mechanisms that work through inter-household wealth flows.
In our view, such spillover effects stemming from social interactions are crucial in the
context of microfinance programs. It is true that our study focusses on microcredit
while that of Flory (2011) considers access to savings accounts, but we recognise the
similarity in interventions that broadly speaking seek to provide financial services to
the poor. Moreover, most institutional microcredit schemes also come with savings
requirements, and the latter are also at the core of other widespread forms of microfi-
nance in the developing world such as Self-Helf Groups and ROSCAs (Armenda´riz &
Morduch, 2010).
The existence of strong social ties in rural communities in developing countries has
been extensively documented and is typically viewed as crucial for the provision of in-
formal insurance in contexts where financial markets are incomplete. Some instances
are Rosenzweig (1988a, 1988b) that show the importance of the family as a prime risk
mitigation institution in rural India, Udry (1994) that documents bilateral informal
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loans with state-contingent repayments as the preferred risk-pooling device in North-
ern Nigeria, and Fafchamps and Lund (2003) that find risk-sharing, although not effi-
cient at the village level, works primarily through family and friends networks. In sum,
households who live in the poorest areas of the world consistently demonstrate solidar-
ity in the face of hardship. It is therefore natural to think that radical changes in the
financial environment of such communities, be it access to credit or savings accounts,
can interact with pre-existing social networks of which one of the main purposes is
insurance.
Building on the premise of the existence of risk-sharing networks in rural villages in
Mexico, Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009) use a rich dataset to estimate the indirect ef-
fects of the famous Mexican program PROGRESA (renamed Oportunidades) on those
households that are not eligible to the program. PROGRESA started in 1997 and con-
sists of cash transfers to poor households in rural Mexico conditional on good health
and schooling practices. Given the nature of the program implementation and the ran-
dom selection of villages in the three waves of data under scrutiny, indirect treatment
effects can be estimated by simply comparing the mean observed outcomes of ineligi-
ble households in treatment and control villages in the fashion discussed in Angelucci
and Di Maro (2016).
The authors first investigate the idea that ineligible households in treatment villages
should experience higher consumption, as a consequence of risk-sharing agreements
anterior to the intervention. Indeed, albeit the full risk-pooling hypothesis is typically
rejected at the village level in low-income countries (see Fafchamps & Lund, 2003;
Udry, 1994, among others), Townsend (1994) shows such a model nonetheless pro-
vides a good benchmark of household consumption behaviours. Findings indicate the
monthly food consumption per adult equivalent of ineligible households in treatment
villages is indeed positively and significantly impacted, and also that nonpoor house-
holds receive more net transfers and loans (this last result is not very reliable given the
poor quality of the data). As the researchers rule out alternative channels of transmis-
sion such as the labour or the goods markets, it seems that increased transfers to the
ineligible would indeed be at the origin of positive spillover effects taking the form of
increased consumption and supposedly greater insurance.
Obviously, PROGRESA differs in nature from microcredit initiatives. Nonetheless,
we feel the above findings are relevant to the argument that indirect treatment ef-
fects might be expected from microfinance programs through similar channels of so-
cial interactions, to the extent that alleviating credit constraints radically modifies the
amount of resources available to some part of the population, in a way comparable to
conditional cash transfers that can be seen as positive income shocks to eligible house-
holds in treatment villages.
The simple estimator used in Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009) can easily be extended
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to accommodate conditioning variables and panel data, which is akin to estimating the
intention-to-treat effects on the non-treated with a difference-in-differences estimator.
This is the approach taken in Islam (2015) to investigate consumption spillovers from
microfinance to ineligible households in rural Bangladesh, even though the results (dis-
cussed but not presented in the paper) suggest there are none. The potential existence
of spillover effects from microcredit is also explored in Khandker (2005) , a follow-up
paper of the pioneering study by Pitt and Khandker (1998). The author exploits panel
data to estimate village-level overall indirect program effects that might accrue to bor-
rowers or non-borrowers alike, and obtains conclusive evidence that the average level
of borrowing by women in a village has a significant and positive impact on household
expenditures.
The use of average borrowings in a village as an additional regressor resembles the
methodology employed by Bobonis and Finan (2009) and Lalive and Cattaneo (2009)
to study the importance of peer effects in the schooling of children from non-poor
households living in areas where PROGRESA educational grants are available. Be-
cause the program is offered only to a fraction of the population (poor households)
in randomly selected villages for which information on all inhabitants are available,
the PROGRESA evaluation data offers a partial-population experiment (Moffitt, 2001)
which allows the authors to use the proportion of children from treated households in a
program-ineligible child’s reference group as an instrument to disentangle contextual
and endogenous social effects. Results from both papers show a positive indirect effect
of the program on schooling levels of children from ineligible households through the
influence of their grant-receiving peers’ behaviour. The unlocking of investment op-
portunities thanks to microcredit programs is often presented as the key to trigger an
overall improvement in the livelihoods of the poor, with impacts on income and con-
sumption ultimately rippling to better health and education outcomes. If microfinance
indeed effectively promotes children’s schooling, the aforementioned research points
to yet another area where to expect potential positive spillovers from microcredit.
To a similar extent, if one considers the idea that household welfare not only depends
on absolute levels of income or consumption, but also on the relative value of such
outcomes , then contextual effects could play a crucial role in the potential indirect
effects of microfinance programs. Indeed, recent research has asserted the prevalence
of status-seeking behaviours through spending on visible or conspicuous goods even
amongst the poorest households of developing countries (see for instance Bloch et al.
(2004) or Brown et al. (2011)). Extra resources made available thanks to microcredit
might be diverted towards such expenses, and in a context where households value
social status one could expect this behaviour to impact the socail welfare of all house-
holds in the community.
The latter class of spillover effects also relates, although not strictly equivalent, to
what Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009) coin context equilibrium effects, which arise
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from the impact of a program on the social norms prevailing in the relevant unit of
study for such interactions. The influence of social networks on existing behaviours is
for instance famously recognised in Conley and Udry (2010) who show that farmers
in Ghana are more likely to adopt a new technology when they witness the success of
their ‘information neighbours’ who already did so (e.g. other farmers with neighboring
crops).
In the context of microfinance, the dissemination of information through informal
netwroks is crucial for the uptake of credit and has an especially large impact on com-
munity members’ awareness of newly available microcredit sources (Okten & Osili,
2004). While Wydick et al. (2011) suggest that adoption of microfinance amongst
members of the same church in rural Guatemala is partially driven by endogenous
peer effects (i.e. people tend to behave similarly to others in their reference group),
findings by Banerjee, Chandrasekhar, Duflo, and Jackson (2013) propose that partici-
pation is actually mostly driven by one’s level of ‘informedness’ about accessible MFIs
rather than by her following social norms. The authors use network data to show that
the greater the ‘centrality’ of the injection point to relay information about MFIs, the
higher the rate of participation in microfinance programs in a village - i.e. informa-
tion diffuses more effectively when its source is an important member of the commu-
nity, e.g. the chief or the doctor of the village. Interestingly, Banerjee at al. (2012)
also reveal that even non-participants to microfinance do provide a substantial share
of information spread through the network. This last point suggests that the relevant
spheres for the study of social interactions in the context of microfinance are probably
broader than those provided by a simple dichotomy between program participants and
non-participants.
To sum up, social interactions play a central role in spreading awareness about avail-
able microcredit sources and how they can help, and also in influencing actual uptake
of microfinance loans. We want to investigate whether such social interactions can gen-
erate spillover effects from microfinance programs on outcomes related to household
welfare, such as consumption and education, as is the case for the Mexican conditional
cash transfers program PROGRESA.
Because our dataset does not embed information on social networks nor on any vari-
able that could be used to construct a social distance matrix, we cannot draw on modern
approaches of social network analysis as in Banerjee et al. (2013) and must therefore re-
sort to empirical models of social interactions. The complexity of estimating the impor-
tance of various types of social interactions on an individual’s behaviour was famously
discussed in the seminal paper by Manski (1993) that coined the phrase “reflection
problem”. We turn to these issues in a later section when presenting our methodology,
and draw on the papers by Bobonis and Finan (2009) and Lalive and Cattaneo (2009),
among others, to design an empirical strategy allowing us to investigate the indirect
effects of microfinance programs through social interactions.
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, after presenting the
data we follow a strategy similar to Khandker (2005) to simply study the direct impact
of microcredit on consumption and also to take a first look at the potential existence
of spillover effects. We repeat the earlier study not in an attempt at replicating it, but
rather because the subsequent study of spillover effects is more meaningful in light of
baseline estimates form a typical impact evaluation. Moreover, we also consider chi-
dren education as an outcome of interest, which was not done in previous studies on
panel data similar to ours. We briefly compare our results to Khandker (2005) because
our empirical model is slightly different and also because we implement some alter-
native approaches considered in the replication by Roodman and Morduch (2009). In
section 4 we draw on studies of PROGRESA and the large literature on the economet-
rics of social interactions to devise an empirical strategy that allows us to disentangle
contextual and peer effects and their respective contributions to the spillover effects of
microcredit.
3 Impacts of microcredit on borrowing households and pre-
liminary exploration of spillover effects
3.1 Some features of the data
3.1.1 Data collection
A rich dataset was created by the Bangladesh Institute for Development Studies (BIDS)
and the World Bank in 1991-1992. It is a pool of surveys of 1,769 households in 87 ran-
domly selected villages in a set of 29 rural sub-districts (upazillas) randomly chosen
among the 391 Bangladesh counts. The interviews were undertaken in three rounds
corresponding to the main rice seasons, the first round taking place between Novem-
ber 1991 and February 1992, the second one from March to June 1992 and the last
one during the period July-October 1992. The original sample consists in surveys of
just over 20 households in each one of three villages picked randomly from each sub-
district, and suffers very low attrition as only 29 households were not surveyed the
three times. The control group is formed by the villages in five sub-districts that did
not receive any microfinance program.
Credit programs from three providers of different types were evaluated: the Grameen
Bank, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) and the Bangladesh Ru-
ral Development Bank’s RD-12 program. These MFIs targeted these programs towards
the landless. As long as they meet the eligibility requirement of owning half an acre
of land or less, people in treated villages can self-select into single-sex groups in order
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to get a loan; 10 villages have only male borrowing groups, 22 had only female groups
and 40 had both.
The data collected contain a large set of variables, including socio-economic aspects,
credit history of the households and qualitative information. Collection was imple-
mented in the spirit of a quasi-experiment in which credit uptake is left to self-selection
and where program placement is non-random (only the selection of villages within ar-
eas where the programs are effective is random). This design introduces potential sta-
tistical biases that need to be accounted for in the empirical strategy, and makes the
case of how crucial the chosen methodology is in social program impact assessments.
A follow-up survey was administered in 1998-1999 to the same households as well as
to an extended sample of new households from the same villages, new villages from
the original thanas, as well as 3 additional thanas, for a total of 2,599 households.
Our empirical strategy seeks to exploit the “time” feature of the data and therefore
makes use of a balanced panel structure, i.e. we keep in the sample only those 1,638
households that were successfully interviewed across all waves of data collection. We
follow Khandker (2005) and merge the 1998-99 data for those households that had split
since 1991-92, and combine data across the three first rounds of interviews in order to
have 2 observations per household: one in 1991-92, and one in 1998-99. Therefore,
discussions on sampling and descriptive statistics consider this balanced sample only,
unless indicated otherwise.
3.1.2 Program eligiblity and mis-targeting
Households were randomly sampled within villages according to their eligibility sta-
tus to the microfinance initiatives under scrutiny in 1991-92, i.e. Grameen Bank, BRAC
and BRDB RD-12. Around 20 households were sampled from each village, and eligi-
ble households were oversampled compared to ineligible households (around 85% of
households sampled in each village are program-eligible), as is customary in impact
evaluation studies that seek to maximize the statistical power of program effects esti-
mates for a lower cost. Weights to be used in the analysis are derived from this sam-
pling procedure. The final sample considered in this paper embeds close to 19 house-
holds per village on average, with a minimum (maximum) of 13 (23) observations, for
a total of 1,638 households.
According to the initial sampling information, as of 1991-92 our dataset includes 824
eligible households that borrowed through microfinance programs (“treated” target
households), 567 eligible households that did not participate to microcredit initia-
tives (“non-treated” target households), and 247 households not eligible to microcredit
borrowing (non-target households). However, according to individual-level loan data,
only 55.8% of those eligible households did borrow from either Grameen Bank, BRDB
138 Chapter 3 Analysis of spillover effects from microfinance as social interactions
or BRAC, i.e. the subsample of participating target households is actually made of 761
households instead of 824 as stated by census data. According to Pitt and Khandker
(1998), at the time of data collection the three MFIs under scrutiny followed a similar
rule which deemed a household eligible to borrowing if their landholdings were no
greater than half an acre (50 decimals). This should be consistent across household-
level data and the available census data on which sampling was designed. However, a
closer look at the data shows the eligibility status of households varies depending on
the adopted definition, which unravels a substantial amount of mis-targeting in our
sample, i.e. some allegedly landed and ineligible households do in fact borrow. Please
refer to section 2 of Chapter 1 of this thesis for details.
3.2 Empirical strategy for program impact estimates
3.2.1 Continuous outcome
We estimate the impact of microcredit on three consumption measures: household per
capita annual total, food and non-food expenditures, expressed in 1992 Taka for both
waves of data. Our empirical framework closely follows that of Khandker (2005). We
consider the following outcome equation:
Yijt = φt +Cijtδ+Xijtγ +αij + ηj + ijt (3.1)
where Yijt is the outcome realised by household i in village j at time t, and depends
on contemporaneous values of covariates X and household microcredit borrowings C;
φt is a time effect and is included in every regression, so we omit it from equations
whenever possible. Household and village unobserved components that influence out-
come Y αij and ηj , respectively enter model (3.1) additively and are assumed to be
time-invariant. Khandker (2005) also defines a credit demand equation:
Cijt = Xijtλ+α
c
ij + η
c
j + 
c
ijt (3.2)
where superscript c signifies household and village time-invariant characteristics and
the error term belong to the credit equation. In a panel data setting the introduction
of household-level fixed effects can remove household and village-level endogeneity if
the source of the latter are unobserved attributes that are time-invariant (Khandker,
2005). In practice, fixed effects estimates of the coefficients in model (3.1) are obtained
through performing OLS on the first-differenced equation, which will be our baseline
results.
Consistency of such fixed effects estimates relies on the assumption that the effects
of household and village unobserved heterogeneity do not change over time. While
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we control for observed village features (which can vary over time) in our baseline re-
gression, the potential existence of time-varying impacts of village-level characteristics
unknown to the econometrician can be easily accommodated by introducing a set of vil-
lage dummy variables in the regression equation after taking first differences. This new
specification controls for the change in impact over time of time-invariant village-level
unobserved heterogeneity, so that village covariates remain in the set of regressors as
providers of information on time-varying village heterogeneity. We follow this method
to obtain our second set of results .
Time-varying impacts of unobserved heterogeneity at the household-level are more
problematic because they cannot be addressed in the aforementioned fashion. Indeed,
we have only two observations per households, so re-inserting household dummy vari-
ables after first-differencing the estimation equation would result in an incidental pa-
rameter problem. Khandker (2005) suggests using an IV approach to try and deal
with measurement error and potential time-varying heterogeneity and proposes to use
the same instruments as in Pitt and Khandker (1998). The candidate instrument is a
household choice variable (c) defined as the interaction of two dummy variables: the
eligibility status of the household to microfinance loans (e) and the availability of mi-
crofinance programs in a village (p). All exogenous covariates are then interacted with
c to create the set of instruments. Pitt and Khandker (1998) and Khandker (2005) clas-
sify households as eligible when they hold less than half an acre of land as per the
alleged eligibility criterion followed by MFIs in the sample.
Because of the occurrence of mis-targeting mentioned earlier, the authors also reclas-
sify ineligible borrowers as eligible in order to ascertain they are not excluded from
the instrumenting equation. This latter ad hoc manipulation brings Roodman and
Morduch (2009, 2014) to contest the validity of this strategy, arguing that the quasi-
experiment setting offered by the exogenous variation in eligibility status around the
cut-off point on landholdings is inadequately exploited. Moreover they warn about
the risk of overfitting in the first stage given the multitude of instruments created by
the interaction of the household choice variable with all covariates and village dummy
variables.
Well aware of the issues raised so far, we choose to implement nonetheless a simi-
lar IV approach as it is, with this dataset, our only option to relax the assumption of
time-invariant household unobserved heterogeneity. We use two different measures of
eligibility to define our instruments, one based on census data (survey data for the sec-
ond wave) and the other based on household landholdings. In each case we estimate
the model with household fixed effects, household and village-level control variables,
as well as time-interacted village unobserved effects in the form of village dummy vari-
ables that enter the second estimation stage after differencing other variables.
Finally, in every regression with cumulative microcredit borrowings as the treatment
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variable we also allow for impacts to differ depending on the gender of borrowers, and
hence our specifications include in turn household total borrowings or two credit vari-
ables, one for women’s borrowings and one for men’s. Note that in the case of gender-
based credit with use the same set of instruments for both variables. Indeed, when data
collection started microcredit was offered to single-sex groups, with 10 villages having
only male borrowing groups, 22 with only female groups and 40 with both. Such in-
dicators of program placement could have helped us refine the intrumentation stage,
but unfortunately this information is not available in the dataset made avilable by the
World Bank. David Roodman does provide (on his webpage at the Center for Global
Development) a dataset used in the replication of Pitt and Khandker (1998) that in-
cludes dummy variables identifying villages with male-only or female-only borrowing
groups, however we choose not to use them because they conflict with our data (i.e. we
find several occurrences of, for instance, men who borrow in villages with women-only
groups) and are not available for the second wave of data.
3.2.2 Remark on logarithmic transformation
Previous studies by Pitt and Khandker (1998) and Khandker (2005) carry out regres-
sions where consumption measures and explanatory variables of interest, i.e. microcre-
dit borrowings, enter in logarithmic form. While transforming the dependent variable
is motivated by trying to limit the influence of outliers and to “normalise” its distri-
bution with the hope that residuals will then be better behaved, taking the logarithm
of our explanatory variable of interest is rather a matter of interpretability of the re-
sults. Indeed, coefficients estimates from so-called ‘log-log’ regressions have a direct
economic meaning as elasticities.
Roodman and Morduch (2014) debate the choice of the censoring value for credit vari-
ables in Pitt and Khandker (1998) and argue that imputing 0 when no borrowing occurs
implicitly allocates 1 Taka of credit to non-borrowers (as ln(1) = 0). As a consequence,
the authors state that “moving from non-borrowing status, proxied by 1 taka, to min-
imal borrowing status 1,000 taka has the same proportional impact as moving from
1,000 to 1,000,000 taka of borrowing”. In order to circumvent this conundrum they
propose to enter an additional regressor alongside the log-transformed credit variable,
namely a dummy variable equal to one if any borrowing occurs, which then renders
the arbitrary choice for the censoring value harmless. However they acknowledge that
available instruments are most likely insufficient to model both the decision to borrow
and borrowing amounts as endogenous variables.
We choose to maintain the ‘log-log’ specification used in previous studies in order to
produce directly interpretable estimates. The minimum amount for a loan observed in
our data is 1,000 Taka, so we follow Roodman and Morduch (2009) in their replication
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of Khandker (2005) and input ln(1,000) as the value of microcredit variables for non-
borrowing households3.
We anticipate slightly on forthcoming sub-section 3.4 where we use the logarithms of
village average and aggregate microcredit borrowings to have a first look at spillover
effects. While we find microfinance programs and participants in every sampled vil-
lage for the second wave of data, control villages in 1991-92 have no active programs
and hence no occurrence of borrowing, positing again the problem of the logarithm of
zero for which we choose to input the logarithm of the minimal observed amount of
village average or aggregate credit. To draw a parallel with the previous situation, the
occurrence of loan uptake in villages is a matter of program placement. As explained
above, household fixed effects and time-varying village unobserved effects handle po-
tential non-randomness in the latter, thereby mimicking the fix proposed by Roodman
and Morduch (2014).
3.2.3 The case of schooling
We use two measures of children schooling as the outcome of interest: a child-level
binary variable with a value of one if the subject is currently enrolled in school, and
the proportion of children in the household who are currently enrolled in school. We
define school enrolment for children of age 5 to 18 and for boys and girls separately, in
line with previous studies using the same data (Chemin, 2008; Morduch, 1998; Pitt &
Khandker, 1998).
Ideally, binary or fractional outcomes are modelled through probit or logit regressions.
One challenge is then to address unobserved household-level heterogeneity, even if it
is time-invariant, because the non-linearity of the link functions used in the probit and
logit estimators do not allow differentiation to remove the fixed effects. The “brute
force” method consisting of a mere inclusion of household dummy variables is not an
option given the shortness of our panel (only two time periods) as it would result in
heavily biased estimates, a consequence of the incidental parameter problem (see e.g.
Greene, 2004a).
One option is to run a probit regression with random effects, at the cost of assuming
strict exogeneity and also that unobserved household heterogeneity is uncorrelated to
the regressors, which seems too restrictive in our case. The latter assumption can possi-
bly be relaxed by the inclusion of time-averaged household-level variables in the spirit
of a correlated random effects model a` la Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1980), as
suggested by Wooldridge (2010b)4.
3 All monetary values are deflated and expressed in 1992 Taka.
4 See Section 15.8 in Chapter 15 of his book.
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Another possibility is offered by the form of the logistic link function that allows one
to leave the relationship between unobserved effects and regressors unrestricted. How-
ever, a dummy variables approach will still yield biased estimates (Coupe´, 2005; Katz,
2001), so the likelihood needs to be conditioned on those observations for which out-
come changes over time, which can result in a significant share of observations being
dropped from the regression.
We follow the approach proposed in Papke and Wooldridge (2008) and implement
probit regression on pooled data while specifying a linear functional form for the re-
lationship between unobserved household-level heterogeneity and the regressors in a
Mundlak-Chamberlain fashion, i.e. by adding time-averaged values of household co-
variates as extra regressors. Standard errors clustered at the household level also offer
heteroskedasticity-robust inference. There remains the issue that nonlinear estima-
tors are sensitive to the number of covariates because each parameter is considered a
quantity to be estimated (Greene, 2004a, 2004b), hence limiting our ability to control
for time-varying effects of time-invariant unobserved village heterogeneity. Therefore,
our pooled probit regressions include either village controls (observed time-varying
heterogeneity) or village dummy variables (time-constant unobserved heterogeneity).
Albeit valid for the case of a binary outcome, the empirical methodology of Papke and
Wooldridge (2008) is actually proposed in a fractional probit framework and therefore
is also applicable in the case where schooling is measured at the household-level by
the proportion of children currently schooled. They devise a two-step control function
approach in the spirit of Heckman to deal with endogneous regressors where residuals
produced from a linear first-stage are directly included in the second stage alongside
the original endogenous variables.
Consider including our set of instruments Z in the credit equation (3.2):
Cijt = Xijtλ+Zijtβ +α
c
ij + η
c
j + νijt (3.3)
Equation 3.3 is estimated via OLS and we recover predicted residuals νˆ that are plugged
in as an extra regressor in a second stage regression equation of the form of (3.1). This
method also provides a straightforward test of exogeneity of the problematic regres-
sors, i.e. the estimated coefficient attached to first-stage residuals will be statistically
significant if there is endogeneity. As a consequence of using two-stage estimation, we
carry out 1,000 bootstrap replications to produce standard errors that are fit for infer-
ence by re-sampling clusters (i.e. households). Note that we use this control function
approach for both binary probit and fractional probit.
Given that our focus is primarily on the sign and significance of the estimated effects
with no intent to make predictions, we complement our results from nonlinear mod-
els by the simpler linear probability model and run regressions following the same
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empirical strategy as that implemented when consumption is the outcome of inter-
est. The linear-in-means framework allows for flexible control over unobserved effects
while avoiding the incidental parameter problem, and for a straightforward applica-
tion of the IV approach described in Section 3.2 which should still provide econom-
ically meaningful estimates even if the underlying relationship is actually non-linear
(Angrist & Krueger, 2001).
Finally, note that the nature of our educational outcome variables forces us to con-
sider only the units for whom they are relevant, namely those households with girls
age 5-18 and those with boys age 5-18, depending on the dependent variable. As a
consequence, our estimation sample is an unbalanced panel dataset because, as could
be expected, household composition changes over the seven years separating our two
waves of data. With that in mind, one important drawback of the correlated random ef-
fects approach is that cross-section units with only one observation are ignored (Bluhm,
2013; Wooldridge, 2010a).
There is no way around this conundrum if we want to account for household unob-
served heterogeneity while adequately modelling a binary or fractional outcome. Ac-
tually, controlling for fixed effects in a linear model for panel data on an unbalanced
sample with only two observations per cross-section at most would result in single-
tons having no explanatory power. It is therefore common practice to run linear panel
data estimation with fixed effects on the complete unbalanced sample and let the sta-
tistical software deal with singletons, given that coefficient estimates on independent
variables are unaffected. However, inference is influenced by the presence of singletons
as it tends to yield smaller standard errors and hence improve statistical significance,
as explained in a short manuscript by Correia (2015). We were also able to observe this
very phenomenon when running preliminary regressions. Therefore, we always use
the balanced sample when studying schooling outcomes, irrespective of the method.
To sum up, we model schooling for boys and girls separately as either binary or frac-
tional. In each case we select households with observations for both time periods to get
balanced panel data in order to implement pooled probit regressions with Mundlak-
Chamberlain correlated random effects5. Even after selection, child-level binary out-
come leave enough observations to include village dummy variables as an alternative
to village covariates, although we do not include both together in order to limit the
number of parameters to estimate.
We follow Papke and Wooldridge (2008) and use pooled fractional probit regressions
with correlated random effects to model household-level schooling outcomes, however
we control only for village observed heterogeneity because the balanced panel severely
5 In the case of schooling as a binary outcome, the estimation sample is balanced at the household
level, i.e. there is not necessarily the same number of children of age 5 to 18 in one household in both
time periods. Correlated random effects are modelled at the household-level, so this is the relevant unit
on which to balance the panel.
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limits degrees of freedom. We apply their control function approach to try and account
for the potential endogeneity of credit variables in the pooled fractional probit model
as well as in the binary outcome case, using 1,000 bootstrap replications for inference
(re-sampling households with replacement).
Finally, we complement our set of results with OLS fixed effects and 2SLS for panel
data. These estimators can be used with both outcomes and allow us to control for
household-level time-invariant heterogeneity as well as fixed village level unobserved
factors whose impact can change over time. Note that when instrumenting for credit
variables the first stage is always linear, irrespective of the estimator used in the second-
stage. Therefore we use the same instrumentation strategy as that used in the case of
continuous outcomes where both stages are linear, i.e. we interact the household choice
variable with all household and village covariates as well as with the full set of village
dummy variables to produce instruments6.
3.2.4 Descriptive statistics for outcome and credit variables
Credit and consumption variables are described extensively in Chapter 1 of the the-
sis. Specifically, the distributions of the various expenditure variables are carefully
explored and their analysis reveals that these variables are heavily skewed to the right
and exhibit a peak around their mode. This is the case particularly for total and non-
food expenditure, the lumpy nature of the latter influencing the former, while food
consumption is less positively skewed and rather ‘flat’ around its mode. These features
justified the use of quantile regression techniques in Chapter 2. The present study
goes back to linear models that rely on well behaved residuals, and hence consumption
outcomes enter the left hand-side of the regressions in logarithms.
The bottom panel of Table 3.1 reveals that there are more girls of age 5 to 18 who
are currently enrolled in school (at time of survey) living in households ineligible to
microfinance programs. Girls from eligible non-bororwing housheolds are the worst
off with little over 40% of them who go to school, while daughters of microfinance
clients have one in two probability of being schooled. The proportion of boys in school
is greater than that of girls overall, but boys in eligible non-participating are even worse
off than their female counterparts. By the late 1990s, over 60% of children are schooled,
no matter the borrowing or eligiblity status of the household and no matter the sex of
the child.
Altogether, children from ineligible households are still more likely to be enrolled in
school than others, but the gap is much narrower than 7 years ago. In the meantime,
microfinance initiatives have strived as witnessed by the amounts of loans to women
6 Recall that household choice is determined by the presence of a microcredit program in the village
and the eligibility status of the household, which is taken from census and survey data.
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Table 3.1 Summary statistics of household credit and expenditure variables
1991-92 1998-99
Borrowers
Non-borrowers
Full sample Borrowers
Non-borrowers
Full sample
Eligible Non-eligible Eligible Non-eligible
HH total microcredit
cumulative borrowings
10,295.2 2,515.3 17,985.7 7,408.6
(9,741.1) (6,538.2) (19,508.5) (15,332.5)
Female microcredit
cumulative borrowings
6,717.5 1,641.2 15,196.2 6,259.6
(8,726.8) (5,189.4) (19,242.0) (14,436.1)
Male microcredit
cumulative borrowings
3,577.7 874.1 2,789.4 1,149.0
(7,490.6) (4,008.0) (8,937.5) (5,896.7)
HH per capita total
expenditure, annual
4,028.0 3,864.0 5,664.2 4,513.7 5,039.9 4,971.0 6,989.2 5,373.0
(1,645.7) (1,683.6) (3,553.9) (2,605.2) (3,324.2) (3,599.6) (5,387.5) (3,963.2)
HH per capita food
expenditure, annual
3,082.4 3,039.5 3,646.5 3,255.6 3,224.1 3,256.8 3,960.2 3,373.5
(799.6) (946.8) (1,053.1) (991.2) (1,140.2) (1,550.6) (1,868.6) (1,491.6)
HH per capita non-food
expenditure, annual
945.6 824.4 2,017.7 1,258.1 1,815.8 1,714.2 3,029.1 1,999.4
(1,194.1) (984.5) (2,980.4) (2,011.9) (2,727.8) (2,541.6) (4,693.2) (3,156.7)
Observations 781 611 246 1,638 840 612 186 1,638
Girls age 5-18 currently
enrolled in school
(1=yes)
0.495 0.431 0.622 0.517 0.629 0.660 0.674 0.649
(0.500) (0.496) (0.486) (0.500) (0.483) (0.474) (0.470) (0.477)
Number of individuals 736 514 248 1,498 873 574 201 1,648
Boys age 5-18 currently
enrolled in school
(1=yes)
0.548 0.401 0.662 0.545 0.600 0.616 0.679 0.621
(0.498) (0.491) (0.474) (0.498) (0.490) (0.487) (0.468) (0.485)
Number of individuals 803 520 303 1,626 949 608 207 1,764
Note: Sample means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for household microcredit and expenditure variables,
and for individual-level school enrollment for girls and boys age 5-18. Statistics account for sampling weights. All
monetary amounts are deflated and given in 1992 Taka. The word household is abbreviated by ‘HH’. The eligibility
status of a household used to identify sub-samples is taken from census data for the first wave of data (1991-92) and
from the questionnaire module on loans for the second wave (1998-99).
that more than doubled. In the interval between the two waves of surveys, eligible non-
borrowers are clearly those for whom education of children has improved the most.
We can imagine that eligible housheolds share characteristics that bring them closer
together and make them more likely to exchange and interact, whether they borrow or
not. The interesting fact is that children education also improved in ineligible house-
holds. Of course, this improvement can very well be explained in many ways, but it is
tempting to envisage the potential for social interactions at the community level that
could have seen the gains in interest for schooling of borrowing and eligible households
spill over to the third category.
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3.3 Results of direct program impact estimates
3.3.1 The consumption effects of microcredit
Estimates of the impact of microcredit on the consumption of borrowing households
are reported in Table 3.2. Recall that both the dependent variable and explanatory
variables of interest enter regressions in logarithm, so coefficient estimates can be in-
terpreted as elasticities. Baseline results from simple OLS regressions with household-
level fixed effects show that a 10% increase in the total amount of household borrowing
boosts household total annual per capita expenditure by 0.37%, with the estimate sta-
tistically significant with 99% confidence.
They also suggest this effect is positive and significant whether credit is offered to
women or men, with a larger elasticity estimate for the latter. Although household
borrowings seem to have a small positive impact on household food consumption with
an elasticity of 0.014% significant at the 5% level, the significance of this effect vanishes
when we differentiate by gender of borrowers (coefficient estimates still take positive
values).
Table 3.2 Impact of microcredit borrowings on the log of household per capita an-
nual expenditure
OLS FE Time-varying village effects
Measure of HH per
capita expenditure
Total Food Non-food Total Food Non-food
Log of household
borrowings
0.037*** 0.014** 0.106*** 0.025** 0.008 0.078***
(3.484) (1.984) (4.898) (2.453) (1.093) (3.788)
F-statistic 3.819 5.566 3.030
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log of women’s
borrowings
0.033*** 0.012 0.097*** 0.025** 0.007 0.076***
(2.951) (1.627) (4.311) (2.389) (1.011) (3.592)
Log of men’s
borrowings
0.041** 0.017 0.096** 0.014 0.004 0.047
(2.129) (1.449) (2.444) (0.775) (0.366) (1.337)
F-statistic 3.847 5.571 3.055
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: Elasticities estimates from fixed effects regressions with a panel of 1,638 households observed twice
over time. Heteroskedasticy robust absolute t-statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%;
* 10%. The bottom two lines of each panel report the F-statistic and p-value associated to the test of joint
significance of time-varying village effects.
It appears that the bulk of the positive increase in household consumption thanks to
microcredit falls on non-food expenditure which increases by 1.06% when households
borrow 10% more. The contributions of women’s and men’s borrowings are almost
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identical (elasticities of 0.97% and 0.96% for a 10% increase in credit, respectively)
and statistically significant.
The three rightmost columns provide results from similar regressions that allow for
the impact of time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity at the village level to change
over time. We can see that time-varying coefficients on unobserved village fixed effects
are jointly significant across the board. As a consequence, coefficient estimates are
lower and a 10% increase in household total credit generates a 0.25% gain in total
expenditure (against 0.36% earlier).
The estimated elasticity associated to women’s borrowing is of the same value and sta-
tistically different from zero while the impact of microcredit issued to men, albeit be-
ing positive, is insignificant. In the new specification we find only very small effects
of microcredit on food expenditure that are not statistically distinguishable from zero,
irrespective of the gender of borrowers. Finally, we confirm the previous observation
that the impact of microcredit is the strongest for non-food expenditure with an esti-
mated gain of little more than 0.78% for a 10% increase in total household credit or
in women’s borrowings alike, both coefficients being strongly significant. If microcre-
dit issued to men also generates small positive impacts, the latter are not statistically
significant.
Overall, the positive impacts of microcredit on household per capita annual expen-
diture seem to be driven by the positive benefits accruing to those households with
female borrowers, especially on non-food expenditure. We do not find strong evidence
that microfinance loans help borrowers consume significantly more food than non-
borrowers, and neither can we conclude that microcredit issued to men is beneficial.
We now turn to results obtained from two-stage least squares (2SLS) fixed effects re-
gressions carried out in an attempt to deal with the potential endogeneity of a house-
hold’s decision to participate to microfinance programs and household-level outcome
behaviours. Indeed, the previous approach dealt with the issue only to the extent that
unobserved characteristics that influence both the decision to borrow and the level of
expenditure are fixed over time. Instrumentation is one option to account for poten-
tially time-varying hidden factors.
The first three columns of 3.3 show the output of 2SLS fixed effects regressions when
census eligibility is used in the construction of instruments7. We find no significant
impact of microcredit on total expenditure, although the estimates are of the same sign
and order of magnitude as those obtained previously, and results from Hansen’s over-
identification test suggest that our instrument set is valid. However this conclusion is
reversed when the outcome is either food or non-food expenditure. Surprisingly, the
7 Census eligibility refers to the eligibility status of a household reported in the census data use for
sampling households in villages in 1991-92, and to the eligibility status reported directly by households
in the 1998-99 survey.
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Table 3.3 Impact of microcredit borrowings on the log of household per capita an-
nual expenditure, IV estimates
Census eligibility Landholdings eligibility
Measure of HH per
capita expenditure
Total Food Non-food Total Food Non-food
Log of household
borrowings
0.024 0.017 0.130*** 0.022 -0.010 0.071
(0.919) (0.942) (2.577) (0.822) (0.596) (1.319)
J-statistic 126.2 139.3 138.1 149.5 144.0 122.8
p-value 0.111 0.023 0.027 0.012 0.026 0.248
Log of women’s
borrowings
0.017 0.005 0.133** 0.013 -0.017 0.061
(0.600) (0.244) (2.439) (0.474) (0.963) (1.104)
Log of men’s
borrowings
0.051 0.057* 0.085 0.104** 0.075** 0.119
(1.204) (1.876) (1.061) (1.989) (2.026) (1.154)
J-statistic 126.2 138.0 137.2 140.9 131.0 123.5
p-value 0.099 0.024 0.026 0.034 0.106 0.216
Note: Elasticities estimates from two-stage least squares regressions with fixed effects on a sample of
1,638 households each observed twice over time. Instruments are generated by interacting the credit
choice dummy with household and village covariates as well as the full set of village dummy variables.
Household eligibility to microcredit, used to build the choice variable, is defined either from census and
survey data or from the exogenous ‘landholdings rule’ (eligible if hold less than half an acre of land). The
bottom two rows of each panel report the J-statistic and p-value from Hansen’s overidentification test.
The second stage includes all covariates and controls for time-varying unobserved village heterogeneity.
Household-cluster-robust t-statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.
only significant (10% level) impact we find on food consumption pertains to micro-
credit issued to men with an estimated elasticity of 0.057%, three times its value from
baseline OLS regressions. Our findings in the case of non-food expenditure, however,
are rather consistent with previous observations given our statistically significant es-
timates of 0.13% and 0.133% for the elasticity of the outcome to household total and
female borrowings, respectively, while the impact of male microcredit is not distin-
guishable from zero.
The results displayed in the three rightmost columns of Table 3.3 are quite puzzling.
Although estimates of the impact of total and female borrowings on total expenditure
are qualitatively in line with the first estimates (close in value and insignificant), the
output shows a significant positive and large effect of borrowing by men on household
total expenditure. Furthermore, Hansen’s tests yield conclusions opposite to the for-
mer case and suggest that the set of instruments is not valid. When we consider food
consumption as the outcome of interest household total microcredit and women’s bor-
rowings still have no significant impact, however the coefficient estimates are negative
while male microcredit appears to generate food consumption gains.
Conclusions regarding the quality if instrumentation are mixed, and we reject the null
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that over-identifying assumptions are respected when microcredit is not split by gender
but do not reject it when estimating gender-based impacts. Finally, we conclude that
the instruments set is valid when non-food expenditure is the outcome of interest, in
regressions where estimated elasticities are positive but none are significant.
At any rate we apprehend the above IV estimates with great care. Indeed, as hinted
previously when discussing our empirical methodology, we have some doubt about the
premise on which our instrumentation strategy is founded. The validity of the quasi-
experiment offered by the landholdings eligibility criterion as a source of identification
for program impacts in our dataset has been a long-standing debate, starting with the
critic of Pitt and Khandker (1998) by Morduch (1998), before a response by Pitt (1999)
and the critical replication of Pitt and Khandker’s study by Roodman and Morduch
(2014), to which Pitt (2014) responded once more.
The main argument is to know whether the substantial amount of mis-targeting of
ineligible households by microfinance programs invalidates the use the landholdings
criterion of eligibility as an exogenous cut-off point to identify parameters of inter-
est. Although the aforementioned debate considers the cross-sectional case, Roodman
and Morduch (2009) also casted doubt on its relevance in their replication of Khand-
ker (2005) using panel data. Our own results also suggest that this instrumentation
strategy is not very reliable, given the ever changing conclusions from Hansen’s tests.
When we use census eligibility to build the household choice variable that is then inter-
acted with exogenous covariates to build instruments, we rely on an eligibility rule that
is ad hoc and not identifiable in the data, i.e. census eligibility does not strictly match
the landholdings criterion and hence the way microfinance officers deem households
eligible to group-lending remains unknown. On the other hand, the landholdings el-
igibility rule is “more” exogenous but provokes a pattern of results at odds with that
observed earlier, especially the negative impacts of household total and female micro-
credit on food expenditure (although insignificant) and the strong positive impact of
male credit on this same outcome.
Altogether, we feel that OLS regressions with household fixed effects and time-varying
village unobserved heterogeneity are probably the best way to go, acknowledging the
somewhat costly assumption that in that case household unobserved characteristics are
restricted to being time-invariant. Note that our results are quite different from those
obtained by Khandker (2005) who finds a significant and positive impact of female
credit on all three measures of consumption with estimated elasticities of 0.009% for
total expenditure, 0.006% for food expenditure and 0.018% for non-food expenditure,
whereas our estimates are about three to four times larger for total and non-food ex-
penditure and insignificant for food consumption. The author also finds systematically
negative and insignificant coefficients attached to male microcredit, which is not our
case.
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These discrepancies can arise for various reasons. Even though we use the same dataset,
we constructed our own variables which might differ from those used in the previous
study. Moreover, regression specifications are also quite different since we do not in-
clude the lagged values of microcredit, we include a different set of covariates (e.g. a
household economic dependency ratio and dummy variables to control for the occur-
rence of borrowing from sources other than microfinance programs) and we account
for time-varying impacts of village unobserved effects. Finally, it is likely that Khand-
ker (2005) uses a different censoring value for the logarithm of zero in microcredit
variables, as pointed out in Roodman and Morduch (2009) (see sub-section 3.2.2). In
sum, we do not seek to replicate nor to criticise Khandker’s findings, and carry on with
our own analysis of the data.
3.3.2 The impacts of microcredit on educational outcomes
Table 3.4 Impact of microcredit borrowings on children education for borrowing
households, individual-level outcome (binary)
Girl age 5-18 in school (1=yes) Boy age 5-18 in school (1=yes)
Pooled probit
with CRE
LPM
Pooled probit
with CRE
LPM
Household
microcredit
0.033 0.035 0.017 0.012 0.021 -0.014
(1.042) (1.140) (1.466) (0.250) (0.485) (1.050)
Women’s microcredit
0.043 0.039 0.018 0.028 0.039 -0.010
(1.324) (1.201) (1.436) (0.516) (0.804) (0.688)
Men’s microcredit
-0.046 -0.010 0.011 -0.115 -0.112* -0.038
(0.460) (0.102) (0.345) (1.638) (1.793) (1.473)
Village covariates yes no yes yes no yes
Village dummy variables no yes yes no yes yes
Number of observations 2,470 2,470 2,470 2,732 2,729 2,732
Note: Estimated effects of microcredit on school enrolment of children age 5-18. Outcome variable is
binary. We use pooled probit regressions with household-level correlated random effects (CRE) and village
covariates or dummy variables on a balanced sub-sample. ‘LPM’ stands for linear probability model
estimated via OLS with household fixed effects. Actual coefficient estimates are very small in magnitude,
so tables display coefficients multiplied by 10,000. Absolute robust t-statistics in parentheses clustered at
the household level. Significance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.
Table 3.4 reports the estimated impacts of microcredit on the probability of being cur-
rently schooled for children from borrowing households. Note that the values found
in the tables are the estimated coefficients multiplied by 10,000 because of the small
magnitude of actual estimates . The first two columns show results from pooled pro-
bit regressions with household correlated random effects assuming strict exogeneity
of the regressors. Girls of age 5 to 18 living in borrowing households are more likely
to be in school thanks to microcredit issued to men and less likely so when loans are
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issued to men. This observation is consistent whether we include village covariates or
dummy variables, however none of the estimated coefficients is significant. We observe
the same pattern of results from pooled probit regressions when the response variable
is the schooling of boys. Male children of age 5 to 18 are more likely to be enrolled
in school if they live in households where women borrow, the converse being true for
those in households with male borrowers. The negative estimated impact of male credit
on the education of boys is statistically significant when village dummy variables are
included. The corresponding linear probability models suggests that microcredit fa-
vors the schooling of girls irrespective of the gender of borrowers, but again without
finding any significant impact. In the case of the male education, all coefficients esti-
mated via OLS with fixed effects are negative and insignificant.
Results from switching to a household-level measure of education, i.e. the proportion
of girls (or boys) of age 5 to 18 in the household currently schooled, are qualitatively
similar in sign and magnitude with no significant estimated impacts, and hence they
are not presented here (they can be found in Appendix M). At a glance, borrowing by
women increases the proportion of girls enrolled in school while borrowing by men
decreases it, but neither effect is statistically distinguishable from zero. The pattern of
results is the same for the education of boys. Much like in the case of a binary outcome,
estimates from OLS regressions with household fixed effects suggest that microcredit
is always beneficial to the education of girls an always detrimental to male education,
whether loans are issued to women or men. Statistical significance also eludes the latter
set of results.
To the extent schooling decisions are made at the household-level, there is room for
potential endogeneity bias in our estimates if household-level heterogeneity is not ac-
counted for properly by correlated random effects or fixed effects. Results from the con-
trol function approach following Papke and Wooldridge (2008) to account for endoge-
nous regressors in pooled probit models with correlated random effects are reported in
Table 3.5 in the case of a binary educational outcome at the child level. The procedure
is repeated 1,000 times on bootstrap samples generated by re-sampling households
with replacement.
We use bootstrap percentile confidence intervals for inference, drawing directly on the
empirical distribution of coefficient estimates to build the lower and upper bounds of
the interval. Another option was to use basic bootstrap confidence intervals whose va-
lidity rely on the normality of the bootstrapped quantity of interest. As can be seen
from Quantile-Normal plots in Appendix N, the distribution of most of our bootstrap
estimates is likely to be normal. However, Shapiro-Wilk and Shapiro-Francia tests do
reject the null hypothesis of bootstrap estimates being normally distributed in a few
instances, so for the sake of clarity we prefer to use the same type of confidence inter-
vals for all estimates (basic bootstrap confidence intervals yield qualitatively similar
results).
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Table 3.5 Impact of microcredit borrowings on children education for borrowing
households, IV estimates, individual-level outcome (binary)
Girl age 5-18 in school (1=yes) Boy age 5-18 in school (1=yes)
2SLS for panel
data
Pooled probit CRE -
Control Function
2SLS for panel
data
Pooled probit CRE -
Control Function
Household
microcredit
0.133*** 0.080 0.018 0.088
(0.041) (0.066) (0.027) (0.078)
Household
microcredit –
first-stage residuals
-0.083 -0.084
(0.071) (0.056)
J-statistic 91.1 113.8
p-value 0.505 0.061
Women’s microcredit
0.134*** 0.029 0.026 0.073
(0.041) (0.070) (0.029) (0.085)
Women’s microcredit
– first-stage residuals
-0.016 -0.048
(0.075) (0.059)
Men’s microcredit
0.063 0.463* -0.094 0.131
(0.232) (0.196) (0.098) (0.173)
Men’s microcredit –
first-stage residuals
-0.493** -0.267
(0.176) (0.153)
J-statistic 88.2 112.2
p-value 0.564 0.066
Note: IV estimates of the effects of microcredit on school enrolment of children age 5-18. Outcome variable
is binary. We use pooled probit regressions with household-level correlated random effects (CRE) with a
control function approach to deal with endogenous credit variables, for which we also report the coeffi-
cient on first-stage residuals that enter second stage regressions. Inference based on bootstrap percentile
intervals with 1,000 replications. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. Other results are obtained
with two-stage least squares (2SLS) for which the J-statistic and p-value of Hansen’s overidentification test
are reported. Standard errors clustered at the household-level in parentheses. Actual coefficient estimates
are very small in magnitude, so coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 10,000. Significance
levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.
The estimated impact of female microcredit on the probability of a girl to be enrolled
in school is positive and similar in magnitude to regressions without instrumentation,
and is insignificant. The impact of male credit on female education becomes positive
and very large but remains insignificant. The strong significance of the coefficient at-
tached to first-stage residuals, i.e. the device controlling for endogeneity, suggest that
men’s microcredit is not strictly exogenous, but we cannot say the same for women’s
microcredit or for household total microcredit. Male education is also improved by
the occurrence of microcredit borrowing in the household, but not statistically signifi-
cantly.
Impacts estimated via two-stage least squares with household fixed effects tell a dif-
ferent story. Total household microcredit significantly increases the probability of a
girl form a borrowing household to be currently enrolled in school, an effect due to
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women’s credit (the estimated impact from men’s microcredit is close to nil and in-
significant). On the other hand, the probability of boys being schooled is improved by
a little thanks to female borrowings and is hurt by male borrowings although neither
impact is significant. Interestingly, the null is never rejected by the over-identification
restrictions tests in the case of schooling as a binary outcome.
Table 3.6 Impact of microcredit borrowings on children education for borrowing
households, IV estimates, household-level outcome (fractional)
Proportion of girls age 5-18
in HH currently enrolled
Proportion of boys age 5-18
in HH currently enrolled
2SLS for panel
data
Pooled fractional
probit CRE -
Control Function
2SLS for panel
data
Pooled fractional
probit CRE -
Control Function
Household
microcredit
0.128*** 0.091 0.029 0.064
(0.045) (0.066) (0.033) (0.070)
Household
microcredit –
first-stage residuals
-0.077 -0.028
(0.066) (0.055)
J-statistic 87.5 103.4
p-value 0.612 0.196
Women’s microcredit
0.132*** 0.039 0.043 0.053
(0.045) (0.070) (0.036) (0.076)
Women’s microcredit
– first-stage residuals
-0.005 0.005
(0.071) (0.058)
Men’s microcredit
-0.002 0.477* -0.135 0.105
(0.225) (0.189) (0.101) (0.163)
Men’s microcredit –
first-stage residuals
-0.535*** -0.207
(0.169) (0.143)
J-statistic 84.1 101.2
p-value 0.682 0.217
Note: IV estimates of the effects of microcredit on school enrolment of children age 5-18. Outcome vari-
able is fractional. We use pooled fractional probit regressions with household-level correlated random
effects (CRE) with a control function approach to deal with endogenous credit variables, for which we
also report the coefficient on first-stage residuals that enter second stage regressions. Inference based on
bootstrap percentile intervals with 1,000 replications. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. Other
results are obtained with two-stage least squares (2SLS) for which the J-statistic and p-value of Hansen’s
overidentification test are reported. Standard errors clustered at the household-level in parentheses. Ac-
tual coefficient estimates are very small in magnitude, so coefficients and standard errors are multiplied
by 10,000. Significance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.
The pattern of results is very similar when schooling outcomes are measured at the
household level. Indeed, Table 3.6 shows a small positive insignificant impact of fe-
male microcredit on the proportion of girls in the household who are enrolled in school
when estimated via a control function approach in a pooled fractional probit regres-
sion with correlated random effects. The same regression confirms the positive and
significant impact of microfinance loans issued to men on the education of girls, while
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the schooling benefits accruing to male children of borrowing households are never
significant. Implementing our 2SLS fixed effects approach with household-level mea-
sures of schooling confirms the findings of Table 3.5, i.e. that women’s microcredit is
significantly beneficial to the education of girls while credit issued to men does not
affect it. The proportion of boys in the household currently in school is improved by
female borrowings and decreases because of male borrowings, but these impacts are
not significant.
Overall, it is hard to conclude on the potential benefits or detriments of microcredit on
schooling outcomes. Without accounting for endogenous credit, results from pooled
probit regressions suggest that microfinance loans issued to women yield better educa-
tional outcomes for boys and girls alike, and the reverse for male microcredit. Linear
probability models hint that microcredit, whether issued to women or men, is bene-
ficial for female education and detrimental for male education. However, statistical
significance completely eludes these results.
Resorting to instrumentation does not particularly plays in favour of the consistency
of the results. All estimated coefficients from pooled probit regressions with a con-
trol function approach become positive, and the sign reversal in the impact of male
credit on female education measured at the household level is accompanied by the
appearance of statistical significance. Two-stage least squares regressions yield an un-
equivocally positive and significant impact of female microcredit on the education of
girls, and insignificant effects of microcredit on male education. However, provided
the many reserves already mentioned about the validity of the instrumentation strat-
egy on this data, we refrain from giving more credit to the appealing results from IV
estimates. Our subsequent investigation on the potential existence of spillover effects
might help shed some light on the inconsistency of the above results.
3.4 Spillover effects
3.4.1 Regression framework
Section 2 introduced the idea that average treatment effects (ATE) can be under or
over-estimated in the presence of spillover effects. Consider a simple setting where the
comparison of mean outcomes in the treated population to their counterpart in the un-
treated population yields a positive difference. If treatment is randomly assigned and
compliance is perfect, under the typical Stable-Unit-Treatment-Value-Assumption – or
SUTVA – and an independence assumption between treatment and potential treatment
outcomes, this difference is an unbiased estimate of the ATE which is positive.
However, if the untreated population is somehow negatively affected by the treatment
(in the form of an externality or otherwise), then the SUTVA is violated and the ATE
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is over-estimated, because the control group is supposed to provide a counterfactual
to the observed outcomes for the treatment group, i.e. a picture of “what would have
happened” had the treated population not received treatment. And conversely, if con-
trol units indirectly benefitted from the program then the ATE is under-estimated. In
some contexts, one cannot rule out either the possibility that treated units themselves
benefit from indirect treatment effects, hence further under-estimating the ATE.
The above example is obviously overly simplified, but we feel it spells out clearly the
importance of spillover effects. In section 2 we also defend the idea that spillover ef-
fects can arise from microfinance programs and that their detection could substantially
improve the current state of knowledge about the actual impacts of such initiatives.
Philipson (2000) argues that exact identification of external program effects is achieved
when the unit of observation, or the group, completely internalises every external ef-
fects amongst its members. The choice of the relevant sphere within which spillover
effects are expected to occurr is therefore crucial. For instance, Townsend (1994) recog-
nises that the extended family is probably the most accurate unit of study for informal
insurance networks in rural areas of developing countries, an idea corroborated by An-
gelucci, De Giorgi, Rangel, and Rasul (2010).
Okten and Osili (2004) and Wydick et al. (2011) show the importance of various net-
works for the diffusion of information about new sources of credit, especially micro-
finance. Unfortunately, absent precise data that could allow us to narrow down the
circle of influence of households in our study, we have to assume that spillover effects
are embedded at the village level. This is a rather conservative approach in that the
village might be quite large a unit compared to the actual groups that internalise the
social interactions at the source of spillovers.
The latter remark might make one worry about the so-called ecological fallacy , i.e. the
potential bias inherent to using aggregate data to draw conclusions about behaviour at
lower levels (see e.g. Clark and Avery (1976); or Wakefield (2008) for a review). In our
context the analogous fallacy is to draw conclusions about actual social networks based
on village-level detection of spillover effects. But our approach need not be invalidated
by such concerns, to the extent that some spillover effects arise directly at the village
level, in line with the expected impacts of microfinance programs that are also im-
plemented with the alleged hope of triggering community-wide effects. Therefore we
build on the rationale that village economies are relevant units of study in developing
countries, a well established fact in development economics (see e.g. Townsend, 2016).
For a preliminary detection of potential spillover effects as the focus of this sub-section,
we do not need to worry about the ecological fallacy, however we need to assume there
are no cross-villages externalities within our sample, a hypothesis our data does not
allow us to check.
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When envisaging spillover effects arising within the village, the interpretation of vil-
lage unobserved effects changes. While the latter are usually used to control for non-
random program placement, they are now partly a consequence of external program
effects to the non-participating population and to program participants alike. That is,
program placement causes village heterogeneity.
This is pointed out in Khandker (2005) who therefore augments his baseline household
fixed effects regressions with an extra regressor capturing the intensity of treatment in
the village, with which Equation 3.1 becomes:
Yijt = φt +Cijtδ+Xijtγ +Πjtpi+αij + ηj + ijt (3.4)
where Πjt is a measure of treatment intensity at the village level that varies with
time, which Khandker (2005) suggests could be village average microcredit borrow-
ings. Then, parameterpi captures the indirect impact of microfinance on non-borrowers
as well as program impacts on borrowers above and beyond the direct effects from
credit uptake. We can recover an estimate of indirect effects on every household in a
village by elucidating part of the previously unexplained village heterogeneity in the
fashion proposed by Khandker (2005) and expressed in Equation 3.4.
One drawback of this approach is that indirect treatment effects to participants and
non-participants are constrained to be equal. To account for potential heterogenous
spillover effects to households with different borrowings status our regressions include
an additional interaction term between treatment intensity at the village level and a
dummy variable equal to one if a household does not borrow. We consider in turn con-
sumption and educational outcomes and use linear panel data estimation with house-
hold fixed effects and time-varying impacts of village unobserved effects throughout.
3.4.2 Evidence of indirect program effects
Spillover effects to the non-participating and participating population are captured by
a village average level of borrowing. The top left quadrant of Table 3.7 suggests that
the village-level stock of total household microcredit has an significant positive impact
on per capita total and non-food expenditure, whereas direct consumption gains from
microcredit for borrowers are not significant.
Interestingly, we find no direct impacts of microfinance on the education of children
nor indirect impacts to the population as a whole but there is potentially an adverse
spillover effect on the proportion of boys enrolled in school in the household for the
non-participating population only. This is captured by the interaction term between
village average borrowings and a dummy equal to one when the household does not
borrow. The coefficient is negative and significant with 90% confidence. Although
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Table 3.7 Spillover effects of microcredit borrowings on consumption and educa-
tional outcomes
HH per capita expenditure Female education Male education
Dependent variable Total Food Non-food
Girl currently
in school
(1=yes)
Proportion
of girls in
school
Boy currently
in school
(1=yes)
Proportion
of boys in
school
Log of household
borrowings
0.024 0.019 0.056 0.007 0.004 -0.038 -0.025
(1.234) (1.473) (1.588) (0.257) (0.155) (1.549) (0.910)
Log of village average
HH borrowings – (V)
0.082*** 0.036 0.171*** -4.328 -4.482 0.145 0.604
(2.959) (1.573) (3.476) (1.457) (1.412) (0.060) (0.279)
(V) x Non-participation
dummy
-0.000 0.004 -0.008 -0.009 -0.007 -0.014* -0.011
(0.067) (1.048) (0.776) (1.014) (0.798) (1.783) (1.297)
F-statistic 3.747 5.566 2.993 5.002 3.664 2.521 2.057
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log of women’s
borrowings
0.052*** 0.036*** 0.078** 0.013 0.005 -0.048* -0.034
(2.840) (2.730) (2.114) (0.447) (0.175) (1.760) (1.124)
Log of village average
women’s borrowings –
(VF)
0.045** 0.043*** 0.074* 0.099 0.111 0.051 0.097
(2.172) (2.627) (1.652) (0.995) (1.050) (0.652) (0.935)
(VF) x Non-participation
dummy
0.010* 0.011** 0.000 -0.006 -0.006 -0.018** -0.015
(1.818) (2.420) (0.033) (0.623) (0.638) (2.096) (1.576)
Log of men’s borrowings
-0.052 -0.016 -0.047 -0.004 0.007 -0.008 0.001
(1.319) (0.660) (0.597) (0.071) (0.128) (0.180) (0.024)
Log of village average
men’s borrowings – (VM)
0.093*** 0.037** 0.154*** 0.284 0.285 -0.019 -0.036
(3.288) (2.110) (2.587) (1.513) (1.428) (0.131) (0.270)
(VM) x Non-participation
dummy
-0.022* -0.007 -0.030 -0.009 -0.003 0.012 0.010
(1.810) (1.092) (1.250) (0.566) (0.196) (0.818) (0.691)
F-statistic 3.844 5.567 3.088 4.873 3.597 2.554 2.129
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: Elasticities estimates from fixed effects regressions with 1,638 households. Coefficients on log of village average
borrowings – (V), (VF) and (VM) – capture indirect program effects on all households in the village. Interaction terms
with a dummy variable indicating that a household does not participate to microfinance programs measure the extra
spillover effects to non-borrowing households beyond and above the overall indirect effect. Heteroskedasticy robust
absolute t-statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%. The bottom two lines of each panel report
the F-statistic and p-value associated to the test of joint significance of time-varying village effects.
spillover effects to the whole community are not significant, this coefficient has to be
interpreted as a specific effect to the non-partiticpating population beyond overall in-
direct effects. A 10% surge in the stock of microcredit in the village increases the
proportion of boys in school by 1.45% for every household, but this increase is 0.14%
less important for non-borrowers.
Much like our baseline regressions, the lower left panel of Table 3.7 shows that female
microcredit generates positive gains on all measures of consumption, the impacts be-
ing typically significant with at least 95% confidence. There is also evidence suggesting
positive and significant spillover effects from female microcredit at the village level on
all three measures of household per capita expenditure, especially on non-food con-
sumption. Additionally, extra indirect impacts emerge for the non-participating pop-
ulation. There are small positive food consumption gains for non-borrowers on top of
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overall spillover effects as a response to an increase in village average female credit.
There are no significant estimated direct impacts from microfinance loans issued to
men, which are small in magnitude with negative signs. The stock of men’s borrowings
in the village, however, appears beneficial to the population as a whole. There are
strong positive impacts associated to spillover effects from male credit across all three
measures of consumption but they are the more salient for non-food consumption.
However, the interaction term suggests an additional negative indirect impact on the
total per capita expenditure of non-borrowers, significant with only 90% confidence,
but this negative spillover is not found on measures of food and non-food expenditure
separately.
The rest of the coefficients presented in Table 3.7 tend to show no direct or indirect
effect of microfinance participation to the education of children, with the exception of
the schooling of boys that appears to be negatively impacted by female microcredit,
when the outcome is measured at the household level. Additionally, when considering
this same outcome the results hint at an extra, small negative spillover effect stemming
from the intensity of women’s borrowing in the village that affects the schooling of
boys in non-borrowing households. This is to be balanced with the estimated overall
indirect effect to the whole community that is positive and larger in magnitude than the
negative additional non-borrowers specific spillover, albeit statistically not significant.
Recall that the interaction term captures additional spillovers to non-borrowers above
and beyond the overall village-level indirect effects.
In sum, the estimates commented above offer at least partial evidence of the potential
for spillover effects to stem from microfinance programs. There exist direct consump-
tion gains from participating in microfinance for female borrowers, as well as positive
overall spillover effects and even an extra positive indirect effect for the non-borrowing
population. Indirect village-level effects from male borrowing are large and positive,
with additional food consumption gains specific to the non-bororwing population.
One tentative explanation relates to theories of risk-sharing in village economies that
imply that under efficient risk-pooling and re-distribution of resources then individual
consumption is insured against idiosyncratic shocks and co-moves with aggregate con-
sumption. This explanation is seducing because risk insurance has been shown to be a
reliable device for rural households of developing countries. To the extent microfinance
programs provide extra resources at the aggregate level, these can be re-distributed at
the local economy level through daily trade transactions, income sharing or even gift-
giving, which is suggested by Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009) to explain increases in
the consumption of ineligible households living in PROGRESA areas.
One pitfall of this methodology is it cannot investigate precisely what type of spillover
effects are at work. Absent network data or precise data on informal sources of credit
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and gifts, the only type of spillover effects possibly identifiable with the present dataset
are social interactions, which is the topic of the next section.
4 Spillover effects as social interactions
Indirect effects from policy interventions can be broadly classified under four cate-
gories: externalities, general equilibrium effects, social interactions and contextual ef-
fects (Angelucci & Di Maro, 2016). The former define those spillover effects that go
strictly from the treated population to the untreated population. One example is the
study of deworming programs by Miguel and Kremer (2004) in Kenya where deworm-
ing drugs are provided to all children of randomly selected schools. The authors iden-
tify significant cross-school externalities resulting in improved health outcomes for
children in untreated neighboring schools as a consequence of lower exposure to this
type of infectious diseases.
We discussed some forms of general equilibrium effects from microfinance programs
in Section 2. They have been analysed mainly through the lens of how new sources of
widely available cheap credit affect pre-existing financial institutions, especially their
impact on interest rates served by informal lenders (Demont, 2016). A few studies also
attempt to capture economy-wide impacts of microfinance on wages and earnings by
evaluating structural models of general equilibrium (Buera et al., 2012, is one exam-
ple).
The distinction between the two latter types of spillover effects is somewhat more sub-
tle. Indirect program effects can be conveyed through the various social spheres within
which local treated units interact with local untreated units, for instance in the context
of risk-sharing networks. Contextual effects, however, arise when a policy intervention
have an influence on pre-existing social norms and when said modified norms are then
followed by the local population as a whole.
Our first attempt at detecting spillover effects in section 3.4 potentially captures every
type of indirect effects mentioned above. The idea that social interactions are particu-
larly relevant for the study of microfinance programs is already grounded in the eval-
uation literature on such initiatives, and they have been studied mostly as information
transmission channels that impact awareness of newly available microfinance sources
and ultimately the uptake of loans. Section 2 defends the view that social interactions
can also play a role in yielding broader welfare benefits from microfinance programs
than just direct effects on their beneficiaries, potentially influencing meaningful out-
comes such as consumption and education for the non-borrowing population as well.
The remainder of this study attempts to find whether this can be verified empirically.
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4.1 Econometric framework
4.1.1 The linear social interactions model
The behaviour of an economic agent, often modelled as an individual constrained util-
ity maximisation problem, can also depend on the behaviours of other agents in her
reference group. The idea that an individual makes welfare-inducing decisions partly
based on the information provided by the decisions of others is not new, however
the empirical investigation of such social interactions remains a challenge to this day.
The seminal paper by Manski (1993) was paramount in determining the identification
problems pertaining to the estimation of the popular linear model of social interac-
tions. The latter can be presented as follows, omitting the constant:
Yig = αXig + βX¯g +γVg +θY¯g + ig (3.5)
where outcome value Yig of individual i in group g is determined by individual exoge-
nous characteristics Xig , mean exogenous characteristics in the reference group X¯g , ex-
ogenous features of the group’s environment Vg , and group realised mean outcome Y¯g ;
ig is an idiosyncratic i.i.d. error term. The structural model exposed in Manski (1993)
actually uses expected values of group mean characteristics and group mean outcome,
but realised values are typically used in empirical applications under the assumption of
self-consistency which states that subjective expectations formed by individuals about
the average outcome in the group is equal to the mathematical expectation of said out-
come in the group (Blume, Brock, Durlauf, & Jayaraman, 2015)8.
Equation 3.5 provides a clear visualisation of how similarities in the behaviour of in-
dividuals belonging to the same group might arise (Bobonis & Finan, 2009). Follow-
ing the nomenclature made popular by Manski (1993), parameters α and γ represent
correlated effects, formalising the proposition that people tend to behave in a similar
fashion because they have similar characteristics and/or face a similar environment.
The influence of exogenous group characteristics on individual outcomes, coined peer
exogenous or contextual effects, is captured in parameter β. Finally, parameter θ mea-
sures peer endogenous effects, the extent to which group behaviour (or mean outcome
in an empirical application) affects individual-level decisions. In sum, social interac-
tions matter for the determination of individual outcomes when β includes non-zero
elements and/or when θ is non-zero (Blume & Durlauf, 2006).
The crucial contribution of Manski (1993) is to show that parameters in Equation 3.5
are not identified because it represents an equilibrium where individual outcomes are
realised simultaneously (Moffitt, 2001). Setting Vg = X¯g as in Manski (1993) (dropping
8 Blume, Brock, Durlauf, and Ioannides (2011) provide microeconomic foundations to derive the linear
empirical model presented here as well as the condition of self-consistency.
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X¯g from Equation 3.5), realised group outcome is expressed by:
Y¯g =
α +γ
1−θ Vg (3.6)
This linear dependence of group mean outcome on a constant and group-level charac-
teristics leads to a failure to identify structural parameters and disentangle the impacts
of the two types of social interactions (Blume et al., 2011). This is what Manski coined
the reflection problem: any correlation between individual behaviour and group av-
erage behaviour might actually stem from the effect of contextual variables (Vg ) on
individual decisions (Blume & Durlauf, 2006).
Going back to Equation 3.5, taking expectations on both sides conditional on X and
Z, solving for average group outcome and plugging the latter back in (3.5) (see e.g.
Bobonis & Finan, 2009), the reduced form equation for individual outcomes is:
Yig =
α
1−θXig +
β
1−θ X¯g +
γ
1−θVg + ig (3.7)
In a context where structural parameters in (3.5) are not identified, we see that com-
posite parameters in (3.6) are. As such, a regression to the mean of individual outcome
Y onto explanatory variables X, X¯ and V would still be informative about the existence
of social interactions, however without enabling the researcher to distinguish between
peer exogenous and endogenous effects. This result shows how our preliminary detec-
tion of spillover effects through the inclusion of village average borrowings as an extra
regressor could indeed yield partial evidence of social interactions.
4.1.2 Instrumental variables to break the reflection problem
In spite of the identification problems pertaining to the linear social interactions model,
Blume et al. (2011) mention a useful result stating that identification of structural pa-
rameters in (3.5) is possible under the necessary condition that the group average of
at least one element of Xi is excluded from Vg . To see why, notice that relaxation of
Manski’s restriction that Vg = X¯g yields the following expression for expected group
mean outcome in (3.5):
Y¯g =
α +γ
1−θ X¯g +
γ
1−θVg (3.8)
Compared with equation (3.6) that represents average group outcomes as perfectly
collinear with a constant and contextual variables, the presence of X¯g in Equation 3.8
implies that it is not the case if the right-hand side first term does not itself depend
linearly on a constant and Vg , hence the exclusion restriction mentioned above as a
necessary condition for identification (Blume et al., 2011). The associated sufficient
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conditions for identification are summarised in Durlauf and Tanaka (2008) and basi-
cally state the (i) existence of such a variable in Xi (ii) whose group average is indepen-
dent of the component of Vg that does not include X¯g and (iii) is orthogonal to the error
term (this must hold for other exogenous variables too). Essentially, structural parame-
ters of interest, and most notably endogenous effects, can be recovered from estimating
Equation 3.5 while instrumenting for group average behaviour (Blume et al., 2011).
4.2 Empirical strategy
What follows draws mostly on the study of peer effects in schooling choices of children
from ineligible household in the context of PROGRESA, by Bobonis and Finan (2009),
and also to a lesser extent on a similar study by Lalive and Cattaneo (2009). Recall
that PROGRESA was a nationwide program in Mexico whose implementation started
in the late 1990’s that targeted all rural villages and provided cash transfers to poor
households (based on a poverty indicator constructed from income data) conditional
on children attending school and good health practices. They consider a structural
equation of the same form as Equation 3.5 for the sub-sample of children from in-
eligible households. The dependent variable is an indicator of schooling (change in
schooling in Lalive and Cattaneo (2009)) for ineligible children i in reference group
g, which is determined by a set of covariates similar to those found in (3.5) including
peer group mean school enrolment behaviour from which endogenous peer effects are
assumed to originate. Estimation of the latter hinges on the availability of a variable
that can be used to instrument for group mean outcome while being excluded from
second stage Equation 3.5.
In the context of PROGRESA, the program was gradually phased in starting with ran-
domly selected villages. Therefore program availability makes for a good instrument
in the spirit of a partial-population experiment as proposed in Moffitt (2001). Even if
group assignment is not random, identification remains possible when there are policy
variables that provide treatment to some individuals in the group without affecting di-
rectly the rest of its members. Effectively, Bobonis and Finan (2009) use the availability
of PROGRESA in a village as an instrument for peer group average school enrolment,
and Lalive and Cattaneo (2009) use the share of eligible group peers in treated villages.
The resulting reduced-form first-stage equation is:
Y¯g = αXig + βX¯g +γVg + δTgmg + ig (3.9)
where Tg is a dummy for availability of threatment in group g and mg is the share of
individuals eligible to treatment in group g. Equations 3.5 and 3.9 provide the two
stages of a linear instrumental variable estimation that identifies endogenous social
interactions.
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We follow a similar strategy to evaluate whether spillover effects from microfinance
programs stem from endogenous peer effects, although the weaknesses of our data do
not offer as clean a design a PROGRESA evaluation data. Our dataset contains data
on 1,638 households successfully interviewed three times in 1991-92 and once again in
1998. We focus on the sub-sample of households ineligible to microfinance, and further
exclude those who obtained microfinance loans nonetheless because of mis-targeting.
We estimate our regressions on both waves of data separately, following the previous
discussion which only considers the cross-sectional case.
Our instrument for village-level average behaviour is the share of eligible households
in program villages (i.e. Tgmg in Equation 3.9). Therefore, we assume that the avail-
ability of microfinance programs affects ineligible non-participants only through its
influence on the behaviour of the population that are able to take up treatment, i.e. eli-
gible households. Strictly speaking, both the share of eligible households in the village
and its interaction with the program placement dummy enter our first stage equation
while being excluded variables from the second stage.
Note that at the time of the first round of interviews, 72 villages were selected based
on the availability of a microfinance program for at least three years, and 15 villages
had no program. By the second wave of interviews in 1998-99, however, all villages
had access to microfinance borrowings, so there is only one excluded instrument in
our regressions on the second wave of data. Regressions using the first wave of data
where control villages exist include the program placement dummy as an extra regres-
sor in the second stage in order to account for unobserved factors that potentially differ
systematically between program and control villages. The eligibility status of a house-
hold is taken from census and survey data, from which we compute the proportion of
eligible households in the village.
Our specification also includes contextual variables alongside village covariates to con-
trol for other sources of social interactions and isolate endogenous peer effects. With
consumption outcomes as dependent variables, regressions include village-level aver-
ages of the following household covariates: education, gender and age of the household
head; landholdings; the economic dependency ratio; and the three indicator dummy
variables for the occurrence of borrowing from sources other than microcredit (banks,
informal lenders and relatives). In the case of educational outcomes, the latter three
dummy variables are not used to construct contextual variables, however the latter in-
clude village averages for the highest education level of any female in the household
and its counterpart for males.
Finally, note that we assume neighbourhood peer effects at the village level which im-
plies to exclude household i when computing group mean outcome (Bobonis & Finan,
2009; Moffitt, 2001). That is, the endogenous regressor used to capture peer effects in
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group g is constructed as follows:
Y¯−ig = n−1g
ng∑
j=1,j,i
Yjg (3.10)
where ng is the size of group g.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Consumption outcomes
Table 3.8 Endogenous peer effects from microfinance programs on the consumption
of ineligible households
1991-92 1998-99
Measure of HH per
capita expenditure
Total Food Non-food Total Food Non-food
Village-level mean outcome 0.796* 0.832 0.805** 1.820 0.996 3.861
(1.747) (0.921) (2.513) (1.484) (0.564) (0.664)
First stage:
F-statistic 3.015 0.413 6.440 1.707 0.940 0.312
p-value 0.054 0.663 0.002 0.197 0.336 0.578
Sample size 246 186
Note: Endogenous peer effects from microfinance programs on ineligible households. Village-level mean
outcome is instrumented by the share of eligible households in program villages. The bottom two rows
show the F-statistic and p-value from first stage regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the village
level, absolute robust t-statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.
Table 3.8 reports estimates of peer endogenous effects from microfinance programs
on consumption outcomes. We find that in 1991-92 a 1% increase in total per capita
expenditure of village peers leads to a 0.8% increase in household total per capita ex-
penditure for ineligible non-borrowers, the estimate being statistically significant with
90% confidence. The first-stage F-statistic is quite low but there is evidence that our
instruments have explanatory power. What our empirical model essentially captures
is that the tendency of non-borrowers to follow the average consumption behaviour of
households in the village is significantly related to the number of eligible households in
their environment. In other words, the number of households eligible to microfinance
in the village influences average peer consumption, which has a feedback effects on the
consumption of ineligible households through social interactions.
The estimated peer endogenous effect is of similar magnitude in the case of food con-
sumption but statistically insignificant, and statistics from the first stage stage suggest
Chapter 3 Analysis of spillover effects from microfinance as social interactions 165
poor explanatory power of our set of instruments. The case of non-food per capita
expenditure is where our instruments seem to perform best. The p-value for the first-
stage F-test is below 1%, and our estimate suggests that a 1% increase in peer vil-
lage average non-food consumption induces ineligible households to increase theirs by
0.805%, with 95% confidence that this impact is statistically meaningful.
Results from the second wave of data also show positive endogenous peer effects on all
measures of household expenditure. For instance, a 1% increase in average peer non-
food consumption is estimated to boost that of ineligible households by 3.8% through
social interactions. However, but none of the estimated peer endogenous effects is
statistically significant, and first-stage regression statistics actually suggest that our
instruments do not fulfil their purpose as well as they do in the 1991-92 data, possibly
because of the lack of control villages in 1998-99.
Overall, we find only mild evidence in support of the idea that consumption spillover
effects from microfinance programs can stem from social interactions. Findings from
the first wave of data indicate that if such effects exist, they influence mostly non-food
expenditure. This is in line with our program impact estimates which unravelled that
the observed substantial consumption gains from microfinance loans to women could
be almost fully imputed to increases in non-food expenditure. One possible interpreta-
tion of this result is to consider the existence of conformist or status-seeking behaviour
in the communities under scrutiny. Indeed, our measure of non-food expenditure in-
cludes several items that can be considered as conspicuous goods, such as purchases
of shoes and clothes, and expenses incurred for social or religious ceremonies. In a
context where individuals concern themselves with how they fare relative to others,
increased spending on visible goods can improve social status and ultimately yield
greater welfare.
If eligible households who take up microfinance loans divert part of their extra re-
sources to status-conferring expenses, it might compel others in the community to do
so. Of course, microcredit initiatives target the poorest of the poor, so the ineligible
households in our estimation sample are likely already better off. Nevertheless, some
rank-based theories of status suggest that if welfare improves with one’s relative posi-
tion in the distribution (her rank) it is also affected by the local shape of the distribution
(Hopkins & Kornienko, 2004, 2009). In other words, status-seeking agents are better
off the wider the gap with other agents in the relevant social space (Akerlof, 1997). En-
dorsing this view, it is possible that ineligible non-borrowers, no matter how better off,
feel the need to increase their own conspicuous consumption to maintain their status
which is “threatened” by a surge in spending on visible goods in the community after
the inception of microfinance programs.
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4.3.2 Schooling outcomes
Table 3.9 Endogenous peer effects from microfinance programs on the education of
children of ineligible households
Child currently enrolled in
school (1=yes)
Proportion of children in the
HH currently enrolled in
school
1991-92 1998-99 1991-92 1998-99
Dependent variable Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys
Village-level mean outcome -0.168 2.089*** -5.014 -2.729 -0.491 1.567*** -4.506 0.347
(0.168) (2.590) (1.607) (0.063) (0.293) (2.649) (1.051) (0.314)
First stage:
F-statistic 2.143 3.484 2.964 0.016 0.721 3.869 0.908 2.905
p-value 0.124 0.036 0.092 0.901 0.490 0.025 0.346 0.095
Sample size 248 303 201 207 158 169 117 125
Note: Endogenous peer effects from microfinance programs on ineligible households. Village-level mean
outcome is instrumented by the share of eligible households in program villages. The bottom two rows
show the F-statistic and p-value from first stage regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the village
level, absolute robust t-statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.
We try and assess the extent to which microfinance programs can impact school at-
tendance of children from ineligible non-borrowing households through social inter-
actions. Results of this endeavour are presented in Table 3.9. In the 1991-92 data, we
find that girls from ineligible households are less likely to be enrolled in school when
the village average enrolment rate of girls increases, but this impact is insignificant.
On the other hand, we observe strong and significant positive endogenous peer effects
on the probability of schooling for boys in ineligible households. Recall that in sub-
section 3.4 results from Table 3.7 shows a negative indirect impact specific to the non-
borrowers that only mitigates an otherwise positive (and larger in magnitude) overall
positive spillover effect on boy schooling. Table 3.9 suggests that this positive spillover
effect to boys schooling in non-borrowing households does exist in 1991-92, and that it
works through social interactions.
Endogenous peer effects on boy schooling are insignificant in 1998-99, and are of op-
posite sign depending on the chosen outcome. There is tentative evidence that our
instruments are stronger when the endogenous regressor is the village average enrol-
ment rate of boys age 5 to 18 in 1991-92. However, the relevance of the instruments is
questionable in the 1998-99 estimates. The measured endogenous effects are large and
negative but too imprecise to be distinguishable from zero.
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The right panel of Table 3.9 shows similar results when educational outcomes are mea-
sured at the household level. Endogenous peer effects on girls schooling are consis-
tently negative, and very large in 1998-99, albeit not statistically significant. Our in-
struments have low explanatory power when the endogenous average peer outcome
under consideration is girls education. They do a better job in the case of male educa-
tion and we find again a positive and significant increase in the probability that a boy
age 5 to 18 from an ineligible household be enrolled in school as a result of higher peer
average levels of schooling. The estimates for 1998-99 are still insignificant, although
the endogenous peer effects on male education are positive while the estimated peer
effects for girls remain negative.
With the exception of social interaction effects on the schooling of boys in 1991-92
which are positive and significant, it is hard to put much faith into the rest of the
results. Endogenous peer effects on boys schooling are also the specifications for which
our instruments work best, except for binary educational outcomes in 1998-99 where
we find the only negative estimate of such effects (insignificant). Based on descriptive
statistics from Table 3.1 in sub-section 3.2, we see that schooling of boys in borrowing
and eligible non-borrowing households increase dramatically over time. The estimated
spillover effects would suggest that the ineligible population followed this trend and
decided to also send more boys to school, even though boys schooling was already
higher in that population than in other sub-groups.
4.4 Limitations
Our attempt at measuring endogenous peer effects on ineligible households in villages
with microfinance programs suffers several limitations. First, the sample size is very
small due to our focus on this particular population because eligible households were
over-sampled in the study to maximize statistical power. We have only little over 200
observations in 1991-92 and less than that in the second wave of data. One option to
drastically increase sample size is to consider program non-participants instead of just
ineligible, but we feel it would only raise more problems.
Indeed, non-participating households fall into two categories: ineligible and eligible to
group lending. The introduction of the latter invalidates the proposed identification
strategy that uses variations in the proportion of eligible households at the village-
level to instrument for peer average outcomes. It is likely that the mere availability
of a new credit source itself directly influences behaviours in the eligible population.
Household decisions might start to evolve based on the knowledge that extra resources
are potentially accessible in the near future.
Second, we do not control for unobserved village characteristics that potentially matter.
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The introduction of group dummy variables in the cross-sectional linear social inter-
actions model renders identification impossible (Blume and Durlauf (2005)). There is,
of course, the possibility to use a fixed approach on panel data (Blume et al. (2010)),
but the problem is that sample composition evolves between 1991-92 and 1998-99.
Some households see their eligibility status change, while an ever greater proportion
of ineligible households report having taken up microcredit loans in the second wave
data. This implied having to restrict the estimation sample only to those ineligible non-
participants whose status remains the same over time, resulting in hardly more than
100 observations.
Finally, the study design makes control villages available only in 1991-92. This can be
an explanation why our identification strategy of endogenous peer effects is stronger
in the first wave of data than in the second one.
5 Conclusions
The chapter discusses the importance of spillover effects in program evaluation and
establishes their relevance in the context of microfinance programs. The sparse liter-
ature that undertakes to measure indirect program effects pertaining to microcredit
largely focus on the competition shock on rural credit markets provoked by the en-
try of new players, namely microfinance institutions. More specifically, theoretical
models and empirical evidence offer the result that informal lending rates increase in
the locality when microfinance becomes available. Some researchers, such as Demont
(2016), clearly recognise in this phenomenon a negative impact from microfinance pro-
grams that spills over to non-participating households who still need to rely on infor-
mal sources of finance and now do so at a higher price. Other approaches envisage the
general equilibrium effects of microfinance from a macroeconomic perspective, and
show an improvement in economic conditions regarding wages (Batbekh & Blackburn,
2008).
One channel of spillover that is particularly relevant to microfinance interventions is
that of social interactions. Through the existence of peer endogenous or exogenous ef-
fects, programs can have much broader impacts than only the intended benefit if the
treatment to the treated population, as has been shown to be the case for instance in
PROGRESA conditional cash transfers program. The premise at the foundation of our
expectation that such effects can arise is the well documented interconnectedness of
rural communities in developing countries. The poor interact to share resources, to
pool risk, to exchange information and transmit technological knowledge. Microfi-
nance as a new means of insurance, income-smoothing device and welfare enhancing
policy intervention is bound to have broader impacts.
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The chapter first provides a more basic program evaluation studies in line with pre-
vious studies using the same data. We estimate that a 10% increase in microcredit
boosts per capita total consumption by 0.37%, and by up to 1.06% in the case of non-
food expenditure. Only the latter effect is robust to implementing an IV approach,
and it appears that the observed positive returns from microcredit mostly pertain to
loans issued to women. Our estimates are larger in size that those found by Khandker
(2005) using the same data, possibly because the variables used in this thesis were built
from the raw data and the econometric applications use different sets of covariates and
slightly different specifications.
The current study adds to the literature by considering educational outcomes as bi-
nary or fractional dependent variables in panel data estimation, with an application of
pooled probit regressions with instrumental variables on quasi-experimental data to
study the non-monetary impacts of microfinance. We obtain consistent estimates that
show women’s credit to be beneficial for girls and boys schooling alike, while men’s
credit is detrimental to both. However, these results are almost never significant, and
they are sensitive to the implementation of our IV approach which indicates positive
education gains for both girls and boys stemming from male microcredit.
Then, the chapter unravels partial evidence of spillover effects, especially in terms of
consumption. Village-level spillover effects on household expenditure thanks to mi-
crocredit are positive and large, with an extra positive spillover effect from women’s
borrowings to the non-borrowing population. Our final set of results confirms that
the non-borrowing population benefits indirectly from microfinance in terms of con-
sumption, most notably in terms of non-food expenditure, and that these benefits stem
from social interactions with households who are eligible to microfinance, although
our estimates are significant only for 1991-92.
Evidence on educational spillover effects is more scarce, but results suggest an overall
positive spillover effects to boys schooling that is slightly smaller for the non-borrowing
population. These spillovers too are found to come from social interactions in 1991-92,
while results on 1998-99 data stay mute.
Overall, the chapter succeeds in establishing the existence of indirect effects from mi-
crofinance programs on household non-food consumption, as well as benefits to boys
in non-borrowing households thanks to social interactions with households targeted
by microfinance programs.

Chapter 4
Need for insurance and the impacts
of microfinance on household
vulnerability
1 Introduction
The aim of microfinance initiatives is to broaden the access to financial services for
the poorest of the poor. Its original component, microcredit, is therefore thought to
be a crucially useful device in unlocking investment opportunities. Ultimately, the
hope of microfinance advocates is that credit-boosted income-generating activities will
flourish, thereby increasing resources for the household in the long run. This effect is
expected to ripple to outcomes usually related to welfare in the mind of economists
such as consumption, education and social empowerment. As such, the success of
microfinance is often judged on its capacity to tackle poverty.
The state of affairs is that, since the unequivocal findings of Pitt and Khandker (1998)
advertising magnificent consumption returns to microcredit when issued to women,
empirical evidence has accumulated to this day to provide a rather mixed set of evi-
dence (Banerjee, 2013). One dimension that is often overlooked in evaluation studies
of microfinance programs is that of household vulnerability to risk. Only a handful
of studies have attempted to investigate the link between microcredit and household
vulnerability (Morduch, 1998; Swain & Floro, 2012). Although the concept relates
to poverty, it is different in nature in that it is the probability of falling into (or fur-
ther into) poverty in the near future. The latter is intimately linked to the capacity
of households in developing countries to cope with adverse shocks, especially in rural
areas where traditional credit and insurance markets fail to provide reliable safety nets
(Conning & Udry, 2007).
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Informal risk-sharing contracts amongst rural households and their efficiency to help
cope with idiosyncratic shocks have been extensively studied in the literature. Because
of incomplete credit and insurance markets, the indigent in poor countries rely heavily
on social networks and family ties as risk-mitigating devices. In spite of facing hardship
and unkind environments, the poor usually manage quite well to achieve a satisfying
degree of income and consumption smoothing. That being said, it seems natural to
envisage that access to a new source of finance in that context can reshape the land-
scape for insurance and offer new opportunities for income diversification and income
smoothing. Hence, microfinance programs can be expected to play an important role
in the lives of the poor as to how well they insure against risks.
After defining vulnerability more precisely, section 2 of the chapter examines tentative
evidence that households in the study sample are potentially vulnerable to seasonal
income shocks and to idiosyncratic shocks in general, such as illnesses. Section 2 con-
cludes by a brief review of the microfinance literature that undertook to study this
topic. In section 3, a precise empirical methodology is described to measure vulnera-
bility, and the choice of the method is discussed and defended. Finally, poverty and
estimated vulnerability profiles are commented in section 4 before turning to the im-
pacts of microfinance on household vulnerability. Section 5 concludes.
2 Definition of concepts and descriptive evidence
2.1 Definition of vulnerability
A general definition of vulnerability can be given as the likelihood that an individual
will experience a level of welfare below some pre-determined threshold (Hoddinott
& Quisumbing, 2010). Conceptually, there are no restrictions on the scope of welfare
measures and time horizon in the definition of vulnerability. In the context of devel-
oping countries, it is often seen as the probability of falling into poverty, and so the
welfare measure mentioned in the definition would be consumption, and the poverty
line would be the benchmark. It is important to note the difference between two re-
lated concepts: vulnerability is an ex ante appreciation of some event yet to come, while
poverty can be observed at any given point in time, i.e. it is an ex post measure. Chaud-
huri, Jalan, and Suryahadi (2002), who propose the aforementioned distinction, offer
to consider that “the observed poverty status of a household is the ex-post realization
of a state, the ex-ante probability of which can be taken to be the household’s level of
vulnerability”. This view implies that vulnerability is relevant only for sub-groups of
the population that are considered non-poor, i.e. those for whom the risk of becoming
worse off exists (Kamanou & Morduch, 2002).
Chapter 4 Microfinance and household vulnerability 173
Vulnerability as expected poverty is not the only approach in the literature. For in-
stance, Ligon and Schechter (2003) argue that it is not a good representation of a
household’s aversion towards risk. They propose an alternative measure, coined vul-
nerability as low expected utility, by imposing a functional form on utility to define a
certainty-equivalent level of consumption above which a household is not considered
vulnerable, then comparing the expected utility of consumption to that benchmark to
measure the degree of vulnerability (Hoddinott & Quisumbing, 2010). This approach
further allows for a decomposition of vulnerability into expected poverty and two com-
ponents of risks, namely idiosyncratic and aggregate risk.
Therefore, household vulnerability relates to the ability to insure against unexpected
adverse shocks. This third approach, coined vulnerability as exposure to uninsured
risk, is used in Tesliuc and Lindert (2002) as a backward looking assessment of vulner-
ability that considers the contributions of covariant and individual-specific shocks to
the variability of individual consumption. This concept relates to full insurance models
studied for instance in Cochrane (1991) and Townsend (1994), stating that under per-
fect resource pooling within the community individual consumption should co-move
with aggregate consumption only and be insensitive to transitory income shocks.
2.2 Sources of vulnerability
2.2.1 Lack of income diversification
Individuals living in rural areas of poor countries typically face risky environments.
Engagement in agricultural activities implies being vulnerable to severe variations in
income (Morduch, 1995). The ability to smooth income and consumption is then de-
pendent on conditions on the local insurance market which hinges on informal con-
tracts (Udry, 1994), and community-level resource pooling in order to mitigate idiosyn-
cratic shocks (Townsend, 1994). Moreover, because a large share of the local population
is usually also involved in the agricultural sector, adverse shocks that affect all crops
in the area (such as extreme weather events) cannot be insured properly. This is one
reason why the extended family is a crucially efficient device for risk-sharing, as strong
kinship ties make it a reliable insurance network, while strategic marriages can be used
with the objective to “place” one family member in a different locality that faces differ-
ent states of the world (Rosenzweig, 1988a, 1988b).
In rural Bangladesh where rice is the main cultivated crop, the demand for agricul-
tural labour can fluctuate greatly with sometimes dramatic consequences, especially
during two precise lean seasons following the plantation of the Boro and Aman crops,
in March-April and September-November of each year, respectively. Khandker (2012)
studies the seasonality of income in the Greater Rangpur region in North-Western
Bangladesh (one of the poorest regions in the country), where the period following
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the plantation of the Aman crops is when famines are the most likely to occur and the
most severe1. Khandker (2012) points out that these famines are actually caused by
the lack of financial resources rather than the unavailability of food. As a consequence,
strategies for income and consumption smoothing include diversifying crops and also
engaging in non-farm activities (Morduch, 1995).
Table 4.1 Repartition of household labour supply by type of work, sample means
1991-92 1998-99
Program villages Non-program villages All villages
Household labour
supply
Hours per
month
% of total
Hours per
month
% of total
Hours per
month
% of total
Waged employment 149.0 41.0 169.3 47.7 120.8 38.8
Non-agricultural work 80.5 22.2 104.5 29.4 61.2 19.6
Agricultural work 68.5 18.8 64.8 18.2 59.6 19.1
Permanent 5.9 1.6 4.7 1.3 2.8 0.9
Seasonal 62.6 17.2 60.1 16.9 56.9 18.2
Self-employment 214.5 59.0 185.9 52.3 190.8 61.2
Agricultural activities 122.1 33.6 123.4 34.7 76.0 24.4
Non-agricultural activities 92.4 25.4 62.5 17.6 114.8 36.9
Total 363.5 100 355.2 100 311.6 100
Number of observations 1,364 274 1,638
Note: Weighted sample means of household labour supply by type of work. We distinguish between pro-
gram and control villages in 1991-92 only, because all villages in the sample have access to microfinance
programs in 1998-99.
Table 4.1 shows average characteristics of household total labour supply in the study
sample for both waves of data2. Statistics for the full sample are driven by program vil-
lages given their over-sampling in our dataset (see Pitt & Khandker, 1998), and hence
statistics are also calculated separately for program and control villages in 1991-92 to
examine any systematic difference between the two groups regarding income diversifi-
cation as a source of vulnerability.
A first observation is that household total labour supply is a bit larger in program
villages (363.5 hours per month) than in control villages (355.2 hours per month).
Households in program villages allocate a larger share of their labour supply to self-
employment activities than their counterparts in control villages (59% versus 52.3%).
This is likely a symptom of the availability of microcredit in the former group of vil-
lages given that microfinance loans are issued mostly for productive purposes and to
favour the creation of small businesses. Household members spend more than half
that time on agricultural activities, however those in program villages allocate more
1 This time of year is known as Monga in this part of Bangladesh.
2 We use a balanced panel dataset. Please see Chapter 1 of the thesis for details.
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working time to non-farm enterprises than in control villages. Again, this is tentative
evidence that access to group loans can help rural households diversify their activities
and maybe mitigate vulnerability to seasonal income.
In both sub-samples between 18% and 19% of household labour supply is allocated
to wage agricultural work, almost exclusively in the form of seasonal or casual work.
Households in control villages allocate 29.4% of their labour supply to wage non-
agricultural work (against 22.2% in program villages), most likely because they lack
access to financial resources to start their own businesses, unlike those living in pro-
gram areas. By 1998-99 all villages had access to microfinance programs, and the share
of total labour supply allocated to wage employment falls to 38.8% across all villages.
The time allocation to seasonal wage agricultural work is quite stable over time (19.1%
in 1998-99) but households work less time as employees in the non-agricultural sector.
More than 60% of household labour supply are allocated to self-employment activities,
and about 60% of that time is invested into working on non-farm enterprises. Discrep-
ancies in labour supply allocation between program and control villages in 1991-92
and its observed evolution over time tend to suggest that microfinance potentially mit-
igates vulnerability arising from the lack of income source diversification. Neverthe-
less, almost one fifth of labour supply is allocated to seasonal agricultural employment,
so households in the sample could still be subject to large income variations.
2.2.2 Idiosyncratic shocks
Incomplete credit and insurance markets are typical in rural areas of developing coun-
tries, making it hard to cope with unexpected shocks, for instance shocks relating
to health and illness. Asfaw and von Braun (2004) find that food and non-food ex-
penditure are significantly negatively affected by illness shocks, while Skoufias and
Quisumbing (2005) suggest that food consumption is probably well insured against
adverse health outcomes. Ultimately, resilience to bad health depends on a house-
hold’s ability to quickly activate risk-coping mechanisms in the face of hardship, one
widespread strategy being the sale of livestock (Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1993). There-
fore, the proneness of households to encounter such adverse conditions can still be seen
as a source of vulnerability: not all households can get help from relatives and friends,
nor do all of them necessarily have enough livestock to sell.
Table 4.2 summarises information collected in 1991-92 about household members who
were ill in the 30 days prior to the survey. Almost every household in either program
or control villages reported at least one such occurrence. In about 40% of cases the
individual had to stop her usual activities, the average length of the spell during which
she could not work as a result of illness being 9 days in program villages and 10 days in
176 Chapter 4 Microfinance and household vulnerability
Table 4.2 Health shocks reported by households in 1991-92
Program villages Non-program villages
Number of households who reported at
least one member ill in last 30 days
1,299 260
% of cases where household member
had to stop working
43.2 39.9
Average number of days without work-
ing
9 10
Number of households who reported at
least one member ill for over a month
571 133
Number of observations 1,364 274
non-program villages3. In an environment where access to savings facilities and credit
is scarce, being offwork for over a week can have dire short-term welfare consequences
for the family. Finally, about half the households reported at least one member had
been ill for over a month. Continued illness can preclude one from being a reliable
income source meanwhile being supported by other income earners in the household.
Additionally, long-term illness can generate unanticipated substantial and frequent
medical expenses, for instance in some cases of chronic illness.
Interviews carried out during the second wave of data collection did not include sim-
ilar questions about the health status of household members. However, they included
a module regarding situations of distress encountered over the previous three years. A
wide variety of distresses are considered including the death of the main income earn-
ing member of the household, loss or destruction of crops, loss of money, eviction from
land, or damages to the house because of natural events4.
Table 4.3 Distress faced in the last three years reported by households in 1998-99
Number of households who reported at least one distress in the past 3 years 901
Number of households who reported crop losses 297
Number of households who reported large medical expenses 353
Median amount of damage because of distress (1992 Taka) 3,370
Median amount of expenses incurred because of distress (1992 Taka) 2,696
Number of households who reported being unable to face distress in at least one case 290
Number of households in sample 1,638
3 This information was asked for by the interviewers when the household member who was ill was at
least 10 years old.
4 The full questionnaire of the 1998/99 collection data can be accessed on the World Banks Microdata
website at http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/1318/download/24079.
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Table 4.3 shows that more than half the households in the sample reported facing at
least one distressful situation over the past three years. Almost 300 households re-
ported at least one instance of crop losses or destruction of crops, and 353 reported
having incurred large medical expenditures5. The crucial monetary consequences of
facing distressful situations are well represented by the median amount of damage in-
curred from such unexpected adverse shocks is Tk 3,370, while the median amount of
expenses required to deal with the situation is Tk 2,696 (e.g. funeral expenditures).
In comparison, Table 1.5 in Chapter 1 showed that median household per capita an-
nual food expenditure is Tk 3,068, so facing an extreme event can cost almost as much
money as is typically spent to feed one person for a year. Indeed, 290 households out
of the 901 who faced an extreme event reported not being able to handle the distress.
Along with tentative evidence about income source diversification and health shocks,
this last observation reinforces the idea that there exists a need for insurance against
idiosyncratic shocks for households in our sample.
2.3 Vulnerability in the microfinance literature
Policy interventions seeking to expand access to financial services for the poorest of
the poor have typically been gauged on their effect in helping the indigent exit poverty.
Burgess and Pande (2005) show that the expansion of rural banks in India has a sig-
nificant impact in reducing rural and aggregate poverty, and Khandker (2005) claims
that microfinance helps significantly reduce the incidence of extreme poverty in rural
Bangladesh. However, little attention has been paid to the potential consequences of
microfinance programs in terms of risk insurance and, ultimately, on household vul-
nerability to adverse shocks.
Numerous claims have been made that microfinance institutions fail to reach their al-
leged targets (e.g. Morduch, 1999a; Simanowitz, 2002, among others), i.e. the poorest
of the poor, part of the reason being that there exists a trade-off between the depth of
outreach and the financial efficiency of micro-lenders (Hermes et al., 2011). The topic
at hand raises yet another question, which is to know whether microfinance programs
reach the most vulnerable fringes of the population. Amin et al. (2003) use data from
two villages in Northern Bangladesh and build on Townsend (1994) to construct a mea-
sure of vulnerability as the extent of risk-sharing a household can achieve within the
village. Their results suggest that microfinance does actually reach the poor but seems
to leave out the vulnerable poor.
5 The selection of these two types of distresses is made so as to echo the previous sub-section on the
risk associated to agricultural activities, and the previous paragraph on health outcomes in 1991-92
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An early investigation of the direct impact of microfinance on vulnerability is Mor-
duch (1998)6 who finds that microcredit helps borrowers achieve better consumption
smoothing. In a study of Self-Help Groups in rural India, Swain and Floro (2012) show
that members of such initiatives are significantly poorer than non-members but not
more vulnerable, with larger security benefits for longer-term members. Finally, Islam
and Maitra (2012) evaluate the efficiency of microcredit as a risk-coping device when
households face health shocks. In spite of weak evidence that microcredit is an efficient
consumption-smoothing device in the short run, the study shows that microcredit re-
cipients are better able to cope with health shocks without resorting to selling livestock
– or to the least they have a lesser need to do so thanks to microfinance.
3 Empirical methodology
3.1 Measuring vulnerability
3.1.1 Conceptual framework
Vulnerability to poverty is measured in this study as it is in Swain and Floro (2012)
based on the methodology developed by Chaudhuri et al. (2002) (CJS afterwards)7.
Essentially, the vulnerability level vit of a household i at time t is defined as the prob-
ability that the household will become poor in the next time period:
vit = Pr(Cit+1 ≤ z) (4.1)
where the chosen welfare measure is consumption C and benchmark z is an adequate
consumption poverty line. As CJS point out, this conceptual approach implies that the
current vulnerability status of a household can only be estimated, but never observed,
unlike current poverty status that can be assessed at any given point in time. This
unusual feature is at the heart of the literature on measuring vulnerability. Therefore,
one needs to define a framework that adequately accounts for inter-temporal and cross-
sectional characteristics that determine consumption patterns.
CJS build their reasoning on the following premise: household consumption at time t
depends on several factors such as income, wealth or uncertainty, whose realisations
can themselves be seen as stemming from observed and unobserved household charac-
teristics and from features of the local environment, i.e. aggregate-level characteristics.
6 That study uses the three rounds of survey used to construct the first wave of data exploited in this
thesis.
7 This section draws heavily on their article.
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A possible reduced form for household consumption is then:
Cit = c(Xi ,βt ,αi ,it) (4.2)
where Xi are household characteristics at time t; βt are parameters measuring the im-
pact on consumption of economic conditions at time t; αi is a time-invariant unob-
served household effect; and it captures idiosyncratic shocks that explain differences
in welfare of households with similar characteristics. Combining equations 4.1 and 4.2
gives:
vit = Pr(Cit+1 = c(Xi ,βt+1,αi ,it+1) ≤ z|Xi ,βt ,αi ,it) (4.3)
Equation 4.3 formalises the idea that household vulnerability depends on the stochastic
nature of consumption streams over time which in turn derive from household char-
acteristics and economic factors describing the environment of the household. The
authors point out that the above expression allows for a wide variety of household
socio-economic characteristics and characteristics of the local environment as determi-
nants of vulnerability. They design an estimation procedure that is relevant to data
limitations usually found in cross-sectional survey from developing countries.
3.1.2 Econometric procedure
Measuring vulnerability as expected poverty as suggested by Equation 4.3 entails to
at least estimate expected consumption and the variance of consumption8. Some as-
sumptions are needed to achieve that from a single cross-section of data, starting with
a functional form for the stochastic generating process of consumption proposed as
follows:
ln(Ci) = Xiβ + i (4.4)
where the dependent variable is the logarithm of per capita food expenditure, Xi is a
set of household characteristics and i is a disturbance term with mean zero captur-
ing household-level shocks that affect consumption and hence generate differences in
consumption between households who are observationally equivalent. The assump-
tion in (4.4) that idiosyncratic factors are i.i.d. over time for each household leads
to the assumption that there are no unobservable characteristics of consumption that
are persistent over time, as would be the case for instance with serial correlation or
household-level unobserved effects. Note that parameters β are no longer indexed by
time. This is the second main assumption of the CJS approach, namely that economic
conditions are relatively stable over time, at least to the horizon of prediction relevant
8 This sub-section draws on Chaudhuri et al. (2002), Swain and Floro (2012) and Hoddinott and
Quisumbing (2010).
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to the chosen assessment vulnerability. The approach rules out uncertainty about fu-
ture consumption as stemming from uncertainty about the future state of the economy.
Nevertheless, aggregate shocks need not be identically distributed across households.
Relaxation of the assumption that the variance of disturbance term i is the same
for every household is one of the main contributions of CJS. In order to alleviate the
constraint, one can specify a simple functional form for the variance of idiosyncratic
shocks:
σ2,i = Xiθ (4.5)
Then, estimates of β and θ are used to predict expected log consumption and the vari-
ance of log consumption respectively as:
Eˆ[ln(Ci)|Xi] = Xi βˆ (4.6)
Vˆ [ln(Ci)|Xi] = Xi θˆ (4.7)
Assuming a log-normal distribution for consumption, the vulnerability level of house-
hold i with characteristics Xi can be estimated by the following probability:
vˆi = φ
 ln(z)−Xi βˆ√Xi θˆ
 (4.8)
Where φ(.) is the cumulative density of the standard normal distribution. CJS propose
to estimate β and θ via three-step feasible generalised least squares (FGLS), a method
designed by Amemiya (1977). The estimation procedure consists in the following steps:
1. Equation 4.4 is estimated by OLS to predict residuals ˆi . Their square is used as
a raw estimate of the variance of the disturbance term and used as a dependent
variable in the following linear regression:
ˆ2OLS,i = Xiθ + νi (4.9)
2. The predictions from estimating Equation 4.9 via OLS are used to transform the
equation as such:
ˆ2OLS,i
Xi θˆOLS
=
(
Xi
Xi θˆOLS
)
θ +
νi
Xi θˆOLS
(4.10)
Estimation of (4.10) by ordinary least squares yields an asymptotically efficient
FGLS estimate of θ – denoted θˆFGLS – and a consistent estimate of the variance
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of idiosyncratic consumption shocks given by:
σˆ2,i = Xi θˆFGLS (4.11)
3. Finally, the original Equation 4.4 is transformed by dividing both sides by the
estimated standard error of idiosyncratic consumption shocks (i.e. the square
root of the left-hand side quantity in (4.11)):
ln(Ci)
σˆ,i
=
(
Xi
σˆ,i
)
β +
i
σˆ,i
(4.12)
Regression Equation 4.12 is estimated via OLS and the resulting coefficient βˆFGLS is
consistent and asymptotically efficient. Inference can be made by dividing the coef-
ficients estimated standard error by the regression standard error. Finally, the FGLS
estimates are used to predict expected consumption and consumption variance which
are ultimately used to compute household-level vulnerability from Equation 4.8. The
final measure of vulnerability used in CJS and Swain and Floro (2012) is an indicator
variable equal to one if the estimated probability in Equation 4.8 is greater than a given
threshold.
3.2 Justification for the choice of vulnerability measure
There are at least three broadly accepted approaches to measuring vulnerability. CJS
propose to take it as the likelihood of falling into poverty in the next time period, Ligon
and Schechter (2003) follow a similar reasoning using a utilitarian framework, and
Tesliuc and Lindert (2002) view household vulnerability as failure or limited ability to
insure against risk.
The choice to follow CJS is based on its easiness of conceptual interpretation and on its
applicability to cross-sectional data. However the latter feature of that method comes
at the cost of rather strong assumptions. Given the availability of two waves of data, one
might wonder why we do not seek to apply a measure of vulnerability that exploit the
benefits of observing the same unit twice. This could allow to account for unobservable
household-level features that persistently affect idiosyncratic consumption shocks over
time.
For instance, Pritchett, Suryahadi, and Sumarto (2000) extend the time horizon of the
measure of vulnerability as expected poverty proposed by CJS. The authors point out
limitations of their proposed methodology when only two waves of data are available,
but the main point to be made here is that the dataset used in this thesis embeds two
waves of data collection that happened 7 years apart. Controlling for time-invariant
household unobserved effects would aim at correcting estimates of household-specific
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components of the variance of consumption capturing variations over a 7-year period.
Then, a measure of vulnerability as expected poverty including said estimated het-
eroskedastic variance of consumption would be relevant to predict the likelihood of
falling into poverty 7 years later. Notwithstanding the merits of evaluating the long-
term impacts of microfinance, a time horizon of 7 years is probably too long from a
policy-making perspective. Estimating vulnerability from the two cross-sections in the
dataset provides an assessment of the probability of falling into poverty in next year,
which makes for a more relevant horizon from the standpoint of policy makers.
Vulnerability as exposure to uninsured risk can also be estimated from panel data by
capturing the extent of risk-sharing achieved by each household within the village,
an approach followed by Amin et al. (2003). The upshot is that long time series are
needed to estimate individual-level regressions9. An alternative empirical strategy to
measuring a similar concept can be implemented on cross-section data provided the
researcher has access to variables that adequately capture idiosyncratic and aggregate
shocks (Tesliuc & Lindert, 2002). Covariant shocks can even be controlled for through
community-level dummy variables that are differenced out from the equation when
panel data are available, as in Islam and Maitra (2012). The latter article considers
health shocks as realisations of idiosyncratic risks. While the approach is appealing,
the dataset under scrutiny in this thesis does not contain consistent measures of health
outcomes to proxy idiosyncratic shocks, and income measures are usually deemed too
imprecise in survey data from developing countries (Deaton, 1997). Indeed, as pre-
viously mentioned a questionnaire about illnesses of members of the household was
administered in 1991-92 only. While some questions about distressful situations from
the 1998-99 interviews relate to health issues and large unexpected medical expendi-
ture, they are less detailed and report any such event that happened over the previous
three years, whereas in 1991-92 households reported illnesses over the month prior to
the survey.
Finally, a comparative study of various empirical strategies to estimate vulnerability
provided in Ligon and Schechter (2004) shows that when the environment is stationary
and there is no measurement error in consumption expenditure variables, then the
estimator proposed by CJS is the measure of vulnerability that performs best.
9 Amin et al. (2003) use monthly income and consumption data collected over a whole year.
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3.3 Choice of benchmark and estimation of impacts
3.3.1 Choice of poverty line
Recall from Equation 4.1 that vulnerability as expected poverty is computed as the
probability that consumption in the next time period will fall below a previously spec-
ified benchmark. Choosing the official national poverty line is a natural way to go
(Swain & Floro, 2012). Poverty lines are typically computed using information from
Household Integrated Economic Surveys (HIES), with each new round used to update
the previously set poverty line. There are several methods used to compute poverty
lines, two of which are the Direct Caloric Intake and the Cost-of-Basic Needs (CBN)
methodologies. In Bangladesh, individuals who cannot manage to take in 2,122 Kcal
per day are classified as absolute poor, while those who consume less than 1,805 Kcal
per day are considered hard core poor (Ahmed, 2004). The CBN approach values the
average consumption basket required to achieve the defined caloric intake, producing
poverty lines in monetary terms. The higher daily caloric intake benchmark defines the
upper poverty line (UPL) and the lower number of calories the lower poverty line (LPL).
Table 4.4 Poverty lines in rural regions of Bangladesh (amount per capita per month,
in 1992 Taka) and national-level headcount ratios
1991-92 1995-96 2000 1998-99*
Geographic area LPL UPL LPL UPL LPL UPL LPL UPL
Rural Barisal 413 467 403.2 455.5 360 406.2 381.6 430.85
Rural Chittagong 438 541 426.1 526.5 383.8 474.1 405 500.3
Rural Dhaka 425 512 401.6 484.1 361.3 434.5 381.5 459.3
Rural Khulna 420 497 407.3 483.2 347.5 411.4 377.4 447.3
Rural Rajshahi Bogra Rangpur 426 487 382 436.7 336.3 383.8 359.2 410.25
Rural Rajshahi Pabna 459 540 436.7 514.3 386.4 455 411.6 484.65
Rural Sylhet 432 558 407.3 525.7 377.2 486.6 392.3 506.15
National-level headcount
ratios (% of total population)
Rural 44 59 39.4 54.5 37.9 52.3 38.7 53.4
Urban 23.6 42.6 13.7 27.8 19.9 35.1 16.8 31.45
Total 41.3 56.8 35.1 13.7 34.3 48.9 34.7 31.3
Note: Lower (LPL) and Upper (UPL) poverty lines for rural areas of regional Bangladesh, and national-
level headcount ratios. The asterisk signifies that 1998-99 data are estimates, namely averages of 1995-96
and 2000 poverty lines.
One HIES was undertaken in Bangladesh in 1991-92, the first time period in our
dataset, and the next ones were carried out in 1995-96 and 2000-01. Table 4.4 presents
the upper and lower poverty lines for rural Bangladesh by region for the various areas
represented in our sample. All amounts are food consumption per capita per month
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valued in 1991-92 using World Bank consumer price index data. Absent poverty lines
for 1998-99, the average between the 1995-96 and 2000 poverty lines are used to com-
pute vulnerability in the second wave of data. Note that poverty lines computed with
the CBN method also include an allowance for non-food expenditure (Ahmed, 2004),
and hence the dependent variable used to compute vulnerability indicators is the log-
arithm of household per capita total annual expenditure10.
In the analysis, both the UPL and LPL are considered in order to provide a more com-
prehensive picture of vulnerability in the data, hence generating two measures of vul-
nerability, to moderate poverty and to hard core poverty, respectively. What then re-
mains to be decided is the threshold at which households are deemed vulnerable. A
common choice in the literature is 0.5, which means that a vulnerable household is
one that has an estimated probability of falling into poverty in the next time period
(our measure of vulnerability) greater than 50%. The final measure of vulnerability
becomes an indicator variable.
Nonetheless, a threshold of 0.5 is likely much too low for our data, as will be confirmed
later. Table 4.4 shows that incidence of rural poverty at the national level in Bangladesh
in 1991-92 was close to 60%. Swain and Floro (2012) propose to use the observed
poverty rate in the population as a relative vulnerability threshold, arguing that it is a
good approximation of the average level of vulnerability in a group that does not face
aggregate shocks. In line with this view, two thresholds are used in the present study:
regional and national poverty headcount ratios. The resulting dependent variables are
four binary variables, i.e. measures of vulnerability to moderate and extreme poverty,
relative to the regional or national poverty headcount ratios. Note that our sample
consists of rural villages, hence poverty headcount ratios in the rural population should
be used. While the national headcount ratios for rural areas are available, we could not
find such data at the regional level in every time period under study, and therefore we
estimate poverty headcount ratios to rural regional poverty lines from our sample.
3.3.2 Estimation of impacts
The aim is to assess the impact of microcredit on household vulnerability to poverty.
The latter is measured following CJS for each wave of data separately and is then used
as a dependent variable in a panel data household fixed effects regression. In practice, it
is performed via OLS on first differenced variables to take out household time-invariant
unobserved heterogeneity, and village-level unobserved fixed effects are removed by
the same token.
To check the robustness of our results we also use a richer specification and control for
time-varying impacts of village fixed effects by re-introducing village dummy variables
10 Monthly poverty lines are transformed adequately.
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after taking the first difference. Inference relies on robust standard errors clustered at
the household-level.
The only difference with fixed effects linear regressions run in Chapter 3 is that treat-
ment variables are cumulative borrowings in level. Indeed, vulnerability is ultimately a
binary outcome, therefore there is no need to take the logarithm of credit, which has the
added advantage to avoid having to deal with the logarithm of zero for non-borrowing
households. Please refer to the methodology section of Chapter 3 of the thesis for fur-
ther details. All specifications, for the estimation of vulnerability and microfinance
impacts alike, include the full set of household and village covariates used previously
in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of the thesis. The details of the variables included in re-
gressions as well as summary statistics can be found in Chapter 1.
4 Results
4.1 Poverty and vulnerability in the sample
The natural first step after computing vulnerability measures is to explore the overall
levels of vulnerability in the sample under consideration. Incidence of poverty and
estimated vulnerability are presented in Table 4.5. Poverty is extremely salient in the
sample. Based on regional poverty lines, 89% of households in the sample are moder-
ately poor in 1991-92 while 80% classify as hard core poor. Extreme poverty (i.e. using
the LPL) is more present in the sub-sample of borrowers than for non-participating
households, with headcount ratios of 84% and 76%, respectively. In that context, one
in two non-borrowing household are classified as vulnerable, and over 60% of bor-
rowers face a severe risk of falling into poverty in the next time period. Given that
the incidence of rural poverty at the national level in 1991-92 is much lower than in
our sample (59%), vulnerability gauged against this measure is very high: nine in ten
households in the sample are vulnerable, with this proportion reaching a striking 97%
for borrowing households.
For similar reasons headcount ratios and vulnerability levels are very high when con-
sidering upper poverty lines. Based on regional UPL almost 90% of households in the
sample classify as moderate poor (92.8% amongst borrowing households), and over
60% of households are vulnerable (70% for borrowers). One observation is clear how-
ever: there are more vulnerable households in the group of borrowers than amongst
non-borrowers, and the incidence of poverty is higher in the former sub-sample too.
In comparison, the 1998-99 data provide teasing results. Poverty reduces everywhere
in the sample. About 70% of households in the sample are moderate poor and 60%
are hard core poor, with very similar proportions in the sub-groups of borrowers and
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Table 4.5 Poverty profile and estimated vulnerability of households in the sample
1991-92 1998-99
Borrowers
Non-
borrowers
Full
sample
Borrowers
Non-
borrowers
Full
sample
At Lower Poverty Line
Headcount ratio at
regional poverty line
84.3 76.4 80.2 58.5 60.7 59.5
Vulnerability – Regional
poverty level
61.8 50.4 55.8 31.6 35.9 33.7
Vulnerability – National
poverty level
97.0 85.7 91.0 76.4 71.5 74.0
At Upper Poverty Line
Headcount ratio at
regional poverty line
92.8 85.4 88.9 71.4 70.7 71.1
Vulnerability – Regional
poverty level
71.2 56.8 63.6 36.2 40.1 38.1
Vulnerability – National
poverty level
98.1 87.3 92.4 74.6 69.6 72.2
Note: Poverty profile and estimated vulnerability of households in the sample. Expected consumption
and consumption variance are computed for each cross-section of data separately, and used to measure
vulnerability using the regional poverty line. Household vulnerability levels are then compared to re-
gional and national poverty headcount ratios to assess the severity of vulnerability (regional headcount
ratios are computed from our sample using rural regional poverty lines).
non-borrowers, even though the headcount ratio at regional LPL is now slightly higher
for the non-borrowing population in our sample. Regarding vulnerability based on
regional poverty level, it would seem that the sample counts fewer vulnerable house-
holds borrowers (31.6% at LPL and 36.2% at UPL) than vulnerable non-borrowing
households (35.9% at LPL and 38.1% at UPL), while the pattern observed in 1991-
92 persists when using national poverty as the relative vulnerability threshold. Over-
all, the vulnerability headcount ratio is much lower in 1998-99 (a decrease by at least
20% when using regional poverty levels), and the dispersion of vulnerable households
seems to get tighter as shown by the much narrower gaps in vulnerability measures
against lower and upper poverty lines. The drop in poverty and vulnerability is par-
ticularly spectacular for households participating in microfinance programs. Whether
this tentative evidence of correlation actually points to causal impacts of microfinance
programs on vulnerability is the topic of the next sub-section.
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4.2 Microcredit to mitigate vulnerability
The regression results shown in Table 4.6 are unequivocal11. In OLS regressions with
household fixed effects, the coefficient estimates on household total cumulative bor-
rowings are systematically significant at least at the 5% level. They are consistently
negative and of the same magnitude across the board, and suggest that on average an
additional Tk 1,000 in microcredit reduces the probability of being classified as vulner-
able by 0.2% and 0.23% when using the regional and national LPL, respectively. This
impact is a reduction of 0.35% and 0.22% when using the regional and national UPL,
respectively.
Table 4.6 Impact of microcredit borrowings on household vulnerability to poverty
OLS FE Time-varying village effects
Vulnerability to
poverty at:
Regional
LPL
Regional
UPL
National
LPL
National
UPL
Regional
LPL
Regional
UPL
National
LPL
National
UPL
Household
borrowings
-0.020** -0.035*** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.023** -0.041*** -0.026*** -0.024***
(2.158) (3.295) (2.817) (2.699) (2.401) (3.647) (3.355) (3.006)
F-statistic 1.929 1.413 2.361 2.109
p-value 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000
Women’s
borrowings
-0.022** -0.035*** -0.023*** -0.019** -0.025** -0.043*** -0.027*** -0.020**
(2.280) (3.224) (2.579) (2.205) (2.556) (3.625) (3.283) (2.421)
Men’s borrowings
-0.011 -0.033 -0.026 -0.044** -0.006 -0.026 -0.019 -0.047**
(0.350) (1.045) (1.521) (2.417) (0.221) (0.950) (0.988) (2.439)
F-statistic 1.924 1.416 2.358 2.110
p-value 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000
Note: Impact estimates from fixed effects regressions with 1,558 households. ‘UPL’ stands for upper
poverty line and ‘LPL’ for lower poverty line. Standard errors are clustered at the household-level, abso-
lute t-statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%. The bottom two lines of each
panel report the F-statistic and p-value associated to the test of joint significance of time-varying village
effects.
Differentiating the impacts of microcredit by gender shows that the aforementioned
effect is mostly driven by loans issued to women. The coefficient estimates on women’s
credit are significant with at least 95% confidence and show a reduction in the prob-
ability of being vulnerable by 0.19 to 0.35% for an extra Tk 1,000 in microfinance
borrowings. Loans issued to men also seem to help reduce household vulnerability,
but the estimated impact is significant only when vulnerability is measured against
national poverty at the UPL, i.e. for moderate poverty. Table 4.5 shows that more
households are considered vulnerable when using UPL compared to LPL – the former
11 Because microcredit variables enter in level, the scale differential with the dependent variable that is
binary generates estimates that are small in magnitude and hence regression coefficients displayed in the
table are multiplied by 10,000.
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being higher – and when using national instead of regional headcount ratios – the for-
mer being lower. Therefore, this significant coefficient suggests that men’s microcredit
helps reducing vulnerability for those households classified as vulnerable with respect
to a harsher criterion, i.e. households ‘marginally’ vulnerable to moderate poverty as-
sessed on a national scale. In contrast, women’s microcredit helps reduce household
vulnerability to both moderate and extreme poverty, whether measured at the national
or regional levels.
Accounting for potential time-varying impacts of the unobserved village-level time-
invariant heterogeneity does not affect the results, but rather strengthens them. Re-
sults from the F-test show that village fixed effects have jointly significant impacts that
change over time. Household total and female microcredit are still exhibiting a strong
significant negative impact on the probability of being vulnerable. It is slightly larger
in magnitude that in the previous set of estimates and systematically significant with at
least 99% confidence. On average, an extra Tk 1,000 in microcredit reduces the prob-
ability of being vulnerable to moderate poverty by 0.23%, and to extreme poverty by
0.41%, with respect to regional headcount ratios (the impact is around -0.25% when
considering national-level poverty). Gender-based estimated impacts are also consis-
tent with the previous specification, although slightly larger in magnitude for women’s
credit, especially so for vulnerability to moderate poverty (regional). The results con-
firm the efficiency of male microcredit in helping to mitigate vulnerability to moderate
poverty when measured at the national level.
Overall, microfinance loans are beneficial in lowering the probability of being vul-
nerable across the board. The impact is typically larger on vulnerability to moderate
poverty than that on extreme poverty (even in the case of male microcredit when it is
not significant), in line with descriptive evidence that showed a sharp decrease of vul-
nerability in the sample over time, especially for borrowing households with respect
to regional moderate poverty. It seems that these benefits arise most often when mi-
crocredit is issued to women. One exception is when vulnerability is measured against
nationwide incidence of moderate poverty, as in that case microcredit issued to both
women and men helps significantly reducing the probability of being vulnerable. Fur-
thermore, the reduction imputable to male credit is twice as large as that due to female
credit, suggesting that the former matters for marginally vulnerable households.
5 Conclusions and discussion
Poverty and vulnerability are often mentioned in discussions about developing coun-
tries, and while they go hand in hand they are two quite fundamentally different con-
cepts. Vulnerability relates to how well individuals can cope with risk, and it is of-
ten overlooked in program evaluation studies of microfinance initiatives. This chapter
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aims at filling this gap and adds to the scarce literature by estimating the impact of
microfinance programs on household vulnerability.
In our dataset, the first wave of data reveal that households allocate most of their labour
supply to seasonal agricultural employment and farming self-employment activities,
exposing them to potentially severe income variations due to the seasonality of the
demand for wage agricultural work, and making them sensitive to extreme weather
events. While better diversification of the labour supply towards non-agricultural ac-
tivities is achieved in the late 1990s, tentative evidence from the surveys suggest that
households in the sample are prone to reporting health shocks and other forms of dis-
tresses such as crop losses. This sum of tentative evidence establishes the potential
existence of a need for insurance against adverse shocks for households in our sample.
Unfortunately, survey data does not readily offer a measure of idiosyncratic shocks
consistent across both time periods.
The chapter then seeks to find a measure of vulnerability that is consistent across time
periods, and can be used to assess the impact of microfinance on household exposure
to risk. Of the three broadly accepted methods for the empirical measure of vulnera-
bility, two consider the latter as the likelihood of falling into poverty in the next time
period, and it can potentially be computed for any measure of welfare relative to any
relevant arbitrarily chosen benchmark. We follow the method developed by Chaud-
huri et al. (2002) and estimate household vulnerability as expected poverty, which is
forward-looking in nature. Combined with regional and national data on the inci-
dence of poverty, our study shows that a large share of households in the sample can
be classified as hard core poor. Furthermore, estimates on data from the early 1990s
show that participants in microfinance programs are classified as vulnerable more of-
ten than non-participants. The poverty and vulnerability profiles of the population
under scrutiny improve over time, and the incidence of poverty and vulnerability be-
comes comparable in both groups. Moreover, in 1998-99 vulnerability to moderate
and extreme poverty occurs less often in the sub-sample of borrowers than for non-
borrowers when it is measured with respect to regional standards of poverty. This find-
ing further motivates the investigation about the role microfinance might have played
in this drastic change.
We use linear regressions with household fixed effects – and alternatively time-varying
village effects – to estimate the impact of microfinance borrowings on the probability
of being vulnerable to falling into poverty in the next time period, using our cross-
sectional measure of vulnerability as the dependent variable in a panel data analysis.
Our results show a strong significant negative influence of microcredit on the proba-
bility that households be vulnerable. On average, an extra Tk 1,000 in microfinance
loans can yield a reduction in the probability of being vulnerable of 0.2% to 0.41%, de-
pending on the benchmark used to define vulnerability. More specifically, we find this
impact to be larger for our measures of vulnerability to moderate poverty, especially
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so when regional poverty is used as the threshold. Gender-based estimates suggest
that this decrease is mostly due to female microcredit which has a significant nega-
tive impact on every measure of vulnerability. Additionally, male microcredit is found
to substantially reduce the probability of being vulnerable only when considering na-
tionwide incidence of moderate poverty as the threshold, in which case the estimated
impact is larger than that associated to female credit. This indicates that microfinance
loans issued to men help mitigating the risk of falling into poverty for marginally vul-
nerable households, i.e. those households classified as vulnerable against a harsher
criterion.
There are some limitations to our study. The choice of using a cross-sectional measure
of vulnerability has already been defended. It is a way to obtain an indicator that can
itself be used as a dependent variable to assess the impact of microcredit on vulner-
ability. One main issue is whether microcredit borrowings should be included in the
regression specification for three step FGLS that provides the expected consumption
and consumption variance predictions. On one hand it seems pointless to use credit as
a predictor of a variable that it then tries to explain, on the other one cannot ignore the
potential of microcredit to serve as a risk mitigating device and excluding it from the
measure would seem arbitrary.
In their study on Indian Self-Help Groups and vulnerability, Swain and Floro (2012)
include a dummy variable equal to one for households who are members of a microfi-
nance group in their regressions. In their setting it is a treatment indicator. The authors
then use Propensity Score Matching (PSM) techniques to compare mean outcomes of
observationally similar households in the treatment and control groups. There is no
such device in the present study. The use of PSM on the dataset used here would be ill
advised given that control villages are not available anymore. The premise being that
households who participate in microfinance programs are potentially different from
non-participants, the reasoning extends to the distinction between eligible households
and ineligible. In the second wave of data, there are only ineligible and eligible house-
holds left in the sample, all in program villages, and hence performing PSM would
result in matching treated units mostly to eligible untreated units and rarely to ineli-
gible households.
The other issue pertaining to the chosen measure of vulnerability is the assumption
that the economic environment is overall stable, which is linked to the incapacity of
using community-level dummy variables to control for time-invariant hidden features
or, with cross-sectional data, to merely control for all heterogeneity at the village level.
Indeed, the problem is that said dummies would then serve as predictors, and it is
famously known that although they efficiently control for unobserved fixed character-
istics the coefficient estimates attached to them are biased, and hence unfit for predic-
tions. CJS are able to mitigate the issue by running regressions on data from different
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localities separately. This option is not available here given the limited number of ob-
servations per village in the sample.
Albeit being subject to empirical limitations, this chapter shows that vulnerability to
risks is a relevant dimension along which to gauge the effectiveness of microfinance
to help the poor not only alleviate themselves out of poverty, but to improve their
prospects in risky environments. Our results are encouraging in that they show micro-
credit to be efficient in mitigating vulnerability to both moderate and extreme poverty.

Conclusion
After forty years of existence, microfinance initiatives are still amongst the most pop-
ular poverty alleviation policies implemented in the developing world. Quite surpris-
ingly, the large body of empirical evidence relating to such practices that has accumu-
lated over the past 20 years has yet to provide a clear and unequivocal picture of the
true effect of providing financial services to the poorest of the poor.
The main goal of the thesis was to contribute to the debate in an original fashion by
investigating potential welfare consequences of microfinance programs other than tra-
ditional assessments of average impacts on the borrowing population. We make three
important contributions by: unravelling the distributional impacts of microfinance
on household expenditure; assessing whether spillover effects from microfinance pro-
grams can arise through social interactions; and gauging the efficiency of microcredit
as a tool to reduce vulnerability to poverty.
The motivations for the use of quantile regression techniques in Chapter 2 are laid out
in part in Chapter 1 as they are inherent to the nature of the outcome variables of in-
terest. Indeed, household per capita total, food and non-food expenditure all exhibit
leptokurtic and right-skewed distributions, therefore questioning the reliability of sim-
ple measures of central tendency to investigate the welfare implications of microcredit.
Consumption variables are not distributed similarly for borrowers and non-borrowers,
the latter typically achieving higher levels of consumption on average but not neces-
sarily at every point of the distribution. Additionally, the distribution of consumption
appears to evolve over time not only in terms of location but also with respect to shape,
strengthening the idea that one could expect the welfare impacts of microcredit to be
potentially different across borrowers.
A large part of Chapter 2 is devoted to discussing appropriate econometric techniques,
and hence we will refrain from doing so here. Let us just recall that our most sensible
specifications perform quantile regression at every decile on by pooling both waves of
data together and defining household correlated random effects. The first important
finding from the empirical analysis in Chapter 2 is that microcredit yields consump-
tion gains at every point of the distribution. To that extent it is in line with similar
studies using quasi-experimental data. For instance, our estimated returns to an extra
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Tk 100 in loans issued to women in terms of total annual expenditure for a household
at the median of the conditional distribution are between Tk 12.9 to Tk 18.5, similar in
magnitude to the marginal average effects advertised by Khandker (2005), i.e. between
Tk 15 and Tk 21.
However, our second important finding shows that returns to microcredit are heteroge-
neous. Specifically, we measure that an extra Tk 1,000 in credit would yield between
Tk 11 to Tk 14 per capita per year in total expenditure for relatively low-consuming
households (i.e. at the bottom decile of the conditional distribution), while these ben-
efits go up to between Tk 42 and Tk 61 for relatively high-consuming households (i.e.
those at the top decile). That is, some borrowers reclaim four times as much benefits
as others. Understandably, one would like to know which borrowers exactly enjoy the
largest welfare gains. The drawback of conditional quantile regression is that we can-
not answer that problem. But we can nonetheless draw crucial welfare implications
from the uncovered heterogeneity, especially in light of our last finding.
Heterogeneous returns to microcredit are driven by the impact of the latter on non-food
expenditure. Indeed, formal statistical testing invites us to accept that all categories of
borrowers probably enjoy similar food consumption benefits, i.e. between Tk 6 and Tk
15 per capita per year for an extra Tk 1,000 in credit. On the other hand, the high-
est consumers of non-food items (relatively to their socio-economic characteristics) can
experience returns to microcredit between 6 to 10 times larger than their relatively
low-consuming counterparts. In light of the stylised fact that even the poorest of the
poor in developing countries tend to have an incompressible level of non-food con-
sumption, we argue that non-food expenditure is an important part of how households
in our sample can signal social status. Then, in the spirit of social distance models,
the higher the realised level of non-food expenditure, the higher the associated social
welfare utility.
Additionally, our estimates are conditional in nature, and hence the highest consump-
tion returns benefit to those who already consume relatively much compared to similar
peers. A group of similar households is the relevant sphere in which social status mat-
ters and is determined. In a status-seeking environment, what matters is not only to
rank higher than others in the distribution but also to leave them as far behind as pos-
sible. We conjecture that microfinance offers limited opportunities of upward mobility
within a reference group, given that households at bottom quantiles of the conditional
distribution will find similar households who already consume more than them to ben-
efit from credit to a greater extent than they do. In that sense, microcredit can have
inequality-sharpening consequences in terms of welfare derived from one’s social sta-
tus, even though impact estimates advertise positive gains throughout the distribution.
We feel that such findings are crucial in bettering our understanding of the ramifica-
tions of poverty alleviation programs.
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It is in a similar spirit that we set out to investigate the potential spillover effects of
microfinance, and more precisely their nature. Chapter 3 shows that village-level
spillover effects on household expenditure thanks to microcredit are positive and large,
with an extra positive spillover effect from women’s borrowings to the non-borrowing
population. Evidence on educational spillover effects is more scarce, but results sug-
gest an overall positive spillover effects to boys schooling that is slightly smaller for
the non-borrowing population than for others. The raw estimation of village-level
spillover effects does not allow however to disentangle between the mechanisms at
play.
We are interested in knowing whether such consumption – and to a minor extent chil-
dren education – spillovers can stem from social interactions, given that existing stud-
ies have typically focussed on the impacts of microfinance on market conditions as
sources of indirect program impacts. Our final set of results confirms that the non-
borrowing population benefits indirectly from microfinance in terms of consumption,
most notably in terms of non-food expenditure, and that these benefits stem from so-
cial interactions with households who are eligible to microfinance. Similarly, boys
from non-borrowing households are more likely to be educated as a consequence of
the village-wide increase in the education of boys driven by the population of borrow-
ers and eligible non-borrowers.
Finally, we explore one last dimension against which to gauge the efficiency of micro-
credit: household vulnerability. Chapter 4 introduces the idea that although its main
focus is poverty alleviation, microfinance ought to be judged on its overall ability to
help households improve their welfare. For instance, it could have risk mitigation
properties that would be welcome in the risky environments typically faced by rural
households of developing countries. Tentative evidence from survey data establishes
the potential existence of a need for insurance against adverse shocks for households
in our sample. To assess it in a more formal way, we follow the method developed by
Chaudhuri et al. (2002) and proceed to estimate household vulnerability as expected
poverty, which is forward-looking in nature. Combined with regional and national
data on the incidence of poverty, our study shows that a large share of households in
the sample can be classified as hard core poor. Furthermore, estimates on data from
the early 1990s show that participants in microfinance programs are classified as vul-
nerable more often than non-participants. The poverty and vulnerability profiles of
the population under scrutiny improve over time, and the incidence of poverty and
vulnerability becomes comparable in both groups. This finding further motivates the
investigation about the role microfinance might have played in this drastic change.
We then use linear regressions on panel data to estimate the impact of microfinance
borrowings on the probability of being vulnerable to falling into poverty in the next
time period, using our cross-sectional measure of vulnerability as the dependent vari-
able. Our results show a strong significant negative influence of microcredit on the
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probability that households be vulnerable. On average, an extra Tk 1,000 in micro-
finance loans can yield a reduction in the probability of being vulnerable of 0.2% to
0.41%, depending on the benchmark used to define vulnerability. Gender-based esti-
mates suggest that this decrease is mostly due to female microcredit which has a sig-
nificant negative impact on every measure of vulnerability. Additionally, male micro-
credit is found to substantially reduce the probability of being vulnerable only when
considering nationwide incidence of moderate poverty as the threshold, in which case
the estimated impact is larger than that associated to female credit. This indicates
that microfinance loans issued to men help mitigating the risk of falling into poverty
for marginally vulnerable households, i.e. those households classified as vulnerable
against a harsher criterion.
Altogether, in spite of important data limitations, findings from the three empirical
chapters provide a clearer picture of what can be expected from microfinance pro-
grams. The thesis also succeeds in motivating the idea that the efficiency of policy
interventions has to be gauged on multiple dimensions, and not only on their pre-
determined announced goals. What appear like positive results on the face of it can
hide more complex socio-economic phenomena with potentially adverse consequences,
as was the case with the unravelled heterogeneity in consumption gains from micro-
credit. Many conceptual and statistical tools are readily available that can easily help
in providing more comprehensive evaluations of microfinance programs, and of policy
interventions in general, than mere impacts at the mean.
Appendices
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Figure A.1 Kernel density estimates for household per capita food expenditure
(a) Panel A: By borrowing status
Full sample
Borrowing HH Non-borrowing HH
(b) Panel B: By time period
1991-92 1998-99
Note: Kernel density estimates using an Epanechnikov kernel function and sampling weights.Because of
the long right tails, the top 1% observations of the grand distribution of the sub-sample considered in each
graph are trimmed to improve visualisation.It does not hamper the overall shape of the density estimates.
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Figure A.2 Kernel density estimates for household per capita non-food expenditure
(a) Panel A: By borrowing status
Full sample
Borrowing HH Non-borrowing HH
(b) Panel B: By time period
1991-92 1998-99
Note: Kernel density estimates using an Epanechnikov kernel function and sampling weights.Because of
the long right tails, the top 1% observations of the grand distribution of the sub-sample considered in each
graph are trimmed to improve visualisation.It does not hamper the overall shape of the density estimates.
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Figure A.3 Quantile-quantile plots for household per capita food expenditure
(a) Panel A: Comparison across time, by borrowing status
Full sample
Borrowing HH Non-borrowing HH
(b) Panel B: Comparison across borrowing status, by time period
1991-92 1998-99
Note: Quantile-quantile plots. The straight line is the ‘identity’ line, i.e. the benchmark case in which
both distributions are identical. Because of a few very extreme observations, the top 1% observations of
the grand distribution of the sub-sample considered in each graph are trimmed to improve visualisation.
It does not hamper the overall shape of the plots.
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Figure A.4 Quantile-quantile plots for household per capita non-food expenditure
(a) Panel A: Comparison across time, by borrowing status
Full sample
Borrowing HH Non-borrowing HH
(b) Panel B: Comparison across borrowing status, by time period
1991-92 1998-99
Note: Quantile-quantile plots. The straight line is the ‘identity’ line, i.e. the benchmark case in which
both distributions are identical. Because of a few very extreme observations, the top 1% observations of
the grand distribution of the sub-sample considered in each graph are trimmed to improve visualisation.
It does not hamper the overall shape of the plots.
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Table B.1 Cross-section quantile regressions, household total expenditure
1991-92 1998-99
Quantile 10% 30% Median 70% 90% 10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Household microcredit
borrowings
0.006 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.025 0.010 0.014** 0.017** 0.028** 0.053**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.016) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.011) (0.016)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head
-29.09 -21.21 25.56 139.8** 270.0** 29.79 49.79* 65.55* 107.1* 146.8
(35.56) (25.01) (31.30) (46.83) (102.6) (29.89) (28.84) (38.89) (67.60) (154.9)
Age of HH head
-9.139** -11.50** -9.184** -9.398** -6.937 1.644 -0.574 -7.823 -17.99 -20.43
(3.606) (3.950) (4.468) (5.118) (8.471) (4.911) (4.412) (5.892) (7.985) (14.12)
Gender of HH head
127.1 -88.74 -177.2 -42.80 40.86 112.9 -318.9 -164.5 -451.8 -2211.8
(226.8) (243.9) (183.0) (199.5) (894.6) (248.1) (209.5) (308.1) (598.8) (1147.0)
Highest education of men in
HH
80.58* 82.38** 48.61* -16.17 55.91 50.23* 70.12** 83.46** 121.7** 281.1**
(33.12) (22.48) (25.86) (36.29) (76.61) (26.48) (19.53) (24.98) (41.64) (104.9)
Highest education of women
in HH
25.64 51.52** 74.27** 57.39* 47.86 51.01** 91.23** 137.8** 203.7** 342.7**
(21.69) (19.96) (25.09) (35.77) (78.05) (25.47) (22.53) (34.57) (59.45) (146.7)
Landholdings
1.152** 1.052** 1.051** 2.841** 3.719* 1.937* 1.887** 2.229** 2.685** 17.33
(0.492) (0.606) (1.095) (1.240) (2.153) (0.988) (0.701) (1.086) (1.901) (13.00)
HH economic dependency
ratio
-104.7** -123.7** -180.5** -240.9** -225.8** -95.98** -166.8** -220.4** -295.1** -293.4**
(31.67) (23.81) (26.95) (35.17) (94.42) (32.44) (32.38) (38.17) (63.61) (125.9)
# of HH head relatives
owning land
25.03 15.36 21.62 10.94 28.19 21.78 36.06* 56.08* 66.01* 60.68
(12.55) (12.58) (17.48) (24.17) (41.59) (30.48) (23.26) (36.02) (43.80) (99.14)
# of HH head’s spouse
relatives owning land
-21.77 -4.451 -1.855 8.667 -14.00 49.64** 32.59** 9.876 29.24 -0.534
(11.57) (11.43) (13.48) (15.50) (33.96) (20.16) (15.94) (22.60) (38.90) (57.59)
# of HH head relatives living
outside thana
0.0832 8.990 -23.19 -33.11 -48.76 -33.63 -17.55 -10.84 -40.89 -49.91
(20.15) (17.46) (18.41) (32.69) (53.04) (29.89) (23.57) (29.93) (38.69) (70.13)
# of HH head’s spouse
relatives living outside thana
0.867 -2.160 10.69 11.69 49.22 -3.116 -6.647 -5.804 -9.632 13.33
(10.98) (10.70) (14.42) (19.04) (43.98) (15.62) (14.58) (18.12) (24.30) (40.71)
Loans from traditional
banks (1=yes)
428.0 324.3** 732.9** 870.5** 1578.3 363.1 452.9* 314.9 926.4 1952.8*
(209.7) (205.0) (246.6) (360.6) (890.3) (297.5) (234.0) (410.5) (808.3) (1928.3)
Loans from informal sources
(1=yes)
-104.1 15.63 -42.25 396.1 440.3 523.0* 48.54 62.73 -316.6 -25.47
(190.6) (154.4) (204.5) (338.7) (509.8) (220.5) (181.4) (256.2) (426.3) (1938.3)
Loans from relatives (1=yes)
-30.75 117.8 78.23 83.31 338.3 -26.43 348.0* 567.3** 943.7** 1882.3**
(200.1) (174.6) (162.3) (299.6) (744.7) (220.8) (191.0) (261.6) (398.0) (787.5)
Eligibility of HH (1=yes)
-321.7** -351.8** -417.0 -269.0 -136.8 -318.4** -717.3** -816.2** -1063.0** -544.8
(131.7) (137.5) (208.6) (289.7) (612.8) (222.6) (213.2) (268.7) (503.2) (967.9)
Village covariates
Average male wage
6.677 4.295 0.298 -1.356 47.44 -1.647 -4.236 -0.863 4.520 -20.42
(9.684) (9.101) (9.943) (11.90) (42.98) (7.769) (6.638) (9.849) (12.79) (23.92)
Average female wage
4.422 4.531 4.678 6.401 42.31 -0.471 -4.089 3.302 -8.997 18.25
(6.352) (5.679) (7.977) (10.21) (32.20) (7.854) (8.672) (11.95) (16.90) (30.50)
Primary school (1=yes)
-190.4 -121.1 -209.0 -178.1 62.29 135.9 112.8 -88.98 -528.0 -1557.6
(120.2) (135.9) (163.7) (178.4) (379.3) (317.7) (304.6) (533.2) (644.6) (1097.1)
Food program (1=yes)
-74.23 -141.7 -172.1 -333.9 -569.8 -225.1 -310.1* -372.9 -373.8 -331.3
(118.2) (111.6) (138.9) (175.1) (425.5) (193.0) (193.7) (255.2) (337.6) (603.6)
Distance to nearest bank
(km)
-12.98 -36.24 -40.35 -48.48* -88.99 -17.37 -11.71 -19.50 13.71 -28.86
(21.75) (21.67) (28.00) (29.85) (83.09) (37.90) (39.12) (51.01) (64.89) (126.2)
Distance to nearest pucca
road (km)
2.428 -10.14 -1.154 21.83 122.6 -61.38 -36.75 -92.41 -55.32 47.43
(19.95) (18.69) (24.12) (31.16) (109.6) (56.92) (66.49) (83.71) (132.1) (252.9)
Distance to nearest
shop/market (km)
28.90 59.38 51.33 101.2** 80.78 41.62 0.382 28.72 87.19 -308.7
(36.88) (33.75) (39.10) (47.61) (111.0) (111.8) (104.5) (137.5) (168.0) (272.5)
Electricity in village (1=yes)
315.9 352.8** 405.8** 698.8** 1170.9** 482.3** 335.0* 424.9 270.6 973.8
(122.1) (126.9) (158.7) (184.8) (561.4) (202.8) (211.9) (291.6) (382.9) (710.1)
Price of rice
-73.93 78.61 35.44 -11.43 -41.59 70.66 108.4 44.14 107.2 213.3
(83.03) (83.74) (104.3) (130.8) (268.2) (67.93) (71.47) (103.5) (128.3) (248.4)
Price of wheat flour
57.74 34.10 72.59 162.4 153.4 -45.51 -180.4 -181.7 -224.0 -508.4*
(74.42) (79.17) (98.34) (115.1) (283.7) (114.9) (109.4) (143.2) (181.9) (351.3)
Price of mustard oil
8.626 1.640 3.753 -9.148 -84.25 0.0719 8.820 6.717 21.84 42.47
(10.73) (11.23) (14.04) (17.00) (46.59) (12.79) (14.19) (19.88) (25.99) (49.15)
Price of hen’s eggs
-19.98 -15.17 -28.47 -76.59 -123.6 117.0 199.6 321.7 507.8 860.8*
(142.9) (162.4) (272.4) (370.5) (579.2) (210.3) (205.3) (285.2) (389.2) (728.5)
Price of milk
38.16 31.36 68.72** 99.20** 49.14 -1.120 4.216 12.13 -7.672 -75.02
(31.35) (30.79) (38.23) (42.03) (101.6) (31.80) (29.14) (38.24) (52.46) (86.48)
Price of potatoes
-27.22 41.71 -34.58 -26.62 -41.79 -6.677 11.32 -41.74 0.634 32.41
(48.09) (46.36) (63.72) (86.60) (155.3) (37.69) (40.80) (56.00) (90.45) (153.6)
Overall intercept
2246.3 1900.5 2556.6 2803.2 5789.0 1806.0 4040.4** 5603.1** 5985.0** 10847.9**
(1144.0) (1277.3) (1423.9) (1501.2) (3704.1) (1554.4) (1468.0) (1934.4) (2783.7) (5787.9)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table B.2 Cross-section quantile regressions, household total expenditure, by gen-
der
1991-92 1998-99
Quantile 10% 30% Median 70% 90% 10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Female microcredit
borrowings
0.008 0.008 0.008 0.004 0.015 0.011* 0.015** 0.018** 0.030** 0.054**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.022) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.011) (0.017)
Male microcredit
borrowings
-0.001 0.001 0.003 0.015 0.026 -0.001 0.012 0.007 0.007 0.007
(0.010) (0.009) (0.014) (0.017) (0.022) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.016) (0.026)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head
-31.51 -22.82 25.08 135.0** 262.5** 29.76 49.02* 67.50* 110.9* 150.6
(35.78) (24.86) (31.42) (47.08) (101.3) (30.01) (28.98) (38.52) (67.09) (155.3)
Age of HH head
-9.266** -11.69** -9.279** -9.716* -7.850 1.899 -0.787 -7.558 -16.05 -19.21
(3.621) (3.945) (4.441) (5.075) (8.480) (4.899) (4.434) (5.912) (7.935) (14.26)
Gender of HH head
196.5 -96.22 -197.6 -62.51 14.60 109.5 -313.3 -176.8 -396.3 -2045.3
(228.9) (243.1) (183.1) (199.0) (892.2) (250.2) (207.4) (309.8) (605.5) (1143.4)
Highest education of men in
HH
86.28* 83.74** 49.59* -16.26 56.81 50.37* 71.88** 84.97** 108.9** 288.4**
(33.50) (22.42) (25.91) (36.02) (74.91) (26.43) (19.85) (24.80) (40.90) (106.3)
Highest education of women
in HH
24.29 50.96** 73.37** 60.34* 52.23 54.01** 88.22** 136.1** 204.7** 343.5**
(21.76) (20.06) (25.04) (36.14) (78.27) (25.48) (22.77) (34.68) (59.55) (146.4)
Landholdings
1.155** 1.053** 0.941** 2.857** 3.762* 2.004** 1.842** 2.188** 2.871** 16.70
(0.495) (0.602) (1.098) (1.238) (2.156) (0.979) (0.712) (1.150) (1.894) (12.98)
HH economic dependency
ratio
-103.2** -122.5** -180.6** -236.6** -231.5** -99.77** -172.1** -224.8** -297.3** -289.4**
(32.14) (23.70) (26.37) (35.28) (94.75) (32.69) (32.40) (38.32) (64.49) (124.8)
# of HH head relatives
owning land
24.31 16.36 21.61 9.871 29.79 24.75 36.45* 60.82* 64.27* 54.66
(12.54) (12.48) (17.61) (24.10) (41.41) (31.00) (23.64) (36.49) (44.55) (100.2)
# of HH head’s spouse
relatives owning land
-22.76 -3.852 -1.349 8.324 -14.73 46.06** 35.77** 9.486 29.76 3.571
(11.63) (11.43) (13.51) (15.51) (34.12) (20.24) (15.88) (22.70) (39.18) (58.26)
# of HH head relatives living
outside thana
0.926 8.108 -23.20 -31.64 -46.31 -36.70 -19.83 -11.18 -42.07 -35.92
(19.85) (17.31) (18.45) (32.60) (53.35) (30.14) (23.67) (29.52) (38.77) (69.52)
# of HH head’s spouse
relatives living outside thana
-0.00514 -2.414 10.59 11.69 49.34 -3.426 -5.693 -6.547 -10.98 12.39
(10.78) (10.67) (14.26) (18.83) (43.91) (15.70) (14.68) (18.07) (24.24) (41.63)
Loans from traditional
banks (1=yes)
410.6 324.2** 708.9** 861.3** 1540.1 338.2 436.4* 322.9 864.6 1929.1*
(211.0) (207.1) (246.0) (360.5) (890.0) (296.4) (235.9) (414.8) (800.6) (1944.8)
Loans from informal sources
(1=yes)
-116.5 15.79 -45.09 397.1 443.7 551.9** 67.72 91.83 -218.5 40.86
(190.4) (154.3) (205.1) (338.4) (512.9) (218.0) (181.3) (255.5) (423.2) (1936.7)
Loans from relatives (1=yes)
-37.50 124.6 80.16 87.99 329.8 -2.800 334.4* 570.7** 893.6** 1796.8*
(204.4) (175.1) (163.1) (296.6) (741.1) (219.3) (193.4) (261.5) (395.0) (779.0)
Eligibility of HH (1=yes)
-337.2** -345.4** -434.4 -287.0 -131.4 -349.6** -709.8** -824.7** -1139.3** -385.3
(132.5) (136.0) (208.7) (290.3) (614.7) (224.7) (213.1) (267.5) (503.1) (958.4)
Village covariates
Average male wage
7.120 4.457 0.600 -0.893 47.50 -1.591 -4.335 -2.072 4.150 -18.40
(9.655) (8.924) (10.01) (12.08) (42.87) (7.768) (6.698) (9.869) (12.75) (23.87)
Average female wage
4.314 4.633 4.469 6.415 42.64 -0.675 -3.935 3.329 -8.545 16.22
(6.290) (5.649) (7.968) (10.13) (32.17) (7.935) (8.674) (11.89) (16.73) (30.10)
Primary school (1=yes)
-179.6 -119.8 -201.1 -213.5 63.33 108.0 119.7 -150.1 -469.0 -1705.4
(119.6) (136.0) (162.1) (178.4) (378.3) (321.7) (310.0) (534.2) (656.4) (1136.6)
Food program (1=yes)
-74.19 -144.8 -166.6 -333.7 -578.0 -246.1 -314.8* -366.7 -346.2 -358.1
(118.5) (112.1) (138.4) (175.6) (426.2) (189.6) (195.5) (256.8) (338.2) (601.8)
Distance to nearest bank
(km)
-15.29 -35.93 -39.07 -50.61* -94.65 -13.48 -9.440 -13.97 12.73 -45.67
(21.60) (21.63) (27.94) (30.20) (82.85) (38.43) (39.45) (51.65) (65.33) (125.9)
Distance to nearest pucca
road (km)
4.339 -10.34 -1.991 22.40 119.4 -66.94 -37.29 -89.57 -53.06 18.82
(19.85) (18.73) (24.15) (30.99) (109.5) (57.19) (68.30) (85.20) (135.1) (249.6)
Distance to nearest
shop/market (km)
29.15 60.04 48.83 98.42** 79.69 49.03 -6.647 24.68 78.10 -279.0
(36.63) (33.65) (39.21) (48.42) (110.8) (112.0) (106.0) (137.0) (169.8) (272.9)
Electricity in village (1=yes)
308.2 354.6** 390.8** 674.8** 1132.9** 447.5** 329.7* 433.2 233.8 864.9
(121.6) (126.9) (159.4) (186.8) (558.6) (200.0) (213.8) (291.6) (384.1) (704.8)
Price of rice
-73.89 78.31 31.33 -21.52 -49.65 74.28 109.8 33.04 101.8 224.6
(83.07) (84.24) (104.2) (130.8) (267.7) (68.34) (72.55) (106.1) (129.1) (247.8)
Price of wheat flour
55.03 29.77 77.16 166.4 153.4 -40.95 -177.9 -178.8 -233.3 -528.6*
(74.33) (79.16) (98.69) (115.2) (282.4) (114.9) (111.4) (144.1) (181.7) (352.8)
Price of mustard oil
9.171 1.844 3.529 -9.264 -84.14 0.385 8.874 7.685 23.00 35.86
(10.75) (11.08) (14.00) (17.08) (46.41) (12.88) (14.36) (19.98) (26.11) (50.04)
Price of hen’s eggs
-19.46 -14.11 -28.49 -72.62 -119.7 145.4 208.2 323.8 524.7 819.9*
(142.8) (161.3) (271.7) (368.3) (578.6) (212.2) (206.2) (289.8) (391.3) (728.3)
Price of milk
39.36 31.27 68.27** 100.3** 45.60 -1.792 3.474 14.65 -11.31 -61.44
(30.97) (30.45) (38.70) (41.94) (101.6) (31.82) (29.55) (39.06) (52.47) (86.21)
Price of potatoes
-27.69 43.71 -33.99 -23.49 -41.21 -9.921 10.39 -43.78 -9.326 11.48
(47.98) (46.23) (64.10) (87.43) (156.3) (37.83) (41.14) (56.51) (90.84) (154.4)
Overall intercept 2160.4 1916.2 2608.3 2918.0 6019.7 1702.7 3984.0** 5741.6** 6132.1** 11192.9**
(1141.1) (1277.2) (1425.2) (1505.4) (3719.7) (1558.2) (1480.1) (1925.6) (2814.8) (5792.2)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table B.3 Cross-section quantile regressions, household food expenditure
1991-92 1998-99
Quantile 10% 30% Median 70% 90% 10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Household microcredit
borrowings
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.006* 0.008** 0.005 0.008 0.011
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head
-10.71 -2.968 34.33 50.60** 116.8** 46.76 45.37** 70.91** 79.83** 210.2**
(18.55) (18.56) (19.45) (21.96) (38.99) (21.34) (19.21) (21.42) (20.88) (55.92)
Age of HH head
-5.094** -3.806* -6.065* -1.668 1.258 3.677 2.512 2.972 -0.859 0.996
(2.483) (3.097) (3.026) (2.891) (4.244) (3.291) (3.211) (3.235) (3.841) (5.465)
Gender of HH head
202.9 40.12 -15.17 33.19 79.40 40.34 -140.8 -163.1 -412.1** -1374.3**
(167.2) (149.1) (158.0) (140.6) (328.4) (181.4) (137.5) (197.2) (249.8) (464.4)
Highest education of men in
HH
45.63** 42.41** 20.14 8.842 -3.468 9.597 28.37* 22.34** 35.36** 33.16
(18.71) (16.05) (16.09) (17.69) (29.18) (18.39) (14.38) (13.76) (14.86) (22.80)
Highest education of women
in HH
-0.100 -10.56 5.697 11.65 -10.44 1.341 23.15 39.42** 47.45** 0.103
(14.97) (17.05) (17.23) (16.34) (28.45) (16.95) (15.52) (16.97) (20.51) (40.76)
Landholdings
0.395** 0.836** 0.735** 0.634** 0.823** 0.468* 0.806 0.948 1.790 2.451
(0.268) (0.285) (0.306) (0.432) (0.675) (0.500) (0.766) (0.849) (0.894) (2.489)
HH economic dependency
ratio
-89.88** -86.22** -134.9** -154.5** -167.9** -82.78** -110.0** -145.1** -162.3** -219.7**
(23.58) (17.51) (18.81) (20.89) (45.06) (20.36) (23.54) (26.49) (30.85) (51.87)
# of HH head relatives
owning land
8.464 11.74 3.434 2.269 -3.301 13.48 42.56 27.89* 26.36** -11.16
(10.06) (10.64) (12.18) (13.05) (19.34) (19.76) (18.57) (15.92) (16.81) (34.04)
# of HH head’s spouse
relatives owning land
-13.77 -1.159 -7.916 -4.435 -0.167 33.23** 9.894 3.368 12.58 49.90
(8.482) (9.343) (8.650) (9.044) (17.43) (12.34) (11.72) (13.54) (18.12) (28.66)
# of HH head relatives living
outside thana
1.376 2.198 2.506 0.360 6.388 -9.290 -1.676 1.853 -0.685 -30.98
(15.42) (14.74) (14.17) (19.60) (38.05) (19.05) (17.31) (18.17) (19.36) (30.82)
# of HH head’s spouse
relatives living outside thana
14.73 -0.937 6.483 6.770 22.84 -10.39 1.998 2.615 -5.644 5.688
(8.057) (7.790) (9.845) (12.46) (18.02) (10.22) (10.10) (10.75) (12.35) (19.87)
Loans from traditional
banks (1=yes)
100.7 270.0* 410.5** 385.3** 253.0 -12.45 40.39 127.8 -39.60 841.3
(152.5) (135.3) (139.3) (149.9) (197.6) (196.1) (163.9) (146.4) (232.2) (439.3)
Loans from informal sources
(1=yes)
-188.7 4.390 49.56 -120.5 -36.20 255.7 244.3 104.7 117.9 -376.6
(120.1) (125.8) (110.2) (106.7) (190.0) (217.0) (131.7) (137.6) (177.4) (251.6)
Loans from relatives (1=yes)
-77.09 43.17 103.5 118.8 47.70 13.22 59.57 241.3 121.5 129.3
(132.9) (118.0) (122.0) (146.0) (215.2) (131.2) (122.6) (126.7) (145.4) (256.3)
Eligibility of HH (1=yes)
-309.6** -187.1** -251.0* -249.6 -82.48 -207.6* -359.7** -400.5** -417.1** -28.36
(93.40) (96.09) (119.8) (134.2) (204.0) (133.9) (152.2) (149.8) (167.3) (300.0)
Village covariates
Average male wage
6.369 8.993 6.560 3.409 -1.700 -1.958 -3.825 -5.437 0.841 1.504
(7.995) (8.151) (8.011) (7.500) (11.64) (4.882) (5.013) (5.469) (7.006) (13.01)
Average female wage
3.198 0.598 -3.461 -2.356 -1.514 -1.548 1.195 5.318 0.239 -8.031
(4.604) (4.668) (5.798) (6.082) (9.383) (6.037) (5.964) (7.108) (8.811) (12.84)
Primary school (1=yes)
-174.9** -117.9 -162.5 -156.9 -94.91 88.19 94.94 19.55 -64.36 115.3
(85.46) (114.2) (132.9) (130.0) (178.4) (192.9) (209.9) (230.5) (271.0) (402.6)
Food program (1=yes)
-116.4 -88.99 -82.14 -200.5 -183.7 -207.4* -213.8 -238.1 -225.1 -404.5*
(87.43) (90.12) (110.9) (119.7) (167.3) (131.0) (134.2) (151.0) (185.2) (272.6)
Distance to nearest bank
(km)
-21.26* -28.71 -31.96* -48.90** -66.65** -15.07 -7.224 9.600 45.09 21.98
(15.13) (17.63) (19.78) (20.94) (30.02) (25.70) (27.88) (33.28) (39.31) (58.68)
Distance to nearest pucca
road (km)
5.986 -1.215 3.673 18.39 18.68 -65.44 -57.22 -45.13 -60.74 -98.87
(12.93) (14.30) (17.63) (18.33) (24.36) (41.47) (41.67) (50.82) (58.87) (96.78)
Distance to nearest
shop/market (km)
7.926 18.71 30.40 47.88 62.78 32.81 -38.31 -54.79 -33.72 -26.47
(25.66) (28.34) (30.95) (33.23) (48.29) (73.55) (72.51) (80.42) (98.74) (131.0)
Electricity in village (1=yes)
241.4** 249.3** 286.8** 314.7** 416.5** 273.0* 289.9 211.3 302.7 460.3
(90.43) (92.00) (113.4) (118.2) (189.3) (138.2) (150.8) (166.6) (220.2) (350.4)
Price of rice
-30.91 38.90 33.20 -58.37 -82.01 91.73* 108.4* 61.56 99.79 205.0*
(59.27) (70.89) (83.76) (87.91) (113.6) (42.51) (48.33) (56.88) (79.53) (126.6)
Price of wheat flour
37.72 41.02 32.05 124.6 101.9 -61.51 -116.1 -99.37 -174.8* -328.3**
(56.68) (57.35) (72.25) (82.25) (122.0) (84.72) (75.60) (76.93) (100.7) (146.7)
Price of mustard oil
11.74 7.306 4.017 -0.194 -9.868 -5.366 6.717 9.782 7.855 -2.804
(8.134) (8.877) (10.77) (11.47) (15.53) (8.978) (10.02) (11.01) (14.98) (26.77)
Price of hen’s eggs
-13.10 -5.091 -15.29 -35.02 -41.71 12.82 149.9 292.9* 430.8** 362.0
(131.9) (153.5) (210.7) (288.1) (400.1) (143.8) (156.5) (167.1) (221.7) (397.3)
Price of milk
15.36 16.92 39.98 56.23* 88.49* 4.618 6.560 2.589 -3.414 -14.53
(24.06) (27.71) (31.80) (31.08) (49.04) (22.04) (22.57) (23.05) (30.85) (42.56)
Price of potatoes
1.929 -4.180 -2.107 -5.894 1.122 17.32 24.87 14.46 19.68 46.05
(35.22) (41.80) (47.82) (57.42) (62.05) (26.17) (28.76) (33.40) (45.03) (72.50)
Overall intercept
1559.0* 1162.6 2032.1 2638.3* 3565.3** 1830.5 1934.5* 2396.4** 3256.8** 6377.1*
(805.9) (968.8) (1189.0) (1196.8) (1548.9) (1164.9) (1098.2) (1183.6) (1618.2) (2598.3)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table B.4 Cross-section quantile regressions, household food expenditure, by gen-
der
1991-92 1998-99
Quantile 10% 30% Median 70% 90% 10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Female microcredit
borrowings
0.003 0.004 0.009 0.002 0.002 0.007* 0.007** 0.005* 0.011 0.012*
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Male microcredit
borrowings
-0.005 -0.001 -0.003 -0.000 -0.006 -0.000 0.008 0.001 -0.005 0.001
(0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.013)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head
-13.59 -6.459 31.28 50.86** 112.1** 40.02 44.96** 72.00** 71.28** 212.5**
(18.73) (18.40) (19.53) (21.95) (38.76) (21.39) (19.15) (21.54) (20.77) (55.74)
Age of HH head
-5.534** -4.262* -6.450* -1.691 0.279 4.398 2.266 2.841 -2.231 0.993
(2.486) (3.088) (3.021) (2.924) (4.231) (3.314) (3.206) (3.254) (3.875) (5.436)
Gender of HH head
245.2 34.90 -51.32 34.10 41.55 107.7 -138.6 -166.3 -349.4** -1377.7**
(166.4) (150.8) (157.0) (140.5) (328.0) (180.5) (137.7) (196.2) (247.0) (464.4)
Highest education of men in
HH
47.06** 44.50** 23.54 8.832 -1.948 15.59 29.59* 22.43** 37.88** 33.62
(19.04) (15.99) (16.12) (17.72) (29.10) (18.21) (14.33) (13.78) (14.80) (22.64)
Highest education of women
in HH
1.142 -8.974 5.695 11.68 -7.522 0.814 22.68 40.51** 48.25** 0.361
(14.78) (17.04) (17.07) (16.45) (28.50) (16.83) (15.67) (16.91) (20.70) (40.77)
Landholdings
0.417** 0.836** 0.739** 0.633** 0.710** 0.435* 0.785 0.941 1.846 2.376
(0.269) (0.284) (0.307) (0.431) (0.678) (0.516) (0.769) (0.861) (0.856) (2.484)
HH economic dependency
ratio
-73.17** -84.59** -137.7** -153.9** -169.0** -81.64** -110.2** -143.8** -159.2** -218.5**
(24.09) (17.86) (18.48) (20.82) (45.02) (20.56) (23.73) (26.62) (30.42) (51.76)
# of HH head relatives
owning land
7.409 11.14 0.984 2.405 -0.631 18.11 42.46 27.51* 30.33** -16.18
(9.956) (10.65) (12.14) (13.09) (19.17) (19.71) (18.78) (15.96) (17.01) (34.89)
# of HH head’s spouse
relatives owning land
-14.12 -0.902 -4.461 -4.447 -0.349 29.88** 10.24 4.191 9.337 50.36
(8.349) (9.415) (8.712) (9.104) (17.30) (12.30) (11.73) (13.40) (17.86) (28.69)
# of HH head relatives living
outside thana
0.946 5.172 1.253 0.354 6.820 -10.13 -1.097 2.341 -2.504 -33.40
(15.28) (14.67) (14.17) (19.97) (38.39) (19.02) (17.34) (18.13) (19.25) (30.83)
# of HH head’s spouse
relatives living outside thana
16.21 -0.175 7.214 6.747 23.61 -7.861 1.378 2.018 -2.982 9.124
(8.030) (7.783) (9.731) (12.46) (17.97) (10.20) (10.09) (10.67) (12.25) (20.07)
Loans from traditional
banks (1=yes)
145.4 225.7** 395.6** 383.6** 293.3 -49.02 37.14 125.0 46.80 832.4
(153.6) (135.1) (139.6) (150.3) (198.9) (194.1) (164.9) (146.9) (227.4) (432.5)
Loans from informal sources
(1=yes)
-199.1 -3.032 45.81 -121.4 -17.43 221.2 248.6 112.2 107.1 -393.9
(119.2) (125.9) (111.4) (107.0) (189.0) (217.6) (132.3) (140.3) (174.7) (252.7)
Loans from relatives (1=yes)
-46.18 17.91 108.1 118.5 53.71 -32.29 62.18 240.5 95.12 100.4
(135.7) (118.4) (121.4) (146.0) (217.0) (132.0) (122.8) (127.3) (143.6) (254.9)
Eligibility of HH (1=yes)
-298.9** -195.7** -247.4* -249.5 -96.22 -166.0* -363.0** -398.3** -438.5** -27.68
(95.09) (96.70) (120.1) (134.2) (204.2) (135.7) (152.6) (150.1) (167.7) (298.9)
Village covariates
Average male wage
5.469 9.461 7.951 3.367 -2.247 -2.302 -3.815 -5.511 1.089 2.614
(7.838) (8.097) (7.962) (7.497) (11.76) (4.845) (5.038) (5.476) (6.890) (13.03)
Average female wage
3.036 1.136 -3.712 -2.410 -0.555 -1.528 0.981 5.181 -0.539 -6.020
(4.573) (4.669) (5.795) (6.074) (9.347) (6.030) (5.987) (7.066) (8.703) (12.63)
Primary school (1=yes)
-172.6* -110.6 -152.7 -156.2 -67.16 139.4 96.65 21.98 23.17 95.99
(84.84) (114.4) (131.8) (130.0) (178.6) (193.0) (214.9) (233.2) (266.2) (408.8)
Food program (1=yes)
-109.8 -86.19 -82.63 -200.2 -189.4 -214.8* -217.6 -234.8 -244.1 -395.3*
(85.96) (90.44) (109.5) (119.9) (168.4) (130.1) (134.3) (153.1) (183.3) (273.2)
Distance to nearest bank
(km)
-23.00* -26.71* -31.11 -48.77** -68.95** -16.72 -6.007 9.085 48.44 21.39
(14.98) (17.57) (19.50) (21.06) (29.94) (25.82) (27.83) (33.48) (39.01) (58.25)
Distance to nearest pucca
road (km)
2.661 -1.068 3.895 18.43 17.90 -50.83 -56.68 -45.66 -63.66 -111.2
(12.71) (14.25) (17.50) (18.44) (24.48) (42.06) (41.90) (51.53) (58.69) (96.86)
Distance to nearest
shop/market (km)
12.00 12.35 29.43 48.09 66.61 40.60 -37.07 -56.20 -29.78 -27.40
(25.02) (28.18) (30.63) (33.31) (49.05) (72.74) (73.55) (81.58) (97.62) (130.5)
Electricity in village (1=yes)
233.5** 237.8** 299.4** 316.5** 412.7** 311.1* 302.0 206.5 270.1 427.9
(89.33) (92.10) (113.4) (119.3) (189.9) (135.4) (151.2) (166.6) (219.8) (350.4)
Price of rice
-21.96 49.52 43.19 -58.76 -74.54 87.16* 107.7* 61.66 116.6 196.1*
(58.82) (70.95) (83.50) (88.11) (113.2) (42.50) (48.76) (57.43) (79.27) (125.9)
Price of wheat flour
29.69 41.97 35.22 124.6 88.99 -61.76 -118.5 -96.27 -183.7* -317.2**
(56.54) (57.36) (71.33) (82.12) (122.2) (84.61) (76.19) (77.18) (100.1) (146.5)
Price of mustard oil
10.88 7.721 2.911 -0.263 -11.00 -3.534 6.361 9.479 8.760 -6.162
(8.095) (8.852) (10.75) (11.39) (15.55) (8.936) (10.17) (11.06) (14.89) (26.65)
Price of hen’s eggs
-13.35 -9.978 -21.29 -35.08 -42.27 17.96 151.7 295.8** 490.6** 351.6
(130.3) (153.0) (210.3) (287.2) (400.1) (143.9) (157.0) (168.6) (220.7) (395.2)
Price of milk
16.05 12.74 34.36 56.42* 91.37* 3.995 6.930 1.872 -8.166 -14.09
(23.57) (27.85) (31.68) (31.39) (49.41) (21.84) (22.70) (23.12) (30.56) (42.35)
Price of potatoes
4.512 0.283 -2.090 -6.388 -0.646 16.77 25.80 13.75 23.51 33.82
(34.99) (41.99) (47.69) (57.47) (61.44) (26.12) (29.07) (33.55) (45.50) (73.54)
Overall intercept 1551.4* 1064.0 2000.7 2644.3* 3712.4** 1594.2 1983.3* 2392.3** 2944.1** 6566.5*
(796.4) (961.1) (1186.4) (1200.6) (1543.4) (1164.6) (1101.3) (1190.4) (1614.4) (2582.8)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table B.5 Cross-section quantile regressions, household non-food expenditure
1991-92 1998-99
Quantile 10% 30% Median 70% 90% 10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Household microcredit
borrowings
0.003* 0.003* 0.003 0.008 0.021 0.003* 0.004** 0.007** 0.013** 0.031**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.010) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.013)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head
-0.391 -4.496 4.471 25.92 149.1** 6.191 16.62 28.20 -0.753 4.195
(8.980) (10.09) (14.82) (29.39) (80.54) (7.423) (12.44) (24.91) (43.47) (132.3)
Age of HH head
-1.511** -3.923** -4.812** -4.243* -7.550 -4.449** -2.003* -3.950** -5.987** -12.90**
(0.916) (1.134) (1.557) (2.455) (5.757) (1.328) (1.623) (2.236) (3.908) (10.08)
Gender of HH head
27.49 -36.87 -47.32 -28.52 -219.2 77.53 -18.24 125.2 -20.43 -731.6
(52.04) (49.85) (59.06) (109.1) (536.2) (64.28) (69.25) (119.1) (269.1) (994.1)
Highest education of men in
HH
16.21** 28.70** 30.54** 14.83 24.55 19.62** 32.29** 41.96** 90.75** 204.8**
(8.427) (9.101) (13.72) (22.66) (50.30) (7.523) (8.777) (18.11) (28.50) (94.44)
Highest education of women
in HH
22.56** 31.95** 50.44** 89.33** 51.47 29.60** 36.64** 72.23** 112.8** 323.4**
(5.877) (7.981) (14.07) (38.59) (62.80) (5.965) (9.344) (18.74) (41.29) (130.8)
Landholdings
0.225** 0.248** 0.596** 1.446* 2.408* 0.583** 0.794** 1.550** 1.827** 12.41
(0.120) (0.271) (0.719) (1.199) (1.502) (0.332) (0.408) (0.718) (1.366) (11.09)
HH economic dependency
ratio
-19.51** -24.52** -29.99** -43.18** -92.21 -29.39** -46.87** -62.60** -87.76** -14.75
(7.511) (9.207) (11.38) (17.05) (51.44) (9.507) (11.28) (18.01) (32.82) (99.11)
# of HH head relatives
owning land
4.022 5.935* 9.393 20.50 0.902 5.573 2.390 12.79 33.25 87.30
(4.258) (3.750) (6.702) (13.17) (27.40) (6.413) (8.751) (17.15) (25.16) (102.5)
# of HH head’s spouse
relatives owning land
0.190 0.493 -1.919 -2.804 15.13 8.243 12.90 5.917 16.99 3.693
(2.617) (3.851) (4.091) (7.106) (21.41) (5.815) (6.258) (9.686) (21.22) (51.79)
# of HH head relatives living
outside thana
1.982 1.419 -3.881 -5.502 -34.73 -11.66* -10.80 -15.70 -16.16 -37.19
(6.437) (5.469) (7.770) (14.09) (31.14) (6.682) (7.755) (9.767) (17.56) (52.17)
# of HH head’s spouse
relatives living outside thana
-2.491 -2.147 -0.171 -4.052 45.82 -1.648 2.643 1.923 -5.644 -14.81
(2.996) (3.590) (5.746) (10.66) (28.55) (4.075) (5.031) (7.552) (13.28) (31.82)
Loans from traditional
banks (1=yes)
144.1** 163.0* 256.8* 448.1* 1346.9 37.67 11.03 296.6 637.4 1776.2
(55.79) (81.26) (144.3) (305.1) (915.5) (63.30) (120.9) (283.1) (467.2) (2446.1)
Loans from informal sources
(1=yes)
27.16 28.60 69.33 407.1** 554.3 -85.07 47.23 14.74 -109.2 132.0
(51.44) (51.79) (93.18) (196.3) (372.3) (66.93) (95.79) (111.6) (224.0) (2445.1)
Loans from relatives (1=yes)
69.51 68.04 81.33 126.2 374.2 83.71 186.6* 247.5** 595.0** 2322.0**
(49.52) (67.43) (97.94) (176.6) (661.9) (54.42) (83.40) (133.9) (239.7) (774.7)
Eligibility of HH (1=yes)
-93.86** -104.9 -59.81 -138.8 -220.6 -102.0* -134.8** -374.7** -570.2** -897.4
(47.02) (49.82) (94.57) (191.8) (408.5) (60.88) (84.92) (164.7) (277.4) (940.0)
Village covariates
Average male wage
-1.627 -0.0354 -0.202 0.784 20.71 0.776 0.784 1.104 2.463 -11.79
(1.902) (2.428) (3.463) (6.542) (33.43) (2.082) (2.573) (3.787) (5.922) (17.34)
Average female wage
1.925 1.364 4.085* 4.020 15.83 0.961 -1.260 -1.137 -0.225 9.000
(1.676) (2.022) (2.666) (5.034) (23.67) (2.339) (2.798) (4.347) (8.323) (21.57)
Primary school (1=yes)
-0.288 -8.352 -40.98 -74.96 -44.71 7.339 -14.53 -120.4 -302.7 -804.0
(32.95) (41.88) (59.51) (105.1) (272.5) (85.20) (93.77) (192.0) (331.5) (971.0)
Food program (1=yes)
-3.563 -50.17 -64.30 -104.1 -76.36 -35.76 -33.21 -70.75 -122.0 -403.2
(33.78) (39.43) (54.62) (94.57) (319.5) (52.93) (61.43) (98.86) (168.3) (438.9)
Distance to nearest bank
(km)
3.172 -2.694 -4.931 -9.132 -18.34 0.521 -1.897 -8.918 -11.23 -19.37
(6.004) (6.963) (9.128) (14.38) (53.73) (11.68) (13.93) (19.64) (30.60) (85.35)
Distance to nearest pucca
road (km)
-3.568 -1.807 0.234 -0.353 28.42 -1.982 -4.148 -28.39 -14.43 -43.82
(4.980) (6.857) (8.715) (15.73) (86.26) (14.88) (20.98) (30.00) (54.62) (184.3)
Distance to nearest
shop/market (km)
6.578 19.85 23.59 39.92 -1.465 -1.767 0.614 20.63 30.82 -132.9
(9.871) (12.23) (15.22) (25.85) (81.01) (32.61) (38.53) (52.70) (82.14) (211.4)
Electricity in village (1=yes)
5.922 63.58 61.83 120.4 327.0 106.8* 97.37* 128.7 88.32 268.8
(33.67) (42.16) (60.36) (108.9) (398.3) (59.54) (66.62) (104.1) (177.6) (454.5)
Price of rice
10.31 8.481 5.077 65.02 53.80 -22.62 -34.93 -18.80 -33.63 -34.11
(20.73) (24.87) (34.75) (69.67) (174.5) (21.12) (26.97) (41.09) (71.68) (173.8)
Price of wheat flour
17.86 30.24 36.01 29.45 84.26 -19.48 -30.77 -72.05 -91.22 -309.0
(20.62) (30.21) (37.63) (64.06) (193.5) (32.73) (35.91) (56.82) (80.19) (249.2)
Price of mustard oil
2.237 2.357 2.315 -7.563 -45.25* 5.145 6.263 3.899 9.770 20.72
(2.804) (3.438) (4.747) (8.273) (33.62) (4.155) (5.514) (8.559) (15.55) (38.23)
Price of hen’s eggs
-1.085 -6.016 -6.184 -13.03 -1.870 44.55 86.07 168.6 196.5 428.9
(31.10) (48.83) (63.71) (100.1) (252.4) (65.48) (79.33) (120.3) (191.9) (524.8)
Price of milk
7.812 6.157 11.82 17.95 16.26 -3.844 -1.270 -10.86 -5.542 -14.72
(6.939) (8.778) (12.58) (27.49) (67.20) (9.366) (9.639) (13.85) (24.45) (62.84)
Price of potatoes
0.315 -7.757 -6.752 14.74 16.96 -10.23 -20.84 -28.30 -40.10 -72.46
(12.10) (14.63) (23.58) (38.66) (99.08) (11.32) (14.61) (23.68) (38.19) (98.69)
Overall intercept
-135.1 56.02 63.64 4.320 1455.6 717.3 1131.0** 2030.6** 2774.9** 7685.6**
(270.2) (326.1) (459.5) (803.4) (2311.3) (481.7) (540.6) (793.9) (1324.2) (4064.0)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table B.6 Cross-section quantile regressions, household non-food expenditure, by
gender
1991-92 1998-99
Quantile 10% 30% Median 70% 90% 10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Female microcredit
borrowings
0.003 0.002 0.002 0.008 0.016 0.003* 0.005** 0.007** 0.013** 0.032**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.013) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.015)
Male microcredit
borrowings
0.003 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.026 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.006 -0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.015) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.009) (0.018)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head
-0.252 -4.398 4.625 26.42 150.2** 7.208 15.98 27.46 -0.435 9.754
(9.051) (10.03) (14.87) (29.29) (80.74) (7.393) (12.40) (25.02) (43.82) (133.4)
Age of HH head
-1.526** -3.802** -4.669** -4.346* -6.442 -4.249** -2.072* -3.494** -5.596** -14.33**
(0.918) (1.123) (1.541) (2.454) (5.730) (1.317) (1.612) (2.253) (3.942) (9.976)
Gender of HH head
25.18 -35.15 -46.31 -36.62 -192.8 81.04 -17.98 118.1 2.614 -805.9
(52.32) (49.95) (59.04) (109.0) (534.1) (63.30) (68.97) (120.1) (269.8) (990.1)
Highest education of men in
HH
16.15** 28.80** 29.96** 14.26 21.21 18.65** 32.89** 43.15** 88.68** 202.7**
(8.442) (9.143) (13.83) (22.62) (49.91) (7.516) (8.778) (18.06) (27.96) (95.49)
Highest education of women
in HH
22.51** 32.13** 50.78** 88.57** 60.68 29.24** 36.99** 70.98** 108.8** 324.8**
(5.926) (8.005) (14.10) (38.48) (62.73) (5.973) (9.471) (18.81) (41.26) (130.4)
Landholdings
0.224** 0.245** 0.588** 1.442* 2.281* 0.608** 0.785** 1.526** 1.871** 11.86
(0.119) (0.270) (0.719) (1.202) (1.510) (0.329) (0.415) (0.746) (1.340) (11.07)
HH economic dependency
ratio
-20.02** -22.68** -30.60** -44.28** -81.78 -28.97** -46.77** -61.63** -89.50** -16.17
(7.638) (9.268) (11.46) (17.00) (51.47) (9.366) (11.34) (18.01) (32.77) (98.08)
# of HH head relatives
owning land
3.958 5.927* 9.394 20.21 1.382 4.909 3.022 14.97 33.81 94.18
(4.295) (3.738) (6.701) (13.21) (27.53) (6.402) (8.874) (17.38) (25.67) (103.7)
# of HH head’s spouse
relatives owning land
0.219 0.605 -1.867 -2.467 16.07 7.827 13.86 6.511 18.71 8.101
(2.626) (3.865) (4.115) (7.143) (21.49) (5.794) (6.364) (9.687) (20.83) (52.41)
# of HH head relatives living
outside thana
2.195 1.035 -3.286 -6.075 -28.21 -11.51* -9.578 -15.22* -17.96 -39.95
(6.465) (5.524) (7.748) (14.06) (31.00) (6.726) (7.813) (9.742) (17.72) (51.23)
# of HH head’s spouse
relatives living outside thana
-2.459 -1.839 0.0405 -4.124 48.55 -1.080 2.483 1.884 -6.273 -9.354
(2.999) (3.611) (5.751) (10.62) (28.37) (4.171) (5.071) (7.592) (13.19) (31.91)
Loans from traditional
banks (1=yes)
144.1** 157.3* 261.8* 453.3* 1267.3 40.60 4.733 297.5 624.0 1776.2
(55.87) (81.39) (144.4) (306.3) (918.5) (62.83) (121.5) (285.1) (466.4) (2462.4)
Loans from informal sources
(1=yes)
26.78 35.64 67.60 406.1** 559.9 -51.57 54.10 8.962 -112.9 173.1
(51.58) (51.40) (93.94) (195.5) (370.4) (66.29) (95.97) (109.9) (226.4) (2428.6)
Loans from relatives (1=yes)
64.39 66.26 84.27 125.8 362.1 81.51 176.9* 255.2** 600.3** 2253.6**
(49.65) (67.67) (97.97) (176.2) (661.8) (54.08) (82.77) (134.0) (240.5) (762.5)
Eligibility of HH (1=yes)
-94.39** -101.0 -58.96 -144.3 -213.7 -100.8* -137.3** -366.1** -605.2** -881.0
(47.10) (49.62) (94.52) (192.5) (410.0) (61.24) (85.15) (163.8) (275.9) (947.2)
Village covariates
Average male wage
-1.641 -0.124 -0.299 0.839 20.56 0.702 0.781 0.675 2.537 -8.175
(1.945) (2.466) (3.510) (6.642) (33.56) (2.113) (2.584) (3.806) (5.893) (17.22)
Average female wage
1.961 1.348 4.020* 3.892 17.38 0.779 -0.812 -0.594 -0.0578 7.618
(1.693) (2.029) (2.675) (5.051) (23.86) (2.354) (2.829) (4.396) (8.272) (21.36)
Primary school (1=yes)
-3.349 -8.380 -42.06 -71.50 -47.98 8.395 -14.91 -114.8 -277.0 -751.7
(33.32) (41.96) (59.48) (105.6) (274.2) (86.22) (93.98) (193.5) (331.7) (985.6)
Food program (1=yes)
-2.061 -46.29 -62.99 -107.6 -63.85 -30.47 -34.51 -62.52 -115.1 -413.7
(33.97) (39.52) (55.13) (95.85) (320.9) (52.64) (61.30) (99.67) (169.0) (444.9)
Distance to nearest bank
(km)
2.964 -1.840 -5.277 -7.890 -24.03 3.101 -0.971 -8.472 -7.564 -25.24
(6.062) (6.973) (9.114) (14.46) (53.73) (11.71) (13.96) (19.68) (31.19) (85.82)
Distance to nearest pucca
road (km)
-3.336 -1.953 0.428 -1.136 29.15 -3.387 -6.189 -25.19 -16.01 -40.61
(5.036) (6.884) (8.745) (15.76) (86.10) (14.79) (21.45) (31.30) (55.30) (179.0)
Distance to nearest
shop/market (km)
6.758 18.61 22.30 39.00 2.766 -3.226 4.711 18.21 28.06 -123.2
(9.937) (12.28) (15.34) (26.04) (81.23) (32.57) (38.83) (53.13) (81.04) (207.9)
Electricity in village (1=yes)
6.298 63.08 64.16 119.9 302.6 99.58 94.79* 124.4 83.77 244.3
(33.60) (42.36) (60.16) (109.2) (399.4) (59.33) (67.11) (105.0) (177.2) (453.7)
Price of rice
9.490 7.666 3.847 65.22 39.42 -18.62 -30.71 -21.88 -32.17 -57.25
(21.02) (24.98) (34.52) (69.36) (175.3) (21.45) (27.17) (41.84) (72.62) (175.9)
Price of wheat flour
16.99 31.15 32.13 30.17 66.73 -15.15 -31.36 -69.83 -89.42 -293.6
(20.68) (30.24) (37.80) (64.38) (192.5) (32.80) (36.19) (57.58) (80.52) (249.2)
Price of mustard oil
2.314 2.552 2.407 -7.607 -42.94* 5.385 6.089 5.037 10.48 19.16
(2.808) (3.436) (4.742) (8.318) (33.67) (4.175) (5.528) (8.577) (15.60) (38.05)
Price of hen’s eggs
-0.886 -5.861 -5.587 -17.80 -5.522 55.96 89.67 166.8 209.6 507.7
(31.58) (48.87) (63.99) (99.90) (250.7) (65.51) (79.46) (121.0) (192.8) (522.5)
Price of milk
7.968 5.521 13.24 18.15 22.27 -4.612 -1.259 -9.485 -8.235 -19.52
(7.086) (8.911) (12.70) (27.68) (68.11) (9.364) (9.676) (13.93) (24.61) (61.07)
Price of potatoes
1.147 -7.627 -4.860 14.77 3.102 -8.940 -19.95 -30.64 -39.69 -83.07
(12.15) (14.67) (23.70) (39.28) (100.5) (11.56) (14.73) (23.94) (38.45) (99.57)
Overall intercept -122.4 39.94 82.16 26.21 1524.0 561.9 1057.5** 1942.0** 2660.5** 7711.2**
(271.3) (325.8) (459.5) (807.1) (2331.3) (485.9) (538.5) (803.4) (1325.0) (4068.9)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table C.1 Cross-section quantile regressions with village quantile effects, household
total expenditure
1991-92 1998-99
Quantile 10% 30% Median 70% 90% 10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Household microcredit
borrowings
0.007 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.008 -0.000 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.026
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.012) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.014)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head
4.113 -15.18 32.50 91.84** 251.7** 38.47 34.92 77.99** 133.4** 200.4**
(36.04) (27.79) (33.03) (44.32) (66.51) (31.32) (26.83) (32.87) (49.17) (107.2)
Age of HH head
-10.13** -12.13** -13.33** -8.713** -11.28* 5.109 -3.648 -2.342 -10.66 -11.71
(3.832) (3.800) (4.171) (4.613) (7.452) (4.052) (4.215) (5.340) (7.003) (11.31)
Gender of HH head
44.18 155.0 174.3 -126.5 -582.5 400.2 -90.14 -149.9 -292.2 -946.3
(229.2) (170.9) (225.1) (233.4) (836.4) (229.0) (249.3) (305.4) (438.3) (744.8)
Highest education of men in
HH
20.68 75.42** 53.28* 34.08 -25.96 41.48** 73.36** 67.29** 85.98** 67.50*
(34.42) (26.27) (25.99) (34.08) (56.20) (24.04) (17.95) (21.75) (29.12) (62.81)
Highest education of women
in HH
55.34** 60.83** 75.37** 68.55** 41.76 34.67 62.44** 89.81** 135.3** 241.0**
(22.86) (18.10) (23.05) (29.38) (48.76) (23.67) (21.82) (29.11) (42.10) (97.75)
Landholdings
1.005** 1.104** 1.201** 2.776** 3.289** 2.133** 1.990** 1.651** 2.195** 2.909
(0.467) (0.596) (1.013) (1.207) (1.752) (0.580) (0.717) (0.973) (1.765) (6.513)
HH economic dependency
ratio
-126.1** -172.8** -210.5** -242.5** -346.3** -87.62** -159.9** -208.5** -253.9** -269.9**
(32.84) (27.70) (22.46) (36.47) (56.77) (31.02) (31.98) (38.73) (48.62) (97.56)
# of HH head relatives
owning land
29.50** 21.52* 9.353 -4.979 -2.245 59.15** 63.76** 90.78** 110.7** 109.0
(11.72) (11.24) (15.80) (22.38) (35.58) (28.09) (25.93) (32.49) (33.48) (77.40)
# of HH head’s spouse
relatives owning land
-3.090 1.199 -9.217 22.04 29.63 31.05** 27.39* 23.85 24.36 41.71
(8.864) (9.950) (13.48) (16.97) (25.43) (16.64) (15.47) (21.02) (28.35) (49.41)
# of HH head relatives living
outside thana
6.321 -16.87 -6.564 -7.691 53.84 -14.34 -29.19 -32.78 -22.39 -60.56
(18.58) (16.04) (17.65) (33.54) (58.23) (24.28) (26.42) (26.76) (37.06) (57.51)
# of HH head’s spouse
relatives living outside thana
10.04 -1.823 12.66 10.19 -12.40 7.160 -4.059 1.688 -12.98 -30.03
(9.333) (12.20) (15.58) (19.97) (23.55) (12.32) (13.47) (17.18) (20.32) (34.65)
Loans from traditional
banks (1=yes)
354.4 506.8** 546.4** 985.7** 1364.9* 448.9** 493.4* 544.7* 1048.5** 2864.6**
(218.1) (156.0) (195.1) (466.4) (681.2) (182.7) (257.8) (418.6) (579.1) (1706.9)
Loans from informal sources
(1=yes)
-48.46 85.07 150.0 216.3 421.4 115.9 -13.24 -67.54 23.89 386.5
(165.8) (142.5) (183.7) (310.8) (436.8) (225.6) (198.2) (259.9) (453.4) (1347.3)
Loans from relatives (1=yes)
173.9 -63.00 -41.09 -4.762 -37.95 -3.367 62.34 25.04 398.0 543.7
(148.1) (150.7) (164.4) (261.1) (384.5) (174.7) (149.8) (247.0) (369.7) (619.0)
Eligibility of HH (1=yes)
-557.6** -320.4** -381.0 -138.1 81.83 -628.7** -891.5** -774.2** -942.6** -725.2
(119.0) (131.0) (205.9) (239.0) (386.1) (203.8) (211.9) (265.6) (366.2) (766.3)
Overall intercept
3410.6** 3762.6** 4444.2** 4319.6** 5302.0** 3331.4** 6430.1** 7567.1** 9073.1** 11055.0**
(407.7) (374.9) (485.8) (523.3) (1146.2) (1020.7) (1120.0) (1445.8) (1268.6) (1964.1)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table C.2 Cross-section quantile regressions with village quantile effects, household
total expenditure, by gender
1991-92 1998-99
Quantile 10% 30% Median 70% 90% 10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Female microcredit
borrowings
0.007 0.011 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.007 0.007 0.011 0.031*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.016) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.014)
Male microcredit
borrowings
0.006 0.007 0.010 0.018 0.016 -0.017 -0.010 -0.005 -0.030 -0.003
(0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.017) (0.016) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.021) (0.035)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head
1.944 -14.76 32.56 90.14** 262.7** 31.11 37.46 79.93** 143.0** 221.7**
(35.98) (28.08) (33.04) (44.56) (66.65) (31.47) (26.52) (33.60) (48.51) (106.0)
Age of HH head
-10.07** -12.00** -12.45** -8.907** -11.25* 4.779 -3.587 -3.191 -10.33 -11.87
(3.834) (3.785) (4.178) (4.635) (7.538) (4.169) (4.286) (5.341) (6.916) (11.21)
Gender of HH head
41.25 182.1 157.7 -141.7 -595.8 413.9 -111.3 -119.9 -218.3 -980.7
(229.1) (171.4) (225.7) (229.4) (836.5) (224.0) (256.3) (317.4) (441.0) (757.0)
Highest education of men in
HH
22.57 75.31** 54.44* 35.04 -37.47 46.75** 71.92** 66.03** 85.33** 77.99*
(34.40) (26.19) (25.89) (34.44) (56.53) (24.12) (17.86) (21.95) (29.51) (64.86)
Highest education of women
in HH
56.64** 60.52** 76.87** 70.95** 47.76 31.55 62.08** 91.77** 128.8** 235.6**
(22.91) (17.92) (23.14) (29.42) (49.07) (23.31) (22.38) (29.05) (42.32) (98.43)
Landholdings
1.026** 1.096** 1.143** 2.766** 3.413** 2.074** 1.998** 1.768** 2.363** 3.407
(0.466) (0.599) (1.013) (1.199) (1.755) (0.595) (0.794) (1.106) (1.737) (6.536)
HH economic dependency
ratio
-124.8** -172.1** -206.0** -239.2** -348.7** -89.38** -158.9** -210.0** -258.9** -311.8**
(33.24) (27.86) (22.19) (37.04) (58.19) (31.26) (32.32) (39.07) (49.42) (93.89)
# of HH head relatives
owning land
29.09** 21.06** 10.16 -6.957 -7.004 66.06** 67.90** 100.9** 105.2** 101.9
(11.94) (11.25) (15.74) (22.37) (35.28) (27.03) (26.42) (34.30) (34.41) (81.05)
# of HH head’s spouse
relatives owning land
-3.222 1.081 -8.090 21.25 29.07 33.85** 25.53 16.10 23.27 54.98
(8.954) (9.927) (13.32) (16.98) (25.28) (16.13) (16.06) (22.89) (28.29) (51.10)
# of HH head relatives living
outside thana
4.584 -15.88 -8.367 -6.845 55.58 -18.79 -32.77 -39.73 -22.55 -22.29
(18.64) (16.14) (17.73) (33.07) (57.94) (23.14) (26.79) (27.02) (36.97) (59.49)
# of HH head’s spouse
relatives living outside thana
9.221 -1.504 11.15 11.40 -7.135 9.019 -5.467 1.645 -6.284 -27.08
(9.595) (12.23) (15.51) (19.91) (23.24) (12.11) (13.97) (17.27) (20.40) (35.08)
Loans from traditional
banks (1=yes)
359.6 500.0** 544.1** 957.7** 1363.9** 509.3** 489.7* 551.2* 1063.7** 2641.2**
(218.2) (156.7) (196.2) (466.3) (687.4) (182.1) (277.4) (426.3) (562.2) (1698.2)
Loans from informal sources
(1=yes)
-49.86 91.25 126.3 198.7 474.6 134.3 -24.81 -36.47 68.17 18.91
(165.7) (142.9) (182.5) (310.0) (439.0) (233.5) (204.1) (260.7) (459.9) (1334.9)
Loans from relatives (1=yes)
166.1 -65.64 -58.64 1.806 -18.70 -11.34 73.09 0.252 336.6 371.5
(149.7) (151.5) (163.1) (260.2) (386.0) (177.2) (149.8) (248.9) (367.1) (632.0)
Eligibility of HH (1=yes)
-554.7** -322.1** -356.5 -168.4 97.10 -693.8** -889.3** -787.5** -902.1** -671.6
(118.4) (131.8) (204.5) (240.5) (391.2) (204.6) (214.8) (266.2) (368.8) (760.5)
Overall intercept
3404.6** 3733.2** 4390.3** 4344.7** 5320.7** 3399.5** 6473.3** 7583.1** 8950.2** 11086.7**
(407.4) (375.9) (485.4) (522.3) (1156.5) (1025.1) (1140.2) (1457.6) (1281.9) (2005.9)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table C.3 Cross-section quantile regressions with village quantile effects, household
food expenditure
1991-92 1998-99
Quantile 10% 30% Median 70% 90% 10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Household microcredit
borrowings
0.003 0.008* 0.004 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.005
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head
5.754 15.74 18.94 29.79* 67.87** 24.76 38.88 34.33** 64.06** 100.1**
(21.47) (19.38) (17.96) (17.78) (26.13) (18.40) (19.26) (15.19) (19.70) (34.20)
Age of HH head
-7.128* -5.374* -7.301** -4.126* -6.783 4.757* 1.302 5.156 2.117 2.170
(2.616) (2.699) (2.431) (2.412) (3.926) (2.352) (2.292) (3.174) (3.341) (5.163)
Gender of HH head
309.5* 185.8* 86.11 58.23 -340.6 188.3 -181.3 -198.6** -308.7 -530.4**
(173.5) (128.5) (156.3) (142.2) (316.0) (190.1) (147.3) (132.8) (220.8) (345.4)
Highest education of men in
HH
10.21 13.40 30.08* 28.65 14.04 17.78 22.15** 21.91** 24.54* 18.15
(20.69) (18.59) (16.17) (15.37) (21.54) (16.65) (11.84) (11.40) (12.63) (19.65)
Highest education of women
in HH
1.440 5.396 14.16 -0.512 -11.89 1.027 13.67 26.70** 25.48 38.13
(16.43) (14.88) (13.18) (15.31) (20.43) (15.21) (14.61) (13.04) (16.88) (28.24)
Landholdings
0.269** 0.800** 0.745** 0.654** 0.968** 0.422** 1.347** 1.396 1.434 1.366
(0.302) (0.261) (0.274) (0.415) (0.517) (0.689) (0.703) (0.716) (0.771) (0.880)
HH economic dependency
ratio
-98.38** -125.5** -143.3** -184.2** -202.8** -63.83** -96.39** -103.2** -109.4** -190.0**
(25.23) (20.76) (15.12) (19.10) (29.32) (18.57) (21.85) (24.36) (30.98) (42.07)
# of HH head relatives
owning land
22.30** 19.77* 8.726 8.851 -4.406 31.57** 26.06* 36.28** 36.88** 52.97
(10.24) (9.729) (9.740) (11.19) (17.42) (19.01) (17.11) (13.43) (15.19) (27.64)
# of HH head’s spouse
relatives owning land
-0.829 6.527 5.113 3.873 16.13 24.90* 23.28** 20.68* 24.37* 46.23**
(7.089) (6.399) (8.624) (10.94) (13.59) (11.70) (9.901) (10.41) (13.29) (22.10)
# of HH head relatives living
outside thana
-11.76 -26.24* -11.76 -7.020 -2.557 -16.03 -5.331 6.403 -3.291 20.80
(14.86) (12.67) (12.70) (16.24) (33.12) (16.46) (13.52) (14.49) (19.27) (30.23)
# of HH head’s spouse
relatives living outside thana
9.664 3.864 1.338 4.255 -10.26 3.352 7.744 -2.098 -6.492 -22.88
(6.292) (7.574) (9.859) (9.782) (13.01) (8.637) (8.702) (8.234) (10.85) (13.67)
Loans from traditional
banks (1=yes)
164.7 251.6* 297.9** 227.6** 214.2 153.7 229.9** 345.8** 237.3 106.7
(141.3) (134.0) (116.3) (120.8) (186.4) (141.8) (123.4) (145.4) (140.7) (387.7)
Loans from informal sources
(1=yes)
-52.16 18.36 5.855 27.73 -89.65 112.1 43.18 -96.90 -176.4 99.88
(130.1) (113.6) (103.2) (100.1) (153.2) (179.6) (141.2) (115.4) (157.5) (255.7)
Loans from relatives (1=yes)
77.55 -26.81 -106.9 54.20 -3.277 -39.97 -20.85 -18.05 -29.68 113.1
(109.8) (113.5) (122.3) (168.8) (156.2) (123.2) (88.98) (91.13) (135.4) (178.8)
Eligibility of HH (1=yes)
-437.7** -248.9** -145.0 -123.6 31.77 -362.2** -424.8** -413.3** -348.3** -292.0
(94.97) (88.42) (93.72) (110.8) (167.1) (130.3) (146.0) (109.1) (171.8) (304.0)
Overall intercept
2784.2** 3027.6** 3303.9** 3567.7** 4620.2** 2375.2** 3841.4** 4546.6** 5440.0** 7405.1**
(287.3) (280.0) (250.8) (268.2) (542.1) (727.0) (573.7) (785.8) (679.9) (1102.9)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table C.4 Cross-section quantile regressions with village quantile effects, household
food expenditure, by gender
1991-92 1998-99
Quantile 10% 30% Median 70% 90% 10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Female microcredit
borrowings
0.004 0.005 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.000 0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.006
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Male microcredit
borrowings
0.000 0.012** 0.007** 0.005 0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.008 -0.013 -0.003
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.011)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head
7.647 16.81 18.41 30.69* 66.89** 25.05 39.53 38.85** 68.04** 108.7**
(21.54) (19.53) (17.78) (17.70) (26.55) (18.14) (19.20) (14.76) (19.28) (34.18)
Age of HH head
-6.995* -5.216* -6.699** -3.926* -6.658 5.141* 0.894 5.304 1.638 3.247
(2.609) (2.762) (2.473) (2.421) (3.905) (2.377) (2.356) (3.229) (3.265) (5.123)
Gender of HH head
259.2* 187.8* 97.21 54.04 -328.0 196.8 -172.3 -183.8** -289.4 -540.9**
(174.9) (129.1) (157.9) (142.9) (315.9) (192.3) (147.1) (133.3) (220.0) (344.4)
Highest education of men in
HH
8.524 13.35 28.56* 26.80 14.08 17.90 22.73** 20.48** 23.22** 18.48
(20.59) (18.70) (16.24) (15.34) (21.43) (16.26) (11.75) (10.93) (12.37) (19.54)
Highest education of women
in HH
2.234 4.732 14.44 0.988 -8.472 -1.088 13.56 25.78** 25.42 35.58
(16.37) (14.83) (13.26) (15.14) (20.73) (15.32) (14.90) (12.90) (17.10) (28.24)
Landholdings
0.268** 0.801** 0.746** 0.656** 0.991** 0.403** 1.265** 1.693 1.448 1.115
(0.304) (0.260) (0.274) (0.412) (0.519) (0.698) (0.707) (0.728) (0.756) (0.857)
HH economic dependency
ratio
-97.68** -125.0** -140.2** -185.6** -205.2** -64.42** -100.1** -102.4** -122.0** -190.5**
(25.90) (20.66) (15.01) (19.09) (30.34) (19.11) (21.91) (24.75) (30.80) (41.78)
# of HH head relatives
owning land
19.88** 19.26* 9.666 8.849 -4.965 35.53** 25.77* 38.53** 41.60** 48.96*
(10.31) (9.753) (9.835) (11.12) (17.38) (18.54) (17.57) (13.74) (15.07) (27.70)
# of HH head’s spouse
relatives owning land
-1.044 6.206 6.209 3.984 15.15 25.86* 23.31** 15.76* 22.02* 52.56**
(7.087) (6.435) (8.710) (10.99) (13.62) (11.56) (9.577) (10.64) (12.88) (22.28)
# of HH head relatives living
outside thana
-14.66 -26.43* -14.09 -6.987 -2.294 -19.08 -2.165 7.901 -9.899 20.16
(14.93) (12.64) (12.81) (16.32) (33.13) (16.19) (13.75) (14.24) (19.20) (30.33)
# of HH head’s spouse
relatives living outside thana
9.819 2.411 2.355 5.156 -9.135 4.265 6.297 -0.351 -6.204 -24.31
(6.494) (7.635) (9.982) (9.802) (13.02) (8.590) (8.611) (8.046) (10.57) (13.97)
Loans from traditional
banks (1=yes)
163.5 246.9* 294.1** 237.9** 210.3 157.0 237.1** 337.4** 230.9 110.6
(141.6) (132.2) (119.7) (120.5) (188.0) (143.3) (123.7) (146.1) (140.6) (381.5)
Loans from informal sources
(1=yes)
-53.21 16.97 -4.067 30.41 -77.69 96.82 54.51 -98.56 -166.2 116.4
(130.1) (113.9) (103.4) (100.4) (153.8) (182.7) (141.8) (117.9) (157.1) (254.1)
Loans from relatives (1=yes)
87.77 0.0780 -92.01 64.31 -7.240 -30.63 -13.35 -8.865 -19.89 137.2
(110.6) (113.2) (122.4) (167.8) (156.6) (122.1) (89.02) (91.52) (135.6) (179.6)
Eligibility of HH (1=yes)
-451.8** -247.5** -131.1 -123.1 30.34 -371.5** -438.8** -413.9** -343.1** -285.6
(94.90) (87.86) (93.92) (111.5) (168.2) (129.4) (147.6) (110.5) (171.4) (302.3)
Overall intercept
2863.4** 3025.2** 3228.8** 3599.0** 4609.5** 2357.5** 3861.0** 4511.6** 5458.7** 7378.4**
(286.4) (279.5) (250.0) (272.8) (541.3) (721.9) (590.6) (800.1) (676.2) (1108.2)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
224 Appendix C Cross-section quantile regression estimates, village quantile effects
Table C.5 Cross-section quantile regressions with village quantile effects, household
non-food expenditure
1991-92 1998-99
Quantile 10% 30% Median 70% 90% 10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Household microcredit
borrowings
-0.000 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.018** 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.022*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.009) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.010)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head
-3.268 2.916 11.63 31.11* 83.87* -0.103 7.603 5.335 43.26 89.08
(7.484) (9.716) (16.19) (22.66) (47.33) (6.725) (10.84) (21.62) (34.32) (68.11)
Age of HH head
-1.649** -3.787** -3.681** -5.245** -4.141 -2.806* -2.623* -4.661** -3.223 -12.40*
(0.965) (0.945) (1.447) (2.279) (4.819) (1.331) (1.468) (1.998) (3.654) (7.576)
Gender of HH head
11.54 3.132 -21.10 -70.62 -104.2 149.9* 2.002 3.798 65.46 -300.4
(40.82) (46.99) (58.08) (103.4) (387.7) (62.71) (83.72) (122.6) (240.9) (369.7)
Highest education of men in
HH
20.00** 23.82** 23.70* 26.53 5.405 22.96** 33.73** 44.71** 61.58** 72.76**
(8.002) (8.035) (13.79) (18.63) (36.95) (5.467) (8.484) (13.09) (25.38) (40.55)
Highest education of women
in HH
22.33** 30.31** 54.16** 61.12** 155.1** 22.15** 25.07** 53.31** 69.13** 187.9**
(5.648) (7.869) (13.02) (22.57) (47.73) (4.962) (8.957) (15.73) (31.79) (60.16)
Landholdings
0.232** 0.246** 0.473** 1.921** 2.516** 0.796** 0.778** 1.479* 1.252* 1.717
(0.127) (0.293) (0.687) (1.120) (1.164) (0.292) (0.446) (0.639) (1.393) (5.284)
HH economic dependency
ratio
-34.17** -40.80** -41.32** -47.45** -127.6** -33.13** -47.56** -63.17** -64.98** -125.8*
(9.776) (8.385) (12.27) (17.00) (31.93) (7.986) (10.44) (15.07) (27.96) (59.31)
# of HH head relatives
owning land
2.799 6.215** 7.120 4.442 -2.458 16.79** 17.28** 33.31** 57.62** 65.85*
(3.638) (3.387) (5.245) (10.17) (20.80) (6.295) (8.629) (17.55) (23.15) (53.95)
# of HH head’s spouse
relatives owning land
1.971 -2.462 -4.884 -1.050 8.583 8.903 11.66 6.129 -2.939 -18.80
(2.688) (3.140) (4.582) (7.489) (15.61) (6.053) (6.125) (8.869) (16.35) (28.92)
# of HH head relatives living
outside thana
1.007 -2.262 -0.716 -1.922 7.939 -8.265 -9.703 -10.38* -28.26 -52.45
(6.469) (5.406) (8.035) (13.90) (26.59) (6.381) (9.167) (9.759) (16.27) (40.91)
# of HH head’s spouse
relatives living outside thana
-1.714 0.771 0.569 7.084 10.29 2.238 -1.188 -0.246 2.437 19.93
(3.226) (3.434) (5.783) (11.07) (17.73) (3.403) (4.913) (6.939) (10.80) (25.03)
Loans from traditional
banks (1=yes)
138.8** 123.3** 254.2** 449.3** 912.6** 152.2** 77.10 214.1 689.2* 3343.8**
(53.61) (80.69) (149.7) (299.2) (670.1) (51.47) (101.9) (272.8) (424.1) (2033.3)
Loans from informal sources
(1=yes)
48.81 88.53** 76.07* 200.1 451.8* -54.72 -36.34 106.8 70.64 98.99
(47.09) (42.34) (74.21) (156.0) (265.0) (59.57) (98.06) (125.1) (219.4) (1408.5)
Loans from relatives (1=yes)
41.88 4.438 -2.721 -68.98 25.46 19.09 105.5 74.26 232.0 542.1
(45.45) (54.49) (82.48) (130.8) (208.2) (54.73) (67.57) (111.6) (224.1) (389.3)
Eligibility of HH (1=yes)
-102.3** -102.6* -104.6 54.04 177.9 -146.2** -208.9** -337.9** -420.1** -296.5
(42.29) (45.96) (93.90) (158.8) (204.4) (64.17) (86.60) (145.4) (252.9) (521.4)
Overall intercept
436.4** 609.8** 741.2** 517.4** 868.1** 1180.9** 1463.8** 2467.5** 3739.9** 3781.7**
(109.4) (106.6) (178.7) (252.7) (563.9) (255.7) (240.2) (463.6) (1012.2) (1614.8)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table C.6 Cross-section quantile regressions with village quantile effects, household
non-food expenditure, by gender
1991-92 1998-99
Quantile 10% 30% Median 70% 90% 10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Female microcredit
borrowings
-0.000 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.003* 0.005** 0.008 0.030**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.013) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.011)
Male microcredit
borrowings
0.001 0.001 0.002 0.010 0.021* 0.001 0.001 -0.007 -0.008 -0.024
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.011) (0.023)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head
-3.098 2.682 12.32 32.87* 92.33* -0.201 5.870 4.416 50.26 107.2
(7.427) (9.747) (16.43) (22.69) (47.35) (6.783) (11.12) (21.72) (33.75) (67.47)
Age of HH head
-1.636** -3.855** -3.546** -4.930** -3.759 -2.761* -2.700* -4.573** -3.246 -15.70*
(0.955) (0.945) (1.429) (2.295) (4.836) (1.324) (1.506) (2.033) (3.624) (7.623)
Gender of HH head
12.31 3.153 -26.39 -71.54 -220.7 150.9* 1.105 13.76 49.58 -375.8
(40.63) (46.78) (57.97) (103.2) (382.6) (64.46) (86.72) (127.7) (240.0) (377.9)
Highest education of men in
HH
19.78** 24.30** 23.01 25.15 -2.135 22.60** 34.91** 42.85** 59.76** 73.98**
(7.994) (8.138) (13.89) (18.77) (36.94) (5.500) (8.698) (12.97) (24.51) (42.83)
Highest education of women
in HH
22.44** 30.13** 52.71** 60.14** 153.5** 22.32** 25.46** 56.73** 72.56** 179.3**
(5.675) (7.897) (12.99) (22.66) (47.60) (4.974) (9.295) (15.43) (31.49) (60.49)
Landholdings
0.228** 0.246** 0.488** 1.915** 2.484** 0.792** 0.742** 1.536* 1.242* 1.972
(0.127) (0.294) (0.688) (1.117) (1.166) (0.293) (0.466) (0.629) (1.396) (5.306)
HH economic dependency
ratio
-34.15** -40.65** -41.59** -48.10** -114.7** -32.74** -46.19** -67.77** -67.24** -135.3*
(10.18) (8.438) (12.38) (17.01) (31.82) (8.003) (10.50) (14.83) (28.13) (59.13)
# of HH head relatives
owning land
2.781 6.023** 7.332 5.052 -4.435 16.73** 15.82** 37.08** 52.87** 76.94*
(3.624) (3.373) (5.235) (10.13) (20.47) (6.329) (8.786) (18.42) (22.98) (55.20)
# of HH head’s spouse
relatives owning land
1.804 -2.091 -5.212 -0.946 9.561 9.861 12.20 1.046 1.659 -8.036
(2.707) (3.201) (4.596) (7.511) (15.44) (6.026) (6.393) (8.983) (15.59) (30.06)
# of HH head relatives living
outside thana
0.960 -2.554 -0.798 -2.654 5.849 -8.538 -8.809 -12.86* -25.34 -53.48
(6.432) (5.477) (8.050) (13.65) (26.63) (6.408) (9.392) (10.32) (16.35) (39.95)
# of HH head’s spouse
relatives living outside thana
-1.619 0.862 1.344 6.798 6.281 2.219 -1.405 3.181 2.945 28.16
(3.242) (3.447) (5.797) (10.94) (17.37) (3.461) (5.081) (7.043) (10.33) (24.90)
Loans from traditional
banks (1=yes)
140.0** 124.8** 254.2** 444.6** 910.9** 150.9** 81.00 152.4 736.0 3123.8**
(53.90) (80.34) (150.9) (299.5) (667.1) (52.26) (104.8) (273.4) (432.8) (2027.7)
Loans from informal sources
(1=yes)
49.60 87.17** 70.77* 201.8 415.9* -57.81 -30.96 111.9 77.73 223.2
(47.05) (42.79) (74.48) (155.0) (262.5) (60.69) (98.04) (119.9) (224.2) (1408.4)
Loans from relatives (1=yes)
42.40 6.200 2.118 -76.28 48.61 16.15 103.6 78.71 224.4 421.5
(45.54) (54.78) (82.26) (131.8) (208.6) (55.40) (68.37) (108.2) (228.8) (390.6)
Eligibility of HH (1=yes)
-104.3** -103.1* -102.8 54.39 188.6 -145.6** -205.7** -353.0** -423.7** -251.8
(42.58) (45.98) (93.80) (160.1) (209.1) (63.94) (87.69) (141.7) (252.9) (506.5)
Overall intercept
434.1** 611.2** 741.3** 516.9** 976.0** 1175.7** 1472.3** 2461.2** 3628.3** 4090.0**
(109.9) (106.6) (179.6) (254.8) (558.3) (256.4) (241.4) (468.0) (996.7) (1642.7)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table D.1 Cross-section quantile regressions with village penalised fixed effects,
household total expenditure
1991-92 1998-99
Quantile 10% 30% Median 70% 90% 10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Household microcredit
borrowings
0.009 0.008* 0.009 0.013** 0.006 0.009** 0.011** 0.017** 0.022** 0.052**
(0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.016)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head
-34.84 -31.56* -1.629 75.91 118.1 11.00 39.00* 32.89** 72.63* 85.56
(25.87) (17.54) (23.58) (40.29) (72.15) (16.22) (22.56) (22.51) (46.04) (104.7)
Age of HH head
-5.811** -11.05** -11.23** -11.97** -19.48** 0.784 0.880 -3.167 -7.593 -15.86
(3.648) (2.719) (3.152) (4.385) (7.092) (2.971) (3.404) (4.431) (5.854) (9.259)
Gender of HH head
243.4 70.26 -33.00 -123.6 -453.3 116.0 -59.09 -295.5 -551.1* -1748.4*
(145.9) (185.6) (153.9) (213.5) (751.4) (143.1) (186.3) (198.6) (391.5) (1197.2)
Highest education of men in
HH
78.93** 77.73** 62.01** 42.10* 75.41* 56.52** 60.80** 82.58** 91.39** 203.4**
(23.99) (15.62) (19.04) (34.07) (61.22) (14.40) (18.80) (16.90) (34.16) (70.84)
Highest education of women
in HH
15.96 66.76** 73.55** 75.34** 134.7* 28.37** 85.23** 102.7** 154.0** 362.3**
(19.21) (15.96) (18.55) (34.85) (59.39) (18.27) (19.75) (20.71) (39.32) (100.0)
Landholdings
0.966** 1.026** 1.724** 2.876** 2.294** 2.220** 2.148** 2.337** 3.742** 9.477*
(0.388) (0.503) (1.006) (1.135) (1.698) (0.826) (0.507) (0.920) (1.653) (8.935)
HH economic dependency
ratio
-98.18** -124.9** -153.8** -205.5** -296.9** -103.7** -164.9** -176.5** -218.8** -323.7**
(23.30) (18.57) (24.21) (28.39) (39.19) (21.72) (23.27) (24.72) (39.19) (82.21)
# of HH head relatives
owning land
7.600 6.924 3.988 -1.620 -19.27 12.10 17.30 18.28 66.55* 69.49
(8.748) (9.838) (14.69) (21.86) (27.04) (17.07) (16.89) (23.66) (32.80) (99.60)
# of HH head’s spouse
relatives owning land
-3.745 -9.025 -7.270 -5.913 18.06 24.21** 20.06 19.03 12.05 34.65
(9.105) (7.751) (10.68) (14.00) (22.22) (11.91) (13.42) (16.77) (23.65) (52.08)
# of HH head relatives living
outside thana
6.588 19.65 0.269 0.467 40.41 15.91 3.027 18.71 -2.395 48.51
(17.43) (13.73) (13.16) (23.36) (61.55) (13.73) (15.74) (20.05) (26.06) (48.18)
# of HH head’s spouse
relatives living outside thana
-2.278 5.499 3.547 10.85 -1.336 -9.439 9.542 -5.079 5.044 21.34
(9.354) (6.589) (9.955) (14.66) (29.97) (12.19) (9.542) (12.42) (15.89) (36.59)
Loans from traditional
banks (1=yes)
331.6** 445.1** 536.1** 818.5** 2038.4** 102.4 381.9 327.4 686.9 1270.7
(158.1) (170.6) (196.3) (357.8) (918.0) (235.6) (218.5) (197.8) (552.9) (763.4)
Loans from informal sources
(1=yes)
123.9 286.2** 391.8* 541.8** 1340.9** 360.7** 216.7** 16.53 -73.81 -309.9
(114.2) (102.6) (215.6) (254.3) (359.8) (116.2) (109.4) (178.5) (276.4) (632.1)
Loans from relatives (1=yes)
301.6** 55.28 120.6 339.5 256.2 99.21 262.9** 568.4** 808.5** 1480.9**
(96.56) (122.7) (164.6) (217.3) (366.9) (126.0) (121.6) (178.1) (273.2) (639.2)
Eligibility of HH (1=yes)
-395.0** -354.6** -445.7** -437.2* -1259.3** -285.0* -581.4** -817.2** -1120.7** -842.8*
(146.1) (133.0) (189.0) (307.4) (770.2) (194.1) (205.9) (248.0) (446.4) (986.7)
Overall intercept
2853.7** 3710.5** 4349.5** 4993.7** 7414.2** 2485.7** 3503.9** 4603.7** 5974.7** 7986.1**
(294.0) (263.9) (305.9) (437.8) (1185.2) (284.7) (298.5) (427.5) (675.4) (1514.9)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table D.2 Cross-section quantile regressions with village penalised fixed effects,
household total expenditure, by gender
1991-92 1998-99
Quantile 10% 30% Median 70% 90% 10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Female microcredit
borrowings
0.016** 0.009** 0.010 0.011* 0.006 0.010** 0.014** 0.020** 0.027** 0.056**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.016)
Male microcredit
borrowings
0.004 0.003 0.010 0.023 0.020 0.003 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.003
(0.010) (0.008) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.020)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head
-42.47 -33.61 -3.175 75.25 111.2 10.95 38.04* 30.89* 75.01* 53.56
(24.53) (17.72) (23.44) (39.37) (71.21) (16.29) (22.21) (21.79) (47.22) (101.9)
Age of HH head
-6.808** -11.25** -11.39** -11.28** -19.34** 0.535 0.767 -2.202 -7.885 -17.70
(3.481) (2.738) (3.265) (4.332) (7.164) (2.880) (3.364) (4.474) (5.799) (9.385)
Gender of HH head
202.9 69.75 -37.50 -126.9 -467.1 141.5 -34.75 -240.8 -577.2 -1618.3
(147.0) (189.9) (154.9) (217.3) (742.6) (144.8) (179.2) (199.2) (395.5) (1187.9)
Highest education of men in
HH
81.31** 79.38** 61.97** 39.58* 75.04* 56.93** 60.13** 83.03** 91.99** 222.7**
(22.66) (15.76) (19.10) (33.62) (60.75) (14.31) (18.58) (16.41) (34.19) (67.08)
Highest education of women
in HH
25.12 67.08** 73.02** 78.47** 141.4* 30.75** 85.12** 103.6** 148.1** 360.6**
(18.96) (15.87) (18.81) (34.42) (59.23) (17.90) (19.00) (21.45) (39.02) (97.38)
Landholdings
1.048** 0.999** 1.754** 2.796** 2.189** 2.226** 2.008** 2.229** 3.624** 10.43
(0.386) (0.508) (1.003) (1.134) (1.722) (0.766) (0.476) (0.908) (1.585) (8.829)
HH economic dependency
ratio
-106.4** -121.8** -153.4** -209.9** -300.8** -101.5** -165.1** -176.3** -217.4** -330.0**
(21.99) (18.05) (24.26) (28.50) (38.73) (21.98) (24.31) (24.60) (39.37) (80.32)
# of HH head relatives
owning land
13.42 6.645 3.309 -2.155 -16.33 16.00 20.13 25.59 62.49* 77.47
(8.731) (9.873) (14.56) (21.83) (26.84) (16.82) (16.72) (23.78) (33.02) (102.1)
# of HH head’s spouse
relatives owning land
-3.859 -8.638 -6.812 -5.959 14.72 22.98** 24.12* 15.83 16.07 47.48
(8.399) (7.762) (10.59) (13.87) (22.75) (12.10) (13.17) (16.49) (23.43) (52.57)
# of HH head relatives living
outside thana
6.612 16.49 1.248 -2.107 46.13 15.48 3.568 11.12 -2.016 53.83
(16.94) (13.54) (13.16) (22.64) (59.63) (13.64) (15.55) (19.69) (26.82) (47.35)
# of HH head’s spouse
relatives living outside thana
-2.730 4.555 3.257 10.67 -0.0682 -10.04 8.762 1.057 5.806 20.54
(8.977) (6.574) (9.964) (14.52) (29.84) (12.13) (9.365) (12.22) (15.92) (35.58)
Loans from traditional
banks (1=yes)
337.8* 432.3** 537.3** 750.2** 2014.3** 75.08 375.1 319.9* 568.5* 1058.5
(157.7) (172.4) (198.6) (354.9) (915.9) (235.6) (228.5) (188.8) (535.8) (767.9)
Loans from informal sources
(1=yes)
141.8 269.7** 375.7** 559.8** 1378.3** 366.1** 208.6** 66.31 -62.58 -213.7
(112.7) (101.5) (214.7) (252.4) (354.4) (119.8) (113.9) (166.2) (280.4) (674.0)
Loans from relatives (1=yes)
322.6** 73.21 135.5 316.4 284.3 98.45 275.8** 563.2** 869.9** 1349.0**
(94.22) (122.6) (164.9) (220.0) (360.3) (126.5) (118.9) (180.7) (273.1) (629.7)
Eligibility of HH (1=yes)
-370.7** -364.5** -440.2** -474.1* -1272.2** -283.8* -582.1** -784.2** -1167.9** -818.1*
(144.7) (133.8) (187.5) (309.2) (768.4) (195.4) (204.7) (248.5) (450.5) (985.9)
Overall intercept
2890.1** 3727.6** 4355.4** 5016.7** 7418.8** 2460.6** 3476.9** 4471.0** 6040.1** 7937.9**
(289.4) (264.6) (303.6) (438.8) (1179.6) (284.4) (293.4) (432.5) (678.9) (1493.7)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table D.3 Cross-section quantile regressions with village penalised fixed effects,
household food expenditure
1991-92 1998-99
Quantile 10% 30% Median 70% 90% 10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Household microcredit
borrowings
0.002 0.004 0.002 0.004 -0.004 0.005** 0.008** 0.007** 0.011** 0.013**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head
-25.03 -13.79 -7.433 37.07* 68.07 23.31 27.53** 33.85** 48.78** 97.34**
(14.94) (10.73) (14.45) (16.40) (30.12) (17.27) (12.69) (11.14) (17.78) (42.05)
Age of HH head
-6.411** -5.605** -7.269** -5.185** -5.200 0.505 -0.830 -0.399 -0.643 -4.927
(2.420) (2.186) (2.137) (2.462) (3.282) (2.415) (2.638) (2.362) (3.156) (5.218)
Gender of HH head
282.1** 73.49 30.90 -21.05 -11.04 7.801 -43.77 -253.8 -402.2** -1125.7**
(96.76) (152.1) (111.4) (128.0) (165.3) (105.2) (103.5) (145.6) (223.0) (443.6)
Highest education of men in
HH
48.30** 37.61** 37.09** 21.54 12.33 19.50 30.20** 30.23** 28.89** 41.30**
(14.66) (9.786) (12.11) (15.31) (28.27) (15.53) (11.08) (9.030) (13.74) (21.52)
Highest education of women
in HH
4.132 15.11 40.09** 20.09** 45.22 19.59 35.87** 44.08** 62.05** 71.33**
(11.02) (11.24) (13.15) (12.40) (29.13) (13.58) (12.16) (11.85) (16.56) (34.55)
Landholdings
0.390** 0.517** 0.687** 0.833** 0.628* 0.619 0.698* 1.468** 1.929 2.613*
(0.242) (0.263) (0.299) (0.411) (0.495) (0.494) (0.610) (0.738) (0.805) (1.623)
HH economic dependency
ratio
-77.01** -80.62** -109.3** -136.8** -210.6** -84.91** -106.8** -133.9** -130.5** -213.6**
(16.61) (13.32) (14.57) (18.41) (28.07) (17.76) (17.93) (15.75) (20.32) (33.36)
# of HH head relatives
owning land
8.029 1.999 -2.717 4.522 -8.361 6.411 3.069 7.286 16.62 15.04
(7.442) (5.744) (8.658) (10.35) (14.49) (13.32) (10.68) (11.37) (14.01) (30.25)
# of HH head’s spouse
relatives owning land
-0.619 -1.543 -2.259 -5.988 -6.416 17.77* 11.91 6.583 7.763 15.24
(6.126) (4.559) (6.245) (8.259) (11.84) (9.460) (8.560) (8.450) (10.78) (25.44)
# of HH head relatives living
outside thana
-5.261 -5.757 -0.531 0.897 1.884 1.531 8.299 3.019 -0.217 2.453
(16.55) (9.835) (9.867) (13.54) (25.91) (10.52) (9.932) (10.13) (12.41) (24.34)
# of HH head’s spouse
relatives living outside thana
8.445 0.535 1.885 5.856 27.07* -8.448 0.812 0.684 -4.147 -7.201
(6.532) (4.663) (7.386) (8.808) (11.96) (8.587) (7.603) (7.004) (9.000) (15.44)
Loans from traditional
banks (1=yes)
131.8* 258.2** 221.9** 215.1** 283.7 65.27 166.2 65.53 53.94 362.9
(95.69) (92.01) (100.8) (136.4) (181.4) (156.9) (109.7) (115.4) (149.9) (350.4)
Loans from informal sources
(1=yes)
53.72 36.99 115.3 141.1 383.7* 291.9** 166.5** 156.0** 167.9 -18.78
(81.01) (85.90) (102.6) (143.5) (187.7) (89.49) (103.0) (78.67) (127.8) (238.1)
Loans from relatives (1=yes)
33.30 68.40 87.66 80.31 85.81 76.16 127.5* 200.6** 145.6 304.7
(92.18) (94.99) (93.48) (136.1) (166.1) (92.24) (88.05) (78.70) (115.6) (205.2)
Eligibility of HH (1=yes)
-196.4** -325.0** -330.6** -265.5** -468.3* -165.3 -222.6** -425.8** -477.1** -384.9**
(99.14) (83.05) (95.23) (124.2) (215.9) (118.1) (143.0) (121.6) (159.2) (294.5)
Overall intercept
2389.7** 3056.9** 3500.4** 3790.9** 4740.9** 2102.7** 2656.1** 3477.5** 4022.1** 5812.6**
(175.5) (222.8) (180.2) (236.4) (361.8) (216.7) (198.0) (239.4) (341.8) (541.8)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table D.4 Cross-section quantile regressions with village penalised fixed effects,
household food expenditure, by gender
1991-92 1998-99
Quantile 10% 30% Median 70% 90% 10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Female microcredit
borrowings
0.005 0.002 0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.007** 0.008** 0.010** 0.013** 0.015**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
Male microcredit
borrowings
0.000 0.005 0.002 0.002 -0.006 0.000 0.007 0.003 -0.003 -0.001
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.010) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.010)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head
-22.15 -16.09 -5.834 35.25* 68.37 22.38 27.31** 38.12** 49.83** 94.36**
(14.89) (10.72) (14.73) (16.22) (29.79) (16.21) (12.88) (11.24) (16.96) (41.31)
Age of HH head
-6.169** -5.684** -7.199** -4.588** -4.340 -0.395 -1.168 -0.0185 -0.706 -4.966
(2.355) (2.213) (2.187) (2.479) (3.334) (2.369) (2.667) (2.346) (3.106) (5.246)
Gender of HH head
263.7** 77.99 47.48 -24.50 18.15 13.62 -57.59 -256.4 -429.1** -1077.0**
(103.9) (152.2) (111.6) (128.1) (165.7) (105.9) (104.0) (143.4) (223.0) (444.8)
Highest education of men in
HH
48.26** 37.78** 35.95** 22.31* 12.19 22.05 30.92** 25.37** 27.88** 41.99**
(14.78) (9.809) (12.21) (15.76) (27.83) (14.62) (11.08) (9.286) (13.16) (21.18)
Highest education of women
in HH
2.695 18.91 40.59** 20.89** 45.35 16.79 34.80** 44.23** 60.42** 75.72**
(11.07) (11.19) (13.26) (12.61) (29.26) (13.02) (12.34) (11.69) (16.70) (33.56)
Landholdings
0.430** 0.484** 0.683** 0.816** 0.703* 0.590 0.661* 1.332** 1.939 2.161*
(0.245) (0.258) (0.299) (0.405) (0.497) (0.507) (0.614) (0.742) (0.777) (1.618)
HH economic dependency
ratio
-79.74** -81.54** -109.0** -134.3** -207.4** -87.74** -111.3** -134.4** -127.3** -218.3**
(16.57) (13.23) (14.50) (18.20) (27.36) (17.83) (18.08) (16.42) (19.47) (33.09)
# of HH head relatives
owning land
8.092 3.795 -2.932 5.037 -8.584 14.33 3.916 9.120 14.39 24.13
(7.638) (5.660) (8.564) (10.22) (14.54) (13.25) (10.73) (11.78) (13.73) (30.92)
# of HH head’s spouse
relatives owning land
2.842 -1.392 -1.976 -6.036 -7.009 17.45* 11.77 10.96 8.080 13.10
(6.134) (4.555) (6.331) (8.230) (12.07) (9.771) (8.916) (8.565) (10.23) (25.47)
# of HH head relatives living
outside thana
-5.103 -7.941 -0.332 1.328 3.024 -1.028 8.237 2.096 0.580 1.263
(16.09) (9.705) (9.807) (13.57) (25.58) (10.72) (10.20) (10.76) (11.66) (24.78)
# of HH head’s spouse
relatives living outside thana
5.941 2.031 1.161 3.807 24.99* -9.445 1.704 -1.306 -2.232 -5.942
(6.485) (4.396) (7.420) (8.705) (11.92) (9.026) (7.766) (6.927) (8.552) (15.10)
Loans from traditional
banks (1=yes)
152.0* 265.7** 223.7** 214.5** 275.5 72.56 173.0 46.90 66.28 314.7
(96.24) (91.95) (100.7) (137.1) (184.3) (154.9) (112.1) (111.4) (136.9) (343.8)
Loans from informal sources
(1=yes)
52.03 32.46 112.2 136.3 406.9* 315.4** 163.0** 133.6** 178.8 -24.54
(83.14) (86.67) (103.5) (141.3) (185.2) (89.07) (103.5) (84.54) (116.6) (234.1)
Loans from relatives (1=yes)
60.53 64.48 85.56 80.83 99.37 56.96 123.1 193.4** 157.8 337.6
(101.0) (95.11) (94.31) (135.1) (165.0) (90.61) (89.80) (76.58) (108.5) (206.4)
Eligibility of HH (1=yes)
-172.2** -319.8** -334.1** -270.7** -425.6* -190.5 -201.5* -411.6** -471.4** -374.8**
(99.71) (83.23) (95.11) (121.2) (215.4) (118.5) (143.7) (121.5) (158.7) (294.0)
Overall intercept
2356.6** 3053.3** 3485.1** 3774.8** 4627.4** 2167.8** 2678.7** 3451.6** 4030.2** 5757.9**
(178.6) (221.8) (181.9) (232.3) (361.9) (211.6) (197.0) (237.7) (335.9) (544.6)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table D.5 Cross-section quantile regressions with village penalised fixed effects,
household non-food expenditure
1991-92 1998-99
Quantile 10% 30% Median 70% 90% 10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Household microcredit
borrowings
0.003** 0.003** 0.002** 0.007** 0.018** 0.003** 0.004** 0.006** 0.014** 0.041**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.013)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head
-5.186 -10.46 -2.637 4.282 78.12 1.712 5.785 9.704 3.727 -12.88
(5.907) (5.777) (9.564) (18.67) (66.01) (7.020) (8.250) (15.92) (31.10) (95.29)
Age of HH head
-2.052** -2.837** -4.246** -5.256** -10.70** -1.901* -1.640 -1.766 -6.193* -7.088
(0.644) (0.746) (1.031) (1.507) (4.979) (1.272) (1.035) (1.645) (2.719) (6.826)
Gender of HH head
2.955 -43.40 -62.38 -98.50 -108.9 77.15 52.58 4.027 -62.04 -360.3
(25.74) (44.35) (49.59) (95.75) (856.0) (43.07) (55.57) (74.20) (179.8) (906.4)
Highest education of men in
HH
22.11** 28.96** 31.09** 26.50** 92.82 15.89** 23.98** 36.96** 67.39** 171.3**
(5.493) (5.345) (8.827) (15.66) (59.11) (5.522) (5.551) (11.59) (23.69) (67.67)
Highest education of women
in HH
15.15** 30.86** 37.30** 52.32** 52.62** 16.80** 30.14** 45.92** 79.49** 219.4**
(4.499) (5.693) (8.207) (22.35) (46.14) (6.087) (8.599) (12.33) (23.89) (94.54)
Landholdings
0.252** 0.330** 0.886** 1.917** 2.873** 0.819** 0.847** 1.526** 2.559** 5.621
(0.0910) (0.223) (0.472) (0.978) (1.212) (0.300) (0.369) (0.578) (1.262) (7.228)
HH economic dependency
ratio
-22.08** -21.06** -28.50** -52.18** -97.33** -19.54** -30.76** -50.39** -59.28** -23.43
(4.624) (5.784) (7.535) (9.120) (27.89) (5.920) (8.194) (11.96) (18.85) (67.13)
# of HH head relatives
owning land
3.843 6.267* 2.091 6.389 -11.42 8.259* 4.047 5.293 27.44 192.3*
(2.876) (2.804) (3.482) (8.929) (20.06) (4.583) (5.204) (11.05) (20.36) (99.42)
# of HH head’s spouse
relatives owning land
0.875 0.307 0.0773 -2.775 23.00 6.927 7.650 10.04 6.966 -4.300
(1.612) (2.028) (2.931) (4.845) (16.15) (4.174) (4.839) (6.021) (9.689) (39.93)
# of HH head relatives living
outside thana
3.813 0.784 -0.0919 7.621 24.95 -5.324 -4.310 -1.517 4.719 17.47
(5.538) (3.462) (5.899) (10.52) (40.25) (3.912) (5.159) (6.631) (14.14) (41.97)
# of HH head’s spouse
relatives living outside thana
-2.296 0.955 -0.923 2.863 -2.705 1.577 4.702 4.236 3.413 0.762
(2.118) (1.951) (3.250) (5.393) (23.54) (2.985) (3.267) (4.046) (7.198) (26.92)
Loans from traditional
banks (1=yes)
119.6** 99.68** 211.5** 601.0** 1668.4** 38.08 68.97 162.7 676.0** 661.1*
(38.31) (57.86) (153.3) (272.1) (936.3) (60.84) (77.83) (171.1) (316.9) (795.0)
Loans from informal sources
(1=yes)
56.05* 119.0** 177.5** 531.9** 592.6** 42.75 7.516 -0.219 -94.93 -298.0
(33.26) (46.58) (74.51) (162.3) (169.7) (43.22) (43.35) (64.56) (115.3) (489.2)
Loans from relatives (1=yes)
61.49** 85.00** 147.6** 212.9 252.3 28.90 87.15** 165.2** 461.4** 1732.8**
(29.69) (42.09) (60.46) (131.2) (349.5) (40.57) (52.48) (85.41) (197.1) (661.7)
Eligibility of HH (1=yes)
-92.97** -78.72 -59.26 -171.5 -480.9 -76.07 -148.0** -362.9** -481.2** -1062.3*
(36.74) (46.65) (70.92) (171.8) (606.6) (60.59) (71.26) (201.8) (259.2) (787.7)
Overall intercept
397.8** 566.9** 740.4** 1081.9** 2039.8** 426.9** 652.1** 1054.0** 1571.4** 2620.6**
(53.08) (66.41) (98.50) (210.0) (1107.8) (88.52) (101.0) (226.3) (355.4) (1250.1)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table D.6 Cross-section quantile regressions with village penalised fixed effects,
household non-food expenditure, by gender
1991-92 1998-99
Quantile 10% 30% Median 70% 90% 10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Female microcredit
borrowings
0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.008** 0.013 0.003** 0.004** 0.007** 0.016** 0.047**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.014)
Male microcredit
borrowings
0.004** 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.021* 0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.016)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head
-5.142 -10.01 -2.669 5.415 83.68 4.640 5.561 10.04 9.332 27.23
(5.902) (5.652) (9.481) (18.51) (65.09) (7.296) (7.962) (15.72) (30.53) (93.15)
Age of HH head
-2.060** -2.744** -4.230** -5.181** -11.20** -1.948** -1.477 -2.001 -5.776* -7.022
(0.643) (0.759) (1.056) (1.492) (4.994) (1.251) (1.023) (1.616) (2.804) (6.579)
Gender of HH head
4.822 -44.65 -53.83 -96.12 -137.7 77.34 43.77 8.493 -26.72 -370.9
(26.27) (43.76) (50.85) (94.34) (848.8) (43.59) (55.83) (77.14) (174.0) (877.0)
Highest education of men in
HH
22.09** 28.10** 31.15** 26.51** 82.03 14.92** 25.18** 39.23** 63.98** 160.2**
(5.503) (5.266) (8.985) (15.76) (58.97) (5.543) (5.729) (11.76) (22.20) (64.28)
Highest education of women
in HH
14.99** 29.99** 37.28** 52.31** 65.47** 15.72** 30.93** 44.92** 77.71** 170.9**
(4.594) (5.689) (8.282) (22.14) (45.82) (5.991) (8.392) (12.65) (23.30) (92.30)
Landholdings
0.253** 0.330** 0.887** 1.952** 2.650** 0.805** 0.826** 1.520** 2.505** 6.297
(0.0908) (0.223) (0.475) (0.979) (1.242) (0.281) (0.376) (0.540) (1.241) (7.077)
HH economic dependency
ratio
-22.05** -20.45** -28.28** -52.31** -96.94** -21.24** -29.76** -51.50** -60.27** -22.02
(4.752) (5.633) (7.567) (9.638) (28.36) (6.121) (7.974) (11.99) (19.28) (67.51)
# of HH head relatives
owning land
3.893 6.519* 2.049 5.669 -11.71 9.201 5.556 6.217 30.92 188.9*
(2.921) (2.805) (3.582) (8.780) (20.88) (4.774) (5.505) (11.54) (21.42) (98.53)
# of HH head’s spouse
relatives owning land
0.646 0.452 0.0473 -2.181 23.37 5.905* 9.445* 9.727 6.835 7.914
(1.605) (2.034) (2.859) (4.886) (16.53) (4.092) (4.724) (5.889) (10.22) (41.84)
# of HH head relatives living
outside thana
3.752 0.201 -0.198 8.096 21.26 -5.249 -3.494 -2.390 3.821 17.40
(5.527) (3.435) (5.844) (10.69) (41.37) (3.963) (5.101) (6.540) (14.00) (39.13)
# of HH head’s spouse
relatives living outside thana
-2.449 1.058 -0.877 1.063 3.935 1.589 4.400 4.364 3.600 -10.27
(2.097) (1.969) (3.232) (5.354) (23.16) (3.070) (3.190) (4.132) (7.471) (27.58)
Loans from traditional
banks (1=yes)
118.6** 98.35** 220.1** 601.3** 1610.9** 17.23 58.22 180.1 675.0** 766.1
(38.07) (58.07) (155.4) (270.7) (933.4) (62.81) (78.74) (170.0) (304.1) (795.1)
Loans from informal sources
(1=yes)
56.78* 122.2** 177.9** 526.3** 577.7** 47.15 20.20 9.834 -102.6 -138.8
(33.33) (46.59) (73.96) (162.2) (173.1) (43.23) (45.79) (60.00) (107.9) (478.0)
Loans from relatives (1=yes)
61.27** 82.86** 146.8** 220.2 216.7 26.53 74.45* 154.3** 488.3** 1719.0**
(29.06) (42.57) (59.38) (130.7) (349.4) (40.19) (53.13) (81.36) (197.9) (664.2)
Eligibility of HH (1=yes)
-94.13** -78.25 -58.65 -169.0 -479.7 -91.70 -152.9** -343.9** -512.0** -1039.8
(36.81) (46.63) (71.17) (171.0) (614.6) (61.20) (72.70) (205.5) (257.0) (777.6)
Overall intercept
398.5** 563.4** 730.8** 1074.9** 2095.2** 454.5** 644.1** 1044.5** 1559.3** 2635.5**
(53.15) (66.25) (98.18) (206.8) (1103.3) (87.77) (101.7) (226.3) (353.7) (1222.5)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Figure E.1 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household food consumption:
cross-section two-stage quantile regressions with village covariates
(a) Panel A: Household microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
(b) Panel B: Female microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
(c) Panel C: Male microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
Note: Solid lines show the credit coefficients estimates at each decile. The grey areas show 95% bootstrap
percentile confidence intervals. We carry out 999 replications, re-sampling villages with replacement
to account for within-cluster dependence of household-level observations through time. The estimation
sample includes 1,638 households in each time period. Microcredit is measured as cumulative borrowings
from microfinance programs over the previous six years, in 1992 Taka. Microcredit is instrumented for
following the approach in Pitt and Khandker (1998), using OLS in the first stage. Specifications include
either: village covariates; village quantile effects (i.e. village dummy variables); or penalised village effects
(i.e. restricted to have a pure location-shift effect a` la Koenker (2004)).
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Figure E.2 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household food consumption:
cross-section two-stage quantile regressions with village quantile effects
(a) Panel A: Household microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
(b) Panel B: Female microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
(c) Panel C: Male microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
Note: Solid lines show the credit coefficients estimates at each decile. The grey areas show 95% bootstrap
percentile confidence intervals. We carry out 999 replications, re-sampling villages with replacement
to account for within-cluster dependence of household-level observations through time. The estimation
sample includes 1,638 households in each time period. Microcredit is measured as cumulative borrowings
from microfinance programs over the previous six years, in 1992 Taka. Microcredit is instrumented for
following the approach in Pitt and Khandker (1998), using OLS in the first stage. Specifications include
either: village covariates; village quantile effects (i.e. village dummy variables); or penalised village effects
(i.e. restricted to have a pure location-shift effect a` la Koenker (2004)).
238 Appendix E Plots of quantile processes, cross-section 2SQR
Figure E.3 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household food consumption:
cross-section two-stage quantile regressions with penalised village effects
(a) Panel A: Household microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
(b) Panel B: Female microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
(c) Panel C: Male microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
Note: Solid lines show the credit coefficients estimates at each decile. The grey areas show 95% bootstrap
percentile confidence intervals. We carry out 999 replications, re-sampling villages with replacement
to account for within-cluster dependence of household-level observations through time. The estimation
sample includes 1,638 households in each time period. Microcredit is measured as cumulative borrowings
from microfinance programs over the previous six years, in 1992 Taka. Microcredit is instrumented for
following the approach in Pitt and Khandker (1998), using OLS in the first stage. Specifications include
either: village covariates; village quantile effects (i.e. village dummy variables); or penalised village effects
(i.e. restricted to have a pure location-shift effect a` la Koenker (2004)).
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Figure E.4 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household non-food consump-
tion: cross-section two-stage quantile regressions with village covariates
(a) Panel A: Household microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
(b) Panel B: Female microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
(c) Panel C: Male microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
Note: Solid lines show the credit coefficients estimates at each decile. The grey areas show 95% bootstrap
percentile confidence intervals. We carry out 999 replications, re-sampling villages with replacement
to account for within-cluster dependence of household-level observations through time. The estimation
sample includes 1,638 households in each time period. Microcredit is measured as cumulative borrowings
from microfinance programs over the previous six years, in 1992 Taka. Microcredit is instrumented for
following the approach in Pitt and Khandker (1998), using OLS in the first stage. Specifications include
either: village covariates; village quantile effects (i.e. village dummy variables); or penalised village effects
(i.e. restricted to have a pure location-shift effect a` la Koenker (2004)).
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Figure E.5 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household non-food consump-
tion: cross-section two-stage quantile regressions with village quantile effects
(a) Panel A: Household microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
(b) Panel B: Female microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
(c) Panel C: Male microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
Note: Solid lines show the credit coefficients estimates at each decile. The grey areas show 95% bootstrap
percentile confidence intervals. We carry out 999 replications, re-sampling villages with replacement
to account for within-cluster dependence of household-level observations through time. The estimation
sample includes 1,638 households in each time period. Microcredit is measured as cumulative borrowings
from microfinance programs over the previous six years, in 1992 Taka. Microcredit is instrumented for
following the approach in Pitt and Khandker (1998), using OLS in the first stage. Specifications include
either: village covariates; village quantile effects (i.e. village dummy variables); or penalised village effects
(i.e. restricted to have a pure location-shift effect a` la Koenker (2004)).
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Figure E.6 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household non-food consump-
tion: cross-section two-stage quantile regressions with penalised village effects
(a) Panel A: Household microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
(b) Panel B: Female microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
(c) Panel C: Male microcredit
1991-92
Quantile
1998-99
Quantile
Note: Solid lines show the credit coefficients estimates at each decile. The grey areas show 95% bootstrap
percentile confidence intervals. We carry out 999 replications, re-sampling villages with replacement
to account for within-cluster dependence of household-level observations through time. The estimation
sample includes 1,638 households in each time period. Microcredit is measured as cumulative borrowings
from microfinance programs over the previous six years, in 1992 Taka. Microcredit is instrumented for
following the approach in Pitt and Khandker (1998), using OLS in the first stage. Specifications include
either: village covariates; village quantile effects (i.e. village dummy variables); or penalised village effects
(i.e. restricted to have a pure location-shift effect a` la Koenker (2004)).
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Table F.1 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household food expenditure, cross-section two-stage quantile regressions with village
covariates
1991-92 1998-99
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Quantile
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
10 -0.015 -0.012 -0.003 0.711 -0.013 -0.017 0.029 0.584
(0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.025) (0.069)
20 -0.004 -0.005 -0.007 0.928 -0.003 -0.009 0.007 0.841
(0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.024) (0.067)
30 -0.022 -0.012 -0.019 0.750 -0.001 -0.015 -0.013 0.980
(0.013) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.024) (0.062)
40 -0.021 -0.001 -0.022 0.410 -0.002 -0.011 0.001 0.866
(0.014) (0.016) (0.020) (0.017) (0.023) (0.058)
50 -0.014 -0.002 -0.019 0.549 -0.006 -0.021 0.016 0.579
(0.014) (0.017) (0.021) (0.019) (0.025) (0.056)
60 -0.003 0.002 -0.008 0.727 -0.016 -0.028 -0.005 0.761
(0.015) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022) (0.027) (0.060)
70 -0.004 0.005 -0.009 0.644 -0.022 -0.024 0.023 0.604
(0.016) (0.019) (0.024) (0.027) (0.032) (0.072)
80 0.002 0.003 -0.000 0.921 -0.018 -0.059 0.032 0.493
(0.020) (0.022) (0.028) (0.038) (0.042) (0.114)
90 0.008 0.016 -0.003 0.696 -0.060 -0.066 -0.052 0.950
(0.028) (0.033) (0.037) (0.063) (0.068) (0.192)
Coefficients equal
across quantiles (p-value)
0.433 0.937 0.971 0.996 0.976 0.943 0.967 0.989
Coefficients jointly
zero (p-value)
0.447 0.951 0.980 0.996 0.981 0.932 0.983 0.988
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance is assessed based on bootstrap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level. The bottom
rows show Wald-type tests of the equality of coefficients for each credit variable across all quantiles, and whether they are jointly zero. Columns (4) and (8) show results from tests of the equality
of slope coefficients on female and male microcredit at each quantile. Bottom rows of columns (4) and (8) show joint hypotheses tests of the equality of slope coefficients on female and male
microcredit across all quantiles, and a similar tests for whether all these coefficients are simultaneously zero across all quantiles.
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Table F.2 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household food expenditure, cross-section two-stage quantile regressions with village
quantile effects
1991-92 1998-99
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Quantile
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
10 0.003 0.008 -0.001 0.705 -0.012 0.000 -0.062 0.248
(0.011) (0.019) (0.013) (0.020) (0.021) (0.047)
20 0.010 0.008 0.005 0.892 -0.028 -0.015 -0.056 0.243
(0.012) (0.018) (0.014) (0.017) (0.015) (0.034)
30 0.022 0.012 0.020 0.683 -0.024 -0.003 -0.061 0.072
(0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.030)
40 0.015 0.006 0.019 0.531 -0.022 -0.003 -0.066 0.080
(0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.030)
50 0.009 -0.001 0.025 0.219 -0.023 -0.010 -0.046 0.336
(0.012) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.030)
60 0.006 -0.008 0.017 0.259 -0.028 -0.021 -0.042 0.601
(0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.022) (0.030)
70 -0.005 -0.016 0.015 0.153 -0.029 -0.027 -0.029 0.968
(0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.020) (0.024) (0.038)
80 0.007 -0.002 0.020 0.318 -0.025 -0.031 -0.019 0.834
(0.014) (0.016) (0.018) (0.021) (0.024) (0.049)
90 0.002 0.002 0.002 1.000 -0.014 0.004 -0.053 0.549
(0.020) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.031) (0.080)
Coefficients equal
across quantiles (p-value)
0.394 0.860 0.709 0.878 0.878 0.595 0.944 0.913
Coefficients jointly
zero (p-value)
0.473 0.912 0.701 0.898 0.754 0.670 0.743 0.904
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance is assessed based on bootstrap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level. The bottom
rows show Wald-type tests of the equality of coefficients for each credit variable across all quantiles, and whether they are jointly zero. Columns (4) and (8) show results from tests of the equality
of slope coefficients on female and male microcredit at each quantile. Bottom rows of columns (4) and (8) show joint hypotheses tests of the equality of slope coefficients on female and male
microcredit across all quantiles, and a similar tests for whether all these coefficients are simultaneously zero across all quantiles.
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Table F.3 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household food expenditure, cross-section two-stage quantile regressions with pe-
nalised village effects
1991-92 1998-99
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Quantile
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
10 0.001 0.001 -0.005 0.705 0.011** 0.015** 0.001 0.427
(0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.007) (0.009) (0.015)
20 0.003 0.006 -0.003 0.596 0.017** 0.020** -0.002 0.224
(0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.006) (0.009) (0.015)
30 0.002 0.007 -0.002 0.622 0.018** 0.021** 0.004 0.403
(0.009) (0.010) (0.015) (0.007) (0.011) (0.014)
40 0.002 0.004 -0.001 0.799 0.022** 0.028** -0.004 0.118
(0.009) (0.011) (0.014) (0.008) (0.011) (0.013)
50 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.819 0.023** 0.031** -0.003 0.085
(0.010) (0.014) (0.015) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013)
60 0.003 0.010 -0.002 0.607 0.028** 0.036** -0.002 0.053
(0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013)
70 0.007 0.013 -0.010 0.358 0.033** 0.041** -0.011 0.013
(0.014) (0.016) (0.018) (0.010) (0.012) (0.015)
80 0.005 0.014 -0.006 0.436 0.036** 0.049** -0.004 0.040
(0.016) (0.017) (0.020) (0.011) (0.014) (0.018)
90 0.003 0.008 -0.012 0.512 0.036** 0.049** -0.001 0.131
(0.017) (0.018) (0.023) (0.016) (0.019) (0.024)
Coefficients equal
across quantiles (p-value)
0.999 0.962 0.977 0.997 0.057 0.008 0.935 0.110
Coefficients jointly
zero (p-value)
1.000 0.971 0.988 0.998 0.013 0.006 0.962 0.078
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance is assessed based on bootstrap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level. The bottom
rows show Wald-type tests of the equality of coefficients for each credit variable across all quantiles, and whether they are jointly zero. Columns (4) and (8) show results from tests of the equality
of slope coefficients on female and male microcredit at each quantile. Bottom rows of columns (4) and (8) show joint hypotheses tests of the equality of slope coefficients on female and male
microcredit across all quantiles, and a similar tests for whether all these coefficients are simultaneously zero across all quantiles.
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Table F.4 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household non-food expenditure, cross-section two-stage quantile regressions with
village covariates
1991-92 1998-99
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Quantile
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
10 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.960 0.009 -0.012 0.089 0.032
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013) (0.039)
20 0.005 0.004 0.012 0.471 0.011 -0.010 0.074* 0.075
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.014) (0.038)
30 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.942 0.017 -0.016 0.091 0.066
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013) (0.018) (0.046)
40 -0.003 -0.001 0.004 0.740 0.027 -0.012 0.082 0.190
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.019) (0.024) (0.058)
50 -0.008 -0.004 -0.005 0.968 0.013 -0.008 0.051 0.464
(0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.027) (0.029) (0.069)
60 -0.012 -0.000 -0.011 0.614 0.009 -0.031 -0.020 0.905
(0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.037) (0.036) (0.082)
70 -0.003 0.016 -0.012 0.322 0.014 -0.034 0.040 0.608
(0.017) (0.021) (0.020) (0.054) (0.050) (0.133)
80 -0.000 0.010 0.006 0.927 -0.029 -0.078 0.036 0.709
(0.025) (0.030) (0.028) (0.113) (0.143) (0.271)
90 0.032 0.030 0.024 0.931 -0.133 -0.438 0.435 0.128
(0.037) (0.046) (0.046) (0.263) (0.290) (0.466)
Coefficients equal
across quantiles (p-value)
0.464 0.748 0.532 0.798 0.913 0.866 0.707 0.751
Coefficients jointly
zero (p-value)
0.549 0.790 0.601 0.817 0.889 0.865 0.424 0.735
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance is assessed based on bootstrap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level. The bottom
rows show Wald-type tests of the equality of coefficients for each credit variable across all quantiles, and whether they are jointly zero. Columns (4) and (8) show results from tests of the equality
of slope coefficients on female and male microcredit at each quantile. Bottom rows of columns (4) and (8) show joint hypotheses tests of the equality of slope coefficients on female and male
microcredit across all quantiles, and a similar tests for whether all these coefficients are simultaneously zero across all quantiles.
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Table F.5 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household non-food expenditure, cross-section two-stage quantile regressions with
village quantile effects
1991-92 1998-99
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Quantile
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
10 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.893 0.006 0.002 0.012 0.656
(0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.018)
20 0.002 0.000 0.005 0.693 0.012 0.007 0.026 0.389
(0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.019)
30 0.002 0.006 -0.006 0.401 0.017 0.004 0.032 0.274
(0.007) (0.006) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.022)
40 -0.001 0.004 -0.005 0.542 0.010 0.003 0.030 0.430
(0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.017) (0.019) (0.029)
50 0.000 -0.006 0.011 0.322 0.001 -0.000 0.019 0.713
(0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.022) (0.026) (0.040)
60 -0.002 -0.000 -0.003 0.899 0.004 -0.016 0.031 0.563
(0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.029) (0.032) (0.066)
70 -0.001 0.003 -0.011 0.637 0.007 -0.028 0.076 0.291
(0.016) (0.017) (0.023) (0.034) (0.038) (0.083)
80 0.000 0.006 -0.005 0.776 0.023 -0.029 0.104 0.507
(0.020) (0.022) (0.034) (0.063) (0.083) (0.174)
90 0.022 -0.005 0.074 0.156 0.037 0.008 0.054 0.881
(0.024) (0.026) (0.047) (0.117) (0.165) (0.259)
Coefficients equal
across quantiles (p-value)
0.951 0.740 0.070 0.285 0.946 0.987 0.954 0.995
Coefficients jointly
zero (p-value)
0.974 0.809 0.090 0.333 0.954 0.994 0.913 0.996
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance is assessed based on bootstrap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level. The bottom
rows show Wald-type tests of the equality of coefficients for each credit variable across all quantiles, and whether they are jointly zero. Columns (4) and (8) show results from tests of the equality
of slope coefficients on female and male microcredit at each quantile. Bottom rows of columns (4) and (8) show joint hypotheses tests of the equality of slope coefficients on female and male
microcredit across all quantiles, and a similar tests for whether all these coefficients are simultaneously zero across all quantiles.
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Table F.6 Distributional impacts of microcredit on household non-food expenditure, cross-section two-stage quantile regressions with
penalised village effects
1991-92 1998-99
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Quantile
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
Household
credit
Female
credit
Male
credit
Female = Male
(p-value)
10 0.005** 0.006** 0.004 0.758 0.010** 0.007** 0.017 0.352
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.009)
20 0.005* 0.007* 0.004 0.658 0.010** 0.007** 0.017* 0.378
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
30 0.005* 0.005* 0.006 0.952 0.014** 0.011** 0.019** 0.552
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009)
40 0.006* 0.006 0.006 0.926 0.017** 0.017** 0.017* 0.967
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011)
50 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.821 0.022** 0.022** 0.024* 0.942
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.018)
60 0.006 0.004 0.008 0.649 0.033** 0.031** 0.027* 0.928
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.033)
70 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.945 0.041** 0.032** 0.080 0.287
(0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015) (0.041)
80 0.012** 0.009 0.027 0.398 0.064** 0.054** 0.088* 0.587
(0.008) (0.009) (0.018) (0.020) (0.022) (0.055)
90 0.035** 0.028 0.049** 0.495 0.091** 0.081** 0.187 0.459
(0.015) (0.016) (0.027) (0.037) (0.029) (0.142)
Coefficients equal
across quantiles (p-value)
0.794 0.826 0.755 0.918 0.160 0.079 0.498 0.122
Coefficients jointly
zero (p-value)
0.378 0.487 0.758 0.714 0.180 0.106 0.370 0.098
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance is assessed based on bootstrap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level. The bottom
rows show Wald-type tests of the equality of coefficients for each credit variable across all quantiles, and whether they are jointly zero. Columns (4) and (8) show results from tests of the equality
of slope coefficients on female and male microcredit at each quantile. Bottom rows of columns (4) and (8) show joint hypotheses tests of the equality of slope coefficients on female and male
microcredit across all quantiles, and a similar tests for whether all these coefficients are simultaneously zero across all quantiles.
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Table G.1 Pooled quantile regressions, household total expenditure
Quantile
10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Household 0.008** 0.009** 0.015** 0.022** 0.039**
microcredit borrowings (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.014)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head -0.904 6.425 47.54* 114.1** 218.7
(24.50) (18.45) (26.43) (43.55) (147.6)
Age of HH head -4.656 -5.600** -7.427** -12.67** -9.661
(3.474) (2.799) (3.119) (4.939) (8.944)
Gender of HH head 249.0 -137.3 -388.5** -256.1* -1334.3**
(169.0) (192.7) (157.5) (290.5) (836.0)
Highest education of 60.80** 77.52** 69.25** 81.68** 141.2**
men in HH (22.40) (15.10) (18.87) (33.93) (97.44)
Highest education of 38.36** 82.34** 113.1** 143.6** 239.6**
women in HH (16.81) (16.85) (20.86) (37.60) (106.4)
Landholdings 1.108** 1.026** 1.468** 1.812** 2.218
(0.471) (0.496) (0.709) (0.700) (2.982)
HH economic -83.72** -148.3** -185.4** -227.6** -207.6**
dependency ratio (22.60) (18.76) (23.27) (38.09) (92.07)
# of HH head 13.17 7.658 12.01 24.96 15.01
relatives owning land (12.36) (12.89) (16.69) (23.81) (42.31)
# of HH head’s -8.620 9.102 6.797 14.29 22.31
spouse relatives owning land (11.12) (9.892) (12.28) (19.55) (32.25)
# of HH head -0.132 5.041 -5.676 -14.50 -20.92
relatives living outside thana (15.31) (12.74) (16.34) (24.31) (55.17)
# of HH head’s 6.210 4.159 4.942 -5.197 22.90
spouse relatives living outside thana (8.875) (8.829) (10.88) (16.34) (41.41)
Loans from 291.6* 478.2** 640.7** 740.1** 1438.3
traditional banks (1=yes) (160.4) (200.5) (197.8) (351.7) (1171.6)
Loans from informal 95.38 2.535 0.454 145.4 524.2
sources (1=yes) (141.4) (111.5) (153.8) (295.2) (542.6)
Loans from relatives 89.53 264.5** 335.0** 568.8** 1719.8**
(1=yes) (161.8) (107.5) (129.1) (271.9) (692.7)
Eligibility of HH -206.8** -368.1** -377.7** -535.6** -357.1
(1=yes) (131.6) (103.2) (147.8) (235.0) (543.4)
Village covariates
Average male wage -2.006 -2.534 -1.903 -0.213 3.538
(4.421) (3.099) (4.741) (6.598) (19.75)
Average female wage 2.044 4.589 3.379 -1.900 17.80
(3.428) (2.878) (4.673) (6.589) (14.76)
Primary school 12.41 -110.1 -228.1** -337.0** -364.7
(1=yes) (86.70) (75.37) (99.79) (132.5) (294.1)
Food program (1=yes) -45.11 -157.0** -169.1** -269.1* -424.3*
(81.07) (63.24) (83.12) (118.8) (256.3)
Distance to nearest -16.33 -35.56** -45.74** -57.22** -108.9*
bank (km) (17.01) (12.75) (15.81) (23.42) (50.87)
Distance to nearest -16.70 -11.28 -6.802 9.147 39.71
pucca road (km) (15.19) (10.90) (13.93) (20.17) (59.80)
Distance to nearest 34.13 37.47** 57.69** 97.96** 36.39
shop/market (km) (27.99) (21.91) (27.28) (38.99) (67.10)
Electricity in 160.3** 279.2** 366.0** 489.9** 587.0**
village (1=yes) (83.38) (73.77) (92.59) (136.1) (311.3)
Price of rice 4.714 41.33* 52.18 49.21 200.2
(33.17) (31.12) (45.67) (67.14) (163.1)
Price of wheat flour 52.35 2.120 -9.662 -4.206 -42.91
(46.22) (37.78) (53.24) (66.99) (164.0)
Price of mustard oil 10.28* 10.84* 1.052 -2.218 -34.70
(6.943) (5.994) (7.927) (10.38) (22.43)
Price of hen’s eggs -20.01 -4.155 -10.70 -4.991 -51.93
(15.83) (14.24) (18.02) (47.33) (251.1)
Price of milk 30.29* 30.52** 41.29** 65.58** 24.80
(14.33) (11.59) (18.53) (28.15) (65.35)
Price of potatoes -14.09 11.83 -29.50 -28.03 51.00
(18.26) (16.82) (25.16) (39.59) (89.67)
Intercepts
Second wave of data -247.6 -17.23 464.4** 835.4** 725.2
(1=yes) (216.5) (167.0) (233.8) (381.0) (787.3)
Overall intercept 1236.0** 2257.1** 3569.8** 4147.6** 6145.6**
(611.5) (492.6) (671.0) (1007.0) (2376.7)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table G.2 Pooled quantile regressions, household total expenditure, by gender
Quantile
10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Female microcredit 0.009** 0.009** 0.016** 0.025** 0.049**
borrowings (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.016)
Male microcredit 0.001 0.008* 0.009 0.019 -0.001
borrowings (0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.010) (0.020)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head 2.284 7.697 45.41* 118.9** 179.5
(24.43) (18.52) (26.42) (43.81) (147.9)
Age of HH head -4.832 -5.652** -7.563** -12.62** -12.52
(3.443) (2.808) (3.115) (5.007) (9.024)
Gender of HH head 242.8 -136.6 -383.1** -261.9* -1442.4**
(171.3) (194.2) (156.5) (287.2) (835.5)
Highest education of 59.61** 76.47** 69.55** 76.82** 178.7**
men in HH (22.40) (15.08) (18.80) (34.00) (98.06)
Highest education of 41.40** 82.04** 114.9** 142.0** 250.0**
women in HH (16.96) (16.98) (20.98) (37.38) (106.4)
Landholdings 1.112** 1.031** 1.337** 1.820** 2.012
(0.472) (0.495) (0.710) (0.709) (2.989)
HH economic -90.40** -148.9** -186.6** -227.9** -211.2**
dependency ratio (22.34) (18.80) (23.13) (38.19) (91.31)
# of HH head 13.03 7.121 13.86 23.82 22.48
relatives owning land (12.17) (12.92) (16.74) (24.08) (42.00)
# of HH head’s -6.791 9.293 7.160 17.58 25.32
spouse relatives owning land (11.10) (9.936) (12.16) (19.63) (32.48)
# of HH head 0.832 4.992 -4.206 -17.77 -28.71
relatives living outside thana (15.46) (12.75) (16.30) (24.33) (54.85)
# of HH head’s 6.116 3.886 4.992 -4.955 17.75
spouse relatives living outside thana (9.036) (8.788) (10.82) (16.45) (41.95)
Loans from 212.9* 481.9** 669.7** 755.5** 1291.2
traditional banks (1=yes) (160.8) (200.8) (199.5) (352.4) (1173.4)
Loans from informal 83.29 8.094 8.185 139.8 563.0
sources (1=yes) (144.3) (112.4) (154.5) (294.6) (542.5)
Loans from relatives 93.67 262.0** 341.6** 597.9** 1797.6**
(1=yes) (163.0) (107.8) (132.0) (271.0) (688.8)
Eligibility of HH -211.3** -373.8** -385.3** -542.0** -263.0
(1=yes) (131.8) (103.3) (148.2) (235.7) (543.1)
Village covariates
Average male wage -1.834 -2.625 -1.855 -0.246 -0.472
(4.418) (3.097) (4.807) (6.591) (19.72)
Average female wage 2.311 4.726 3.935 -1.525 15.57
(3.416) (2.874) (4.687) (6.598) (14.54)
Primary school -1.088 -107.0 -214.9** -301.2** -306.7
(1=yes) (87.33) (75.99) (99.48) (133.3) (293.9)
Food program (1=yes) -63.91 -158.6** -171.9** -260.4* -418.4*
(80.55) (63.73) (82.69) (119.4) (253.8)
Distance to nearest -17.77 -35.67** -46.24** -53.96** -113.4*
bank (km) (16.87) (12.79) (15.85) (23.56) (50.66)
Distance to nearest -12.57 -11.61 -5.833 4.258 42.22
pucca road (km) (14.90) (10.94) (13.90) (19.98) (59.10)
Distance to nearest 40.42 39.85* 62.85** 96.01** 46.88
shop/market (km) (27.77) (21.87) (27.10) (39.28) (66.79)
Electricity in 158.2** 278.0** 363.5** 443.3** 551.2**
village (1=yes) (82.16) (74.23) (93.04) (137.6) (315.7)
Price of rice -3.336 44.17 56.09 77.24 179.5
(33.16) (31.27) (45.85) (69.24) (161.6)
Price of wheat flour 66.15 2.813 -15.27 -12.04 -30.12
(46.25) (38.00) (53.90) (67.43) (162.6)
Price of mustard oil 13.56* 10.94* 0.823 -1.844 -34.65
(6.953) (6.023) (7.914) (10.39) (22.15)
Price of hen’s eggs -19.82 -4.811 -11.78 -7.164 -57.56
(15.94) (14.37) (18.04) (47.30) (250.5)
Price of milk 31.63* 29.98** 42.38** 63.79** 35.10
(14.34) (11.69) (18.50) (28.34) (64.87)
Price of potatoes -13.02 11.49 -33.38 -25.36 53.64
(17.98) (16.91) (25.23) (40.02) (90.27)
Intercepts
Second wave of data -301.8 -21.07 482.7** 818.8** 702.3
(1=yes) (215.3) (168.7) (232.8) (381.3) (782.7)
Overall intercept 1014.6** 2233.2** 3575.0** 3902.6** 6455.4**
(609.6) (494.8) (671.4) (1010.5) (2338.0)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table G.3 Pooled quantile regressions, household food expenditure
Quantile
10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Household 0.005* 0.008** 0.006** 0.006** 0.007
microcredit borrowings (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head 11.24 13.04 44.57** 70.53** 106.3**
(13.56) (12.34) (13.28) (16.63) (39.85)
Age of HH head -0.168 -1.064 -1.484 -0.741 -2.811
(2.410) (2.189) (2.293) (2.521) (3.717)
Gender of HH head 215.5 -11.38 -145.4 -379.0** -572.6**
(138.8) (118.5) (126.1) (164.8) (328.9)
Highest education of 30.98** 37.69** 24.46** 28.01** 24.44
men in HH (12.71) (10.01) (9.954) (12.80) (21.85)
Highest education of 4.627 18.00 37.10** 32.64** 32.54
women in HH (11.52) (12.24) (12.03) (12.99) (33.35)
Landholdings 0.474** 0.704** 0.632** 0.644** 1.595**
(0.220) (0.226) (0.203) (0.354) (0.831)
HH economic -77.47** -100.2** -130.5** -154.4** -190.0**
dependency ratio (15.25) (13.73) (14.49) (19.88) (37.01)
# of HH head 6.768 5.073 3.759 7.725 -6.007
relatives owning land (9.607) (8.256) (10.77) (10.31) (16.81)
# of HH head’s -0.0993 4.463 1.975 -3.628 -5.414
spouse relatives owning land (7.121) (6.532) (7.221) (8.746) (14.34)
# of HH head -0.639 10.99 6.958 9.172 -9.896
relatives living outside thana (11.20) (8.866) (11.13) (13.53) (26.12)
# of HH head’s 6.919 4.120 7.699 7.891 18.14
spouse relatives living outside thana (5.995) (5.665) (6.632) (8.890) (15.67)
Loans from 123.7 238.7* 249.6** 137.4* 333.4
traditional banks (1=yes) (103.1) (118.3) (100.3) (113.6) (189.6)
Loans from informal 6.463 83.19 59.29 -60.94 -38.86
sources (1=yes) (103.5) (85.76) (90.86) (88.98) (167.9)
Loans from relatives -7.343 1.101 161.2* 100.9 55.53
(1=yes) (102.6) (75.66) (76.89) (94.11) (194.4)
Eligibility of HH -130.3** -249.0** -244.5** -239.2** -179.9
(1=yes) (89.32) (68.27) (81.19) (96.15) (165.2)
Village covariates
Average male wage -0.749 -0.836 0.342 0.207 1.128
(2.988) (2.195) (3.043) (3.115) (6.836)
Average female wage 0.471 1.272 0.872 1.546 -6.205
(2.517) (2.078) (3.002) (3.330) (5.298)
Primary school -25.30 -84.44 -155.3* -143.0** -40.63
(1=yes) (64.59) (55.66) (68.00) (69.37) (117.7)
Food program (1=yes) -119.1* -106.2** -93.45* -193.5** -219.7**
(56.00) (44.09) (54.79) (61.14) (110.5)
Distance to nearest -19.09** -34.44** -31.34** -30.44** -53.49**
bank (km) (11.95) (9.543) (10.20) (12.99) (20.74)
Distance to nearest -0.602 -3.984 -1.459 9.650 3.356
pucca road (km) (9.825) (7.958) (10.31) (11.80) (16.58)
Distance to nearest 18.52 20.95 20.12 17.91 59.68
shop/market (km) (16.89) (16.07) (17.09) (20.71) (29.62)
Electricity in 242.0** 263.0** 235.1** 304.0** 465.8**
village (1=yes) (57.06) (50.98) (57.88) (72.02) (144.3)
Price of rice 52.93** 55.62** 41.60 43.65 67.65
(21.27) (21.36) (31.82) (35.10) (58.50)
Price of wheat flour -20.99 -27.89 -25.15 -19.42 -66.84
(29.20) (28.80) (30.51) (38.99) (63.49)
Price of mustard oil 3.337 9.010** 3.010 -1.813 -11.71
(5.305) (4.000) (4.658) (5.409) (9.906)
Price of hen’s eggs -15.61 -1.517 -8.301 -18.01 2.025
(12.00) (8.771) (12.72) (33.92) (118.6)
Price of milk 22.55 23.77** 28.78** 40.39** 59.66**
(10.60) (9.120) (10.66) (15.33) (28.11)
Price of potatoes 9.879 11.00 0.592 12.39 25.95
(12.49) (14.17) (17.63) (21.92) (31.73)
Intercepts
Second wave of data -262.8* -154.8 -5.556 7.079 630.6*
(1=yes) (137.5) (132.4) (160.3) (195.7) (303.8)
Overall intercept 1254.3** 1686.0** 2644.4** 3251.4** 4511.6**
(432.2) (344.9) (435.8) (515.6) (935.4)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table G.4 Pooled quantile regressions, household food expenditure, by gender
Quantile
10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Female microcredit 0.006** 0.008** 0.007** 0.008** 0.007*
borrowings (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Male microcredit -0.002 0.007** 0.002 0.001 -0.013
borrowings (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head 10.43 12.68 47.55** 69.97** 106.7**
(13.37) (12.39) (13.34) (16.78) (39.57)
Age of HH head -0.229 -1.067 -1.274 -0.977 -3.245
(2.402) (2.190) (2.290) (2.553) (3.755)
Gender of HH head 233.2 -12.95 -145.2 -376.6** -564.5**
(136.8) (118.8) (126.8) (165.9) (326.6)
Highest education of 31.80** 37.89** 23.31** 27.78* 25.12
men in HH (12.68) (10.08) (10.04) (12.97) (21.73)
Highest education of 6.875 17.51 34.92** 33.67** 28.14
women in HH (11.45) (12.28) (12.06) (12.97) (33.25)
Landholdings 0.501** 0.709** 0.630** 0.622** 1.605**
(0.220) (0.224) (0.204) (0.366) (0.826)
HH economic -82.86** -100.8** -128.3** -152.8** -184.7**
dependency ratio (15.27) (13.69) (14.34) (19.92) (36.59)
# of HH head 3.641 4.825 3.055 8.860 1.270
relatives owning land (9.393) (8.259) (10.71) (10.28) (16.74)
# of HH head’s 2.236 5.047 2.889 -2.747 -4.581
spouse relatives owning land (7.042) (6.569) (7.190) (8.871) (14.45)
# of HH head -1.808 11.23 6.339 11.16 -11.30
relatives living outside thana (11.19) (8.855) (11.24) (13.55) (25.74)
# of HH head’s 6.659 3.980 8.387 6.910 16.41
spouse relatives living outside thana (5.922) (5.677) (6.669) (8.871) (15.58)
Loans from 153.5 236.3* 254.0** 138.2* 375.4
traditional banks (1=yes) (102.9) (118.8) (99.69) (112.3) (187.5)
Loans from informal 13.21 79.22 52.18 -62.80 -49.56
sources (1=yes) (106.0) (85.89) (91.39) (89.29) (167.6)
Loans from relatives -2.238 3.676 165.2* 100.4 33.98
(1=yes) (103.1) (75.79) (75.97) (93.01) (192.0)
Eligibility of HH -108.2** -248.1** -240.5** -238.8** -144.6
(1=yes) (87.40) (68.84) (81.33) (97.05) (165.5)
Village covariates
Average male wage -0.837 -0.922 0.336 0.438 0.0841
(2.921) (2.194) (3.059) (3.102) (6.887)
Average female wage -0.321 1.444 0.574 0.853 -6.178
(2.451) (2.101) (2.981) (3.314) (5.288)
Primary school -24.27 -83.35 -165.2** -166.8** -45.36
(1=yes) (65.30) (56.38) (67.01) (70.31) (119.6)
Food program (1=yes) -130.0** -102.8** -96.41* -186.2** -219.2**
(54.75) (44.17) (54.51) (61.54) (108.7)
Distance to nearest -19.09** -33.00** -33.13** -32.11** -52.87**
bank (km) (12.09) (9.530) (10.14) (13.01) (20.74)
Distance to nearest -2.467 -4.189 -1.920 10.40 4.962
pucca road (km) (9.854) (7.958) (10.26) (11.76) (16.72)
Distance to nearest 23.45 21.04 17.13 23.91 60.76
shop/market (km) (17.32) (16.04) (17.03) (20.72) (30.18)
Electricity in 225.5** 259.4** 243.7** 314.5** 478.5**
village (1=yes) (56.30) (51.10) (57.60) (73.12) (143.5)
Price of rice 52.26** 55.28** 35.39 42.48 61.53
(21.07) (21.52) (31.76) (36.00) (59.09)
Price of wheat flour -18.53 -25.68 -18.17 -28.05 -44.98
(29.60) (28.69) (30.49) (39.41) (63.14)
Price of mustard oil 3.064 9.360** 2.263 -2.110 -11.59
(5.214) (4.001) (4.669) (5.494) (9.999)
Price of hen’s eggs -15.92 -1.500 -9.221 -18.01 -2.722
(11.91) (8.753) (12.79) (34.30) (119.9)
Price of milk 24.46 24.35** 28.73** 40.57** 59.37**
(10.51) (9.135) (10.57) (15.29) (28.29)
Price of potatoes 6.102 10.87 -2.112 13.16 23.80
(12.15) (14.14) (17.65) (21.91) (32.32)
Intercepts
Second wave of data -229.1* -169.5 -6.740 49.10 635.5**
(1=yes) (135.6) (132.2) (160.3) (195.7) (303.3)
Overall intercept 1237.4** 1641.4** 2709.1** 3362.7** 4381.1**
(416.2) (346.1) (438.2) (521.0) (930.2)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table G.5 Pooled quantile regressions, household non-food expenditure
Quantile
10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Household 0.002** 0.004** 0.006** 0.010** 0.035**
microcredit borrowings (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.011)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head 2.087 -0.470 7.628 5.866 33.38
(6.439) (8.800) (11.67) (31.59) (127.7)
Age of HH head -2.435** -2.986** -4.501** -6.304** -6.816**
(0.808) (0.916) (1.275) (2.285) (4.658)
Gender of HH head 48.39 -48.22 -32.85 -141.5 -739.1
(54.43) (41.61) (62.64) (108.1) (705.7)
Highest education of 18.84** 29.04** 40.27** 67.31** 157.1**
men in HH (5.901) (6.443) (8.816) (22.94) (88.72)
Highest education of 23.87** 43.26** 61.15** 109.8** 176.2**
women in HH (4.173) (6.852) (11.41) (28.79) (102.8)
Landholdings 0.221** 0.260** 0.566** 1.256 1.370
(0.119) (0.232) (0.478) (0.742) (1.574)
HH economic -26.56** -27.23** -42.67** -55.17** 11.55
dependency ratio (5.467) (7.088) (10.06) (17.67) (56.93)
# of HH head 6.032 2.069 8.920 24.54 -3.190
relatives owning land (2.993) (4.062) (6.839) (14.39) (28.99)
# of HH head’s -0.154 4.924 0.640 3.463 36.85*
spouse relatives owning land (2.306) (2.944) (4.195) (9.383) (25.44)
# of HH head -2.407 -4.046 -8.742 -6.934 -5.233
relatives living outside thana (3.770) (4.213) (6.237) (11.30) (35.40)
# of HH head’s 1.380 2.583 4.088 -3.023 0.268
spouse relatives living outside thana (2.162) (2.523) (4.529) (7.844) (26.86)
Loans from 84.85** 88.47* 285.9** 422.0* 1043.9
traditional banks (1=yes) (40.94) (61.31) (125.4) (260.5) (1476.6)
Loans from informal -2.003 19.12 1.251 196.5 389.7
sources (1=yes) (40.11) (44.13) (65.93) (123.7) (454.8)
Loans from relatives 68.65** 130.5** 190.9** 423.0** 2130.2**
(1=yes) (33.12) (44.20) (70.47) (181.5) (807.8)
Eligibility of HH -87.34** -93.89* -93.28 -184.2* -577.4
(1=yes) (29.70) (38.31) (70.67) (146.2) (465.3)
Village covariates
Average male wage -0.355 -0.371 -0.706 -0.825 6.289
(0.905) (1.319) (1.731) (2.993) (11.79)
Average female wage 1.409 0.510 1.844 2.403 8.298
(0.914) (1.040) (1.489) (2.848) (9.572)
Primary school -23.37 -47.18* -83.19** -181.4** -193.6
(1=yes) (21.99) (25.46) (34.22) (68.33) (190.2)
Food program (1=yes) 2.188 -14.25 -60.88* -59.96 -125.3
(18.78) (21.37) (29.95) (55.69) (168.9)
Distance to nearest 2.491 -4.308 -12.05** -15.87** -60.05
bank (km) (3.792) (4.285) (5.586) (8.820) (29.87)
Distance to nearest -2.102 -2.870 -3.621 -5.593 22.52
pucca road (km) (3.364) (3.606) (4.033) (8.485) (33.91)
Distance to nearest 3.244 18.84* 22.89** 40.15** 34.37
shop/market (km) (7.311) (7.493) (9.924) (16.68) (46.07)
Electricity in 47.99** 69.17** 62.78** 126.8* 251.7
village (1=yes) (19.48) (23.64) (33.44) (63.19) (184.2)
Price of rice -12.34 -19.23 3.905 -9.273 74.85
(10.03) (11.90) (15.80) (28.36) (98.77)
Price of wheat flour 9.954 10.41 -7.204 -0.607 -112.0
(10.14) (13.11) (18.66) (33.37) (108.2)
Price of mustard oil 2.038** 2.961 2.369 -4.691 -30.45
(1.473) (2.069) (2.820) (4.966) (14.20)
Price of hen’s eggs 2.384 -2.410 -0.275 6.807 6.093
(3.569) (3.646) (7.831) (32.48) (55.54)
Price of milk 4.226 7.854 9.338 16.10 18.88
(3.591) (4.257) (6.190) (12.49) (43.76)
Price of potatoes -0.978 -12.67** -14.54 -32.85* -31.86
(4.900) (5.674) (9.440) (17.05) (55.61)
Intercepts
Second wave of data 106.0** 214.5** 326.9** 599.4** 943.2**
(1=yes) (46.04) (63.40) (89.43) (173.2) (551.6)
Overall intercept 208.9 481.8** 619.7** 1442.6** 3831.2**
(153.1) (188.8) (243.9) (444.8) (1685.0)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table G.6 Pooled quantile regressions, household non-food expenditure, by gender
Quantile
10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Female microcredit 0.002** 0.004** 0.006** 0.011** 0.041**
borrowings (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.014)
Male microcredit 0.001* 0.004** 0.004 0.009 0.012
borrowings (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.016)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head 2.459 -0.287 7.538 7.382 21.16
(6.444) (8.844) (11.71) (31.88) (128.0)
Age of HH head -2.505** -2.958** -4.305** -6.239** -5.960**
(0.809) (0.918) (1.276) (2.282) (4.680)
Gender of HH head 48.52 -47.99 -37.42 -136.4 -773.4
(54.58) (41.60) (62.97) (107.1) (703.5)
Highest education of 18.64** 28.81** 40.96** 63.93** 172.9**
men in HH (5.935) (6.452) (8.831) (23.13) (89.56)
Highest education of 23.71** 43.33** 59.56** 108.6** 176.8**
women in HH (4.151) (6.842) (11.52) (29.04) (102.7)
Landholdings 0.234** 0.258** 0.576** 1.356 1.419
(0.118) (0.232) (0.480) (0.751) (1.568)
HH economic -26.67** -27.16** -43.69** -53.79** 5.536
dependency ratio (5.467) (7.093) (10.25) (17.53) (56.27)
# of HH head 6.051 2.041 9.010 23.39 -3.804
relatives owning land (3.010) (4.091) (6.905) (14.28) (29.44)
# of HH head’s -0.135 4.943 0.997 3.606 46.57*
spouse relatives owning land (2.318) (2.966) (4.166) (9.469) (26.06)
# of HH head -2.495 -4.166 -8.797 -7.025 -3.064
relatives living outside thana (3.788) (4.198) (6.250) (11.31) (35.62)
# of HH head’s 1.442 2.474 4.541 -2.203 -0.464
spouse relatives living outside thana (2.173) (2.529) (4.524) (7.756) (27.16)
Loans from 88.30** 88.88* 294.7** 431.9* 949.5
traditional banks (1=yes) (40.96) (61.23) (125.1) (258.2) (1477.4)
Loans from informal -3.094 19.56 1.389 198.0 354.8
sources (1=yes) (40.12) (44.21) (66.26) (124.3) (456.8)
Loans from relatives 67.10* 129.9** 192.9** 442.3** 1987.6**
(1=yes) (33.30) (44.11) (70.20) (180.4) (805.9)
Eligibility of HH -87.31** -92.85* -87.25 -188.0* -427.2
(1=yes) (29.67) (38.44) (70.47) (146.4) (462.9)
Village covariates
Average male wage -0.333 -0.379 -0.794 -1.056 5.593
(0.929) (1.314) (1.725) (3.009) (11.67)
Average female wage 1.489 0.484 2.018 2.459 5.042
(0.925) (1.041) (1.488) (2.847) (9.533)
Primary school -21.18 -47.02* -85.82** -200.2** -125.4
(1=yes) (22.02) (25.77) (34.24) (67.72) (194.5)
Food program (1=yes) 3.134 -14.88 -63.62* -61.75 -93.51
(18.76) (21.38) (29.98) (55.90) (169.5)
Distance to nearest 2.501 -4.470 -12.27** -16.22** -68.27
bank (km) (3.826) (4.264) (5.634) (8.831) (29.68)
Distance to nearest -1.869 -2.965 -3.883 -5.941 17.69
pucca road (km) (3.363) (3.617) (4.038) (8.516) (34.02)
Distance to nearest 3.828 18.93* 21.66** 39.85** 36.55
shop/market (km) (7.288) (7.496) (10.00) (16.57) (46.18)
Electricity in 50.01** 68.86** 58.87** 118.2* 267.7
village (1=yes) (19.58) (23.66) (33.54) (63.77) (184.3)
Price of rice -11.35 -18.83 4.107 -8.943 83.26
(10.10) (11.95) (15.86) (28.68) (99.04)
Price of wheat flour 10.42 10.79 -5.120 -0.647 -118.4
(10.13) (13.22) (18.71) (33.49) (108.0)
Price of mustard oil 2.301** 2.896 2.820 -4.395 -34.10
(1.474) (2.059) (2.834) (4.954) (14.06)
Price of hen’s eggs 2.125 -2.527 -0.632 7.329 10.69
(3.573) (3.636) (7.844) (33.08) (54.02)
Price of milk 3.944 7.732 8.777 14.91 17.49
(3.670) (4.255) (6.148) (12.57) (43.33)
Price of potatoes -0.976 -12.58** -14.31 -32.57* -43.68
(4.952) (5.759) (9.536) (16.98) (55.63)
Intercepts
Second wave of data 100.3** 215.2** 313.2** 594.6** 1081.2**
(1=yes) (46.21) (63.66) (89.18) (172.5) (544.4)
Overall intercept 179.1 479.1** 580.8** 1463.9** 3930.1**
(154.2) (188.4) (244.9) (444.5) (1651.2)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table H.1 Pooled quantile regressions with village quantile effects, household total
expenditure
Quantile
10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Household 0.006 0.008* 0.011** 0.013** 0.023**
microcredit borrowings (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.010)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head 0.644 -4.659 29.59 96.92* 164.3**
(19.79) (19.29) (27.89) (38.03) (69.13)
Age of HH head -2.309 -8.349** -3.800 -8.439* -9.570*
(2.841) (2.828) (3.551) (4.483) (6.556)
Gender of HH head 184.3 -38.17 -186.7 -336.3 -472.0
(168.4) (171.3) (190.1) (264.1) (475.1)
Highest education of 53.33** 76.50** 80.83** 67.61** 77.53
men in HH (17.76) (16.53) (19.71) (28.33) (50.83)
Highest education of 37.09** 67.03** 107.9** 122.5** 221.5**
women in HH (16.25) (16.17) (20.86) (31.25) (66.39)
Landholdings 0.860** 0.962** 0.975** 1.326** 0.781
(0.439) (0.465) (0.588) (0.696) (0.854)
HH economic -115.9** -148.5** -182.0** -202.3** -246.5**
dependency ratio (21.38) (22.15) (27.01) (36.49) (59.73)
# of HH head 35.23** 22.04** 45.06** 36.97* 27.43
relatives owning land (11.32) (13.20) (18.18) (23.61) (32.28)
# of HH head’s 6.919 11.75 1.609 22.47 56.20**
spouse relatives owning land (8.268) (10.50) (13.69) (17.05) (24.46)
# of HH head 0.743 10.96 -1.864 6.899 -3.987
relatives living outside thana (12.85) (13.29) (16.79) (23.28) (39.82)
# of HH head’s 6.137 2.828 5.726 -4.125 -49.07
spouse relatives living outside thana (8.195) (9.713) (11.66) (15.34) (24.47)
Loans from 481.6** 338.2** 653.5** 1063.9** 1759.2**
traditional banks (1=yes) (152.7) (176.2) (231.4) (393.0) (626.4)
Loans from informal -30.06 60.38 45.51 -27.58 306.7
sources (1=yes) (129.0) (128.1) (162.9) (242.4) (430.6)
Loans from relatives 126.7 158.5 200.7 352.3 552.4
(1=yes) (111.7) (110.0) (142.7) (253.5) (372.5)
Eligibility of HH -326.3** -390.0** -417.1** -604.1** -684.1*
(1=yes) (114.4) (121.1) (142.1) (208.8) (375.1)
Intercepts
Second wave of data 78.87** 398.2** 565.4** 723.8** 1338.8**
(1=yes) (75.26) (88.56) (107.3) (146.8) (262.5)
Overall intercept 3176.3** 4206.4** 4744.9** 6569.7** 8838.1**
(398.2) (341.4) (463.4) (845.2) (2255.5)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table H.2 Pooled quantile regressions with village quantile effects, household total
expenditure, by gender
Quantile
10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Female microcredit 0.007 0.009* 0.013** 0.014** 0.025**
borrowings (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.013)
Male microcredit 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.008 -0.000
borrowings (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.016)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head 3.788 -2.990 26.71 97.53* 185.5**
(19.96) (19.18) (27.97) (38.04) (69.15)
Age of HH head -2.601 -8.233** -3.834 -8.364* -8.704*
(2.823) (2.816) (3.566) (4.509) (6.479)
Gender of HH head 184.8 -41.94 -193.5 -330.8 -618.4
(169.1) (170.4) (192.1) (266.0) (478.0)
Highest education of 50.59** 75.30** 83.94** 66.67** 76.15
men in HH (17.93) (16.34) (19.73) (28.54) (50.98)
Highest education of 36.77** 67.75** 107.4** 121.0** 219.8**
women in HH (16.27) (16.17) (20.69) (31.22) (67.25)
Landholdings 0.915** 0.962** 0.925** 1.342** 0.531
(0.438) (0.459) (0.599) (0.696) (0.849)
HH economic -115.9** -150.3** -182.9** -202.6** -250.7**
dependency ratio (21.41) (22.02) (26.88) (36.52) (58.82)
# of HH head 35.49** 21.79** 45.14** 37.77* 17.08
relatives owning land (11.29) (13.24) (18.17) (23.89) (31.76)
# of HH head’s 6.399 11.31 1.378 20.00 64.84**
spouse relatives owning land (8.355) (10.53) (13.72) (17.05) (24.88)
# of HH head -0.475 10.86 -3.050 4.704 4.096
relatives living outside thana (12.84) (13.43) (16.75) (23.23) (39.73)
# of HH head’s 5.490 2.838 5.936 -4.152 -47.69
spouse relatives living outside thana (8.307) (9.750) (11.53) (15.44) (24.42)
Loans from 490.4** 342.5** 613.3** 1082.4** 1830.0**
traditional banks (1=yes) (155.3) (177.8) (230.8) (395.6) (631.2)
Loans from informal -9.319 54.82 36.37 -6.357 398.8
sources (1=yes) (130.2) (129.1) (162.4) (242.2) (427.2)
Loans from relatives 144.2 152.5 191.1 377.8 511.2
(1=yes) (112.7) (111.6) (143.2) (254.0) (377.5)
Eligibility of HH -320.8** -384.9** -422.3** -602.3** -645.3*
(1=yes) (114.5) (120.8) (143.2) (211.3) (376.3)
Intercepts
Second wave of data 85.39** 394.3** 554.4** 744.9** 1223.3**
(1=yes) (75.61) (88.11) (107.7) (148.1) (266.4)
Overall intercept 3168.1** 4206.0** 4762.2** 6511.2** 8975.2**
(401.2) (340.0) (464.9) (849.2) (2247.4)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table H.3 Pooled quantile regressions with village quantile effects, household food
expenditure
Quantile
10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Household 0.003 0.006** 0.004* 0.003 0.001
microcredit borrowings (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head 22.06 16.34 17.95* 40.79** 108.9**
(13.25) (12.69) (13.26) (15.82) (24.02)
Age of HH head 0.353 -2.063 -1.805 0.647 -3.786
(1.917) (1.920) (2.040) (2.420) (3.041)
Gender of HH head 95.89 72.32 -160.8 -325.1* -741.6**
(110.8) (109.3) (132.1) (139.2) (234.2)
Highest education of 16.36* 29.43** 32.44** 26.66 15.80
men in HH (11.96) (10.67) (10.43) (12.21) (18.22)
Highest education of 1.679 12.05 31.29** 36.30** 26.30*
women in HH (9.186) (10.44) (12.91) (12.93) (19.06)
Landholdings 0.507** 0.450** 0.670** 0.467** 1.144*
(0.238) (0.229) (0.224) (0.265) (0.501)
HH economic -84.80** -105.6** -130.3** -127.8** -175.6**
dependency ratio (14.71) (14.18) (16.02) (19.31) (27.67)
# of HH head 18.56** 16.12* 16.70* 19.91* 10.53
relatives owning land (8.733) (8.850) (9.711) (10.35) (15.85)
# of HH head’s 4.158 10.17 5.822 14.74 18.49
spouse relatives owning land (5.282) (6.511) (7.692) (8.565) (13.06)
# of HH head -2.834 12.01 4.292 4.961 27.18
relatives living outside thana (9.420) (8.608) (10.21) (12.38) (24.03)
# of HH head’s 6.103 2.005 7.094 7.905 -4.066
spouse relatives living outside thana (5.647) (5.580) (6.980) (7.650) (10.80)
Loans from 159.3** 136.6* 212.0* 196.0* 100.7
traditional banks (1=yes) (103.0) (104.2) (104.1) (114.7) (181.1)
Loans from informal -55.59 81.72 26.02 -63.22 31.54
sources (1=yes) (90.15) (79.67) (81.04) (102.5) (145.4)
Loans from relatives 37.04 13.21 119.4 46.39 -65.44
(1=yes) (78.16) (73.51) (82.84) (90.70) (146.5)
Eligibility of HH -205.2** -265.2** -229.8** -262.3** -178.1
(1=yes) (80.27) (79.32) (79.59) (95.57) (148.9)
Intercepts
Second wave of data -100.4 61.98 147.3** 203.9** 498.2**
(1=yes) (55.05) (54.28) (63.32) (78.79) (114.6)
Overall intercept 2413.9** 3140.1** 3704.6** 4393.0** 6162.0**
(264.9) (223.8) (298.1) (355.5) (998.0)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table H.4 Pooled quantile regressions with village quantile effects, household food
expenditure, by gender
Quantile
10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Female microcredit 0.003 0.005** 0.004* 0.003 0.003
borrowings (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Male microcredit 0.004 0.008* 0.004 -0.001 -0.006
borrowings (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head 21.69 18.13 18.16* 39.66** 108.0**
(13.23) (12.61) (13.27) (15.89) (23.76)
Age of HH head 0.326 -1.684 -1.825 0.645 -3.931
(1.923) (1.923) (2.043) (2.416) (3.004)
Gender of HH head 96.06 72.10 -164.4 -315.3* -729.8**
(111.5) (109.3) (131.9) (139.4) (234.5)
Highest education of 16.86* 27.43** 32.47** 27.39* 16.14
men in HH (11.96) (10.65) (10.40) (12.20) (18.13)
Highest education of 1.360 12.99 31.42** 37.34** 26.20*
women in HH (9.183) (10.47) (12.95) (12.93) (19.00)
Landholdings 0.502** 0.459** 0.671** 0.466** 1.173*
(0.238) (0.230) (0.225) (0.264) (0.487)
HH economic -85.12** -104.5** -130.9** -129.5** -177.7**
dependency ratio (14.62) (14.19) (15.94) (19.39) (27.82)
# of HH head 18.50** 15.47* 16.59* 20.26* 10.77
relatives owning land (8.726) (8.844) (9.729) (10.37) (15.79)
# of HH head’s 4.236 10.49 5.930 13.63 19.63
spouse relatives owning land (5.282) (6.551) (7.693) (8.516) (13.05)
# of HH head -2.723 10.50 4.445 4.421 30.83
relatives living outside thana (9.471) (8.630) (10.25) (12.36) (24.07)
# of HH head’s 5.927 3.010 6.818 7.876 -1.707
spouse relatives living outside thana (5.647) (5.602) (6.976) (7.606) (10.85)
Loans from 158.9** 134.3* 208.5* 194.7* 114.9
traditional banks (1=yes) (102.4) (103.9) (104.3) (114.4) (180.1)
Loans from informal -55.52 89.76 26.61 -61.10 12.42
sources (1=yes) (91.08) (79.62) (81.02) (102.6) (144.5)
Loans from relatives 35.50 4.985 118.3 46.50 -59.72
(1=yes) (77.37) (73.21) (81.96) (90.26) (144.6)
Eligibility of HH -208.0** -266.8** -226.9** -259.1** -151.5
(1=yes) (80.09) (79.21) (79.57) (95.57) (149.4)
Intercepts
Second wave of data -98.70 59.66 147.5** 199.1** 491.0**
(1=yes) (55.03) (54.18) (63.42) (79.31) (114.4)
Overall intercept 2418.7** 3148.3** 3707.6** 4397.3** 6131.8**
(265.5) (225.9) (297.8) (355.6) (997.9)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table H.5 Pooled quantile regressions with village quantile effects, household non-
food expenditure
Quantile
10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Household 0.002** 0.003** 0.005** 0.007** 0.025**
microcredit borrowings (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.011)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head -0.661 -4.441 7.989 39.02 67.61
(4.839) (8.146) (11.98) (24.88) (49.86)
Age of HH head -2.351** -2.860** -2.480** -3.988** -8.793**
(0.759) (0.968) (1.249) (2.124) (4.019)
Gender of HH head 44.81 5.734 1.401 -93.00 -260.9
(41.88) (42.61) (61.82) (106.2) (264.1)
Highest education of 23.72** 31.67** 36.66** 42.69** 77.02**
men in HH (4.347) (6.080) (9.079) (18.95) (37.52)
Highest education of 21.44** 40.23** 51.47** 84.18** 186.2**
women in HH (3.394) (6.347) (10.83) (23.41) (39.78)
Landholdings 0.173** 0.265** 0.360** 1.219 0.859
(0.121) (0.210) (0.432) (0.693) (0.730)
HH economic -25.86** -31.78** -50.01** -52.79** -107.2**
dependency ratio (5.053) (7.642) (10.60) (17.96) (33.59)
# of HH head 7.915** 8.353* 8.882 15.21 2.271
relatives owning land (2.891) (4.007) (6.686) (13.47) (19.08)
# of HH head’s 3.433 3.926 1.153 3.837 31.51
spouse relatives owning land (2.585) (3.324) (4.601) (8.641) (15.87)
# of HH head -3.032 -2.633 -0.168 -8.738 -7.297
relatives living outside thana (3.539) (4.612) (6.151) (10.26) (19.54)
# of HH head’s 3.062 2.528 -3.177 2.339 -16.00
spouse relatives living outside thana (2.176) (2.791) (3.838) (7.363) (13.41)
Loans from 132.7** 78.57** 228.5** 494.2** 1848.2**
traditional banks (1=yes) (34.72) (58.31) (126.6) (240.8) (789.9)
Loans from informal 32.17 31.20 32.73 69.01 267.4
sources (1=yes) (27.90) (44.48) (64.80) (118.9) (214.1)
Loans from relatives 26.64* 96.12** 127.6** 265.0** 547.8
(1=yes) (31.12) (43.94) (70.92) (143.5) (298.8)
Eligibility of HH -103.1** -82.07* -108.4 -198.2 -308.6
(1=yes) (31.12) (43.98) (70.57) (120.3) (231.2)
Intercepts
Second wave of data 177.4** 230.6** 285.9** 437.3** 810.3**
(1=yes) (20.86) (28.10) (41.24) (68.91) (147.2)
Overall intercept 372.9** 684.4** 948.9** 1448.0** 2552.1**
(106.4) (143.7) (187.3) (450.2) (2375.3)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table H.6 Pooled quantile regressions with village quantile effects, household non-
food expenditure, by gender
Quantile
10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Female microcredit 0.002** 0.004** 0.006** 0.009** 0.027**
borrowings (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.013)
Male microcredit 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.011
borrowings (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.007) (0.014)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head -0.654 -4.831 8.875 38.31 68.43
(4.880) (8.066) (12.08) (24.56) (50.94)
Age of HH head -2.353** -2.890** -2.348** -3.739** -8.807*
(0.759) (0.956) (1.260) (2.129) (4.012)
Gender of HH head 46.59 1.842 -1.236 -75.20 -262.9
(42.19) (42.61) (61.88) (105.8) (265.9)
Highest education of 23.54** 31.68** 36.78** 42.46** 77.59**
men in HH (4.368) (6.088) (9.185) (18.72) (38.15)
Highest education of 21.48** 41.49** 49.84** 84.52** 186.1**
women in HH (3.373) (6.242) (10.77) (23.43) (39.90)
Landholdings 0.173** 0.257** 0.353** 1.217 0.867
(0.120) (0.206) (0.433) (0.689) (0.730)
HH economic -25.70** -32.43** -48.53** -50.72** -108.6**
dependency ratio (5.066) (7.405) (10.56) (18.05) (33.87)
# of HH head 8.006** 9.470** 8.028* 15.58 2.211
relatives owning land (2.872) (3.957) (6.727) (13.56) (18.88)
# of HH head’s 3.478 3.106 2.070 4.042 30.97
spouse relatives owning land (2.607) (3.277) (4.552) (8.669) (16.03)
# of HH head -3.044 -2.503 -1.370 -7.685 -8.304
relatives living outside thana (3.557) (4.470) (6.196) (10.35) (19.44)
# of HH head’s 3.091 2.303 -3.014 1.563 -16.53
spouse relatives living outside thana (2.214) (2.762) (3.826) (7.385) (13.62)
Loans from 131.7** 67.65* 219.8** 506.0** 1857.5**
traditional banks (1=yes) (34.67) (57.48) (127.1) (238.8) (788.9)
Loans from informal 31.25 38.76 29.99 56.73 266.5
sources (1=yes) (27.73) (43.72) (64.41) (117.8) (216.2)
Loans from relatives 26.18* 93.19** 131.3** 273.5** 541.5
(1=yes) (31.03) (43.65) (70.89) (143.6) (298.4)
Eligibility of HH -103.2** -89.20* -113.3 -190.8 -319.4
(1=yes) (31.19) (43.73) (69.32) (119.7) (232.9)
Intercepts
Second wave of data 176.7** 221.9** 283.0** 429.7** 817.4**
(1=yes) (20.83) (27.72) (41.89) (68.88) (148.7)
Overall intercept 371.3** 698.1** 940.7** 1401.3** 2568.5**
(106.3) (143.4) (188.1) (451.7) (2375.4)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table I.1 Pooled quantile regressions with penalised village effects, household total
expenditure
Quantile
10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Household 0.008** 0.010** 0.017** 0.022** 0.034**
microcredit borrowings (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.011)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head -8.438 11.77 18.13 52.71* 128.6
(15.55) (15.35) (17.85) (31.12) (77.40)
Age of HH head -2.701 -5.055** -5.694** -8.957** -18.27**
(2.438) (2.185) (2.439) (3.398) (5.955)
Gender of HH head 173.8* 8.788 -212.5 -408.3** -1196.8**
(101.5) (149.3) (136.2) (184.6) (524.2)
Highest education of 49.08** 58.05** 68.25** 82.92** 144.5**
men in HH (13.84) (12.21) (14.21) (24.95) (56.76)
Highest education of 40.85** 75.95** 94.83** 121.4** 233.8**
women in HH (12.78) (13.24) (13.61) (24.40) (68.12)
Landholdings 0.947** 1.121** 1.756** 2.124** 2.012**
(0.389) (0.430) (0.569) (0.671) (1.467)
HH economic -112.8** -139.6** -187.4** -209.2** -236.5**
dependency ratio (16.49) (15.39) (17.88) (24.81) (50.67)
# of HH head 11.61 9.996 2.992 19.63 23.34
relatives owning land (8.282) (9.400) (11.57) (16.67) (28.35)
# of HH head’s 9.711 5.157 9.117 7.120 22.35
spouse relatives owning land (7.393) (7.154) (8.346) (11.88) (21.94)
# of HH head 17.35 11.07 1.668 16.37 92.69**
relatives living outside thana (9.708) (8.919) (11.67) (17.87) (30.21)
# of HH head’s -1.546 7.900 7.274 11.25 10.05
spouse relatives living outside thana (7.053) (6.557) (6.535) (10.71) (23.67)
Loans from 285.7** 328.0** 399.3** 698.3** 1409.9**
traditional banks (1=yes) (122.5) (111.4) (144.8) (334.5) (673.5)
Loans from informal 169.7** 184.5** 181.5 340.3 867.5**
sources (1=yes) (85.23) (82.90) (119.9) (202.6) (315.9)
Loans from relatives 190.5* 196.0** 350.8** 568.1** 1399.8**
(1=yes) (88.46) (87.37) (106.7) (163.3) (385.2)
Eligibility of HH -332.8** -387.4** -546.6** -771.5** -1274.9**
(1=yes) (96.30) (104.1) (137.4) (228.0) (545.0)
Intercepts
Second wave of data 65.20 195.1** 421.3** 524.2** 784.7**
(1=yes) (54.10) (55.05) (70.81) (96.22) (199.7)
Overall intercept 2669.3** 3467.1** 4263.6** 5225.0** 7468.2**
(188.8) (203.5) (218.0) (334.5) (809.4)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table I.2 Pooled quantile regressions with penalised village effects, household total
expenditure, by gender
Quantile
10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Female microcredit 0.009** 0.013** 0.019** 0.023** 0.050**
borrowings (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.014)
Male microcredit 0.005 0.005* 0.004 0.008 -0.000
borrowings (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.008) (0.014)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head -6.327 11.22 17.55 49.62* 126.4
(15.58) (15.27) (17.81) (31.66) (76.65)
Age of HH head -2.835 -5.281** -6.669** -9.312** -18.96**
(2.453) (2.254) (2.423) (3.437) (6.207)
Gender of HH head 187.9* -9.372 -177.8 -370.8** -1127.0**
(102.8) (149.2) (137.5) (186.0) (530.6)
Highest education of 46.38** 57.81** 68.42** 81.58** 146.6**
men in HH (14.01) (12.49) (14.08) (25.33) (55.48)
Highest education of 42.39** 77.58** 103.4** 131.8** 228.2**
women in HH (12.91) (13.38) (13.83) (24.21) (67.11)
Landholdings 1.025** 1.097** 1.722** 2.100** 1.940**
(0.396) (0.422) (0.581) (0.665) (1.507)
HH economic -111.5** -144.8** -182.4** -214.2** -238.2**
dependency ratio (16.23) (15.54) (17.73) (25.44) (51.10)
# of HH head 7.937* 8.876 3.740 17.58 14.80
relatives owning land (8.329) (9.256) (11.59) (16.66) (28.55)
# of HH head’s 12.28 6.943 9.213 9.707 38.77
spouse relatives owning land (7.267) (7.192) (8.660) (11.96) (22.54)
# of HH head 18.25 12.00 3.949 16.36 73.47**
relatives living outside thana (9.620) (8.955) (11.83) (18.35) (29.80)
# of HH head’s -1.099 9.153 6.683 11.32 6.508
spouse relatives living outside thana (7.120) (6.447) (6.359) (10.62) (23.14)
Loans from 320.5** 354.9** 344.1** 712.9** 1325.4**
traditional banks (1=yes) (122.9) (109.1) (146.7) (325.5) (658.2)
Loans from informal 177.8** 167.4** 172.0 330.0 772.5**
sources (1=yes) (86.82) (84.72) (120.0) (200.8) (320.0)
Loans from relatives 191.1* 193.1** 336.1** 537.2** 1401.9**
(1=yes) (88.21) (87.54) (108.1) (163.9) (380.9)
Eligibility of HH -329.9** -400.4** -541.9** -711.6** -1263.2**
(1=yes) (96.99) (103.0) (139.3) (228.3) (541.1)
Intercepts
Second wave of data 59.73 176.4** 405.8** 519.1** 701.7**
(1=yes) (54.95) (55.66) (71.54) (97.18) (204.0)
Overall intercept 2652.4** 3518.2** 4255.1** 5174.5** 7530.0**
(190.9) (204.3) (220.4) (337.2) (811.8)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table I.3 Pooled quantile regressions with penalised village effects, household food
expenditure
Quantile
10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Household 0.005** 0.008** 0.006** 0.007** 0.007**
microcredit borrowings (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head 4.633 7.679 12.82* 33.92** 55.50**
(12.42) (9.563) (8.968) (13.16) (24.51)
Age of HH head -0.528 -2.617 -2.591** -3.811 -6.063*
(1.789) (1.518) (1.397) (1.988) (3.018)
Gender of HH head 126.5* 72.11 -130.1 -260.9** -565.1**
(86.75) (103.6) (97.50) (96.64) (254.2)
Highest education of 27.18** 29.27** 32.79** 32.10** 32.94*
men in HH (11.32) (7.822) (7.052) (10.77) (20.13)
Highest education of 10.81 25.75** 48.49** 49.84** 69.94**
women in HH (8.331) (8.196) (7.950) (9.751) (18.37)
Landholdings 0.356** 0.501** 0.635** 0.718** 0.905**
(0.215) (0.189) (0.184) (0.296) (0.550)
HH economic -84.82** -96.45** -129.2** -147.2** -172.7**
dependency ratio (12.57) (9.667) (9.554) (13.68) (24.55)
# of HH head 6.986 5.086 -1.066 0.887 -5.754
relatives owning land (6.168) (5.861) (5.768) (7.773) (13.35)
# of HH head’s 7.301 3.561 2.802 0.392 -0.669
spouse relatives owning land (5.643) (4.838) (4.568) (6.188) (8.954)
# of HH head 6.983 11.24 4.542 4.915 3.543
relatives living outside thana (7.797) (6.136) (6.232) (10.10) (22.27)
# of HH head’s 3.848 1.695 4.149 6.800 0.111
spouse relatives living outside thana (4.792) (4.049) (4.362) (5.756) (10.70)
Loans from 151.0** 201.8** 196.0** 89.29 260.7
traditional banks (1=yes) (80.80) (72.36) (69.18) (94.56) (171.1)
Loans from informal 63.02 142.7** 105.2* 51.48 228.3
sources (1=yes) (68.24) (68.36) (57.96) (91.14) (175.7)
Loans from relatives 92.23 124.3* 136.4** 104.0* 177.6
(1=yes) (67.01) (62.61) (50.60) (76.92) (137.5)
Eligibility of HH -212.1** -273.6** -317.5** -383.8** -502.5**
(1=yes) (68.16) (66.35) (59.50) (92.91) (164.7)
Intercepts
Second wave of data -138.8** -51.90 59.87 143.4** 443.2**
(1=yes) (45.78) (41.04) (40.74) (62.36) (101.4)
Overall intercept 2237.8** 2790.6** 3375.4** 3977.9** 5146.5**
(138.8) (131.8) (121.8) (149.3) (314.8)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table I.4 Pooled quantile regressions with penalised village effects, household food
expenditure, by gender
Quantile
10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Female microcredit 0.005** 0.008** 0.007** 0.009** 0.010**
borrowings (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Male microcredit -0.000 0.007** 0.003** 0.001 -0.001
borrowings (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head 3.869 7.587 11.51* 36.30** 59.63**
(12.00) (9.579) (8.661) (13.36) (23.76)
Age of HH head -0.992 -2.766 -2.767** -3.745 -5.507*
(1.755) (1.521) (1.395) (1.984) (3.051)
Gender of HH head 126.9* 71.62 -131.3 -244.1** -515.8**
(87.06) (102.7) (96.99) (97.76) (255.2)
Highest education of 26.82** 29.34** 34.21** 32.67** 27.63*
men in HH (11.02) (7.851) (6.939) (10.78) (19.80)
Highest education of 10.13 25.95** 47.79** 47.56** 69.62**
women in HH (8.324) (8.138) (7.724) (9.785) (17.71)
Landholdings 0.373** 0.494** 0.636** 0.671** 0.918**
(0.216) (0.188) (0.182) (0.286) (0.546)
HH economic -84.58** -97.51** -129.9** -147.9** -176.7**
dependency ratio (12.31) (9.671) (9.593) (13.91) (24.78)
# of HH head 7.376 5.211 -0.561 3.382 -7.301
relatives owning land (6.174) (5.819) (5.946) (7.637) (13.38)
# of HH head’s 6.888 4.029 3.048 1.388 0.627
spouse relatives owning land (5.566) (4.805) (4.585) (5.996) (8.937)
# of HH head 4.985 11.12 4.796 5.200 10.83
relatives living outside thana (7.681) (6.049) (6.326) (9.715) (22.36)
# of HH head’s 4.567 1.350 3.842 5.592 2.202
spouse relatives living outside thana (4.802) (4.063) (4.310) (5.538) (10.81)
Loans from 159.5** 197.8** 198.2** 106.1 254.5
traditional banks (1=yes) (81.94) (72.01) (69.18) (90.26) (166.2)
Loans from informal 57.53 138.6** 107.8* 54.28 224.8
sources (1=yes) (67.79) (68.63) (56.33) (88.63) (169.8)
Loans from relatives 81.34 123.1 140.3** 122.5* 197.0
(1=yes) (66.80) (62.65) (49.91) (75.76) (137.9)
Eligibility of HH -203.9** -273.2** -312.3** -395.0** -509.5**
(1=yes) (68.62) (65.58) (58.73) (93.08) (163.4)
Intercepts
Second wave of data -139.1** -50.10 58.02 124.0** 415.8**
(1=yes) (45.89) (40.82) (40.92) (61.37) (102.2)
Overall intercept 2263.2** 2802.5** 3381.1** 3968.3** 5093.4**
(137.8) (131.5) (121.3) (150.7) (317.2)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table I.5 Pooled quantile regressions with penalised village effects, household non-
food expenditure
Quantile
10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Household 0.003** 0.004** 0.005** 0.013** 0.029**
microcredit borrowings (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.009)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head 2.314 -2.993 -0.438 9.061 50.72
(5.062) (5.935) (8.652) (19.86) (61.95)
Age of HH head -1.640** -2.073** -3.011** -4.519** -9.279**
(0.713) (0.657) (0.891) (1.504) (3.679)
Gender of HH head 46.05 -8.759 -22.10 -138.1 -461.7
(34.05) (35.49) (47.09) (81.04) (530.7)
Highest education of 14.38** 23.60** 34.57** 47.13** 96.37**
men in HH (4.566) (4.494) (7.005) (16.10) (50.90)
Highest education of 21.40** 35.35** 46.75** 85.27** 179.0**
women in HH (3.668) (4.846) (6.169) (16.82) (55.47)
Landholdings 0.278** 0.442** 0.813** 1.485** 1.430**
(0.105) (0.202) (0.331) (0.566) (1.116)
HH economic -22.52** -28.08** -45.75** -58.11** -81.66*
dependency ratio (4.499) (4.853) (6.472) (9.814) (34.93)
# of HH head 6.520** 5.416** 2.212 4.542 6.523
relatives owning land (2.464) (2.604) (4.036) (6.789) (23.14)
# of HH head’s 2.831 3.779** 6.356* 0.277 32.20
spouse relatives owning land (2.226) (1.996) (2.654) (4.434) (18.91)
# of HH head -1.990 -0.986 -1.157 12.36 56.07**
relatives living outside thana (2.679) (2.844) (4.196) (8.535) (27.42)
# of HH head’s 0.905 3.002 2.184 3.783 -2.422
spouse relatives living outside thana (1.930) (1.834) (2.609) (4.307) (15.91)
Loans from 57.04* 90.22** 232.2** 502.5** 1439.1**
traditional banks (1=yes) (37.33) (44.97) (96.34) (180.7) (666.9)
Loans from informal 26.54 57.63** 88.83* 235.2** 520.0**
sources (1=yes) (34.27) (29.99) (47.73) (84.31) (215.5)
Loans from relatives 58.44* 109.3** 153.6** 299.6** 1219.5**
(1=yes) (25.77) (31.39) (46.48) (121.9) (473.9)
Eligibility of HH -64.93** -90.86** -100.5** -341.6** -833.0**
(1=yes) (31.18) (36.17) (54.00) (121.7) (460.9)
Intercepts
Second wave of data 156.0** 185.9** 253.2** 331.9** 687.1**
(1=yes) (17.35) (16.94) (27.18) (41.93) (165.5)
Overall intercept 292.7** 494.6** 678.4** 1193.5** 2421.1**
(54.12) (58.54) (80.34) (166.3) (743.6)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table I.6 Pooled quantile regressions with penalised village effects, household non-
food expenditure, by gender
Quantile
10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Female microcredit 0.003** 0.004** 0.007** 0.015** 0.042**
borrowings (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.012)
Male microcredit 0.002* 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.021
borrowings (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.014)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head 2.919 -5.156 0.977 11.26 47.16
(5.258) (5.942) (8.495) (19.33) (62.72)
Age of HH head -1.571** -2.281** -3.090** -4.457** -9.415**
(0.714) (0.665) (0.885) (1.537) (3.710)
Gender of HH head 43.29* -4.728 -7.298 -111.2 -542.8
(33.84) (35.23) (47.64) (80.13) (525.3)
Highest education of 14.08** 26.36** 33.34** 45.90** 114.9**
men in HH (4.716) (4.557) (6.940) (15.72) (53.07)
Highest education of 20.73** 36.78** 46.75** 81.89** 167.4**
women in HH (3.668) (4.857) (6.270) (16.52) (55.53)
Landholdings 0.275** 0.401** 0.722** 1.467** 1.824**
(0.104) (0.199) (0.334) (0.558) (1.171)
HH economic -22.44** -27.81** -46.67** -57.42** -71.31*
dependency ratio (4.594) (4.822) (6.632) (10.16) (34.16)
# of HH head 6.524** 6.093** 4.509 5.792 13.35
relatives owning land (2.459) (2.661) (4.089) (6.955) (24.17)
# of HH head’s 3.695 4.493** 6.145* 1.976 26.51
spouse relatives owning land (2.212) (2.030) (2.637) (4.572) (19.34)
# of HH head -1.908 -1.106 0.0813 11.76 52.79**
relatives living outside thana (2.689) (2.909) (4.232) (8.804) (27.73)
# of HH head’s 0.889 3.118 2.296 4.569 -8.883
spouse relatives living outside thana (1.948) (1.821) (2.621) (4.555) (16.29)
Loans from 51.14* 85.80** 240.7** 506.6** 1403.3**
traditional banks (1=yes) (37.41) (46.17) (97.55) (184.9) (688.4)
Loans from informal 30.82 60.92** 94.36** 218.3** 492.6**
sources (1=yes) (33.85) (30.04) (46.73) (81.99) (219.3)
Loans from relatives 60.01* 109.6** 161.1** 302.8** 1154.7**
(1=yes) (26.37) (31.86) (45.85) (124.0) (481.1)
Eligibility of HH -71.37** -87.58** -109.3** -333.4** -810.6**
(1=yes) (31.33) (36.26) (52.87) (121.9) (465.9)
Intercepts
Second wave of data 158.7** 188.2** 245.7** 325.9** 641.0**
(1=yes) (17.58) (17.09) (26.89) (43.85) (165.7)
Overall intercept 294.9** 488.9** 677.0** 1163.0** 2450.0**
(53.64) (58.81) (79.35) (166.5) (751.6)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table J.1 Panel quantile regressions with household correlated random effects,
household total expenditure
Quantile
10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Household 0.011** 0.016** 0.024** 0.036** 0.061**
microcredit borrowings (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.017)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head 43.10 -17.11 -43.09 -45.84 -120.6
(41.56) (34.28) (44.01) (66.65) (175.3)
Age of HH head 10.00 -7.205 -5.239 -2.219 -4.459
(8.883) (6.841) (7.372) (11.60) (20.43)
Gender of HH head -329.0 -95.13 -117.9 -677.2 -2190.4**
(330.2) (264.2) (308.6) (391.8) (913.8)
Highest education of 44.55 68.31** 75.93** 80.87 174.3
men in HH (35.24) (28.76) (32.73) (46.22) (106.4)
Highest education of -12.52 64.05** 89.08** 115.7** 197.9**
women in HH (24.68) (27.63) (26.86) (38.77) (103.6)
Landholdings -0.649 -0.0398 -0.633 -1.672 -3.404
(0.573) (0.522) (0.909) (1.314) (3.253)
HH economic -48.60** -102.6** -130.6** -166.6** -115.9
dependency ratio (30.36) (25.45) (30.94) (51.83) (113.0)
# of HH head 48.27** 24.71 32.39 25.20 46.94
relatives owning land (20.31) (20.19) (25.53) (27.72) (64.85)
# of HH head’s -15.20 -13.11 -10.71 3.181 40.55
spouse relatives owning land (15.55) (14.31) (17.72) (27.86) (44.42)
# of HH head 15.35 27.44 5.503 -20.01 7.070
relatives living outside thana (20.74) (17.16) (20.27) (25.53) (59.11)
# of HH head’s 3.953 7.008 11.55 12.32 9.934
spouse relatives living outside thana (16.51) (14.73) (14.89) (22.72) (52.31)
Loans from 67.11 258.7 337.8 179.4 -763.7
traditional banks (1=yes) (223.6) (239.3) (291.3) (473.1) (1555.0)
Loans from informal 125.3 30.66 -125.7 124.8 548.0
sources (1=yes) (169.0) (181.3) (191.5) (323.3) (711.7)
Loans from relatives 374.6 343.6** 393.9** 922.7** 1413.0*
(1=yes) (178.0) (141.1) (170.8) (265.5) (614.6)
Eligibility of HH -226.1 -168.7 -207.3 -327.2 -475.6
(1=yes) (170.0) (149.4) (188.0) (301.2) (717.0)
Village covariates
Average male wage 0.0376 -1.523 0.732 1.648 -7.617
(4.123) (3.534) (4.373) (6.722) (17.32)
Average female wage 2.771 2.859 2.102 0.506 17.91
(3.400) (2.996) (4.713) (6.012) (14.40)
Primary school -54.43 -126.4 -223.0** -309.8** -202.7
(1=yes) (90.62) (83.80) (111.4) (137.6) (276.3)
Food program (1=yes) -138.2 -177.0** -206.7* -138.1 -358.7*
(76.81) (65.45) (88.12) (119.5) (247.6)
Distance to nearest -15.99 -39.47** -49.55** -62.14** -92.79*
bank (km) (17.57) (12.90) (16.92) (23.31) (52.14)
Distance to nearest -15.34 -23.67* -4.699 -11.71 25.82
pucca road (km) (14.43) (11.99) (14.89) (18.93) (54.11)
Distance to nearest 47.73* 45.63** 64.38** 83.59** 19.54
shop/market (km) (26.11) (23.81) (28.90) (38.70) (69.28)
Electricity in 258.0** 314.0** 415.6** 539.6** 586.3**
village (1=yes) (78.76) (76.09) (94.73) (131.6) (287.3)
Price of rice 6.212 44.62 48.06 1.194 136.8
(34.17) (31.52) (45.60) (65.62) (144.5)
Price of wheat flour 25.86 -63.55 -60.77 26.71 86.08
(45.91) (40.44) (49.35) (68.24) (161.4)
Price of mustard oil 12.78 6.427 5.271 -2.789 -22.91
(7.104) (5.896) (8.063) (10.97) (21.31)
Price of hen’s eggs -13.70 -7.139 -1.161 -41.91 -66.25
(16.17) (16.43) (17.89) (47.88) (198.4)
Price of milk 28.54* 29.20** 50.74** 62.28** 53.51
(13.49) (13.28) (17.58) (27.57) (57.84)
Price of potatoes -8.769 -0.167 -19.73 -28.52 45.25
(18.62) (18.34) (26.08) (40.00) (71.87)
Intercepts
Second wave of data -398.2 20.92 250.6 216.4 -70.75
(1=yes) (216.4) (208.2) (248.6) (369.5) (688.3)
Overall intercept 1537.5** 3373.4** 3976.8** 4741.5** 4696.3**
(629.5) (561.9) (728.3) (1053.6) (2372.9)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table J.2 Panel quantile regressions with household correlated random effects,
household total expenditure, by gender
Quantile
10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Female microcredit 0.013** 0.016** 0.023** 0.040** 0.068**
borrowings (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.020)
Male microcredit 0.003 0.014 0.023** 0.049** 0.032
borrowings (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.038)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head 50.40 -16.25 -31.09 -47.82 -93.43
(41.09) (34.61) (44.65) (65.23) (174.0)
Age of HH head 10.29 -7.303 -5.109 -5.906 -7.636
(8.826) (6.885) (7.462) (11.74) (20.36)
Gender of HH head -332.8 -81.72 -172.7 -661.1 -2183.4**
(331.0) (263.1) (306.3) (388.4) (910.2)
Highest education of 45.31 64.67** 74.94** 75.68* 180.7
men in HH (35.37) (28.69) (32.64) (46.80) (106.7)
Highest education of -7.145 65.04** 93.04** 117.8** 185.5*
women in HH (24.78) (27.83) (26.89) (38.74) (104.0)
Landholdings -0.652 -0.0526 -0.742 -1.520 -3.297
(0.575) (0.524) (0.916) (1.302) (3.295)
HH economic -59.01** -101.0** -130.1** -164.6** -104.5
dependency ratio (30.85) (25.60) (30.63) (52.11) (113.3)
# of HH head 42.40** 25.12 32.90 27.26 44.09
relatives owning land (20.35) (20.30) (25.41) (27.84) (64.09)
# of HH head’s -18.19 -13.99 -11.13 5.537 34.59
spouse relatives owning land (15.52) (14.31) (17.79) (27.56) (44.54)
# of HH head 15.82 25.16 6.787 -13.53 13.46
relatives living outside thana (20.61) (17.15) (20.19) (25.95) (58.62)
# of HH head’s 2.703 4.617 14.07 11.66 11.98
spouse relatives living outside thana (16.27) (14.68) (14.69) (22.57) (52.48)
Loans from 28.46 274.4 274.9 158.9 -600.5
traditional banks (1=yes) (224.9) (241.2) (290.2) (466.6) (1541.0)
Loans from informal 148.2 25.66 -117.7 86.37 670.4
sources (1=yes) (171.7) (181.9) (193.6) (321.9) (716.3)
Loans from relatives 324.6 352.5** 375.7** 889.1** 1460.0*
(1=yes) (178.3) (141.9) (171.9) (265.7) (609.4)
Eligibility of HH -244.8 -166.4 -201.5 -266.2 -600.7
(1=yes) (169.4) (149.3) (188.5) (301.2) (713.2)
Village covariates
Average male wage -0.498 -1.724 0.701 1.304 -4.847
(4.081) (3.532) (4.335) (6.728) (17.14)
Average female wage 2.800 3.159 2.563 2.037 12.56
(3.404) (2.972) (4.739) (5.986) (14.41)
Primary school -53.40 -117.0 -217.1** -312.5** -211.6
(1=yes) (91.99) (83.67) (111.2) (139.1) (278.3)
Food program (1=yes) -141.1 -185.7** -215.5* -122.3 -317.6
(76.54) (66.64) (88.02) (119.4) (250.7)
Distance to nearest -20.97 -39.91** -51.87** -66.11** -99.58*
bank (km) (17.45) (12.84) (16.96) (23.68) (52.22)
Distance to nearest -9.721 -25.47* -6.517 -14.42 33.42
pucca road (km) (14.44) (11.99) (14.89) (19.19) (54.32)
Distance to nearest 51.20* 50.52** 66.67** 86.75** 33.90
shop/market (km) (25.85) (23.82) (28.76) (38.71) (69.25)
Electricity in 262.8** 312.7** 418.7** 509.9** 609.9**
village (1=yes) (78.80) (77.16) (95.20) (131.7) (292.3)
Price of rice 9.049 44.60 50.69 -1.533 152.3
(34.74) (31.93) (46.08) (65.86) (141.3)
Price of wheat flour 20.66 -60.58 -68.15 34.26 112.2
(45.87) (40.58) (49.25) (68.49) (161.1)
Price of mustard oil 12.78 6.396 4.685 -2.607 -23.71
(7.115) (5.895) (8.074) (11.04) (21.18)
Price of hen’s eggs -15.95 -9.270 -5.087 -42.22 -77.89
(16.27) (16.34) (17.91) (47.81) (199.0)
Price of milk 30.09* 28.02** 50.03** 58.04** 47.62
(13.31) (13.16) (17.42) (27.46) (57.57)
Price of potatoes -13.46 -0.758 -20.88 -25.33 39.48
(18.63) (18.42) (26.15) (40.12) (72.13)
Intercepts
Second wave of data -372.6 20.48 253.1 158.8 -140.0
(1=yes) (214.1) (210.7) (248.3) (368.9) (674.9)
Overall intercept 1575.0** 3373.5** 4018.4** 4729.9** 4465.3**
(626.7) (567.0) (737.1) (1054.6) (2306.3)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table J.3 Panel quantile regressions with household correlated random effects,
household food expenditure
Quantile
10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Household 0.006** 0.010** 0.010** 0.013** 0.011*
microcredit borrowings (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head 22.70 -0.878 5.917 -13.03 37.97
(24.55) (19.51) (20.74) (27.67) (55.61)
Age of HH head 1.791 -6.748 -6.998 0.370 17.68
(6.997) (6.303) (4.087) (5.270) (11.52)
Gender of HH head -93.18 -162.6 15.65 -278.9 -870.7*
(221.1) (202.0) (246.4) (235.9) (416.6)
Highest education of 30.57 31.61** 25.65 8.796 23.27
men in HH (22.84) (17.10) (18.27) (24.81) (35.77)
Highest education of -28.35 -7.971 14.64 27.04 28.52
women in HH (16.72) (17.56) (18.19) (19.62) (32.47)
Landholdings -0.0357 0.142 0.265 -1.015 -1.166
(0.372) (0.428) (0.653) (0.846) (0.911)
HH economic -26.62 -51.29** -72.57** -105.7** -118.5**
dependency ratio (21.13) (17.20) (19.49) (27.03) (44.19)
# of HH head 25.19* 9.242 15.73 21.58 44.70*
relatives owning land (14.37) (12.43) (15.11) (16.71) (25.96)
# of HH head’s -4.081 -11.85 -5.567 -4.377 -2.128
spouse relatives owning land (10.87) (8.640) (10.28) (11.51) (21.66)
# of HH head 16.74 18.06 1.233 3.468 -4.316
relatives living outside thana (14.71) (12.05) (12.99) (16.70) (29.05)
# of HH head’s 7.365 20.92* 18.00** 24.12** 12.34
spouse relatives living outside thana (10.80) (10.15) (9.509) (11.03) (20.02)
Loans from -160.8 -61.17 96.17 -16.45 -29.77
traditional banks (1=yes) (168.1) (135.1) (139.7) (187.4) (319.2)
Loans from informal -8.919 101.8 -64.92 -120.2 -185.4
sources (1=yes) (119.7) (99.41) (134.9) (140.2) (241.3)
Loans from relatives 97.06 131.1* 208.0* 156.2 73.95
(1=yes) (101.8) (91.54) (103.7) (124.4) (209.3)
Eligibility of HH -141.6 -173.0 -204.8 -56.89 91.62
(1=yes) (105.6) (110.3) (117.8) (147.3) (225.9)
Village covariates
Average male wage -1.486 0.549 0.855 1.698 -1.282
(2.863) (2.306) (2.920) (3.383) (7.098)
Average female wage -0.334 1.642 0.650 1.219 -3.468
(2.288) (2.195) (2.880) (3.146) (5.088)
Primary school -81.23 -133.9* -130.2* -130.7* -72.73
(1=yes) (64.09) (60.36) (66.35) (76.28) (108.6)
Food program (1=yes) -111.0* -103.4** -122.3** -169.1** -183.3*
(56.49) (45.31) (50.51) (62.74) (110.2)
Distance to nearest -20.95 -28.47** -27.51** -36.12** -55.90**
bank (km) (12.01) (9.470) (10.50) (12.99) (20.74)
Distance to nearest 4.690 -9.694 -6.685 -0.325 6.808
pucca road (km) (10.37) (8.514) (10.29) (11.73) (17.27)
Distance to nearest 20.50 20.75* 19.88 32.67 70.56
shop/market (km) (17.50) (15.76) (16.72) (21.92) (29.81)
Electricity in 252.1** 288.6** 242.9** 356.1** 538.4**
village (1=yes) (53.61) (50.69) (55.36) (73.12) (145.3)
Price of rice 51.45** 50.79** 50.15* 57.25 30.83
(23.49) (21.74) (28.54) (36.28) (54.92)
Price of wheat flour -12.62 -26.38 -29.04 -27.33 -5.464
(30.44) (29.52) (28.44) (39.49) (69.15)
Price of mustard oil 2.199 6.465 6.482 -1.090 -2.235
(4.733) (4.192) (4.420) (5.766) (10.45)
Price of hen’s eggs -12.46 -8.086 -3.815 -13.74 -22.57
(11.05) (8.645) (13.35) (27.28) (88.02)
Price of milk 24.69* 20.17** 32.05** 32.10** 61.48**
(9.698) (9.084) (10.49) (15.07) (29.03)
Price of potatoes -1.179 14.40 2.548 14.49 28.06
(12.99) (13.21) (17.02) (23.40) (31.58)
Intercepts
Second wave of data -227.7** -287.9* -134.3 -194.6 83.12
(1=yes) (151.5) (155.2) (173.1) (203.2) (306.5)
Overall intercept 1358.3** 1964.2** 2508.4** 3274.2** 4137.9**
(435.2) (403.8) (446.5) (528.3) (915.3)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table J.4 Panel quantile regressions with household correlated random effects,
household food expenditure, by gender
Quantile
10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Female microcredit 0.007** 0.011** 0.010** 0.013** 0.010*
borrowings (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Male microcredit -0.004 0.010** 0.011* 0.011** 0.012
borrowings (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.015)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head 19.13 -0.894 4.053 -6.867 39.90
(24.42) (19.67) (20.88) (26.91) (55.39)
Age of HH head 1.886 -6.840 -6.708 0.156 17.38
(6.972) (6.290) (4.106) (5.383) (11.74)
Gender of HH head -64.80 -167.5 39.60 -240.4 -865.4*
(221.0) (202.3) (246.5) (238.1) (421.6)
Highest education of 30.55 31.40** 27.71 12.67 27.80
men in HH (22.83) (17.15) (17.96) (24.63) (35.12)
Highest education of -20.46 -7.627 16.89 21.00 36.74
women in HH (16.70) (17.62) (18.21) (19.33) (31.83)
Landholdings -0.0498 0.141 0.226 -1.242 -1.261
(0.374) (0.431) (0.656) (0.842) (0.899)
HH economic -27.02 -51.27** -70.21** -107.5** -114.9**
dependency ratio (21.16) (17.32) (19.45) (27.47) (44.01)
# of HH head 26.17 8.994 17.00 24.61 40.07*
relatives owning land (14.37) (12.56) (15.05) (16.53) (25.47)
# of HH head’s -3.204 -11.56 -6.453 -6.812 -3.332
spouse relatives owning land (10.88) (8.694) (10.25) (11.27) (21.68)
# of HH head 16.22 18.03 -0.351 -0.752 -3.198
relatives living outside thana (14.63) (12.05) (12.99) (16.27) (28.72)
# of HH head’s 8.634 21.02* 16.81** 25.85** 19.07
spouse relatives living outside thana (10.88) (10.28) (9.506) (11.05) (19.39)
Loans from -162.3 -59.78 74.32 -52.08 -101.1
traditional banks (1=yes) (169.8) (135.2) (140.9) (189.4) (317.9)
Loans from informal -13.53 103.6 -38.84 -95.51 -217.7
sources (1=yes) (122.5) (100.4) (135.7) (139.4) (237.8)
Loans from relatives 78.60 131.6* 190.7* 152.5 106.6
(1=yes) (102.6) (92.24) (104.4) (123.4) (207.4)
Eligibility of HH -131.3 -172.3 -210.2 -95.22 77.08
(1=yes) (105.2) (111.0) (117.9) (148.9) (227.3)
Village covariates
Average male wage -1.507 0.566 0.738 1.596 -1.993
(2.819) (2.306) (2.914) (3.412) (7.063)
Average female wage -0.496 1.664 0.374 1.297 -2.757
(2.229) (2.199) (2.901) (3.113) (5.052)
Primary school -67.28 -134.5* -127.9* -164.4* -39.43
(1=yes) (64.22) (61.28) (66.25) (76.36) (108.4)
Food program (1=yes) -117.0** -103.2** -128.0** -169.9** -218.5*
(55.86) (45.48) (50.58) (62.43) (107.3)
Distance to nearest -21.05 -28.48** -26.88** -36.38** -55.80**
bank (km) (11.95) (9.478) (10.54) (13.15) (20.71)
Distance to nearest 4.793 -9.472 -4.182 -1.995 5.969
pucca road (km) (10.40) (8.570) (10.38) (11.58) (17.39)
Distance to nearest 23.20* 20.61* 20.49 29.10 74.51*
shop/market (km) (17.49) (15.80) (16.83) (22.29) (29.46)
Electricity in 252.7** 287.2** 240.3** 341.3** 505.9**
village (1=yes) (52.51) (51.19) (55.79) (73.71) (144.3)
Price of rice 54.69** 50.66** 55.53* 52.58 46.63
(23.17) (21.91) (28.57) (35.85) (54.78)
Price of wheat flour -16.62 -26.29 -25.31 -22.59 -19.60
(30.39) (29.38) (28.30) (39.32) (68.77)
Price of mustard oil 1.562 6.627 6.876 -1.393 -1.088
(4.693) (4.223) (4.462) (5.852) (10.62)
Price of hen’s eggs -12.16 -7.887 -3.954 -14.88 -26.47
(11.04) (8.811) (13.61) (26.86) (88.57)
Price of milk 24.17** 20.14** 32.36** 33.60** 73.43**
(9.578) (9.170) (10.42) (14.81) (28.74)
Price of potatoes -0.0204 14.55 4.243 16.09 27.04
(12.77) (13.40) (17.03) (23.16) (31.84)
Intercepts
Second wave of data -219.9** -290.1* -151.0 -216.4 -0.145
(1=yes) (148.7) (155.3) (174.5) (201.2) (302.6)
Overall intercept 1376.1** 1965.4** 2385.4** 3259.7** 3913.8**
(432.2) (404.9) (446.7) (520.7) (909.9)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table J.5 Panel quantile regressions with household correlated random effects,
household non-food expenditure
Quantile
10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Household 0.004** 0.007** 0.012** 0.017** 0.040**
microcredit borrowings (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.015)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head -13.17 -6.534 -19.98 -48.51 -214.2
(10.29) (12.83) (18.25) (35.75) (149.3)
Age of HH head -1.055 -0.610 -0.183 -4.350 -4.276
(2.375) (2.467) (3.152) (5.570) (13.34)
Gender of HH head 59.93 99.21 41.46 -294.7 -1001.6**
(105.0) (65.94) (114.3) (203.0) (799.9)
Highest education of 10.85 24.56** 42.31** 64.46** 179.8*
men in HH (8.613) (9.002) (14.21) (27.32) (93.35)
Highest education of 19.28** 34.35** 59.83** 103.3** 95.49*
women in HH (7.808) (9.769) (14.88) (28.70) (94.04)
Landholdings -0.441* -0.441* -0.308 0.0705 -0.762
(0.166) (0.235) (0.407) (0.739) (2.810)
HH economic -16.75** -34.74** -38.90** -58.39** 0.345
dependency ratio (7.797) (8.550) (12.74) (26.31) (80.33)
# of HH head 22.46** 7.593* 7.807 16.78 2.138
relatives owning land (5.769) (6.991) (10.52) (18.10) (48.95)
# of HH head’s -1.339 4.380 -0.391 7.932 65.78
spouse relatives owning land (3.663) (4.483) (7.874) (12.82) (35.64)
# of HH head -3.474 -4.927 1.243 1.763 35.38
relatives living outside thana (4.514) (5.224) (7.353) (12.47) (37.17)
# of HH head’s 1.672 2.241 0.342 -5.721 -39.51
spouse relatives living outside thana (3.832) (4.021) (5.427) (10.30) (35.60)
Loans from 124.1 16.45 172.3 316.1 -181.3
traditional banks (1=yes) (51.68) (83.34) (179.4) (372.6) (1863.0)
Loans from informal -45.93 36.77 -9.273 226.2 327.9
sources (1=yes) (50.73) (54.10) (88.88) (154.7) (599.3)
Loans from relatives 99.86** 141.5** 244.0** 454.8** 1908.2**
(1=yes) (46.55) (47.81) (73.33) (167.6) (658.5)
Eligibility of HH -32.01 -45.23 -39.47 -14.38 -376.4
(1=yes) (44.41) (55.37) (76.09) (159.9) (582.9)
Village covariates
Average male wage 0.460 -0.0989 -0.745 0.0267 1.919
(1.064) (1.211) (1.650) (2.904) (11.16)
Average female wage 1.299 0.804 2.846 1.559 1.913
(0.950) (0.970) (1.565) (2.798) (9.839)
Primary school -16.39 -36.35* -91.02** -210.7** -195.2*
(1=yes) (23.12) (25.81) (39.74) (68.73) (202.4)
Food program (1=yes) -11.33 -11.66 -47.39 -49.36 -106.8
(20.17) (21.30) (33.07) (57.89) (181.6)
Distance to nearest 1.587 -4.248 -15.04** -22.74** -54.08
bank (km) (4.035) (4.427) (6.447) (9.656) (31.33)
Distance to nearest -1.511 -5.002 -3.757 -6.144 14.53
pucca road (km) (3.259) (3.832) (4.756) (8.600) (35.60)
Distance to nearest 5.433 11.84* 23.23** 44.87* 30.31
shop/market (km) (6.851) (7.440) (11.16) (17.93) (49.32)
Electricity in 26.25* 69.52** 60.65** 116.2* 202.5
village (1=yes) (20.94) (21.97) (33.97) (63.56) (196.6)
Price of rice -17.89 -17.49 0.930 1.314 28.80
(9.586) (11.60) (16.52) (29.44) (99.88)
Price of wheat flour 8.587 11.93 -11.89 -11.70 -64.43
(11.27) (11.91) (18.39) (33.92) (109.6)
Price of mustard oil 2.743 2.822 2.254 -3.803 -33.57
(1.488) (2.056) (3.071) (5.271) (14.55)
Price of hen’s eggs 1.228 -1.631 -1.655 -0.569 0.578
(4.471) (4.164) (8.868) (31.30) (65.29)
Price of milk 3.667 8.595* 10.82** 17.94* 20.07
(3.960) (4.020) (6.819) (11.59) (40.68)
Price of potatoes -3.821 -13.43** -7.079 -23.04 -64.43
(5.208) (6.043) (10.40) (18.38) (50.56)
Intercepts
Second wave of data 67.76 141.4** 159.0** 436.0** 1243.1*
(1=yes) (54.89) (63.35) (95.25) (190.9) (537.7)
Overall intercept 235.3 543.1** 823.6** 1541.1** 4183.6**
(168.4) (183.8) (282.3) (489.6) (1699.9)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
Appendix J Panel data quantile regressions, CRE 281
Table J.6 Panel quantile regressions with household correlated random effects,
household non-food expenditure, by gender
Quantile
10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Female microcredit 0.004** 0.006** 0.012** 0.018** 0.047**
borrowings (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.019)
Male microcredit 0.010 0.011** 0.013** 0.019** 0.027
borrowings (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.025)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head -15.85 -6.406 -21.20 -54.22* -239.7
(10.30) (12.89) (18.28) (35.77) (149.8)
Age of HH head -0.400 -0.876 0.585 -4.261 -3.072
(2.357) (2.478) (3.177) (5.562) (13.30)
Gender of HH head 64.25 96.58 53.30 -288.8 -991.6**
(105.0) (66.84) (114.5) (199.6) (805.7)
Highest education of 10.18 24.11** 42.01** 65.95** 188.0*
men in HH (8.505) (9.071) (14.21) (27.44) (94.15)
Highest education of 16.73** 33.59** 60.05** 102.7** 107.6*
women in HH (7.742) (9.756) (14.96) (28.75) (94.69)
Landholdings -0.454* -0.448* -0.320 0.0328 -0.689
(0.158) (0.234) (0.406) (0.743) (2.853)
HH economic -13.37** -34.55** -40.41** -58.00** -12.03
dependency ratio (7.834) (8.645) (12.93) (26.00) (81.48)
# of HH head 25.14** 8.212* 7.869 17.72 4.824
relatives owning land (5.831) (7.019) (10.58) (17.89) (48.85)
# of HH head’s -2.212 3.810 0.689 7.414 64.73
spouse relatives owning land (3.645) (4.496) (7.906) (12.73) (35.84)
# of HH head -4.739 -5.467 1.335 1.071 31.61
relatives living outside thana (4.542) (5.209) (7.333) (12.55) (36.32)
# of HH head’s 1.982 1.962 -0.344 -5.774 -38.65
spouse relatives living outside thana (3.771) (4.000) (5.385) (10.14) (35.93)
Loans from 106.8 19.10 179.5 286.2 -199.5
traditional banks (1=yes) (51.92) (82.99) (180.1) (372.1) (1876.0)
Loans from informal -40.36 34.55 -9.299 232.6 319.5
sources (1=yes) (50.59) (53.96) (89.82) (155.3) (600.0)
Loans from relatives 91.69** 142.1** 246.0** 453.6** 1954.2**
(1=yes) (46.72) (48.42) (74.27) (167.1) (657.1)
Eligibility of HH -51.48 -42.89 -38.62 -16.81 -314.2
(1=yes) (44.29) (54.76) (76.05) (158.5) (583.2)
Village covariates
Average male wage 0.404 -0.0606 -0.625 0.152 2.600
(1.062) (1.202) (1.647) (2.902) (11.07)
Average female wage 1.149 0.680 2.941 1.396 2.257
(0.966) (0.978) (1.567) (2.772) (9.838)
Primary school -14.83 -34.42* -93.66** -205.0** -192.3
(1=yes) (22.56) (25.79) (40.40) (68.46) (202.2)
Food program (1=yes) -10.08 -11.33 -50.11 -52.65 -95.09
(19.75) (21.30) (33.23) (57.03) (182.4)
Distance to nearest 1.968 -4.100 -14.99** -22.08** -55.30
bank (km) (3.955) (4.413) (6.476) (9.720) (31.30)
Distance to nearest -1.140 -6.007 -4.410 -6.145 11.70
pucca road (km) (3.258) (3.803) (4.801) (8.610) (35.70)
Distance to nearest 6.135 12.37** 22.55** 44.66** 18.31
shop/market (km) (6.754) (7.460) (11.13) (17.98) (49.53)
Electricity in 29.98* 69.41** 56.90** 108.8* 226.1
village (1=yes) (20.71) (21.90) (34.24) (63.05) (196.2)
Price of rice -18.83 -16.63 -0.322 -0.276 35.09
(9.677) (11.50) (16.66) (28.99) (99.87)
Price of wheat flour 12.47 9.478 -12.39 -9.900 -66.30
(11.32) (11.95) (18.52) (33.96) (109.5)
Price of mustard oil 2.827 2.829 2.534 -3.078 -36.50
(1.492) (2.034) (3.132) (5.272) (14.52)
Price of hen’s eggs 0.988 -1.426 -1.042 -0.549 4.033
(4.521) (4.142) (8.779) (31.00) (65.29)
Price of milk 4.255 8.987* 10.97** 18.50 12.19
(3.961) (3.983) (6.843) (11.57) (40.37)
Price of potatoes -3.895 -13.29** -7.355 -23.71 -60.49
(5.290) (6.092) (10.36) (18.19) (50.96)
Intercepts
Second wave of data 61.96 153.7** 150.7** 433.6** 1196.4*
(1=yes) (54.30) (63.27) (96.02) (187.8) (532.1)
Overall intercept 162.9 547.1** 829.8** 1485.6** 4341.1**
(169.2) (185.0) (284.3) (488.8) (1671.4)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table K.1 Panel quantile regressions with household correlated random effects with
village quantile effects, household total expenditure
Quantile
10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Household 0.013** 0.022** 0.031** 0.038** 0.042**
microcredit borrowings (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.014)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head 23.26 -20.21 -43.96 -33.73 -39.17
(37.24) (35.72) (44.82) (63.66) (121.9)
Age of HH head 11.71 -6.419 -5.411 4.652 -7.711
(9.640) (7.570) (8.425) (10.96) (17.21)
Gender of HH head -463.5 63.18 -429.6 -598.4 -928.8*
(347.0) (284.6) (329.9) (452.7) (717.0)
Highest education of 17.55 71.32** 89.60** 81.61* 38.18
men in HH (32.01) (28.65) (32.81) (44.67) (81.16)
Highest education of -6.665 53.06** 83.51** 95.34** 264.3**
women in HH (24.53) (24.94) (30.20) (44.53) (81.08)
Landholdings -0.625 -0.253 -0.324 -0.866 -1.462
(0.560) (0.473) (0.824) (1.271) (1.249)
HH economic -47.39** -117.8** -139.2** -104.8** -212.3**
dependency ratio (28.32) (29.52) (36.96) (53.03) (75.91)
# of HH head 36.97** 34.74* 35.18 24.80 61.07
relatives owning land (17.94) (19.38) (26.85) (31.86) (49.22)
# of HH head’s 3.367 -18.91 -28.75 12.45 44.91
spouse relatives owning land (14.24) (14.78) (20.47) (27.94) (32.13)
# of HH head 23.52 26.00 23.59 14.75 -1.426
relatives living outside thana (19.50) (16.92) (21.10) (26.05) (41.86)
# of HH head’s 16.30 8.601 10.10 -21.40 -42.00
spouse relatives living outside thana (13.74) (15.95) (18.51) (23.68) (37.00)
Loans from 132.8 328.5 548.6 167.2 545.0
traditional banks (1=yes) (225.7) (234.3) (350.0) (538.9) (885.3)
Loans from informal -91.91 153.2 37.93 -351.6 819.1
sources (1=yes) (181.6) (185.2) (231.7) (295.1) (502.3)
Loans from relatives 211.9 359.4** 433.1** 866.4** 892.2**
(1=yes) (146.2) (145.1) (192.8) (293.3) (459.3)
Eligibility of HH -267.5* -227.4 -172.5 -302.1 -373.7
(1=yes) (174.1) (158.6) (210.6) (301.2) (501.7)
Intercepts
Second wave of data -172.3 114.4 115.4 223.0* 991.9**
(1=yes) (117.4) (106.5) (133.8) (177.2) (311.1)
Overall intercept 3155.2** 4311.5** 5279.5** 7065.0** 7826.9**
(480.7) (391.1) (511.8) (870.1) (2197.0)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table K.2 Panel quantile regressions with household correlated random effects with
village quantile effects, household total expenditure, by gender
Quantile
10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Female microcredit 0.015** 0.022** 0.033** 0.037** 0.048**
borrowings (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.016)
Male microcredit 0.011 0.022* 0.029** 0.041** 0.037
borrowings (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.017) (0.027)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head 20.13 -17.43 -47.29 -30.17 -23.43
(37.23) (35.30) (44.72) (64.51) (122.3)
Age of HH head 12.04 -6.670 -5.776 3.648 -4.809
(9.739) (7.598) (8.561) (11.00) (17.32)
Gender of HH head -453.2 32.35 -376.2 -661.0 -979.4*
(346.5) (282.0) (331.6) (452.1) (714.3)
Highest education of 14.15 67.62** 92.31** 86.77* 41.06
men in HH (32.51) (28.74) (32.63) (44.84) (81.97)
Highest education of -2.805 53.40** 89.67** 104.8** 263.9**
women in HH (24.43) (25.14) (30.14) (44.82) (82.06)
Landholdings -0.695 -0.243 -0.461 -0.926 -1.565
(0.561) (0.476) (0.826) (1.275) (1.257)
HH economic -52.97** -118.1** -131.0** -102.7** -218.2**
dependency ratio (28.60) (29.45) (36.76) (53.26) (76.19)
# of HH head 40.20** 34.25* 37.24 22.74 57.97
relatives owning land (17.90) (19.52) (26.80) (32.01) (48.91)
# of HH head’s 0.866 -19.04 -28.38 13.54 47.04
spouse relatives owning land (14.40) (14.75) (20.41) (27.96) (32.09)
# of HH head 23.61 23.89 23.77 17.57 -4.878
relatives living outside thana (19.59) (17.21) (20.97) (26.11) (42.10)
# of HH head’s 14.71 9.334 8.125 -20.74 -44.41
spouse relatives living outside thana (13.76) (16.00) (18.30) (23.45) (37.88)
Loans from 156.9 333.7 482.6 143.1 522.9
traditional banks (1=yes) (226.9) (235.7) (349.6) (542.1) (885.0)
Loans from informal -59.41 169.9 39.88 -375.3 765.4
sources (1=yes) (183.2) (186.8) (230.9) (295.4) (504.8)
Loans from relatives 220.3 368.6** 442.3** 891.4** 930.8**
(1=yes) (144.4) (145.8) (193.3) (294.5) (460.9)
Eligibility of HH -304.8* -225.4 -173.4 -312.4 -397.4
(1=yes) (174.4) (160.2) (215.6) (303.7) (504.1)
Intercepts
Second wave of data -176.9 115.8 109.0 203.0* 963.7*
(1=yes) (117.2) (106.4) (134.4) (178.2) (316.7)
Overall intercept 3241.4** 4294.6** 5241.8** 6914.3** 7861.3**
(482.2) (391.5) (510.9) (873.7) (2192.9)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table K.3 Panel quantile regressions with household correlated random effects with
village quantile effects, household food expenditure
Quantile
10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Household 0.008** 0.012** 0.012** 0.013** 0.010**
microcredit borrowings (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head 30.39 -12.78 -2.793 20.74 11.01
(20.84) (23.32) (22.24) (24.81) (37.98)
Age of HH head 9.444 1.600 -1.569 -3.361 16.55
(6.894) (5.492) (4.808) (6.002) (9.725)
Gender of HH head -268.4 -66.67 -140.8 -104.8 -803.4**
(203.6) (204.8) (260.7) (256.7) (326.0)
Highest education of 7.447 28.31* 21.47 15.52 32.65
men in HH (20.32) (18.42) (19.81) (22.30) (28.55)
Highest education of -25.71 -3.069 16.65 22.07 30.98
women in HH (14.82) (18.85) (19.03) (19.99) (25.45)
Landholdings -0.152 0.0363 0.281 -0.489 -1.803*
(0.365) (0.392) (0.570) (0.806) (0.680)
HH economic -32.62** -50.11** -69.08** -76.72** -113.5**
dependency ratio (19.79) (18.65) (21.96) (27.06) (32.31)
# of HH head 41.22** 7.232 13.69 20.97 25.10
relatives owning land (13.58) (14.26) (16.11) (17.52) (23.69)
# of HH head’s 0.277 -8.682 -13.77 -11.52 -7.199
spouse relatives owning land (9.243) (10.58) (11.29) (12.99) (17.22)
# of HH head 9.756 21.83 9.864 12.04 40.91*
relatives living outside thana (13.22) (12.19) (13.00) (15.83) (22.88)
# of HH head’s 17.81 10.88 17.94* 25.60* 11.15
spouse relatives living outside thana (9.084) (11.00) (11.19) (11.64) (15.00)
Loans from 87.09 47.63 -27.91 11.63 128.2
traditional banks (1=yes) (140.1) (150.5) (156.3) (196.0) (270.4)
Loans from informal -37.25 109.1 87.31 -105.9 -135.0
sources (1=yes) (119.6) (117.9) (126.3) (139.8) (206.8)
Loans from relatives 56.74 108.1 229.9* 192.0 108.6
(1=yes) (99.00) (101.2) (103.2) (134.5) (193.7)
Eligibility of HH -246.4* -219.0* -142.5 -116.2 -88.18
(1=yes) (111.9) (116.0) (119.1) (145.5) (179.4)
Intercepts
Second wave of data -246.5** -97.07 -52.42 -4.679 -71.14
(1=yes) (82.83) (73.46) (76.83) (101.9) (141.2)
Overall intercept 2563.2** 3231.4** 3826.1** 4403.8** 6623.0**
(299.7) (264.2) (331.1) (376.4) (826.5)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table K.4 Panel quantile regressions with household correlated random effects with
village quantile effects, household food expenditure, by gender
Quantile
10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Female microcredit 0.008** 0.013** 0.013** 0.013** 0.009**
borrowings (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Male microcredit 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.010 0.007
borrowings (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.015)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head 30.28 -11.84 -5.180 20.95 9.830
(21.06) (23.19) (22.06) (24.89) (38.64)
Age of HH head 9.185 2.587 -1.733 -3.217 15.83
(6.900) (5.506) (4.829) (6.024) (9.749)
Gender of HH head -267.6 -89.12 -120.7 -117.0 -709.3*
(204.3) (205.0) (260.9) (258.0) (330.7)
Highest education of 7.520 31.42* 20.82 14.85 37.85
men in HH (20.46) (18.33) (19.71) (22.15) (28.57)
Highest education of -26.90 -6.854 13.75 20.03 27.82
women in HH (14.80) (18.74) (19.11) (20.10) (25.54)
Landholdings -0.146 0.0258 0.281 -0.501 -1.812*
(0.365) (0.387) (0.572) (0.810) (0.687)
HH economic -35.36** -50.62** -72.98** -76.12** -111.3**
dependency ratio (19.82) (18.61) (22.04) (26.97) (32.36)
# of HH head 42.58** 5.865 14.15 21.11 21.59
relatives owning land (13.70) (14.25) (16.22) (17.41) (23.65)
# of HH head’s -0.591 -7.676 -14.61 -12.03 -6.027
spouse relatives owning land (9.229) (10.48) (11.34) (13.01) (17.16)
# of HH head 9.140 23.94 7.281 15.14 43.36*
relatives living outside thana (13.22) (12.24) (13.15) (15.87) (23.07)
# of HH head’s 17.73 11.42 18.94* 24.15* 10.31
spouse relatives living outside thana (9.126) (11.01) (11.22) (11.67) (15.14)
Loans from 100.2 47.57 -33.85 28.83 121.7
traditional banks (1=yes) (140.1) (148.8) (155.9) (196.5) (272.8)
Loans from informal -28.18 113.6 82.79 -130.7 -124.6
sources (1=yes) (118.7) (118.7) (124.7) (139.5) (205.6)
Loans from relatives 55.36 100.2 217.8* 181.5 139.3
(1=yes) (99.23) (101.3) (103.6) (135.3) (194.1)
Eligibility of HH -238.5* -212.1 -132.2 -119.5 -105.0
(1=yes) (112.7) (114.0) (120.1) (146.2) (179.4)
Intercepts
Second wave of data -243.0** -112.6 -40.86 -2.988 -88.75
(1=yes) (82.92) (73.06) (77.26) (102.8) (142.3)
Overall intercept 2571.3** 3261.9** 3803.5** 4410.5** 6568.5**
(299.9) (264.6) (330.5) (379.7) (826.8)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table K.5 Panel quantile regressions with household correlated random effects with
village quantile effects, household non-food expenditure
Quantile
10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Household 0.007** 0.009** 0.014** 0.019** 0.040**
microcredit borrowings (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.013)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head -14.15 -0.155 -15.12 -45.22 -24.96
(11.39) (14.07) (18.48) (39.62) (87.58)
Age of HH head -0.465 -1.036 -0.691 -3.679 -17.18
(2.252) (2.696) (3.106) (5.800) (10.83)
Gender of HH head 127.8 61.59 5.256 -144.4 -760.5**
(89.35) (91.20) (109.7) (240.6) (432.5)
Highest education of 14.83** 20.89** 30.53** 58.80** 30.76
men in HH (7.957) (9.405) (14.02) (27.32) (56.75)
Highest education of 16.79** 40.79** 46.18** 82.05** 153.9**
women in HH (6.811) (11.54) (14.59) (29.91) (55.86)
Landholdings -0.541** -0.457* -0.134 -0.0491 0.253
(0.159) (0.214) (0.361) (0.656) (0.853)
HH economic -21.89** -31.49** -40.45** -23.48 -122.8
dependency ratio (7.058) (9.802) (13.51) (26.91) (46.77)
# of HH head 20.84** 10.90** 13.88 3.097 14.75
relatives owning land (5.677) (6.943) (11.08) (18.78) (32.80)
# of HH head’s 0.700 0.443 2.522 12.88 30.56
spouse relatives owning land (3.680) (4.878) (7.496) (12.80) (20.90)
# of HH head -2.619 0.648 0.891 13.40 2.255
relatives living outside thana (4.548) (5.709) (6.970) (13.56) (24.46)
# of HH head’s 6.930 -1.173 -2.343 -17.31 -42.14
spouse relatives living outside thana (3.975) (4.573) (5.628) (10.90) (26.50)
Loans from 78.98 77.77 172.1 293.6 1128.2
traditional banks (1=yes) (52.68) (84.41) (153.7) (331.4) (951.2)
Loans from informal 4.847 62.65 46.02 11.69 340.7
sources (1=yes) (44.50) (66.13) (86.94) (147.0) (287.2)
Loans from relatives 116.0** 185.1** 246.2** 396.0** 599.2**
(1=yes) (41.04) (54.05) (82.88) (158.7) (321.4)
Eligibility of HH -88.17 -28.39 -1.417 -141.7 -251.9
(1=yes) (43.63) (56.88) (86.45) (168.2) (348.8)
Intercepts
Second wave of data 103.4** 130.2** 188.8** 263.3** 798.4**
(1=yes) (27.28) (35.62) (50.08) (87.98) (193.1)
Overall intercept 545.5** 811.2** 1137.5** 1641.7** 1995.1**
(124.0) (160.2) (203.8) (454.2) (2484.8)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table K.6 Panel quantile regressions with household correlated random effects with
village quantile effects, household non-food expenditure, by gender
Quantile
10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Female microcredit 0.006** 0.010** 0.013** 0.020** 0.044**
borrowings (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.014)
Male microcredit 0.012** 0.009** 0.026** 0.021* 0.014
borrowings (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.021)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head -14.01 -1.809 -17.43 -50.96 -23.86
(11.48) (14.21) (18.29) (39.38) (87.18)
Age of HH head -0.0962 -1.078 -0.814 -2.287 -15.33
(2.243) (2.695) (3.130) (5.820) (10.70)
Gender of HH head 109.5 67.67 20.12 -134.5 -639.8**
(89.90) (91.96) (110.9) (238.4) (437.3)
Highest education of 14.51** 20.27** 32.98** 57.10** 32.42
men in HH (7.958) (9.280) (14.05) (27.22) (57.26)
Highest education of 15.61** 41.30** 44.43** 81.40** 162.4**
women in HH (6.933) (11.50) (14.59) (30.04) (55.62)
Landholdings -0.547** -0.457* -0.121 -0.0753 0.126
(0.156) (0.214) (0.361) (0.658) (0.850)
HH economic -21.80** -31.49** -39.65** -21.13 -100.3
dependency ratio (7.065) (9.696) (13.58) (27.04) (46.98)
# of HH head 19.17** 10.93** 13.45 5.565 19.90
relatives owning land (5.698) (6.897) (10.87) (18.65) (32.57)
# of HH head’s 1.643 0.747 2.561 11.09 22.03
spouse relatives owning land (3.722) (4.949) (7.498) (12.69) (20.94)
# of HH head -3.172 0.853 0.687 12.80 13.08
relatives living outside thana (4.557) (5.750) (6.975) (13.43) (24.75)
# of HH head’s 6.744 -1.652 -1.924 -13.88 -27.38
spouse relatives living outside thana (3.966) (4.602) (5.569) (10.97) (26.35)
Loans from 85.42 70.49 169.9 277.2 1077.5
traditional banks (1=yes) (52.53) (86.00) (155.3) (331.4) (947.5)
Loans from informal 15.38 70.26 46.33 30.34 401.0
sources (1=yes) (43.98) (66.29) (85.35) (145.1) (280.4)
Loans from relatives 118.1** 182.4** 236.4** 417.5** 582.8**
(1=yes) (41.50) (54.13) (82.60) (159.1) (315.5)
Eligibility of HH -80.61 -27.99 8.874 -157.3 -284.0
(1=yes) (43.23) (56.56) (85.79) (168.4) (346.1)
Intercepts
Second wave of data 106.7** 130.3** 197.4** 240.8** 687.4**
(1=yes) (27.16) (35.69) (50.14) (89.20) (190.5)
Overall intercept 528.7** 790.2** 1141.2** 1571.2** 1962.4**
(125.7) (161.4) (204.6) (456.2) (2485.9)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.

Appendix L
Regression tables for panel data
quantile regressions with correlated
random effects (CRE) and penalised
village effects
291
292 Appendix L Panel quantile regressions, CRE and penalised village effects
Table L.1 Panel quantile regressions with household correlated random effects with
penalised village effects, household total expenditure
Quantile
10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Household 0.014** 0.020** 0.026** 0.034** 0.058**
microcredit borrowings (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.014)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head -2.894 -24.31 -33.69 -32.15 -13.19
(31.21) (27.05) (28.93) (47.34) (114.9)
Age of HH head 1.233 -4.059 -0.0566 -1.764 -3.900
(6.557) (6.600) (6.276) (9.523) (14.04)
Gender of HH head -148.5 225.0 -249.2 -910.7** -1974.6**
(285.0) (279.8) (251.5) (327.8) (667.3)
Highest education of 57.20** 70.83** 85.73** 91.34** 192.2**
men in HH (23.10) (20.40) (21.87) (32.94) (72.31)
Highest education of 34.26* 53.84** 60.86** 66.22** 154.1**
women in HH (21.05) (18.74) (20.46) (32.67) (77.75)
Landholdings -0.557 -0.342 -0.513 -0.529 -3.443*
(0.516) (0.451) (0.730) (1.400) (2.704)
HH economic -52.93** -109.2** -127.8** -140.7** -183.4**
dependency ratio (23.52) (19.59) (24.82) (35.43) (71.67)
# of HH head 18.55* 25.98* 13.74 18.53 47.09
relatives owning land (14.14) (13.92) (16.79) (23.39) (45.02)
# of HH head’s -3.406 -9.845 1.771 13.72 23.91
spouse relatives owning land (10.49) (10.19) (12.47) (18.10) (34.61)
# of HH head 24.97* 13.14 17.75 35.49* 99.67**
relatives living outside thana (12.65) (12.65) (15.41) (21.18) (34.98)
# of HH head’s 9.947 19.31* 18.37 28.41 -9.115
spouse relatives living outside thana (10.51) (10.42) (11.80) (18.36) (38.99)
Loans from 290.7 213.8 267.1 413.9 401.9
traditional banks (1=yes) (178.3) (161.6) (207.8) (322.9) (875.0)
Loans from informal 231.4* 240.3* 139.7 167.0 1004.4**
sources (1=yes) (106.7) (132.2) (171.0) (233.1) (423.7)
Loans from relatives 348.7** 184.9** 413.7** 593.0** 1447.9**
(1=yes) (103.8) (110.7) (144.0) (187.7) (427.7)
Eligibility of HH -368.8** -233.2 -213.9 -50.56 -757.9
(1=yes) (149.9) (142.3) (178.9) (273.5) (639.2)
Intercepts
Second wave of data -125.8 15.67 139.2 221.8* 437.0**
(1=yes) (88.52) (80.84) (94.56) (126.8) (250.8)
Overall intercept 2929.0** 3798.3** 4469.3** 5836.1** 7577.0**
(249.1) (236.2) (260.4) (384.8) (844.9)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table L.2 Panel quantile regressions with household correlated random effects with
penalised village effects, household total expenditure, by gender
Quantile
10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Female microcredit 0.016** 0.021** 0.028** 0.034** 0.065**
borrowings (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.016)
Male microcredit 0.014 0.018** 0.016** 0.033** 0.020
borrowings (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013) (0.028)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head -8.962 -26.19 -28.83 -31.75 -1.625
(31.06) (26.90) (28.22) (47.98) (115.6)
Age of HH head 2.035 -4.601 -1.188 -3.561 -7.387
(6.594) (6.691) (6.438) (9.757) (13.99)
Gender of HH head -154.6 197.5 -354.9 -858.0** -1883.7**
(282.6) (279.2) (245.5) (327.4) (673.7)
Highest education of 59.83** 70.84** 90.62** 95.06** 169.2*
men in HH (22.92) (20.21) (21.39) (33.30) (71.16)
Highest education of 32.38* 54.73** 58.54** 62.40** 169.0**
women in HH (20.96) (19.29) (20.51) (32.68) (77.35)
Landholdings -0.568 -0.343 -0.601 -0.384 -2.788
(0.522) (0.439) (0.715) (1.392) (2.824)
HH economic -44.84** -112.8** -124.5** -134.1** -205.2**
dependency ratio (23.73) (20.13) (24.46) (36.23) (74.84)
# of HH head 19.73* 27.17 12.55 17.66 60.42
relatives owning land (14.11) (13.97) (17.19) (23.03) (46.73)
# of HH head’s -6.009 -8.447 2.290 12.19 20.80
spouse relatives owning land (10.49) (10.22) (12.54) (18.28) (35.34)
# of HH head 27.56* 14.94 22.48 37.14* 95.85**
relatives living outside thana (12.45) (12.87) (15.68) (21.83) (35.80)
# of HH head’s 11.13 19.57* 20.88 27.03 -8.160
spouse relatives living outside thana (10.52) (10.34) (11.88) (18.32) (39.55)
Loans from 295.8 219.0 234.5 372.0 504.4
traditional banks (1=yes) (180.9) (162.6) (213.0) (312.5) (861.0)
Loans from informal 211.6* 228.5 124.5 195.6 990.8**
sources (1=yes) (105.4) (133.1) (166.9) (235.2) (439.7)
Loans from relatives 328.8** 183.4** 385.2** 593.4** 1476.4**
(1=yes) (104.2) (113.7) (144.3) (184.6) (429.6)
Eligibility of HH -363.3** -251.4 -145.3 -24.55 -805.7
(1=yes) (151.3) (143.3) (180.7) (270.7) (644.1)
Intercepts
Second wave of data -162.9 25.37 108.9 224.2* 428.5*
(1=yes) (88.12) (81.12) (94.80) (130.5) (256.8)
Overall intercept 2965.3** 3792.7** 4480.1** 5714.3** 7427.7**
(251.0) (234.7) (262.5) (384.0) (846.0)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table L.3 Panel quantile regressions with household correlated random effects with
penalised village effects, household food expenditure
Quantile
10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Household 0.008** 0.011** 0.012** 0.014** 0.014**
microcredit borrowings (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head 30.52 9.798 -7.772 6.064 -25.24
(21.04) (17.59) (15.33) (19.69) (45.43)
Age of HH head 0.431 -3.102 -3.103 -1.549 6.619
(5.553) (5.081) (3.551) (5.406) (9.788)
Gender of HH head -190.5 -57.71 -171.1 -118.4 -807.8**
(206.2) (190.6) (198.6) (179.6) (375.0)
Highest education of 12.75 32.90** 40.58** 34.11** 67.63**
men in HH (18.59) (13.32) (13.03) (18.25) (30.58)
Highest education of 11.89 10.11 23.32** 14.65 30.49
women in HH (15.37) (12.14) (12.31) (15.40) (29.90)
Landholdings -0.135 -0.0461 0.146 -0.493 -2.021*
(0.347) (0.315) (0.428) (0.594) (0.851)
HH economic -38.46** -58.86** -73.23** -97.57** -125.0**
dependency ratio (16.51) (13.73) (14.84) (19.22) (33.65)
# of HH head 20.25 14.20 0.0243 7.783 24.91
relatives owning land (11.70) (9.369) (9.870) (12.62) (24.90)
# of HH head’s -1.821 -8.764 -0.533 -6.185 16.58
spouse relatives owning land (7.640) (7.248) (7.058) (8.935) (18.51)
# of HH head 17.30 13.64 -2.900 4.584 19.39
relatives living outside thana (10.15) (8.635) (9.610) (12.81) (25.28)
# of HH head’s 8.332 13.67** 21.35** 25.51** 21.30
spouse relatives living outside thana (7.405) (7.134) (7.085) (8.908) (18.19)
Loans from 125.2 30.61 8.764 47.62 364.0
traditional banks (1=yes) (130.1) (116.5) (102.2) (137.3) (283.7)
Loans from informal 146.1 141.3 168.6 -8.556 212.7
sources (1=yes) (86.96) (95.16) (94.81) (113.6) (225.7)
Loans from relatives 207.1** 101.4 133.5** 165.9 304.3
(1=yes) (81.21) (85.19) (69.00) (96.11) (172.7)
Eligibility of HH -257.7* -201.7** -195.6* -68.38 5.121
(1=yes) (125.8) (94.22) (98.06) (127.0) (199.2)
Intercepts
Second wave of data -252.4** -141.6** -47.26 -42.06 25.09
(1=yes) (71.38) (61.54) (55.80) (74.37) (135.6)
Overall intercept 2282.4** 2914.2** 3606.5** 4197.8** 5590.0**
(193.8) (173.0) (156.3) (202.9) (370.1)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table L.4 Panel quantile regressions with household correlated random effects with
penalised village effects, household food expenditure, by gender
Quantile
10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Female microcredit 0.009** 0.012** 0.013** 0.013** 0.015**
borrowings (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Male microcredit 0.001 0.007** 0.008** 0.006 0.016
borrowings (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head 25.77 13.62 -9.910 4.670 -25.56
(20.56) (17.49) (15.20) (20.05) (44.20)
Age of HH head -0.0602 -4.486 -3.066 -1.395 7.173
(5.570) (5.037) (3.557) (5.283) (9.941)
Gender of HH head -142.0 -62.68 -163.5 -88.98 -783.7**
(209.5) (188.0) (197.2) (176.5) (387.4)
Highest education of 16.01 35.63** 41.53** 38.80** 66.23**
men in HH (18.62) (13.22) (12.91) (17.98) (30.41)
Highest education of 12.82 7.423 25.79** 12.98 26.87
women in HH (15.20) (12.07) (12.22) (15.19) (29.57)
Landholdings -0.112 -0.0333 0.156 -0.480 -2.037*
(0.352) (0.311) (0.429) (0.585) (0.854)
HH economic -37.78** -59.34** -72.04** -98.49** -120.2**
dependency ratio (16.81) (13.72) (14.71) (19.06) (34.06)
# of HH head 15.53 13.81 0.589 13.05 31.90
relatives owning land (11.57) (9.328) (10.15) (12.52) (24.31)
# of HH head’s 0.0111 -7.492 0.164 -6.101 11.84
spouse relatives owning land (7.655) (7.199) (7.130) (8.758) (18.12)
# of HH head 19.55 14.45 -3.339 3.827 17.53
relatives living outside thana (10.05) (8.640) (9.549) (12.50) (25.20)
# of HH head’s 8.311 15.78** 18.53** 26.03** 18.57
spouse relatives living outside thana (7.606) (7.136) (7.056) (8.839) (17.63)
Loans from 105.3 42.36 5.926 15.83 322.2
traditional banks (1=yes) (128.7) (116.9) (103.0) (133.1) (281.2)
Loans from informal 106.8 136.4 163.5 10.74 265.9
sources (1=yes) (87.76) (95.46) (95.66) (111.2) (218.0)
Loans from relatives 226.2** 86.29 122.3** 144.5 284.3
(1=yes) (82.58) (84.96) (68.83) (96.00) (171.0)
Eligibility of HH -273.5* -200.9** -186.0* -76.03 -8.652
(1=yes) (126.0) (93.38) (97.72) (126.7) (198.7)
Intercepts
Second wave of data -261.7** -130.4** -39.98 -42.99 4.552
(1=yes) (70.58) (61.88) (56.06) (72.63) (137.4)
Overall intercept 2277.8** 2912.1** 3603.1** 4195.1** 5554.1**
(195.7) (173.4) (156.7) (204.2) (370.9)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table L.5 Panel quantile regressions with household correlated random effects with
penalised village effects, household non-food expenditure
Quantile
10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Household 0.006** 0.006** 0.009** 0.018** 0.046**
microcredit borrowings (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.011)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head -11.70 -13.86 -9.848 -31.15 55.39
(8.729) (9.892) (12.55) (28.14) (95.95)
Age of HH head 1.743 0.114 1.576 0.646 -0.838
(2.180) (1.944) (2.333) (3.933) (10.21)
Gender of HH head 29.66 29.21 -62.37 -218.4 -1036.2**
(83.28) (70.95) (88.74) (150.8) (553.5)
Highest education of 17.34** 27.86** 31.62** 44.52** 85.27
men in HH (6.786) (6.916) (10.29) (21.21) (58.74)
Highest education of 12.96** 31.33** 33.13** 67.07** 107.9**
women in HH (5.468) (7.548) (8.631) (22.01) (64.27)
Landholdings -0.401* -0.322 -0.182 0.361 -0.152
(0.146) (0.221) (0.367) (0.714) (2.389)
HH economic -16.57** -24.52** -33.07** -44.02** -104.8
dependency ratio (6.789) (6.476) (8.870) (17.05) (50.31)
# of HH head 15.00** 11.58** 5.354 12.54 23.04
relatives owning land (4.106) (4.672) (6.171) (10.65) (34.84)
# of HH head’s 2.837 5.151 8.110 0.828 22.50
spouse relatives owning land (2.748) (3.500) (4.866) (8.701) (25.94)
# of HH head 0.454 -1.263 5.615 17.08* 84.40**
relatives living outside thana (3.372) (4.336) (5.079) (9.934) (29.76)
# of HH head’s 6.735* 3.272 3.546 0.0264 -42.07
spouse relatives living outside thana (2.969) (3.160) (4.031) (7.686) (28.00)
Loans from 38.41 62.02 168.7 396.7 600.4
traditional banks (1=yes) (51.11) (65.15) (109.9) (216.7) (805.6)
Loans from informal 19.21 60.90 79.44 213.6* 634.3*
sources (1=yes) (38.60) (44.42) (61.51) (110.7) (293.8)
Loans from relatives 73.58** 151.3** 209.5** 325.2** 1331.1**
(1=yes) (35.31) (38.75) (53.42) (126.7) (455.4)
Eligibility of HH -49.77 -10.65 16.54 -59.32 -619.2
(1=yes) (45.60) (45.15) (66.82) (162.6) (536.4)
Intercepts
Second wave of data 78.77** 134.8** 151.3** 252.2** 530.5**
(1=yes) (26.77) (28.09) (36.32) (56.19) (190.8)
Overall intercept 357.6** 595.6** 868.7** 1259.6** 2203.1**
(68.39) (78.74) (105.9) (199.4) (765.1)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table L.6 Panel quantile regressions with household correlated random effects with
penalised village effects, household non-food expenditure, by gender
Quantile
10% 30% Median 70% 90%
Female microcredit 0.007** 0.007** 0.010** 0.020** 0.050**
borrowings (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.014)
Male microcredit 0.006* 0.005** 0.009** 0.013** 0.018
borrowings (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.021)
Household characteristics
Education of HH head -11.96 -9.498 -8.998 -33.93 23.37
(8.883) (9.881) (12.73) (27.53) (95.83)
Age of HH head 1.673 -0.0338 0.843 0.354 0.590
(2.157) (1.962) (2.346) (3.924) (10.57)
Gender of HH head 19.16 24.93 -54.37 -170.2 -957.8**
(82.84) (71.47) (89.71) (149.2) (557.2)
Highest education of 18.12** 25.77** 30.80** 48.40** 103.2
men in HH (6.778) (6.749) (10.34) (20.84) (59.90)
Highest education of 12.04** 31.94** 31.27** 57.96** 114.9**
women in HH (5.572) (7.626) (8.812) (21.57) (64.00)
Landholdings -0.410* -0.367 -0.294 0.121 -0.296
(0.143) (0.214) (0.372) (0.708) (2.546)
HH economic -16.83** -23.84** -35.50** -47.96** -109.4*
dependency ratio (6.803) (6.510) (8.956) (17.15) (50.54)
# of HH head 14.52** 11.01** 8.688 11.06 17.95
relatives owning land (4.159) (4.714) (6.367) (11.04) (35.73)
# of HH head’s 3.743 4.490 8.315 -0.380 16.91
spouse relatives owning land (2.777) (3.475) (4.934) (8.814) (26.17)
# of HH head -0.305 -0.178 4.459 14.58* 71.53**
relatives living outside thana (3.483) (4.356) (5.098) (10.24) (29.00)
# of HH head’s 6.826* 2.779 2.743 -1.490 -29.37
spouse relatives living outside thana (2.994) (3.167) (4.055) (7.446) (27.81)
Loans from 47.65 61.94 193.2 285.9 713.6
traditional banks (1=yes) (51.89) (64.98) (111.6) (215.2) (818.7)
Loans from informal 33.08 56.97 88.35 209.7* 703.4*
sources (1=yes) (38.41) (44.66) (62.34) (110.9) (311.2)
Loans from relatives 71.72** 141.1** 213.6** 327.1** 1315.1**
(1=yes) (34.72) (39.20) (53.93) (128.7) (461.6)
Eligibility of HH -47.63 -7.197 31.09 -88.64 -626.6
(1=yes) (45.39) (44.81) (66.82) (160.8) (548.8)
Intercepts
Second wave of data 81.56** 134.1** 167.4** 257.4** 512.1**
(1=yes) (26.48) (28.06) (36.68) (58.01) (193.1)
Overall intercept 371.1** 596.8** 851.5** 1182.2** 2109.9**
(67.88) (78.64) (106.4) (198.6) (783.6)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are obtained via 999 bootstrap replications. Significance assessed based on boot-
strap percentile confidence intervals: ** 5% level; * 10% level.

Appendix M
Impact estimates of microcredit
borrowings on fractional
educational outcomes
Table M.1 Impact of microcredit borrowings on children education for borrowing
households, household-level outcome (fractional)
Proportion of girls age 5-18
in HH currently enrolled
Proportion of boys age 5-18
in HH currently enrolled
Pooled fractional
probit with CRE
OLS FE
Pooled fractional
probit with CRE
OLS FE
Household
microcredit
0.025 0.011 0.042 -0.008
(0.700) (0.817) (0.844) (0.579)
Women’s microcredit
0.034 0.011 0.058 -0.004
(0.913) (0.784) (1.078) (0.230)
Men’s microcredit
-0.038 0.008 -0.084 -0.036
(0.370) (0.254) (1.084) (1.395)
Village covariates yes yes yes yes
Village dummy variables no yes no yes
Number of observations 1,500 1,500 1,566 1,566
Note: Estimated effects of microcredit on school enrolment of children age 5-18. Outcome variable is
fractional. We use pooled fractional probit regressions with household-level correlated random effects
(CRE) and village covariates on a balanced sub-sample. ‘OLS FE’ stands for OLS with household fixed
effects. Actual coefficient estimates are very small in magnitude, so tables display coefficients multiplied
by 10,000. Absolute robust t-statistics in parentheses clustered at the household level. Significance levels:
*** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.
299

Appendix N
Quantile-Normal plots and
Normality tests for bootstrap
estimates from pooled probit
regressions
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302 Appendix N Normality of bootstrap estimates from pooled probit regressions
Figure N.1 Normality of bootstrap coefficient estimates on credit variables from
pooled probit regressions with endogenous regressors
(a) Panel A: Binary outcome
Dependent variable: girl in school (1=yes)
Dependent variable: boy in school (1=yes)
(b) Panel B: Fractional outcome
Dependent variable: proportion of girls in school
Dependent variable: proportion of boys in school
Note: Quantile-Normal plots of coefficient estimates on credit variables from pooled probit regressions
with endogenous regressors, following a control function approach with 1,000 bootstrap replications.
Quantiles of bootstrap coefficients (y-axis) are plotted against quantiles of the standard Normal distribu-
tion (x-axis). Below each plot are reported p-values from Shapiro-Wilk (S-W) and Shapiro-Francia (S-F)
normality tests. A p-value below conventional significance levels suggests a rejection of the null hypoth-
esis of normality.
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